• 


-  ^%ic.cJ^'^y^ 


ALUMNI  LIBRARY, 
I    THEOLOGICAL  SEMINARY,    | 

J  PRINCETON,  N.  J.  * 


-»  ©<^^9  e(^^9  S.^^3  S<^^S  5^^>?  5^p3>e -^ 

1^     case,  I 

I  Booh,  y^^p-^ 


<^  e<^^s&^^>€e 


i'Wi 


ON   THE 


PASSIONS. 


PHILOSOPHICAL    TREATISE 


ON   THE 


I^A&0ionM  X 


FROM    THE    LAST   LONDON    EDITION. 


By  T.  COGAN,  M.  D. 


Format  enim  Natura  prius  nos  intus  ad  omnem 
Fortunarum  habitum. — Hor  :  de  Arte  PoETlCA. 


BOSTON  : 

WELLS     AND    LILLY, COURT-STREET. 

1821. 


PREFACE. 


Amidst  the  numerous  Branches  of  Knowledge 
which  claim  the  attention  of  the  human  mind,  no 
one  can  be  more  important  than  that  which  con- 
stitutes the  subject  of  the  following  Treatise. 
Whatever  most  intimately  concerns  ourselves  must 
be  of  the  first  moment.  The  principle  of  self-love, 
which  is  inherent  in  our  nature,  immediately  sug- 
gests that  no  other  species  of  knowledge  can  stand 
in  competition  with  it.  Every  thing  is  justly 
deemed  interesting  which  has  an  immediate  re- 
lation to  ourselves  ;  and  the  degrees  of  its  impor- 
tance are  measured  by  the  degrees  of  its  influence 
upon  our  Well-being.  Therefore,  to  attend  to  the 
workings  of  our  own  minds  ;  to  trace  the  power 
which  external  objects  have  over  us ; — to  discover 
the  nature  of  our  emotions  and  affections ; — to 
comprehend  the  reason  of  our  being  affected  in  a 
particular  manner,  must  have  a  direct  influence 
upon  our  pursuits,  our  characters,  and  our  happi- 
ness. 


vi  PREFACE. 

It  may  with  justice  be  advanced,  that  the  history 
of  ourselves  m  this  department,  is  of  much  greater 
utility  than  abstruser  speculations  concerning  the 
metaphysical  nature  of  the  human  soul,  or  even 
the  most  accurate  knowledge  of  its  intellectual 
powers.  For  it  is  according  as  the  passions  and 
affections  are  excited ;  and  directed  towards  the 
objects  investigated  by  these  intellectual  powers, 
that  we  become  useful  to  ourselves  or  others  ;  that 
we  rise  into  respectability  or  sink  into  contempt ; 
that  we  diffuse  or  enjoy  happiness,  diffuse  or  suf- 
fer misery. 

An  accurate  Analysis  of  the  passions  and  affec- 
tions, is  to  the  Moralist,  what  the  science  of  Anato- 
my is  to  the  Surgeon.  It  constitutes  the  first  prin- 
ciples of  rational  practice.  It  is  in  a  moral  view, 
the  anatomy  of  the  heart.  It  discovers  why  it 
beats,  and  how  it  beats  ;  indicates  appearances  in  a 
sound  and  healthy  state ;  detects  diseases  with  their 
cause ;  and  it  is  infinitely  more  fortunate  in  the 
power  it  communicates  of  applying  suitable  reme- 
dies. 

Yet,  notwithstanding  the  superior  importance  of 
this  Science,  it  has  not  engaged  the  attention  of 
philosophers,  to  an  equal  degree  with  the  intel- 
lectual powers  of  man.     Those  who  are  conscious 


PREFACE.  vii 

of  the  acuteness  of  their  own  intellects,  have  loved 
to  employ  them  upon  subjects  the  most  difficult 
and  abstruse.  Their  chief  delight  has  been  in  the 
study  of  natures  and  essences ;  and  their  ambition, 
to  solve  difficulties  which  have  repeatedly  occupied 
and  embarrassed  the  strongest  minds.  Patient  at- 
tention to  facts  appears  to  them  an  employment 
best  adapted  to  plain  and  common  understandings  : 
it  is  the  province  of  Genius  to  soar  above  the  com- 
mon level,  and  penetrate  the  mists  which  surround 
the  regions  of  intellect. 

When  it  is  asserted  that  the  passions  of  the  mind 
have  not  employed  the  attention  of  the  philosophic 
world,  equally  with  the  other  branches  which  relate 
to  Man,  the  assertion  implies  that  they  have  not 
been  totally  neglected.  Philosophers,  in  their 
study  of  human  nature,  have  not  passed  them  over 
in  silence.  They  have  treated  them  occasionally, 
but  generally  speaking,  superficially  ;  chiefly  as  ap- 
pendages to  their  other  philosophical  pursuits. 
This  circumstance,  it  is  acknowledged,  has  been 
productive  of  a  train  of  thought  peculiar  to  each 
speculator ;  and  thus  has  each  been  able  to  throw 
some  light  upon  a  subject,  which  it  was  not  his 
5ole  or  primary  object  to  investigate. 


viji  PREFACE. 

Among  the  Authors  who  have  paid  the  most  at- 
tention to  the  subject,  Professor  Hutcheson,  Dr. 
Watts,  Mr.  Grove,  the  Writer  of  the  Article  "  on 
the  Passions  of  Men,"  in  the  British  Encyclopaedia, 
and  Mr.  Hume,  may  justly  be  placed  in  the  first 
rank.  The  observations  of  Mr.  Hutcheson  chiefly 
respect  the  moral  uses  of  the  Passions,  which  it  is 
not  the  professed  object  of  the  present  Treatise  to 
investigate.  Objections  to  some  of  the  principles 
advanced  by  Dr.  Watts,  and  Mr.  Grove,  as  well  as 
other  Writers  of  eminence,  are  stated  in  the  Intro- 
ductory Chapter,  and  will  occasionally  appear  in 
different  parts  of  this  Work.  It  will  therefore  be 
sufficient  to  remark  at  present,  that  the  very  small 
degree  of  information  obtained  respecting  many 
essential  points ;  the  imperfection  of  every  arrange- 
ment hitherto  pade  ;  the  almost  universal  disagree- 
ment among  philosophers,  in  their  ideas  concerning 
the  precise  nature  of  a  Passion,  Emotion,  and  Af- 
fection, or  in  what  respect  they  specifically  differ 
from  each  other,  &c.  were  the  principal  induce- 
ments to  the  Author  of  the  following  Treatise,  to 
pay  much  greater  attention  to  the  workings  of  the 
human  mind,  than  he  would  have  done,  had  their 
remarks  been  more  satisfactory.  In  order  to  find 
his  way  through  perplexing  labyrinths,  he  was  de- 


PREFACE.  ix 

termined  to  extend  the  analytical  method  much 
farther  than  it  has  hitherto  been  pursued  ;  from  a 
full  conviction  that,  although  it  is  not  in  general 
the  most  popular  and  acceptable  mode,  it  is  much 
the  securest,  and  best  adapted  to  procure  a  strength 
of  evidence,  in  philosophical,  moral,  and  religious 
subjects,  which  approaches  to  the  nature  of  demon- 
stration. 

The  Treatise  now  submitted  to  public  candour, 
contains  the  history  and  the  result  of  this  process ; 
in  which,  however  slow  and  tedious  the  steps,  the 
Author  has  been  frequently  relieved,  and  some- 
times amply  rewarded,  by  discoveries  which  ap- 
peared to  him  equally  new  and  important.  If 
they  should  appear  so  to  others,  he  will  feel  him- 
self completely  recompensed  for  his  labour. 

As  he  is  not  without  apprehensions  that  the 
analytical  part  will  appear  much  too  tedious  and 
prolix,  thus  he  fears  that  the  philosophical  observa- 
tions and  inquiries  will  appear  much  too  superfi- 
cial ;  but  he  would  remind  the  Reader  that  his  sole 
object  in  the  present  treatise,  is  to  give  an  epitome 
of  general  and  influential  principles,  and  not  to 
pursue  the  development  of  any  to  the  extent  of 
which  it  is  susceptible. 

2 


X  PREFACE. 

The  natural  consequences  of  this  immediate  ap- 
plication to  the  genuine  sources  of  knowledge, 
without  any  pre-conceived  hypothesis,  are,  that, 
in  some  instances,  the  author  has  traced  a  perfect 
coincidence  of  opinion  between  his  own  and  those 
of  preceding  Writers  on  the  Passions  ;  in  many, 
he  has  corrected  his  own  previous  ideas  ;  in  others, 
he  thinks  that  he  has  not  only  discovered  errors  in 
preceding  Writers,  but  also  the  causes  of  them. 
Wherever  the  subject  has  appeared  peculiarly  im- 
portant, the  discrepancy  great,  and  the  Authorities 
opposed,  respectable,  he  has  stated  the  subject,  and 
his  reasons  in  the  adjoined  Notes ;  that  the  conca- 
tenation of  ideas,  so  necessary  in  the  analytical 
method,  might  not  suffer  interruption. 

Notwithstanding  his  utmost  care,  the  Analyzer 
cannot  flatter  himself  that  nothing  of  importance 
has  escaped  his  attention.  Both  the  extent  and  in- 
tricacy of  the  subject  will,  it  is  hoped,  furnish  an 
apology  for  many  defects.  Nor  can  he  expect  that 
of  the  numerous  explanations  and  definitions  pro- 
posed, they  will  all  be  equally  acceptable  and  con- 
vincing. Some  of  them  will  probably  be  errone- 
ous. But  it  may  not  be  improper  to  remark,  that 
the  extraordinary  versatility  of  language  renders  it 
extremely  difficult  to  seize  the  precise  signification 


PREFACE.  xi 

of  terms,  in  every  connection  ;  and  this  will  some- 
times occasion  a  diversity  of  opinion,  in  cases 
where  a  criterion  cannot  always  be  found  to  which 
our  judgments  will  uniformly  submit.  If  the  Rea- 
der should  not  agree  with  him  in  the  precise  signi- 
fication of  particular  terms,  the  utmost  care  has 
been  taken  that  the  sense  in  which  the  Author  has 
used  them  shall  not  be  misunderstood  :  so  that  the 
principles  he  advances  must  either  enforce  convic- 
tion, or  lay  themselves  lully  open  to  confutation. 

The  copiousness  of  the  subject  has  principally 
confined  the  Work  before  us  to  a  philosophical  in- 
vestigation of  the  Passions.  Yet  in  these  abtruser 
investigations,  many  thoughts  occasionally  present 
themselves,  properly  belonging  to  the  departments 
of  Ethics^  and  requiring  a  larger  amplification  than 
would  be  consistent  with  the  design  of  the  present 
work.  The  Science  of  Ethics  opens  a  field  for 
contemplation  still  more  extensive.  Although  it 
has  so  frequently  engaged  the  attention  of  Moral- 
ists, it  appears  to  be  inexhaustible  ;  nor  ought  we 
to  despair  of  perpetual  additions  being  added  to 
our  stock  of  knowledge,  concerning  the  nature  and 
importance  of  our  duty. 


xii  PREFACE. 

The  decree  of  acceptance  with  which  this  Trea- 
tise has  been  received  by  the  Philosophic  World, 
encouraged  the  Author  to  prosecute  his  design,  and 
he  proceeded  to  consider  the  Passions  and  Affec- 
tions in  a  more  practical,  and  perhaps  still  more 
interesting  point  of  view.  The  apprehensions 
which  naturally  present  themselves,  lest  public  ex- 
pectation should  not  be  gratified,  by  much  novelty, 
on  a  subject  which  has  been  so  frequently  treated, 
are  in  some  measure  silenced  by  a  conviction  that 
his  attempts  will  be  received  with  an  indulgence 
similar  to  that  which  he  has  already  experienced. 

Although  attention  has  been  paid  in  these  subse- 
quent editions  to  several  minuter  corrections,  yet 
the  Author  has  been  reluctant  to  make  such  altera- 
tions in  them  as  might  depreciate  the  value  of  the 
preceding,  in  the  opinion  of  the  Purchasers.  The 
most  considerable  change  consists  in  the  divisions 
of  the  first  two  Chapters:  the  new  Arrangements, 
and  introductory  Emotions  being  placed  at  the 
commencement  of  the  second  Chapter  instead  of 
terminating  the  ^r5^ ;  by  which  he  thinks  that  a 
more  lucid  order  is  preserved.  Several  additions 
might  have  been  made,  but  as  these  could,  with 
equal  propriety,  be  inserted  in  a  future  Volume, 
that  mode  has  been  preferred. 


m. 


PART  I. 
ANALYSIS  OF  THE  PASSIONS. 

CHAPTER  I. 

GENERAL   VIEW   OF    THE    SUBJECT. 

Page 

Sect.  I.    On  Passions,  Emotions,  and  Affections ;   the   specific 

difference  between  them 17 

II.    Plans  of  Arrangement  examined         .         .         .        .31 

III.  Love  and  Hatred  ;  their  Nature      .         .  .         .        37 

IV.  Desire  and  Aversion  .        .         .        .         .        .47 

V.    Objects  of  Love  and  Hatred      •       .        .        .         .51 

CHAPTER  II. 

classification  of  the  passions   according  to  their  character- 
istic   DIFFERENCES. 

Sect.  I.     Efficient  Causes  of  the  Passions,  &c.  examined        .  Sb 

Sect.  II.  Introductory  Emotions 59 

Sect.  III.  Classification  of  the  Passions  and  Affections,  as  they 

respect  the  Selfish  or  the  Social  Principle        .         .  70 


CONTENTS. 


CLASS  I. 

Page 
PASSIONS     AND    AFFECTIONS,     WHICH   OWE     THEIR     ORIGIN    TO   THE 

PRINCIPLE    OF    SELF-LOVE 70 

Order  I.     passions  and  affections,  &c.  excited  by  the  idea 

OF  good         t 71 

Joy,  Gladness,  &c ibid 

Contentment 74 

Satisfaction          .....          .         .  ibid 

Complacency     .....,:»  75 

Pride,  &c 79 

Desire 81 

Hope 94 

Order  II.     passions  and  affections  excited  by  the  idea  of 

EVIL .  .       97 

1.  Sorrow 98 

Grief,  Melancholy,  &c.         .         .         i         .         .       .      99 
Patience,  Resignation,  Humility      ....      101 

2.  Fear 104 

Consternation,  Terror,  Dread,  Despair,  &c.  &e.         .      109 

3.  Anger 112 

Wrath,  Resentment,  Indignation,  &c.  &c.       .        .       116 

CLASS  n. 

PASSIONS  AND  AFFECTIONS  DERIVED  FROM  THE  SOCIAL  PRINCIPLE         121 

Order  I.     passions  and  affections,  in  which  good  is  the  pre- 
dominant IDEA  .  ,  .  .  .  .  127 

/ 1.  Benevolent  Desires  and  Dispositions         .  .  .  ibid 

1,  Social  Aflfections 128 

2.  Sympathetic  Affections          .          .          .         .  131 
II.  Affections  derived  from  Good  Opinion          .        .        .  143 

Gratitude 144 

Admiration 145 

Esteem,  Respect  ...  ...        151 

Veneration,  &c .         .152 

Fondness,  &c. 154 


CONTENTS.  XT 

Page 
Order  II.     passions  and  affections  in  which  evil  is  the  pre- 
dominant IDEA                  .                .                 ...  155 

I.  Malevolent  Desires  and  Dispositions  .  .  .  156 
Malignancy,  Envy,  Rancour,  Cruelty,  &c.  .  .  .  157 
Rage,  Revenge,  &c.  Suspicion,  Jealousy        .         .         .  164 

II.  Displacency  indicated  by  unfavourable  opinions      .         .  168 
Horror,  Indignation,  Contempt,  &c 169 

PART  II. 

PHItOSOPHICAIi  OBSERVATIONS  AND  INQ,UIRIES. 

CHAPTER  I. 

OBSERVATIONS  RESPECTING  THE  LAWS  OF  EXCITEMENT         .             .  180 

Observation  I.     Surprise  the  eflBcient  Cause  of  Passion        .  ibid 

II.  Affections  alone  permanent        .         .         .  182 

III.  Relations  of  Passions  and  Affections  to  each 
other 187 

IV.  Seat  of  the  Passions 199 

CHAPTER  II. 

CAUSES  WHICH    CREATE    A  DIVERSITY    IN  OUR  AFFECTIONS,    ENUME- 
RATED            212 

\     1.     Experience 213 

§     2.     Difference  of  Sex     ......  214 

§     3.     Diversity  of  Temperament         .         .         .  219 

§     4.     Progress  from  Infancy  to  Age        .         .         .  221 

§    5.     National  Customs         .....  224 

\     6,     Force  of  Habit 227 

§     7.     Self-Love 229 

§     8.     Education 231 

§    9.    Novelty .  234 

§  10.     Fashion 235 

§  11.     Love  of  Singularity 238 

§  12.     Popular  Prejudices 24Cf 

3  13.    Associated  Affections 242 


XVI 


CONTENTS. 


Page 
'q  14.  Manner  in  which  information  is  conveyed  .  247 
§15.  Imitative  Tones  and  Representations  .  250 
S  16.     Rhetoric,  Oratory,  Eloquence        .        .        .253 

§  17.     The  Drama ^^' 

§  18.     Pre-disposing  Causes      .        ...        .       .    258 

CHAPTER  III. 

INFLUENCE   OF   THE   PASSIONS. 

265 
Sect.  I.    Medical  Influence 

II     Influence  on  Thought  and  Language  .        .        .283 

292 

HI.     Influence  on  Character 

300 
IV.  Influence  on  Happiness       .        .        •         •        •        -    -^ 


PART  I. 


CHAPTER  I. 

GENERAL   VIEW    OF    THE    SUBJECT. 
SECTION  r. 

ON   PASSIONS,    EMOTIONS,    AND   AFFECTIONS  ;    THE    SPECIFIC   DIFFER" 
ENCE    BETWEEN    THEM. 

JtfY  Passions,  emotions,  and  affections,  we  under- 
stand those  stronger  or  weaker  feelings,  with  their 
correspondent  effects  upon  the  system,  which  are 
excited  within  us,  by  the  perception  or  contempla- 
tion of  certain  qualities,  which  belong,  or  are  sup- 
posed to  belong,  to  the  objects  of  our  attention ; 
and  which,  in  some  respect  or  other,  appear  inte- 
resting to  us.  In  all  cases,  when  the  violence  of 
the  emotion  is  not  too  powerful  for  the  animal  oeco- 
my,  the  feelings  or  sensations  excited,  are  pleasant 
or  unpleasant,  according  to  the  nature  of  the  excit- 
ing cause,  the  ideas  entertained  of  it,  or  the  intense- 
ness  with  which  the  mind  is  struck  by  it.  These 
feelings  differ  in  degrees  of  strength,  according  to 
the  apparent  importance  of  their  cause  ;  according 
to  certain  peculiarities  of  temperament ;  and  also 

3 


18  PASSIONS. 

according  to  the  manner  in  which  the  influential 
qualities  are  presented  to  the  mind. 

One  or  other  of  the  three  terms,  Passion,  Emo- 
tion, Affection,  is  always  employed  to  express 
the  sensible  effects  which  objects,  or  ideas  concern- 
ing them,  have  upon  the  mind ;  but  they  are  so  fre- 
quently employed  in  a  vague  and  indeterminate 
manner,  that  some  difficulty  attends  the  attempt  to 
restore  them  to  their  precise  and  discriminating  sig- 
nifications. 

The  word,  Passion,  is  thus  rendered  subject  to 
several  peculiarities,  in  the  application  of  it.  Some- 
times it  is  used  in  a  generic  sense,  as  expressive  of 
every  impression  made  upon  the  mind.  When  we 
speak  of  the  passions  in  general,  or  of  a  treatise  on 
the  passions,  we  mean  not  to  express  the  stronger 
impressions  alone,  the  mildest  affections  are  also  in- 
cluded ;  and  if  we  denominate  any  one  to  be  a  per- 
son of  strong  passions,  we  mean  that  he  is  subject 
to  violent  transports  of  joy,  or  grief,  or  anger,  &c. 
indiscriminately.  In  one  instance  the  word  is  em- 
phatically employed  to  express  suffering ;  as  our 
Saviour'' s  passion  :  in  another  it  indicates  anger  ex- 
clusively ;  thus  when  it  is  said  of  any  one  that  he  is 
in  a  passion,  it  is  universally  understood  that 
he  is  very  angry.  The  lexva passion,  and  its  adverb 
passionately,  often  express  a  very  strong  predilection 
for  any  pursuit,  or  object  of  taste  ;  a  kind  of  enthu- 
siastic fondness  for  any  thing.  Thus  we  remark 
that  a  person  has  a  passion  for  music,  or  that  he  is 
passionately  fond  of  painting,  &c.  &c.     In  a  sense 


PASSIONS.  19 

similar  to  this,  is  the  word  also  applied  to  every 
propensity,  which  operates  strongly  and  permanent- 
ly upon  the  mind  ;  as  the  selfish  passions,  the  gene- 
rous  passions.  Yet  when  we  mean  to  particularize 
any  of  these,  a  different  law  of  phraseology  is  ob- 
served. The  word  passion  is  appropriated  by  the 
evil  propensities  which  are  uniformly  operative. 
Thus  we  do  not  say,  the  affection  of  pride,  or  of 
avarice,  but  the  passion.  The  term,  affection,  on 
the  other  hand,  is  appropriated  by  the  virtuous  pro- 
pensities ;  as  the  social,  friendly,  parental,  filial, 
affections,  &:c.  though  philosophically  considered, 
the  relation  they  bear  to  the  state  and  workings  of 
the  mind,  is  perfectly  analogous. 

Nor  is  this  capricious  latitude  of  expression  con- 
fined to  common  language,  where  accuracy  is  not 
always  to  be  expected  ;  it  is  also  obvious  among 
philosophers  themselves,  so  that  scarcely  two 
authors,  who  have  written  upon  the  subject  of 
the  passions,  are  agreed  in  their  ideas  of  the 
terms  they  employ.  While  some  consider  the  emo- 
tions as  highly  turbulent,  others  assert  that  they 
are  in  their  own  nature  quiescent  :* — Some  sup- 
pose a  Passion  to  constitute  the  strength  of  an 
emotion  ;  others  confine  the  idea  of  a  passion  to 
the  desire  which  follows  an  emotion : — Others 
again  represent  the  Passions  as  the  calmest  things 
in  nature,  deeming  them  to  be  the  steady  uniform 
principles  of  action,  to  which  reason  itself  is  always 

*  Lord  Kaims. 


20  PASSIONS. 

subservient.*  Hence  it  becomes  highly  necessary 
to  seek  after  some  rules,  which  may  render  our 
ideas  more  consistent  and  uniform. 

In  most  of  these  applications,  no  attention  has 
been  paid  to  the  primitive  signification  of  the  word 
Passion ;  although  this  appears  to  be  the  safest 
method  to  recall  us  from  those  aberrations  to  which 
we  are  perpetually  exposed.  Few  expressions 
wander  so  far  from  their  original  import,  as  to  con- 
vey a  sense  which  is  totally  foreign.  The  primary 
idea  annexed  to  the  word  is  that  of  passiveness,  or 
being  impulsively  acted  upon.  In  this  sense  the 
term  properly  signifies  the  sensible  effect,  the  feel- 
ing to  which  the  mind  is  become  subjected,  when 
an  object  of  importance,  suddenly  and  imperiously, 
demands  its  attention.  If  our  imaginations  be 
lively,  our  temperaments  susceptible,  the  object  in- 
teresting to  us,  we  cannot  avoid  being  affected,  or 
sufferino;  some  powerful  change  in  our  dispositions, 
by  its  recent  appearance,  or  by  the  suggestion  of  a 
something  we  deem  of  importance.  In  all  such 
cases  we  are  obviously  passive ;  we  are  acted  upon 
without  any  previous  determination  of  the  will,  or 
without  any  consent  of  our  own. 

As  several  of  our  passions  are  of  a  disagreeable 
and  painful  nature,  and  as  this  passive  or  helpless 
state  is  so  frequently  connected  with  suffering,  the 
transition  from  one  signification  to  the  other,  is  not 
only  natural  but  almost  inevitable  ;  and  Passion 
will  often  be  considered  as  synonymous  with  Suf- 

*  Mr,  Hume. 


PASSIONS.  21 

fering.  In  medical  language,  a  person  oppressed 
with  disease  is  called  a  Patient,  an  involuntary  suf- 
ferer, and  the  calmness  with  which  he  submits  is 
termed  patience  ;  that  is,  the  mind  yields  with  tran- 
quillity to  the  pains  and  indispositions  of  the  body. 
The  word.  Pathology,  has  also  the  same  derivation : 
it  is  the  history  of  the  sufferings  incident  to  the  hu- 
man frame.  The  Greeks  expressed  passions  in 
general  by  TraOoc,  which  signifies  suffering ;  and  the 
Latin  word  Passio,  from  which  we  have  adopted 
the  term  passion,  has  the  same  signification.  The 
Stoics  also  gave  the  name  of  vrcc^y]  to  all  extraordi- 
nary emotions  of  the  soul,  because  they  considered 
them  as  mental  diseases,  by  which  the  soul,  while 
under  their  influence,  was  reduced  to  a  state  of  suf- 
fering. But  this  secondary  sense,  as  far  as  it  con- 
veys the  idea  of  an  unpleasant  or  painful  sensa- 
tion, is  alone  applicable  to  the  effects  produced  by 
passions  of  a  certain  class  ;  for  others  are  in  their 
own  nature  pleasing ;  as  joy  and  hope :  whereas 
the  primitive  import  of  the  word,  that  of  passive- 
ness,  equally  belongs  to  them  all.  The  mind  is 
equally  passive  in  every  effect  suddenly  and  unex- 
pectedly produced  upon  it,  whether  its  influence  be 
of  a  pleasant,  or  unpleasant  nature.  (See  Note  A.) 
The  term.  Passion,  therefore,  may  with  strict  pro- 
priety be  used,  and  used  exclusively,  to  represent 
the  first  feeling,  the  percussion  as  it  were,  of  which 
the  mind  is  conscious  from  some  impulsive  cause ; 
by  which  it  is  wholly  acted  upon,  without  any'  ef- 
forts of  its  own,  either  to  solicit  or  escape  the  im- 
pression. 


§2  EMOTIONS. 

Probably  it  is  in  allusion  to  this  passive  state  of 
the  mind,  that  the  terms  passion^  and  passionately, 
are  employed  to  express  the  powerful  attachment 
to  particular  objects  mentioned  above.  They  insi- 
nuate that  the  influence  of  these  beloved  objects, 
is  irresistible  ;  and  that  the  mind  is  completely  un- 
der their  dominion. 

The  state  of  absolute  passiveness,  in  conse- 
quence of  any  sudden  percussion  of  mind,  is  of 
short  duration.  The  strong  impression,  or  vivid 
sensation,  immediately  produces  a  reaction  corres- 
pondent to  its  nature,  either  to  appropriate  and  en- 
joy, or  to  avoid  and  repel  the  exciting  cause.  This 
reaction  is  very  properly  distinguished  by  the  term 
Emotion.  The  sensible  effect  produced  at  the 
first  instant,  by  the  cause  of  the  passion,  greatly 
agitates  the  frame ;  its  influence  is  immediately 
communicated  to  the  whole  nervous  system,  and 
the  commotions  excited  in  that,  indicate  themselves 
by  attitudes  and  motions  of  the  body,  and  by  par- 
ticular expressions  of  countenance.  These  effects 
are  such  universal  concomitants,  that  no  very  im- 
portant change  in  the  state  of  the  mind  can  take 
place,  without  some  visible  change,  of  a  corres- 
pondent nature,  in  the  animal  oeconomy. 

Emotions  therefore,  according  to  the  genuine 
signification  of  the  word,  are  principally  and  primi- 
tively applicable  to  the  sensible  changes  and  visible 
effects,  which  particular  passions  produce  upon  the 
frame,  in  consequence  of  this  reaction,  or  particu- 


EMOTIONS.  £3 

lar  agitation  of  mind.  It  is  alone  by  these  visible 
effects  that  the  subject  is  discovered  to  be  under  the 
influence  of  any  passion ;  and  it  is  alone  by  the 
particular  changes  produced,  or  kind  of  emotion, 
that  we  are  enabled  to  judge  of  the  nature  of  the 
passion.  Thus,  although  the  passion  exists  prior 
to  the  emotions,  yet  as  these  are  its  external  signs, 
they  must  indicate  its  continued  influence,  as  long 
as  they  continue  to  agitate  the  system.  In  conse- 
quence of  this  immediate  connection,  the  words 
passions  and  emotions,  are,  in  familiar  discourse, 
where  no  philosophical  precision  is  requisite,  used 
synonymously ;  though,  in  reality,  the  latter  are 
uniformly  the  effects  of  the  former.  Here,  as  in 
innumerable  other  instances,  figurative  modes  of 
expression  are  adopted.  The  Synecdoche  is  per- 
petually employed,  by  which,  cause  and  effect  are 
confounded,  or  substituted  the  one  for  the  other. 
Since  emotions  are  faithful  indications  of  their 
correspondent  passions,  and  strong  passions  are 
always  productive  of  emotions,  we  should  deem  it 
a  pedantic  precision  to  select,  at  all  times,  the  ap- 
propriate word,  when  we  mean  simply  to  express 
the  general  effect. 

However,  the  term  Emotion  is  sometimes  ex- 
pressive of  lively  sensations  which  do  not  produce 
visible  effects,  in  any  degree  proportionate  to  their 
feelings.  In  emotions  the  mind  is  not  so  complete- 
ly, or  necessarily  passive.  In  general  it  possesses 
some  power  over  the  external  signs ;  and  in  many 


24  AFFECTIONS. 

cases,  where  the  feelings  would  be  too  strong  to  re- 
main concealed,  were  they  totally  void  of  controul, 
some  other  influential  affection,  either  of  fear,  re- 
spect, humanity,  &c.  may  serve  to  repress  or  mo- 
derate their  effects,  and  confine  them  to  inward 
emotions. 

Again,  the  term  is  frequently  employed  to  mark 
the  first  impression,  which  particular  objects  make 
upon  susceptible  minds,  whether  they  remain  con- 
cealed or  not.  Thus  in  the  fine  Arts,  the  charms 
of  musical  compositions  which  are  novel  to  us ; — 
the  first  view  of  a  gallery  of  paintings  possessing 
distinguished  merit ; — the  surprise  of  a  beautiful  or 
elevated  sentiment,  or  poetic  description,  will  gene- 
rally make  a  more  vivid  impression  upon  us,  than 
that  which  is  felt  in  a  continued,  or  renewed  con- 
templation of  the  same  subjects  ;  and  yet  these  im- 
pressions may  not  be  so  forcible  as  to  produce  the 
transports  accompanying  emotions  from  other 
causes.  But  the  difference  is  simply  in  degree,  not 
in  kind.  This  species  of  enjoyment  is  peculiar  to 
minds  highly  cultivated,  whose  repeated  enjoy- 
ments of  a  similar  nature  have  gradually  moderated 
transports,  and  whose  emotions  have  gradually  sub- 
sided into  gentler  undulations,  if  I  may  thus  ex- 
press myself,  in  place  of  those  agitations  which  the 
inexperienced  would  inevitably  betray  upon  similar 
occasions. 

The  third  term.  Affection,  has,  in  itself,  a  differ- 
ent signification  from  either  of  the  above.    It  always 


AFFECTIONS.  25 

represents  a  less  violent,  and  generally  a  more  dura- 
ble influence,  which  things  have  upon  the  mind. 
It  is  applicable  to  the  manner  in  which  we  are 
affected  by  them  for  a  continuance.  It  supposes  a 
more  deliberate  predilection  and  aversion,  in  con- 
sequence of  the  continued  influence  of  some  pre- 
vailing quality.  This  distinguishes  it  from  the 
transient  impulse  of  Passion.  Nor  is  it  intimately 
connected  with  any  external  signs ;  which  distin- 
guishes it  from  Emotions.  The  affections  some- 
times succeed  to  passions  and  emotions,  because 
these  may  have  been  excited  by  something  which 
becomes  permanently  interesting ;  or  they  may  be 
gradually  inspired,  by  a  deliberate  attention  to  the 
good  or  bad  qualities  of  their  objects. 

In  this  philosophic  sense  of  the  word.  Affection 
is  applicable  to  an  unpleasant  as  well  as  a  pleasant 
state  of  the  mind,  when  impressed  by  any  object 
or  quality.  It  may  be  produced  by  whatever  tor- 
ments or  corrodes  the  heart,  as  well  as  that  which 
charms  and  delights  it.  Usage,  however,  chiefly 
applies  the  word  to  the  kindly  and  beneficent  af- 
fections. When  we  remark  that  a  person  has  an 
affectionate  heart,  we  mean  to  applaud  his  being 
under  the  influence  of  the  best  affections,  of  a  social 
and  relative  nature. 

With  other  Writers  on  the  Passions,  we  shall 
always  use  the  term  in  the  philosophical  sense ; 
and  apply  it  equally  to  whatever  produces  more 
permanent  feelings  in  the  mind,  whether  they  be 

4 


86  AFFECTIOI^S. 

pleasing  or  painful,  of  a  benevolent  or  malevolent 
character. 

As  in  Passions  and  Emotions,  thus  in  the  Affec- 
tions, several  gradations  of  influence  are  observa- 
ble. Some  affections  indicate  themselves  so  strong- 
ly, that  they  approach  to  emotions ;  some  may  re- 
quire a  penetrating  eye  to  discover  them ; — some 
may  be  powerfully  indulged  with  such  self  com- 
mand, that  they  shall  elude  the  most  critical  obser- 
vation ; — and  some  have  such  an  equal  and  uniform 
influence,  as  to  blend,  as  it  were,  with  the  temper, 
and  almost  lose  the  name  of  affection  ;  as  generosi- 
ty, fortitude,  humility,  patience,  resignation. 

When  there  is  a  propensity  to  indulge  one  par- 
ticular affection,  or  class  of  affections,  more  than 
another,  arising  from  peculiarity  of  temperament, 
education,  connections,  habits,  &c.  we  consider  this 
propensity  as  an  indication  of  Temper  or  habitual 
Disposition.  Thus  we  speak  of  a  benevolent, 
grateful,  cheerful,  timorous,  revengeful  temper. 
These  characters  do  not  imply,  that  the  subject  is 
perpetually  under  the  influence  of  the  particular  af- 
fection, but  they  mark  his  propensity  towards  it. 
The  Affections  therefore  refer  to  the  actual  impres- 
sion made  upon  the  mind  by  certain  qualities,  real 
or  supposed  ;  and  the  Temper  or  Disposition  is  that 
particular  cast  of  mind,  which  renders  the  percep- 
tion of  certain  qualities  capable  of  making  a  more 
prompt,  or  a  more  durable  impression  upon  one  per- 
son than  upon  another.     We  deem  that  man  to  be 


PASSIONS,  &c.  27 

irascible,  who  is  disposed  to  be  angry  at  trifles ; 
and  him  we  praise  as  humane,  who  is  always  dis- 
posed to  commiserate  sufferings. 

It  is  hoped  that  the  above  explanations  of  the 
terms,  Passions,  Emotions,  and  Affections,  will  ob- 
tain the  approbation  of  philosophic  Readers,  since 
they  were  suggested  to  the  Author  by  an  attention 
to  the  workings  of  the  human  mind.     If  approved, 
they  cannot  appear  unimportant,  as  they  will  serve 
to  indicate  both  mutual  relations  and  characteristic 
differences,  in  the  impressions  which  surrounding 
objects,  or  ideas  concerning  them,  make  upon  us ; 
and  although  an  attention  to  these  minute  distinc- 
tions may  not  always  be  necessary  in  common  lan- 
guage, and  would  sometimes  be  absurd,  yet  the 
want  of  precision  has  always  been  severely  felt  in 
philosophical  investigations,  and  is  a  principal  cause 
of  the  obscurities  in  which  they  are  too  frequently 
involved.     It  will  be  allowed  by  every  attentive 
observer,  that  the  process  which  we  have  charac- 
terized by  the  above  terms,  does  take  place  in  the 
human  mind,  when   exposed  to   the  sudden  and 
powerful  influence   of  particularly  interesting  ob- 
jects.    Such  objects  are  irresistibly  forced  upon  his 
attention,  independent  of  a  will  or  determination  of 
his  own  ;  they  often  produce  great  agitations  both 
of  mind  and  body  ;  and  when  these  agitations  have 
subsided,  the  mind  retains  some  degree  of  predilec- 
tion or  aversion  for  them.     As  these  distinctions 
are  clearly  and  satisfactorily  expressed,  by  the  par- 


28  AFFECTIOHS, 

ticiilar  terms  we  have  given  to  each,  this  is  a  full 
indication  that  they  are  the  most  appropriate.  (See 
Note  B.) 

The  above  observations  are  not  confined  to  a. 
simple  process,  which  takes  place  from  more  sim- 
ple causes.  After  we  have  supposed  a  passion,  in- 
dicated by  an  emotion,  to  be  succeeded  by  some 
correspondent  affection,  we  may  still  consider  this 
affection  as  the  parent  of  new  passions,  emotions, 
and  affections,  according  to  the  variety  of  circum- 
stances connected  with  it.  It  may  inspire  fear,  as 
when  the  object  of  our  affection  is  in  a  perilous 
state  ;  it  may  excite  earnest  desire,  or  sanguine 
hope.  Some  of  these  new  passions  and  affections 
will  arouse  to  action  ;  as  when  the  strong  sense  of 
an  injury  excites  to  revenge  :  others  chill  and  de- 
press the  spirits,  as  sorrow  and  despair.  Yet  in 
the  midst  of  all  these  diversities,  the  characteristic 
differences  between  Passions,  Emotions,  and  Affec- 
tions, are  equally  obvious. 

Confining  ourselves,  therefore,  to  what  we  deem 
the  genuine  import  of  the  words,  in  opposition  to 
the  irregularities  of  custom,  we  shall,  as  often  as 
it  may  be  necessary  to  observe  distinctions,  uniform- 
ly apply  the  term  Passion^  to  the  violent  impression 
made  upon  our  minds,  by  the  perception  of  some- 
thing very  striking  and  apparently  interesting; 
Emotion,  to  the  external  maiks,  or  visible  changes 
produced  by  the  impetus  of  the  passion  upon  the 
corporeal  system  ;  and  Affections^  to  the  less  vio^ 


APPETITES.  29 

lent,  more  deliberate,  and  more  permanent  impres- 
sions by  causes  which  appear  sufficiently  interest- 
ing. The  range  of  affection,  may  be  from  those 
stronger  feelings  which  are  proximate  to  emotions, 
to  the  mildest  sensations  of  pleasure  or  displeasure 
we  can  possibly  perceive. 

Most  writers  on  the  Pathology  of  the  mind, 
agree  to  distinguish  between  Appetites  and  Pas-, 
sions.  The  former  they  refer  to  corporeal  wants, 
each  of  which  creates  its  correspondent  desire  ;  and 
the  indulgence  of  this  desire  is  termed  Gratifica- 
tion. The  latter  they  ascribe  immediately  to  the 
Mind.  In  this  the  Moderns  differ  from  the  An- 
cients. The  word  Appetitus,  from  which  that  of 
Appetite  is  derived,  is  applied  by  the  Romans  and 
Latinists,  to  desires  in  general,  whether  they  prima- 
rily related  to  the  body  or  not :  and  with  obvious 
propriety ;  for  the  primitive  signification  is,  the  seek- 
ing after  whatever  may  conduce  either  to  Gratifi- 
cation or  Happiness.  Thus  Cicero  observes, 
"Motus  animorum  duplices  sunt;  alteri,  cogita- 
"  tionis  ;  alteri  Appetitus.  Cogitatio  in  vero 
"  exquirendo  maxime  versatur  ;  Appetitus  impellit 
"  ad  agendum."  By  two  powers  of  action  being 
thus  placed  in  contrast  to  each  other,  and  the  one 
applied  to  thought  simply,  it  is  obvious  that  the 
other  comprehends  every  species  of  desire,  whether 
of  a  mental  or   corporeal  nature.     Metaphysicians 


30  APPETITES. 

also,  who  have  written  in  the  Latin  language,  use 
the  word  Appetitus  in  the  same  latitude. 

The  modern  distinction  has  the  advantage  of  im- 
mediately pointing  out  a  difference  in  the  nature 
and  character  of  the  objects  which  interest  us,  ac- 
cording as  they  relate  to  the  body  or  to  the  mind. 
But  although  we  shall  consider  the  appetites  as 
confined  to  corporeal  wants  and  cravings,  we  must 
still  observe  that  they  are  as  frequently  the  occasions 
of  passions  and  emotions,  as  other  objects  which  are 
peculiarly  adapted  to  the  mind.  Eager  hope,  joy, 
fear,  anger,  are  daily  manifested  by  the  Infant, 
whose  desires  are  wholly  confined  to  animal  wants : 
and  the  keenest  sensations  of  anger,  jealousy, 
envy,  &;c.  are  intimately  connected  with  the  carnal 
Appetites  of  maturer  age.  Whatever  is  therefore 
beyond  the  mere  instinctive  appetite,  becomes  the 
province  of  the  mind  ;  and  the  influence  which 
various  cravings  of  nature  have  upon  its  ideas  and 
conceptions,  give  rise  to  mental  affections  and  pas- 
sions. The  subject  of  the  present  discussion  obvi- 
ously relates  to  these,  without  requiring  particular 
attention  to  the  existing  cause. 


ARRANGEMENTS  EXAMINED.  31 

SECTION  II. 

PLANS   OF  ARRANGEMENT   EXAMINED. 

So  numerous  and  multifarious  are  the  Passions, 
Affections,  and  Emotions,  in  their  connections 
and  ramifactions,  that  it  is  difficult  to  propose  a 
plan  of  Arrangement,  which  shall  be,  in  every 
respect,  unexceptionable.  By  preferring  one  meth- 
od, we  may  be  deprived  of  some  advantages  at- 
tending another  ;  and  in  all,  it  may  be  necessary 
to  anticipate  many  things,  which  a  rigid  attention 
to  order  could  not  possibly  permit.  Some  Wri- 
ters on  the  Passions,  have  placed  them  in  contrast 
to  each  other,  as  hope  andye^r,  joy  and  sorrow : — 
Some  have  considered  them  as  they  are  personal, 
relative,  social  :— Some  according  to  their  influ- 
ence at  different  periods  of  life  : — Others  accord- 
ing as  they  relate  to  past,  present,  or  future  time  ; 
as  sorrow  principally  refers  to  things  past,  joy  and 
anger  to  present  scenes,  hope  and  fear  respect 
futurity. 

The  Academicians  advanced  that  the  principal 
passions  were  fear,  hope,  joy,  and  grief.  Thus 
Virgil : 

Hinc  metuunt^  cupiunt,  gaudentque,  dolentque. 

They  included  aversion  and  despair  under  the 
fourth  ;  and  hope,  fortitude,  and  anger,  under  de- 
sire. But  not  to  observe  that  this  arrangement  is 
much  too  general  in  some  respects,  and  defective  in 


32  ARRANGEMENTS  EXAMINED. 

Others  ; — that  the  characters  of  hope  and  of  anger 
are  too  opposite  to  each  other,  to  be  placed  under 
the  same  head  ; — that  anger  has  no  particular 
claim  to  be  classed  with  desire,  excepting  when  it 
excites  a  desire  of  revenge,  which  is  not  always  the 
case ; — and  that  desire  is  so  comprehensive  a  term 
as  to  embrace  numberless  other  affections  ; — not  to 
insist  upon  these  objections,  it  is  manifest  that  the 
passions  enumerated  cannot  be  primitive  or  cardi- 
nal, since  some  other  affections  or  passions  must 
be  prior  to  them :  We  must  love,  or  hate,  before  we 
can  either  desire,  rejoice,  or  fear,  or  grieve. 

Dr.  Hartley  has  arranged  the  Passions  under 
five  grateful,  and  five  ungrateful  ones.  The  grate- 
ful ones,  are  love,  desire,  hope,  joy,  and  pleasing 
recollection  ;  the  ungrateful  are  hatred,  aversion, 
fear,  grief,  displeasing  recollection.  The  objec- 
tions to  this  order  are,  that  all  these  cannot  be  con- 
sidered as  cardinal  passions.  Love  must  precede 
desire,  hope,  and  joy  ;  and  hatred  must  precede 
fear.  Nor  do  the  distinctions  themselves  appear 
sufficiently  accurate.  Hope  is  certainly  a  species 
of  desire  ;  pleasing  recollection  is  a  modification 
of  love ;  aversion  is  only  a  particular  manner  of 
testifying  hatred  ;  and  displeasing  recollections'  are 
sometimes  the  renewal  of  grief,  sometimes  of 
anger. 

Dr.  Watts  divides  the  Passions  into  primitive 
and  derivative.  The  primitive  he  subdivides  into 
two  ranks  :  1.  Admiration,  love,  and  hatred  ;  2. 


ARRANGEMENTS  EXAMINED.  33 

The  diverse  kinds  of  love  and  hatred,  as  esteem, 
contempt,  benevolence,  malevolence,  complacency, 
displacency.  The  derivatives  are  desire,  aversion, 
hope,  fear,  gratitude,  anger,  &.c. 

But  the  title  of  Admiration  to  be  considered  as 
a  primitive  passion,  does  not  appear  to  be  so  valid 
as  that  of  the  other  tw^o  associated  with  it.  Love 
and  hatred  are  in  universal  exercise  ;  Admiration 
is  merely  occasional.  The  former  indicate  them- 
selves from  the  instant  we  have  any  powers  of  dis- 
cernment, or  the  smallest  degree  of  experience, 
respecting  the  nature  of  .objects  ;  the  latter  is  the 
result  of  some  degree  of  knowledge :  it  implies  a 
spirit  of  inquiry  ;  and  demands  some  portion  of 
taste  for  particular  qualities,  adapted  to  excite  this 
emotion.  Minds  the  most  infantile,  and  unculti- 
vated, will  manifest  that  they  love  and  hate,  long 
before  they  have  an  opportunity  of  testifying  their 
admiration.  We  might  also  observe,  that  a  subdi- 
vision of  the  primitive  passions  into  two  ranks 
creates  a  suspicion,  if  it  do  not  fully  indicate,  that 
they  cannot  all  be  equally  primitive  ;  and  the  in- 
stances given  under  the  second  rank,  may  justly  be 
considered  as  different  modifications  of  the  two 
grand  principles,  and  not  as  primitives  of  a  distinct 
character.  It  is  farther  obvious,  that  the  Doctor's 
plan  makes  no  distinction  between  the  Passions 
and  Affections,  which  the  nature  of  the  subject  not 
only  admits  but  requires. 
5 


S4  ARRANGEMENTS  EXAJVIINED. 

Mr.  Grove,  adopting  in  part,  the  arrangement 
of  Dr.  Watts,  reduces  all  the  passions  to  the  three 
heads  of  admiration,  love,  and  hatred  ;  which  he 
styles  accordingly,  the  primitive  passions.  The 
others  he  denominates  mixed  passions  ;  which  he 
describes  to  he  those  which  have  admiration  blend- 
ed with  them,  and  those  compounded  of  the  pas- 
sions that  fall  under  love  and  hatred.  As  the 
above  remarks  are  no  less  applicable  to  this  arrange- 
ment, I  shall  only  observe,  that  since  Mr.  Grove 
has  defined  admiration  to  be  "  Thatsuddea  surprise 
"  at  the  novelty  of  an  object,  by  which  the  soul  is 
"  fastened  down  to  the  contemplation  of  it,"  there 
seems  to  be  a  peculiar  impropriety  in  his  placing  it 
among  the  primitive  passions  :  and  this  improprie- 
ty is  increased  by  another  observation  which  he 
makes,  viz.  that  "  Admiration  seems  to  be  a  more 
*'  speculative  passion,  as  being  employed  chiefly 
"  about  the  novelty  or  grandeur  of  objects."  For 
which  reason  he  places  the  chief  energy  of  this 
passion,  "  in  the  6mm,"  which  he  denominates 
"  the  grand  instrument,  or  condition  rather,  of 
^'  thought  and  contemplation."  He  adds,  "  in  the 
"  other  passions,  which  respecting  the  good  or  evil 
"  of  objects,  proceed  from  a  principle  of  self-pre- 
"  servation,  the  spirits  agitated  are  in  the  heart,  the 
"  fountain  of  life,  and  fittest  residence  of  those 
"  motions  of  the  animal  spirits,  which  are  intended 
"  for  the  benefit  and  preservation  of  life."* 

*  Ses  System  of  Moral  Philosopliy  ;   Chap,  VII.  of  the  Passion-;. 


ARRANGEMENTS  EXAMINED.  35 

These  observations  certainly  increase  the  diffi-= 
culty  of  admitting  admiration  among  the  primitive 
passions.  It  may  also  be  justly  doubted  vi^hether 
the  author's  ideas  of  the  nature  of  admiration  be 
always  admissible.  But  this  is  not  the  place  to 
discuss  that  point. 

The  above  comments  upon  the  most  material 
arrangements  which  have  hitherto  been  followed, 
render  some  other  classification  desirable,  which 
may  be  exempt  from  similar  objections.  Perhaps 
the  securest  method  to  obtain  this  end,  will  be 
previously  to  recollect,  what  is  the  first  and  leading 
principle  of  our  nature ;  and  then  enquire  what 
are  the  necessary  consequences  of  this  principle,  in 
beings  formed  as  we  are,  placed  in  various  situa- 
tions, and  surrounded  by  an  infinite  variety  of 
circumstances.  By  thus  attending  to  the  history 
of  the  human  mind,  and  tracing  the  manner  in 
which  it  is  affected  by  various  causes,  a  proper 
arrangement  may  present  itself.  We  shall,  at  least, 
avoid  those  mistakes  and  embarrassments,  into 
which  men  of  eminence  have  been  betrayed,  by 
pursuing  other  methods. 

It  will  be  universally  acknowledged,  that  it  is 
essential  to  the  nature  of  every  sensitive  and 
intelligent  being,  to  be  gratified  with,  or  delight  in 
Well-being.  This  is  so  evident  a  principle,  that 
the  contrary  cannot  be  supposed  for  a  moment. 
Both   reason  and  feeling  unite  to  establish  this 


36  ARRANGEMENTS  EXAMINED. 

axiom.  We  all  feel  the  inestimable  value  of 
happiness,  and  we  all  know  that  to  delight  in 
misery,  is  a  contradiction  :  it  would  be  to  annihi- 
late misery.     (See  Note  C.) 

This  Well-being,  or  grateful  state  of  existence, 
we  unite  to  denominate  an  essential  Good ;  and  its 
opposite  an  essential  Evil.  Whatever  promotes 
this  state,  we  deem  to  be  productive  of  good ; 
whatever  is  an  impediment  to  it,  or  occasions  a 
state  of  uneasy  sensation,  we  consider  as  productive 
of  evil. 

These  ideas  naturally  lead  us  to  esteem  that  as 
a  Good  also,  which  is  productive  of  this  desirable 
state ;  and  to  characterize  as  an  Evil,  whatever  is 
inimical  to  it.  Cause  and  effect  are  so  intimately 
connected  in  our  imagination,  that  we  not  only 
substitute  the  one  for  the  other,  by  a  figurative 
mode  of  speaking,  but  we  quickly  learn  to  con- 
sider that  as  a  good  in  itself,  which  appears  uni- 
formly to  be  the  means  or  instrument  of  good ; 
and  «to  contemplate  as  an  Evil,  whatever  we 
suspect  to  have  a  pernicious  tendency.  Under  the 
impression  of  this  sentiment,  we  indulge  a  predi- 
lection for  the  one,  and  feel  an  abhorrence  of  the 
other. 

It  is  impossible  for  the  attentive  and  considerate 
mind  to  view  or  contemplate  objects  so  diametri- 
cally opposite  as  apparent  Good,  or  apparent  Evil, 
either  with  total  indifference,  or  with  the  same 


LOVE  AND  HATRED.  m 

kind  of  sensation.  We  inevitably  look  upon  what 
we  deem  to  be  a  Good,  or  conducive  to  happiness, 
with  a  pleasant  sensation.  We  deem  it  desirable, 
and  it  inspires  the  affection  of  Love.  Whatever 
occasions,  or  threatens  a  privation  of  happiness,  or 
inflicts  positive  misery,  we  view  with  displeasure, 
we  consider  it  as  injurious,  or  as  an  absolute  evil, 
and  it  inspires  the  affection  of  Hatred  :  that  is, 
we  feel  a  strong  attachment  of  the  heart  to  what- 
ever may  contribute  to  Well-being,  and  we  con- 
template the  reverse  with  feelings  of  displeasure, 
detestation,  and  abhorrence. 

Although  it  may  be  said,  without  impropriety, 
that  we  all  love  to  be  happy,  and  hate  to  be 
miserable  ;  yet  this  is  such  a  self-evident  truth, 
that  it  is  very  seldom  uttered.  The  two  express- 
ions therefore.  Love  and  Hatred,  are  almost 
entirely  applied  to  the  cause,  means,  or  instru- 
ments of  well-being  or  wretchedness  ;  and  we  are 
habituated  to  love  whatever  is  instrumental  to  our 
existing  in  a  desirable  state,  and  to  hate  its 
opposite. 


SECTION   III. 

LOVE  AND  HATRED  ;  THEIR  NATURE. 

% 

These   two   affections    arise,    immediately   and 
inevitably,  from  our  perpetual  solicitude  to  enjoy 


38  LOVE  AND  HATRED. 

the  existence  we  possess.  They  are  coeval  with 
our  ideas  of  Good  and  Evil.  They  are  experi- 
enced by  every  one,  in  every  situation,  and  in 
every  period  of  life.  They  are  inspired  by  every 
object  which  possesses  some  peculiarity,  or  is 
apparently  endowed  with  some  quality,  of  a  bene- 
ficial or  a  pernicious  tendency ;  that  is,  by  what- 
ever is  able,  according  to  our  conceptions,  to  pro- 
mote or  impede  enjoyment  or  happiness  :  from  the 
smallest  gratification  up  to  the  most  exalted- felicity ; 
from  the  smallest  discomfiture,  to  the  depth  of 
misery.  They  are  also  the  parents  of  every  other 
passion  and  affection  ;  and  the  history  of  the  hu- 
man mind  is  no  other  than  a  developement  of  their 
operations,  in  that  diversity  of  situations  and  cir- 
cumstances, in  which  it  may  be  occasionally  plac- 
ed. These  characters  will  undoubtedly  entitle 
them  to  the  denomination  oi  primary  or  cardinal 
affections.  As  no  others  are  in  the  same  predicament, 
they  cannot  deserve  the  same  appellations;  for 
they  can  only  be  considered  as  derived  from  these. 
We  cannot  therefore,  commence  our  minute  in- 
quiry into  the  passions,  with  greater  probability  of 
success,  than  by  paying  previous  attention  to  these 
two  affectionSc 

I.  LOVE. 

Love  may  be  considered  either  as  a  principle 
or  as  an  Affection.     As  a  principle,  it  may  be  de- 


LOVE.  39 

jlined  an  invariable  preference  of  Good  ,•  an  "  univer- 
"  sal  and  permanent  attachment  to  Well  being 
"  or  Happiness."  In  this  point  of  view  it  has 
already  been  considered.  It  has  also  been  remark- 
ed, that  the  love  of  good,  and  solicitude  to  procure 
it,  is  not  only  the  ruling  principle  of  every  sentient 
being,  but  it  meets  with  the  fall  approbation  of 
every  rational  being.  For  nothing  can  excel  that 
which  is  Good,  and  nothing  can  be  valuable,  but 
as  it  has  a  tendency  to  promote  it.  Hence  when 
we  speak  of  love  abstractedly,  we  call  it  the  Prin^ 
ciple  of  love  :  for  it  is  the  principle  by  which  the 
whole  tenour  of  our  conduct  is  directed  ;  and  it 
retains  that  appellation,  as  long  as  we  speak  of  it 
as  a  general  principle  of  action. 

When  this  principle  is  directed  towards  any 
particular  object  it  becomes  an  Affection  ;  that  is, 
the  mind  becomes  well  disposed,  or  pleasingly  af- 
fected towards  that  object ;  and  whenever  this 
love  is  more  violent  in  its  effects  upon  the  system, 
it  is  even  deemed  a  Passion. 

The  affection  will  be  diversified,  and  acquire 
various  characters,  according  to  the  nature  of  the 
object,  or  the  peculiar  qualities  it  may  seem  to 
possess  ;  and  also  according  to  its  various  relations. 
This  affection  may  relate  to  ourselves  ;  to  those 
with  whom  we  are  connected,  by  the  closest  bonds 
of  nature  or  intimacy ;  to  the  whole  of  om  species ; 
to  those  beings  of  inferior  order  in  the  creation, 
which  are  rendered  capable  of  possessing  any  por- 
tion of  enjoyment ;  and  even  to  things  inanimate. 


40  LOVE. 

When  the  affection  of  Love  immediately  relates 
to  ourselves  personally,  it  is  called  Self-love  ;  and 
it  marks  the  peculiar  concern  and  solicitude  we  en- 
tertain for  our  own  interest,  prosperity,  or  enjoy- 
ment. The  principle  of  Self-love  generally  ope- 
rates with  the  greatest  force  upon  the  mind ;  for 
every  circumstance  which  affects  our  own  happi- 
ness, makes  the  most  vivid  impressions.  This  is 
naturally  the  source  of  many  abuses  which  have 
brought  the  term  itself  into  disrepute.  But  Self- 
affection,  when  it  does  not  interfere  with  the  claims 
of  others,  is  not  only  an  innocent  affection,  but  it 
manifests  the  wisdom  and  benevolence  of  the  great 
Source  of  good.  By  rendering  every  Being  active 
in  the  pursuit  of  his  own  happiness,  the  greatest 
quantum  of  general  good  is  most  effectually  secur- 
ed. As  the  largest  communities  consist  of  Indi- 
viduals, were  each  individual  to  seek  his  own  wel- 
fare, without  prejudice  to  his  neighbour,  the  indi- 
vidual stock  of  each  would  render  happiness  univer- 
sal    (See  Note  D.) 

When  our  love  or  desire  of  Good  goes  forth  to 
others,  it  is  termed  Good  will,  or  Benevolence. 
This  usually  operates  with  various  degrees  of 
force,  according  to  our  various  connections  and 
degrees  of  intimacy.  It  may  possibly  render  the 
interest  and  happiness  of  those  with  whom  we  are 
more  immediately  connected,  by  the  bonds  of  nature 
or  friendsmp,  equally  dear  to  us  as  our  own.     It 


LOVE.  41 

lias,  in  some  instances,  been  known  to  exert  a 
more  powerful  influence.  Of  this  truth,  the  love 
of  Parents  towards  their  own  offspring  frequently 
presents  us  with  striking  instances.  Admiration  of 
personal  excellencies,  habits  of  intimacy,  gratitude 
for  benefits  received,  &c.  may  also  increase  our 
attachment  to  individuals,  until  it  rival  the  natural 
influence  of  self-love. 

All  these  powerful  ties  are  usually  characterized 
by  the  term  Affection  ;   as  the  conjugal,  parental, 
filial  affections ;  and  those  who  possess  these  at- 
tachments, in  an  exemplary  degree,  are  termed  af- 
fectionate parents,  children,  relatives,  friends. 

When  love  extends  to  the  whole  human  race,  it 
is  termed  Philanthropy  ;  a  principle  which  com- 
prehends the  whole  circle  of  social  and  moral  vir- 
tues. Considering  every  man  as  his  neighbour, 
and  loving  his  neighbour  as  truly  and  invariably  as 
he  loves  himself,  the  Philanthropist  cannot  be  un- 
just or  ungenerous. 

In  its  utmost  extent,  the  love  of  Benevolence 
embraces  all  beings  capable  of  enjoying  any  por- 
tion of  good ;  and  thus  it  becomes  universal  Be- 
nevolence :  which  manifests  itself  by  being  pleased 
with  the  share  of  good  every  creature  enjoys  ; — in 
a  disposition  to  increase  it ; — in  feeling  an  uneasi- 
ness at  their  sufferings ; — and  in  the  abhorrence  of 
cruelty,  under  every  disguise,  or  pretext, 

6 


it  LOVE. 

When  these  dispositions  are  acting  powerfully, 
towards  every  being  capable  of  enjoyment,  they  are 
called  the  benevolent  affections  ;  and  as  these  be- 
come, in  those  who  indulge  them,  operative  rules 
of  conduct,  or  principles  of  action,  we  speak  of  the 
benevolent  principle. 

It  has  been  remarked,  that  predilection  for  Good, 
as  the  end,  enstamps  a  value  upon  the  means  pro- 
ductive of  this  end.  This  creates  an  affection  for 
various  qualities  and  propensities,  which  we  pro- 
nounce to  be  Good,  when  they  possess  the  power, 
or  indicate  the  disposition  to  promote  happiness  or 
enjoyment.  If  these  be  eminently  good  qualities, 
we  call  them  Excellencies  ;  and  if  they  be  con- 
nected with  the  characters  and  conduct  of  moral 
agents,  they  are  moral  excellencies. 

From  the  habitual  pleasure  which  the  contem- 
plation of  Excellence  inspires,  without  our  advert- 
ing perpetually  to  the  benefits  which  may  accrue 
from  it,  we  may  be  induced  to  imagine  that  we 
love  things  deemed  excellent,  for  their  own  sakes, 
abstracted  from  their  power  of  becoming  useful. 
But  this  is  impossible.  Every  excellence  contains 
a  capability  to  possess  or  to  communicate  good. 
Nothing  which  deserves  the  name,  can  be  in  its 
own  nature  inert.  An  useless  excellence  is  a  con- 
tradiction i^ 

The  propensity  to  love  what  is  productive  of 
good,  extends  itself  much    farther    than  to  the 


HATRED.  43 

powers  and  properties  of  moral  agents.  We  natu-r 
rally  acquire  an  attachment  to  every  object,  animate 
or  inanimate,  which  has  been  the  habitual  instru- 
ment of  good  to  us,  or  is  capable  of  contributing  to 
our  gratification  or  advantage.  Their  latent  pow- 
ers first  induce  us  to  value  them  as  treasures  in  re- 
serve ;  our  opinion  of  their  capacity  to  become 
serviceable,  inclines  us  to  place  our  affections  upon 
them  ;  and  in  process  of  time,  they  will,  by  the 
association  of  ideas,  excite  pleasing  emotions, 
although  their  powers  of  utility  are  not  always  in 
our  recollection.     (See  Note  E.) 


II.  HATRED. 

Hatred  expresses  the  manner  in  which  we  are 
affected,  by  our  perception  of  whatever  we  suppose 
to  be  an  Evil.  It  is  not  confined  to  absolute  suf- 
fering ;  it  marks  also  our  abhorrence  of  whatever 
exposes  to  the  danger  of  absolute  suffering,  or  the 
diminution  of  that  portion  of  good  we  enjoy,  or 
wish  to  possess. 

Hatred  of  misery  and  its  causes,  is  a  natural 
and  necessary  consequence  of  our  solicitude  to 
possess  Good ;  and  the  affection  of  Hatred  is  as 
naturally  inspired  by  that  state,  conduct,  dispo- 
sition, which  is  productive  of,  or  threatens  to 
induce  pernicious  or  disagreeable  consequences, 
as  the  affection  of  Love  is  attached  to  their  contra- 


44  HATRED. 

ries.  Nor  is  our  hatred  at  all  times  confined  to 
that  particular  quality,  or  peculiarity  of  circum- 
stance, which  is  immediately  unfriendly  to  us. 
It  is  apt  to  raise  unpleasant  ideas,  and  to  create 
prejudices  against  many  things,  which  in  them- 
selves are  far  from  being  the  objects  of  hatred, 
and  which  may  be  highly  advantageous,  merely 
because  they  have  been  displeasing  or  injurious 
to  us  in  particular  instances.  As  our  predilection 
for  whatever  proves  acceptable,  will  often  prevent 
our  discerning  its  pernicious  qualities,  thus  do  we 
frequently  extend  our  hatred  far  beyond  the  just 
limits,  until  we  betray  our  ignorance,  or  manifest 
that  we  are  under  the  dominion  of  invincible 
prejudice. 

Personal  Hatred,  or  Malevolence  towards  an 
individual,  commences  with  some  circumstance, 
quality,  or  disposition  which  is  displeasing  to  us ; 
or  with  some  species  of  injury  committed  or  in- 
tended. It  has  these  for  its  professed  objects. 
But  here  also  a  quick  and  powerful  transition  is 
instantaneously  made,  in  our  imaginations,  from 
an  incidental  blemish,  to  the  whole  of  character ; 
•=--from  a  single  act,  we  are  prone  to  form  unfa- 
vourable sentiments  of  general  conduct ; — and  the 
lively  sense  of  an  injury  annihilates  too  frequent- 
ly every  species  of  merit  in  the  offender.  QThis 
is  obviously  the  source  of  hatreds,  long  and 
inveterate. 


HATREJj.  46 

But  notwithstanding  these  excesses  and  exagge- 
rations of  Hatred  and  Malevolence,  yet  they  can- 
not possibly  be  so  extensive  in  their  operations  as 
the  principle  of  Love.  The  affection  of  Hatred 
has  particular  and  partial  evils  alone  for  its  objects, 
while  the  principle  of  Love  may  embrace  the 
universe.  As  nutritious  aliments  are  infinitely 
more  numerous  than  the  substances  which  are 
of  a  poisonous  quality,  thus  does  the  number  of 
those  things  which  are  pleasing,  beneficial,  impor- 
tant in  their  nature,  infinitely  exceed  those  which 
are  either  in  themselves  comfortless,  or  detrimen- 
tal, or  calculated  to  foster  a  malevolent  disposition. 
The  true  object  of  Hatred  is  alone  some  particular 
and  partial  evil,  which  we  experience  or  dread ; 
— some  incidental  interruption  to  the  usual  tenour 
of  our  feelings ; — or  some  pernicious  quality  which 
may  threaten  this  interruption.  The  objects  of 
our  fears,  our  anger,  or  our  grief,  are  considered 
in  the  light  of  robberies,  or  painful  privations,  and 
not  as  permanent  causes  of  the  malevolent  affec- 
tions. They  are  not  looked  upon  as  streams 
perpetually  flowing  from  one  inexhaustible  source, 
but  as  interruptions  to  an  usual  or  desirable  state, 
by  adventitious  causes.  Happiness  appears  to  be 
our  birth -right,  of  which  all  the  painful  sensations 
raised  by  hatred,  are  the  professed  guardians. 
The  wish  for  happiness  is  perpetual  and  unlimited, 
while  our  evil  affections  expire  with  the  causes 
which  gave  them  existence.     Nor  can  malevolence 


46  HATRED. 

extend  itself  to  every  individual  in  the  creation, 
in  a  manner  similar  to  the  contrary  virtue.  That 
happy  cultivation  of  our  nature,  v^^hich  inspires  a 
benevolence  towards  all  animated  beings,  cannot 
possibly  have  a  perfect  contrast,  or  complete  pa- 
rallel, in  the  most  uncultivated  and  brutalized. 
This  would  constitute  a  ferocity  of  character 
which  can  scarcely  be  found  in  the  most  insane. 
When  tyrants,  cruel  and  ferocious,  are  diffusing 
misery,  in  the  wantonness  of  their  power,  their 
conduct  does  not  proceed  from  an  abstract  princi- 
ple of  universal  hatred  ; — but  from  some  low 
policy  of  self-defence ; — from  an  infernal  spirit  of 
revenge  for  supposed  injuries ; — from  inordinate 
self-love,  which  creates  an  insensibility  to  human 
woes  ; — from  pride,  vanity,  and  excessive  igno- 
rance, which  induce  men  to  imagine  that  they 
shall  be  revered  as  deities,  because  they  imitate 
the  destructive  thunder  of  heaven ;  and  to  dream 
that  their  favourite  idol  Power,  can  only  be  made 
known  and  established,  by  deeds  which  excite 
consternation  and  horror ! 

Indeed  the  affection  of  Hatred  is  of  so  unpleas- 
ant a  nature,  that  the  Being  who  could  hate  every 
thing,  would  be  his  own  tormentor.  The  sole 
pleasure  of  which  malevolence  is  capable,  proceeds 
from  the  gratification  of  revenge ;  which  can  only 
be  directed  against  particular  objects.  Nor  is  it 
merely  bounded ;  it  is  irritating,  unsatisfactory, 
and  purchased  by  the  sacrifice  of  all  the  enjoy- 
ments which  flow  from  the  contrary  disposition. 


DESIRE  AND  AVERSION.  47 


SECTION.  IV. 


DESIRE    AND    AVERSION. 


With  the  affections  of  Love  and  Hatred,  are  in- 
timately connected  the  affections  of  Desire  and 
Aversion.  That  is,  we  constantly  desire,  and  are 
solicitous  to  possess  or  accomplish,  whatever  is 
pleasing  or  beneficial ;  and  we  are  averse  from,  and 
endeavour  to  shun,  whatever  is  displeasing,  or 
threatens  to  be  pernicious.  These  two  affections 
are  therefore  the  necessary  consequences  of  the 
preceding.  They  are  accompanied  with  a  certain 
eagerness  of  mind,  either  to  obtain  or  escape,  which 
is  not  so  essential  to  the  former.  Love  and  Hatred 
may  be  inspired  by  a  calmer  contemplation  of  ex- 
cellence or  demerit,  or  any  of  the  causes  of  happi- 
ness or  misery,  without  our  having  an  immediate 
interest  in  them  ; — as  when  we  reflect  upon  benefi- 
cial discoveries  or  destructive  errors.  The  princi- 
ple of  Love  may  approve  of  worthy  conduct  or  re- 
spectable characters,  from  which  we  can  expect  no 
benefit  to  ourselves  ;  and  that  of  hatred  may  de- 
spise villanies  by  which  we  cannot  be  injured. 
Desire  and  Aversion  refer  to  particular  objects, 
which  have  some  relation  to  ourselves ;  and  they 
are  indicated  by  some  effort  of  mind,  either  to  pos- 
sess the  promised  good,  or  to  repel  the  impending 
evil.     Desire  and  Aversion  are  to  be  considered 


48  DESIRE  AND  AVERSION. 

therefore  as  manifestations  of  love  and  hatred ;  and 
the  earnest  application  of  these  principles,  in  each 
particular  instance  of  their  excitement. 

As  Love  and  Hatred  may  be  resolved  into  that 
one  principle,  the  love  of  Well-being,  thus  may  the 
affections  of  Desire  and  Aversion  be  resolved  into 
Desire  :  although  the  use  of  both  teniis  is,  in  com- 
mon language,  necessary,  in  order  to  distinguish 
the  objects  of  our  pursuit,  from  those  we  wish  to 
shun.  Strictly  speaking,  Aversion  is  no  other  than 
a  particular  modification  of  Desire ;  a  desire  of 
being  liberated  from  whatever  appears  injurious  to 
well-being.  The  objects  in  our  possession,  produc- 
tive of  this  good,  we  desire  to  retain.  We  are 
conscious  of  this  desire  every  time  we  appreciate 
the  worth  of  the  object,  and  it  is  necessarily  excit- 
ed when  we  are  under  the  apprehensions  of  priva- 
tion. If  the  Good,  or  the  means  of  good,  be  not 
in  our  possession,  we  desire  to  obtain  them  :  if  a 
privation  be  unjustly  attempted  by  any  one,  and 
the  passion  of  anger  be  excited,  the  desire  of  pre- 
serving or  recovering  the  object,  is  connected  with 
a  desire  to  chastise  the  aggressor  :  if  it  be  in  dan- 
ger from  any  other  cause,  the  fear  of  loss  is  excited 
by  the  desire  of  securing  ;  and  if  we  be  actually 
deprived,  the  hopeless  desire  of  regaining,  is  an  es- 
sential ingredient  in  our  grief  for  the  loss. 

But  although,  in  this  philosophical  sense.  Desire 
may  seem  to  be  equally  extensive  with  the  affection 


DESIRE  AND  AVERSION.  4d 

of  Love,  yet  it  is  necessarily  more  confined  in  its 
application.  Love  relates  to  all  things  which  ap- 
pear good  and  beneficial  in  themselves,  or  to  beings 
capable  of  receiving  good.  It  comprehends  the 
things  enjoyed,  and  the  state  of  pleasing  existence, 
in  which  those  beings  are  actually  placed,  as  well 
as  the  desirableness  of  such  a  state,  and  all  the 
means  and  instruments  of  good.  Desire  mostly 
refers  to  the  state  in  which  we  are  not.  It  solicits 
some  favourable  change,  and  exerts  itself  to  obtain 
it.  Hatred  also  is  universally  applicable  to  what- 
ever appears  pernicious  or  displeasing  in  itself : 
Aversion  more  immediately  concerns  whatever 
appears  pernicious  or  displeasing  to  us  These 
Affections  may  be  considered  as  the  satellites  of 
Love  and  Hatred,  perpetually  accompanying  them, 
and  prompt  to  execute  their  orders.  Wherever 
love  or  hatred  direct  their  immediate  attention, 
desire  and  aversion  seek  to  appropriate  or  repel. 


Thus  it  appears  that  the  love  of  good  and  hatred 
of  evil  ;  the  desire  of  possessing  good  and  escaping 
evil ;  are  the  leading  principles  of  our  nature.  The 
love  of  good  commences  with  our  existence,  and 
the  desire  of  good  is  coeval  with  our  powers  of 
discernment.  Neither  of  them  will  leave  us,  until 
we  cease  to  exist,  or  lose  the  consciousness  of  our 
own  sensations  and  perceptions.  Whatever  diver- 
sity there  may  be  in  our  situations,  however  various 

7 


so  DESIRE  AND  AVERSION. 

and  opposite  the  objects  engaging  our  attention, 
however  versatile  our  humours,  these  remain  the  im- 
mutable principles  of  action.  They  pervade  the 
animal  system,  as  the  electric  fluid  pervades  the 
material ;  and  though,  like  that,  they  may  sometimes 
be  latent,  yet,  like  that,  they  may  be  instantaneously 
roused  into  vivid  action,  and  manifest  both  their 
existence  and  their  power  by  the  effects  they  pro- 
duce. 

Human  nature  possesses  various  sensitive  and 
mental  powers,  to  each  of  which  an  infinite  diver- 
sity of  objects  is  adapted  :  and  as  the  gratification 
of  each  communicates  pleasure,  we  are  prone  to 
estimate  every  thing  as  a  Good,  which  is  capable 
of  contributing  to  these  gratifications  ;  and  every 
thing  as  an  Evil  which  opposes  them.  However,  a 
contrariety  or  opposition  frequently  takes  place 
between  the  higher  and  inferior  pursuits  of  our 
nature  ;  in  consequence  of  which  the  interests  or 
gratifications  of  the  one,  must  yield  to  those  of  the 
other.  As  sensual  objects,  and  things  which  ad- 
minister to  our  immediate  desires,  are  apt  to  make 
the  strongest  impressions  and  captivate  our  atten- 
tion, in  preference  to  things  less  sensual  and  more 
remote,  though  of  superior  importance,  thus  do  we 
frequently  deem  that  to  be  a  Good,  which  is  virtual- 
ly an  Evil.  We  may  also  deem  that  to  be  an  Evil 
which  is  virtually  a  Good,  as  being  productive  of 
extensive,  exalted,  or  permanent  advantage.  But 
notwithstanding  these  facts,  we  still  pursue  every 
thing  as  an  apparent  Good  :  and  we  avoid  every 


OBJECTS  OF  LOVE  AND  HATRED.  51 

tiling  under  the  idea  of  its  being  an  Evil,  of  grea- 
ter or  less  magnitude.  Our  appetites,  our  particu- 
lar propensities,  our  imaginations,  our  passions  may 
spread  deceitful  charms  over  some  objects  ;  and 
our  want  of  attention,  our  ignorance,  our  impa- 
tience of  present  restraints  and  inconveniences,  or 
the  perverseness  of  our  affections,  may  render  ob- 
jects inimical  in  their  appearance,  which  are  bene- 
ficial in  their  tendency  :  yet  our  Desires  are  alone 
excited  by  the  idea  of  some  enjoyment  or  advan- 
tage ;  and  things  are  rendered  objects  of  our  aver- 
sion, alone  because  they  are  disagreeable  to  our 
feelings,  or  threaten  to  endanger,  some  way  or 
other,  our  Well-being.    (See  Note  F.) 


SECTION  V. 

OBJECTS  OF  LOVE  AND  HATRED  ;  THEIR  CHARACTERISTICS. 

Should  it  be  asked,  "  in  what  do  this  Good  and 
Evil  consist  .^"  it  would  be  difficult  to  give  a  satis- 
factory answer.  To  say  that  they  consist  in  a 
certain  consciousness  of  well  being,  or  of  a  comfort- 
less existence,  would  be  little  more  than  to  assert 
that  happiness  consists  in  being  happy,  and  misery 
in  being  miserable.  The  following  observations 
however,  will  discover  to  us  what  we  expect  in  the 
means  of  good,  and  what  we  deem  to  be  the  causes 
of  unhappiness ;  and  they  will  indicate  where 
these  are  principally  to  be  found. 


B2  OBJECTS  OF 

Creatures  formed  like  ourselves,  with  different 
organs  of  sense,  with  various  powers  of  mind  ac- 
companied with  quick  perceptions  and  high  sensi- 
bihtj  ;  creatures  endowed  with  great  diversities  of 
dispositions,  tastes,  propensities,  must  be  variously 
affected  by  every  thing  around  them.  We  are,  as 
it  were,  plunged  into  the  universe  "  tremblingly 
alive  all  o'er,"  and  we  are  rendered  capable  of 
receiving  impressions,  pleasant  or  unpleasant,  from 
every  object  which  addresses  our  senses,  from  every 
thing  we  perceive,  and  from  every  thing  of  which 
we  can  form  an  idea.  Nothing  in  this  vast  uni- 
verse can,  at  all  seasons,  be  totally  indifferent  to 
every  person  in  it  ;  nothing  is  so  inert  as  to  be  in- 
capable of  exerting  some  influence,  in  one  connec- 
tion or  other,  and  of  calling  forth  a  correspondent 
passion  or  affection. 

These  effects  are  produced  by  our  Perception  or 
Supposition  of  certain  powers,  properties,  or  quali- 
ties, in  the  different  objects,  by  which  ideas  of  an 
agreeable  or  disagreeable  nature,  are  excited  within 
us.  The  diverse  influences  of  these  are  to  be 
ascribed  to  an  apparent  Aptitude  or  Correspon- 
dence, in  some  objects,  with  the  frame  and  consti- 
tution of  our  nature,  and  to  an  inaptitude  or  want 
of  correspondence  in  others  ; — to  a  certain  coinci- 
dence between  properties  and  relations  in  objects 
and  circumstances,  with  the  appetites,  powers,  pro- 
pensities of  our  nature,  the  gratification  of  which 
seems  to  promote  our  well-being ;  or  to  the  want 


LOVE  AND  HATRED.  m 

of  this  coincidence,  or  the  exertion  of  a  contrary 
power  which  constitutes  our  misery. 

The  diversity  of  attributes,  seated  in  different 
objects,  and  the  no  less  diversity  in  our  situations, 
and  in  circumstances  surrounding  us,  render  it  dif- 
ficult to  make  choice  of  such  terms  as  may  be 
universally  appropriate.  It  may  therefore  be  neces- 
sary to  observe,  that  by  attribute,  property^  quality, 
^c.  is  meant  to  express  that  peculiarity,  whatever 
it  may  be,  w  hich  exerts  an  influence  upon  us ;  and 
these  terms  are  used  to  indicate  the  distinguishing 
characteristics  of  various  objects,  as  they  are  con- 
nected with  some  singularity  in  state,  circumstance, 
or  conduct,  without  the  real  or  supposed  existence 
of  which,  the  passions  and  affections  could  not  have 
been  excited.     (See  Note  G.) 

The  subjects  possessing  this  real  or  apparent 
aptitude  and  coincidence,  or  inaptitude,  relate  to 
our  animal  wants,  to  the  various  powers  and  em- 
ployments of  our  minds  ;  to  our  state  and  connec- 
tions as  social  beings;  and  also  to  the  opinions 
entertained  respecting  our  relation  to  a  superior 
Being,  or  to  a  future  state  of  existence. 

The  various  objects  soliciting  our  attention  under 
these  heads ; — the  degrees  of  their  suitability, 
excellence,  importance,  or  the  contrary  ; — our 
ideas  and  mistakes  concerning  them  ; — the  facility 
or  difficulty,  with  which  some  things  are  pursued, 
obtained,  preserved,  lost,  dismissed ; — the  uncer- 
tainty, dangers,  contrarieties  to  which  we  are  con- 


54  OBJECTS  OF  LOVE  AND  HATRED. 

stantly  exposed,  respecting  whatever  may  appear 
interesting,  *t^e  perpetually  engaging  our  affections, 
or  exciting  our  passions,  during  the  whole  of  our 
passage  through  life,  from  the  cradle  to  the  grave ! 

Thus  is  that  love  of  Well-being  which  is  one  and 
simple  in  its  principle,  most  wonderfully  diversified 
in  its  operations!  Every  object,  every  circum- 
stance, every  idea  which  can  enter  the  mind,  makes 
some  impression  upon  us,  of  a  pleasant  or  unpleas- 
ant nature  ;  it  contributes  a  something  towards,  or 
deducts  from,  the  Good  we  seek.  They  all  con- 
tain powers  and  properties,  by  which  we  are  attrac- 
ted towards  the  grand  desideratum.  Happiness,  or 
are  repelled  to  various  distances  from  it ! 


CHAPTER  II. 

CLASSIFICATION    OF     THE    PASSIONS    4-CCORDING     TO    THEIE 
CHARACTERISTIC    DIFFERENCES. 

SECTION  I. 

THE   EFFICIENT    CAUSES    OF    THE    PASSIONS,    EMOTIONS,    AND    AFFEC- 
TIONS EXAMINED. 

The  Affections  and  Passions,  to  which  the  cir- 
cumstances stated  in  the  preceding  chapter,  give 
rise,  are  not  only  extremely  numerous,  but  like 
their  exciting  causes,  they  are  so  connected  and 
intermixed,  that  to  arrange  them  in  a  lucid  order, 
would  be  almost  as  impracticable  as  to  form  a  regu- 
lar path  through  the  Hercynian  Wood.  Very  few 
of  the  passions  or  affections  are  perfectly  simple  ; 
some  are  extremely  complex.  Their  complexities 
are  so  various,  that  it  is  almost  impossible  to  restore 
each  to  its  appropriate  place  ;  and  the  most  opposite 
affections  are  so  intermixed,  that  it  is  very  difficult 
to  assign  to  each  its  due  share  of  influence. 

In  this  labyrinth,  an  attention  to  the  following- 
facts  may  perhaps  furnish  us  with  something  of  a 
clue. 

Some  of  our  passions  and  affections  are  inspired 
by  circumstances  which  more  immediately  relate 
to  OURSELVES,  and  to  our  own  personal  interests ; 
that  is,  they  belong  to  the  principle  of  Self-love : 
Some  of  them  belong  to  the  social  principle,  and 


56  EFFICIENT  CAUSES  OF  THE 

refer  to  our  connections  with  our  own  species,  or 
to  all  animated  natures. 

In  some  of  our  Passions  and  Affections,  the  ideas 
of  GOOD  are  obviously  predominant,  in  others  the 
ideas  of  evil. 

The  Passions  and  Affections,  which  relate  to 
Self-love,  and  are  excited  by  the  idea  of  a  Good, 
may  either  refer  to  the  good  which  is  actually  in 
our  possession^  and  communicate  various  degrees  of 
enjoyment,  from  simple  gratification  to  ecstasies  ;  or 

The  good  we  love  may  not  he  in  our  possession ; 
but  it  may  appear  attainable,  and  become  the  ob- 
ject of  our  Desire ;  or 

Though  it  be  not  in  our  possession,  circumstan- 
ces may  appear  highly  favourable  to  our  attaining 
it,  and  it  may  thus  inspire  Hope. 

The  state  in  which  Evil  is  the  predominant  idea, 
referring  to  ourselves,  may  relate ; 

To  the  loss  of  that  good  which  we  possessed,  or 
to  disappointments  respecting  the  good  we  desired, 
and  hoped  to  obtain  ;  inspiring  Sorrow,  with  its 
various  modifications ;  or 

We  may  be  apprehensive  concerning  the  loss  of 
what  we  possess;  concerning  the  approach  of  some 
positive  evil ;  or  concerning  the  accomplishment  of 
our  desires,  which  introduces  the  family  of  Fear. 

The  cause  of  both  sorrow  and  fear  may  be  some 
Agent,  whose  designed  conduct,  or  even  whose 
inadvertency,  may  threaten  or  produce  injuries,  and 
thus  excite  Anger,  in  various  degrees. 


PASSIONS,  EXAMINED,  57 

The  causes  and  excitements  of  our  passions  and 
affections  respecting  Others,  may  also  be  arranged 
under  the  predominancy  of  Good,  or  Evil  in  our 
ideas. 

Under  the  former  head  may  Benevolence  be 
placed,  which  will  indicate  itself  either  by  good 
Wishes,  or  good  Opinions ;  each  productive  of  a 
large  diversity  of  affections  and  passions,  accord- 
ing to  contingent  circumstances. 

The  predominance  of  Evil  in  our  ideas  will  shew 
itself  in  actual  Malevolence  of  disposition  con- 
cerning another;  or  in  a  Displacency  and  disap- 
probation of  their  conduct. 

The  above  sketch  seems  to  indicate  a  plan  of 
investigation  which,  upon  the  whole,  is  the  least 
confused  and  embarrassing.  It  is  founded  upon 
the  remarks  which  have  been  made,  concerning 
the  grand  propensity  of  human  beings  to  seek  feli- 
city ;  upon  the  ideas  of  Good  and  Evil,  either  rela- 
ting to  themselves  or  others ;  and  it  seems  to  com- 
prehend most  of  those  contingent  circumstances 
which  surround  us. 

That  the  idea  of  Good  is  most  prevalent  in  the 
diverse  kinds  of  gratification ;  in  the  pursuit  of 
various  objects  of  desire ;  in  the  indulgence  of 
hope ;  and  in  benevolent  dispositions,  no  one  will 
dispute :  and  that  the  idea  of  Evil,  is  prevalent  in 
malevolence  and  displacency,  is  no  less  evident.  It 
will  also  be  obvious,  upon  a  momem*'»  considera- 
tion, that  as  the  love  of  good  may  produce  Hatred 

to  what  is  inimical  to  it,  thus  in  the  affections  and 

8 


58  EFFICIENT  CAUSES,  &c. 

passions  correspondent  with  this  principle,  the  pri- 
mary and  influential  idea  is  that  of  suffering.  In 
sorrow,  when  we  grieve  for  the  loss  of  what  we 
love,  it  is  the  privation  which  immediately  presents 
itself  to  the  mind,  and  the  hatred  of  this  privation 
is  the  efficient  cause  of  sorrow.  In  fear  the  appre- 
hension of  impending  evil  takes  the  lead  in  our 
minds,  though  this  evil  may  virtually  consist  in 
being  deprived  of  some  good.  In  anger,  the  evil 
intended  or  perpetrated,  is  the  direct  incitement  to 
wrath,  and  we  expatiate,  with  so  much  eagerness, 
upon  all  the  circumstances  of  aggravation,  that  we 
cannot  allow  ourselves,  at  the  first  instant,  to  dwell 
upon  the  attributes  or  qualities  of  the  good  thus 
endangered  or  destroyed.  These  instances  mani- 
fest that  the  perception  of  an  Evil  from  privation, 
is  stronger  in  every  instance,  than  our  estimation  of 
the  intrinsic  value  of  that  which  occasions  the  pain- 
ful emotion. 

But  although  these  observations  may  suffice  to 
justify  the  Order  proposed,  yet  it  is  acknowledged 
that  they  are  not  comprehensive  enough  to  embrace 
every  thing  relative  to  the  passions.  There  is  a 
class  of  emotions,  in  which  distinct  ideas  of  good  or 
evil  are  not  present  to  the  mind,  and  which  in  fact 
may,  with  equal  propriety,  enlist  themselves  under 
each  division.  They  are  vivid  impressions,  produc- 
tive of  effects  which,  strictly  speaking,  belong 
neither  to  the  passions  nor  affections  ;  and  yet  their 
presence  frequently  constitutes  the  difference  be- 
tween an  affection  and  a  passion. 


INTRODUCTORY  EMOTIONS.  59 

This  enigma  will  be  best  explained,  by  our  atten- 
tion to  the  manner  in  which  our  ideas  of  those 
influential  and  operative  qualities,  exciting  passions 
and  inspiring  affections,  are  obtained. 


SECTION  11. 


INTRODUCTORY  EMOTIONS. 


When  the  attention  is  steadfastly  fixed  upon 
any  quality  or  number  of  qualities,  apparent  in  an 
object,  whether  they  be  good  or  bad,  some  impres- 
sion is  made,  or  certain  sensations  are  produced. 
These  may  dispose  the  mind  to  dwell  yet  longet 
upon  the  subject  ;  and  the  qualities  they  exhibit 
may  be  attentively  contemplated,  with  all  their 
relations  and  connections.  Their  former  and  their 
present  influence,  future  consequences,  &c.  may 
thus  be  placed  before  us.  Numberless  correspon- 
dent ideas  will  present  themselves,  each  producing 
its  particular  effect,  until  strong  affections,  either  of 
love  or  hatred,  desire  or  aversion,  will  be  excited ; 
and  these  may  gradually  arise  to  the  most  violent 
passions  and  emotions.  In  this  manner  have  per- 
sons been  known  to  ivork  themselves  up  into  ecsta- 
cies,  or  into  phrensies;  and  the  mind  has  been  so 
completely  occupied  by  its  subject,  that  it  has  totally 
lost  the  power  of  self-command ;  nothing  foreign 


eo  INTRODUCTORY 

being  able  to  gain  admission,  and  divide  the  atten- 
tion. 

But  on  the  other  hand,  whatever  presents  itself 
in  a  sudden  and  unexpected  manner,  has,  in  most 
cases,  a  much  greater  effect  upon  us,  than  subjects 
of  very  superior  importance,  for  which  we  have 
been  gradually  prepared.  The  more  sudden,  that 
is,  the  greater  the  improbability  of  its  appearing  at 
that  instant ;  and  the  more  unexpected,  that  is,  the 
greater  distance  the  train  of  thought  was  from  the 
expectancy,  the  more  violent  will  be  the  first  per- 
cussion ;  and  this  circumstance  will  give  peculiar 
energy  to  the  exciting  cause,  whatever  its  peculiar 
complexion  may  be.  A  strong  impulse  is  given,  by 
the  very  mode  of  its  appearance,  previous  to  our 
being  able  to  acquire  a  distinct  knowledge  of  its 
nature.  This  impulse  is  the  emotion,  we  term 
Surprise. 

Another  circumstance  which  frequently  attends 
the  cause  of  any  specific  emotion,  and  produces  its 
own  characteristic  effects,  in  subjects  of  seeming 
importance,  is  that  of  Intricacy  ;  in  which  the 
mind  is  thrown  into  an  embarrassed  state  concerning 
the  particular  object,  or  something  material  relative 
to  it.  This  embarrassment  also  gives  an  additional 
impetus  to  the  characteristic  passion,  whether  it  be 
of  a  pleasing  or  a  displeasing  nature,  and  is  distin- 
guished by  the  name  of  Wonder. 

A  third  adventitious  effect  is  produced  by  an  in- 
stantaneous perception  of  the  extreme  magnitude 


EMOTIONS.  61 

or  extent,  of  the  subject  which  calls  forth  any  of  the 
Passions  and  Affections.  It  seems  to  possess  some- 
thing immeasurable,  unfathomable,  beyond  the 
utmost  stretch  of  comprehension.  This  we  call 
Astonishment. 

It  now  appears  that  some  of  our  emotions  may 
be  excited,  before  the  good  or  evil,  seated  in  the 
exciting  cause,  can  have  arrested  the  attention. 
Yet  even  in  these  cases.  Good  or  Evil  is  not  ex- 
cluded. For  these  emotions  are  most  intimately 
connected  with  the  idea  of  something  peculiarly 
important ;  but  we  can  deem  nothing  important 
unless  it  possess  a  power  of  producing  Good  or 
Evil.  Their  peculiar  strength  is  even  occasioned 
by  the  vivid  idea  of  Importance,  while  the  emotions 
themselves  manifest  our  ignorance  of  its  specific 
nature. 

These  emotions,  therefore,  are  excited  by  the 
confused  idea  of  something  peculiarly  interesting 
in  the  cause  :  and  they  are  manifestly  intended  to 
awaken  and  direct  the  attention  to  this  cause,  that 
its  nature  and  character  may  be  ascertained.  Sur- 
prise, like  a  watchful  centinel,  is  equally  alarmed 
at  a  sudden  approach,  whether  it  be  of  a  friend  or 
an  enemy.  Wonder  is  excited  by  a  curiosity  which 
induces  us  to  investigate  the  character  of  the  intru- 
der, with  peculiar  keenness :  and  although  Aston- 
ishment is  almost  overwhelmed  with  the  subject, 
yet  it  is  irresistibly  attracted  towards  it,  with  a 


62  INTRODUCTORY 

force  proportioned  to  its  magnitude.  At  the  instant 
in  which  we  feel  our  imbecility  the  most,  we  are 
the  most  eager  to  investigate  those  qualities  which 
we  acknowledge  to  exceed  our  comprehension  ! 

The  above  characters  ascribed  to  them,  plainly 
indicate  that  these  emotions  cannot  be  considered, 
strictly  speaking,  either  as  passions  or  Affections ; 
which  are  always  inspired  by  the  idea  or  perception 
of  some  specific  Good  or  Evil,  but  merely  as  intro- 
ductory to  these :  and  it  is  very  singular,  that  com- 
mon language,  without  the  suspicion  of  its  being 
founded  on  philosophical  investigation,  uniformly 
characterizes  them  by  the  term  Emotions.  We 
never  speak  either  of  the  Passion  or  Affection  of 
surprise,  or  of  wonder,  or  of  astonishment ;  but 
consent  with  one  voice  to  denominate  them  Emo- 
tions. 

It  is  also  agreed  that  they  are  very  distinct  from 
the  permanent  calmness  of  an  affection,  and  that 
they  are  common  to  the  most  opposite  passions. 

The  most  violent  passions,  of  every  kind,  are 
well  known  to  proceed  more  frequently  from  the 
impulse  of  the  moment,  than  from  deliberate 
thought.  They  are  equally  excited  also,  by  sub- 
jects of  a  pleasing  or  displeasing  nature  ;  they  are 
the  precursors  of  many  passions,  and  are  able  to 
communicate  an  energy  to  all. 

Thus  we  perceive  that  the  passions, — using  this 
term  in  a  generic  sense,  may  proceed  both  from  our 
Ignorance^  and  from  our  real  or  supposed  knowl- 


EMOTIONS.  63 

edge  of  the  nature  and  qualities  of  objects.  As  the 
excess  of  cold  operates  upon  the  corporeal  system, 
with  a  stimulating  power  like  the  excess  of  heat ; 
thus  the  opposites  of  expectancy,  of  knowledge,  of 
comprehension,  become  powerful  stimulants  to  the 
awakened  mind,  and  communicate  a  painful  ener- 
gy, which  is  peculiarly  instrumental  in  removing 
their  cause.  This  effect  is  manifestly  produced  by 
the  power  of  the  Imagination  which  immediately 
create  alarms,  forms  numberless  conjectures,  and 
expands  itself  to  the  utmost,  that  it  may  equal  if 
possible  the  vastness  of  the  object. 

Surprise,  Astonishment,  Wonder,  being  excited 
by  something  novel,  something  embarrassing,  or 
something  vast  and  incomprehensible  in  the  objects, 
without  any  reference  to  its  peculiar  nature,  and 
exerting  their  influence,  indiscriminately,  in  pas- 
sions of  the  most  opposite  characters,  they  may, 
with  strict  propriety,  be  contemplated  as  introduc- 
tory to  those  subjects,  which,  upon  a  minute  investi- 
gation, seem  calculated  to  exert  their  own  specific 
influence.  We  shall  therefore  term  them  Introduc- 
tory Emotions. 


When  the  nature  of  the  exciting  cause  is  more  ac- 
curately ascertained,  it  will   be   found  to  respect 
either  the  Selfish  or  the  Social  Principle.     Hence 
arise  two  important  distinctions,  forming  two  dif- 
ferent Classes. 


64  SURPRISE. 

In  each  Class  the  predominant  idea  of  a  Goodf 
and  the  predominant  idea  of  an  Evilt  will  consti- 
tute two  different  Orders. 

The  leading  passions  and  affections,  under  each 
order,  point  out  the   Genera. 

The  complicated  nature  of  some  of  the  passions, 
and  other  contingent  circumstances,  may  be  con- 
sidered as  constituting  Species  and  Varieties,  under 
each  characteristic  Genus. 

These  distinctions  were  suggested  to  the  Author, 
by  an  attention  to  the  natural  progress  of  our  pas- 
sions and  affections,  from  the  first  exciting  cause, 
to  all  the  ramifications  and  diversities  of,  which 
they  are  susceptible.  The  Reader  will  doubtless 
perceive  a  striking  coincidence  with  the  classifica- 
tion, which  Nosological  and  Botanical  Writers 
have  found  it  expedient  to  adopt. 

The  Introductory  Emotions,  from  their  nature 
and  influence,  demand  a  prior  investigation. 


I.  SURPRISE. 

We  have  described  Surprise  to  be  the  strong  emo- 
tion, excited  by  something  which  presents  itself  in 
a  sudden  and  unexpected  manner,  when  the  mind 
was  totally  unprepared  for  it  ;  something  we  pre- 
sume to  be  highly  important,  and  yet  the  kind 
or  extent  of  this  importance  has  not  been  ascertain- 


SURPRISE.  6gi 

ed.  It  is  the  apparent  novelty  of  the  subject,  or  of 
some  peculiarity  relative  to  it ;  or  the  unexpected- 
ness of  its  introduction,  at  a  particular  time,  or  in 
a  particular  manner,  contrary  to  probability  or  ex- 
pectancy, which  produces  the  effect ;  and  whenever 
these  circumstances  take  place,  Surprise  may  be 
equally  excited  by  things  agreeable  or  disagreeable ; 
by  objects  of  our  love  or  hatred,  admiration  or  horror. 
The  primary  or  natural  effects  of  Surprise,  are 
to  rouse  the  mind,  to  force  it  out  of  that  train  of 
ideas  with  which  it  was  occupied,  and  compel  it  to 
advert  to  the  novel  object ;  which  is  afterwards  to 
exert  a  characteristic  influence,  according  to  its  na- 
ture. The  secondary  effect  of  Surprise,  is  to  add 
an  impetus  to  the  existing  cause,  whatever  that 
may  be.  It  renders  pleasing  sensations  more  de- 
lightful; and  it  gives  an  additional  keenness  to  the 
unpleasing  ones.  This  effect  is  evidently  produced 
by  the  force  of  an  awakened  and  active  imagina- 
tion ;  which  preceding  either  deliberate  attention, 
or  the  exercise  of  judgment,  magnifies  the  appa- 
rent good  or  the  apparent  ill,  as  soon  as  their  spe- 
cific natures  are  obscurely  perceived.  In  Surprise, 
the  mind  is  totally  passive.  The  Emotion  can  nei- 
ther be  produced  nor  prevented  by  any  exertions 
of  the  will.  Nor  is  it  its  immediate  province, 
either  to  reflect  or  investigate.  Its  pathological 
effect  is  that  of  a  simple  stimulus,  whose  sole  ob- 
ject is  to  arouse  the  attention.  Sudden  startings, 
earnest  looks,  extension  of  arms  and  hands,  strong 
exclamations,   are  the   characteristic  signs  of  the 

9 


e&  WONDER. 


emotion;  and  when  the  violence  of  Surprise  ex- 
cites an  alarm,  which  is  oft-times  the  case  with- 
out the  actual  presence  of  danger,  the  whole 
body  is  instantly  placed  in  an  attitude  of  defence. 


II.  WONDER. 

Wonder  expresses  an  embarrassment  of  the 
mind,  after  it  is  somewhat  recovered  from  the 
first  percussion  of  surprise.  It  is  the  effect  pro- 
duced by  an  interesting  subject,  whirh  has  been 
suddenly  presented  to  the  mind,  but  concerning 
which  there  may  be  many  intricacies  respecting 
the  subject  itself,  or  the  cause  and  manner  of  its 
introduction. 

In  Wonder  the  mind  begins  to  re-act,  but  its 
ideas  are  in  a  state  of  confusion.  It  attempts  to 
examine  and  investigate,  but  it  seems  engaged  in 
a  fruitless  inquiry.  It  rapidly  collects  together 
various  circumstances,  from  which  to  form  con- 
jectures, but  rejects  them  as  unsatisfactory,  as 
soon  as  they  are  formed.  Whenever  the  desired 
discovery  is  made,  Wonder  ceases,  and  gives  way 
to  the  impression  which  is  correspondent  to  the 
nature  of  the  discovery,  and  to  those  circumstances 
which  are  perceived  to  belong  to  the  exciting 
cause ;  whether  they  be  productive  of  joy  or  grief, 
admiration  or  abhorrence,  hope  or  fearful  appre- 
hension. As  in  this  emotion,  the  mind  begins  to 
exert  its  active  and  discriminating  powers,  so  is  it 


ASTONISHMENT.  67 

able  to  prolong  or  to  shorten  the  effects  of  the 
emotion,  either  by  dwelling  upon  the  subject,  and 
deliberately  following  its  intricacies,  or  by  divert- 
ing its  attention  to  other  objects.  Being  intro- 
duced by  surprise,  and  partaking  of  its  indefinite 
nature,  the  pathological  indications  of  Wonder  are 
very  similar.  They  are,  however,  less  violent; 
and  they  are  intermixed  with  stronger  marks  of 
mental  embarrassment.  The  eyes  are  sometimes 
fastened  upon  the  author  or  narrator  of  something 
wonderful ;  sometimes  they  are  directed  upwards, 
to  be  more  detached  from  every  surrounding  object, 
which  might  distract  the  attention ;  sometimes  they 
roll  about,  as  if  they  were  in  search  of  an  object 
that  may  be  equal  to  the  explanation ;  and  the  half- 
opened  mouth  seems  eager  to  receive  the  desired 
information.  In  very  intricate  and  important  con- 
cerns, total  abstraction  from  every  thing  external, 
and  depth  of  thought  marked  by  countenance  and 
posture,  indicate  how  busily  the  mind  is  employed 
in  searching  out  the  mystery. 


III.  ASTONISHMENT. 

Astonishment  is  the  kind  and  degree  of  wonder 
introduced  by  surprise,  which  as  it  were,  over- 
whelms or  petrifies  the  soul.  The  mental  powers 
are  in  a  stupor,  in  a  state  of  stagnation.  High 
astonishment  is  the  incubus  of  the  miad,  which 
feels  nothing  at  the  instant,  so  much  as  its  inability 


68  ASTONISHMEl^T. 

to  act.  This  emotion  always  relates  to  things  of 
the  highest  importance,  to  things  which  appear  too 
vast  and  extensive  for  the  grasp  of  intellect,  rather 
than  to  intricacies.  When  it  relates  to  human 
conduct,  Astonishment  is  excited  by  great  under- 
takings, or  extensive  projects  ;  by  the  accomplish- 
ment of  plans  which  appeared  more  than  human, 
whether  beneficial  or  destructive ;  or  by  some 
excess  either  of  virtue  or  of  vice.  The  body 
marks,  in  a  striking  manner,  the  singular  state 
of  the  mind.  That  also  becomes  immoveable ; 
petrified  as  it  were,  or  thunder-struck ;  which  are 
the  favourite  expressions,  in  almost  every  language. 
The  eyes  are  firmly  fixed,  without  being  directed 
to  any  particular  object ;  the  character  of  coun- 
tenance, which  was  formed  by  the  habitual  in- 
fluence of  some  predominant  affection,  is  for  a  time 
effaced  ;  and  a  suspension  of  every  other  expres- 
sion, a  certain  vacuity,  strongly  notes  this  singular 
suspension  of  mind. 

Wonder  and  astonishment  are  expressions  which 
in  many  cases,  may  be  used  synonymously ;  as 
both  causes  and  affects  are  very  analogous :  for 
the  intricacy  attending  an  important  subject  may 
be  connected  with  its  vastness ;  and  sometimes 
occasioned  by  it.  When  these  are  introduced  by 
Surprise,  that  is,  when  subjects  of  the  kind  are 
suddenly  and  unexpectedly  forced  upon  the  atten- 
tion, their  united  effects  are  extremely  powerful  ; 
and  they  give  an  infinite  momentum  to  their  causes, 
whether  they  be  of  a  pleasing  or  displeasing  na- 
ture. 


ASTONISHMENT.  69 

According  to  the  above  view  of  the  emotion,  it 
may  obviously  be  connected  with  the  causes  either 
of  happiness  or  misery  ;  causes  which  inspire  those 
pleasing  sensations,  which  so  often  acconjpany  the 
perception  of  things  sublime  and  stupendous,  or 
which  excite  painful  sensations  from  things  we 
deem  horrible.  It  may  introduce  the  excess  of  joy, 
or  the  excess  of  fearful  apprehension ;  call  forth  the 
most  exalted  admiration,  or  inspire  the  deepest  in- 
dignation and  contempt. 

The  term  Amazement,  which  is  sometimes  em- 
ployed, seems  to  express  a  medium  between  won- 
der and  astonishment.  It  is  manifestly  borrowed 
from  the  extensive  and  complicated  intricacies  of  a 
labyrinth  ;  in  which  there  are  endless  mazes,  with- 
out the  discovery  of  a  clue.  Hence  an  idea  is  con- 
veyed of  more  than  simple  wonder ;  the  mind  is  lost 
in  wonder. 

Though  all  these  emotions  have,  generally 
speaking,  the  greatest  power  in  things  which  unex- 
pectedly arrest  the  attention  ;  yet  they  may  also 
proceed  from  contemplation.  When  the  subject  is 
complicated,  the  more  we  discern  concerning  it, 
the  more  will  unexpected  novelties  present  them- 
selves, and  successively  become  the  causes  of  sur- 
prise. These  novelties  may  be  of  such  a  nature, 
as  to  amaze  and  confound  the  understanding.  We 
may  also  be  the  more  deeply  penetrated  with  a 
conviction  of  the  vastness  and  incomprehensibility 
of  the  subject,  so  as  to  be  worked  up  into  astonish- 


70        CLASSIFICATION  OF  THE  PASSIONS,  &c. 

ment.  The  powers  of  the  soul  may  become  petri- 
fied as  it  were,  or  paralized  by  their  fruitless  at- 
tempts to  comprehend  what  is  far  beyond  their 
reach,  and  to  fathom  that  which  is  unfathomable ! 


SECTION  III. 

CliASSIFICATIOBT  OF  THE  PASSIONS  AND  AFFECTIONS,  AS!  THEY  RESPECT 
THB   SELFISH   OR   THE    SOCIAL    PRINCIPLE. 

We  are  now  prepared  to  contemplate  the  imme- 
diate effects  of  those  particular  qualities,  supposed 
to  be  seated  in  the  subjects  themselves ;  which  the 
emotions  of  Surprise,  Wonder,  and  Astonishment, 
may  have  forced  upon  our  attention,  or  which  may 
have  been  discovered  by  calmer  observation. 

According  to  the  order  proposed  we  shall  first 
attend  to  those  which  are  the  most  interesting  to 
Oursehes,  or  which  relate  to  the  principle  of  Self- 

LOVE. 


CLASS  I. 

ON    THE   PASSIONS   AND    AFFECTIONS,   WHICH    OIVE    THEIR   ORIGIN  TO 
THE    PRINCIPLE    OF   SELF-LOVE. 

These  may  be  divided  into  two  distinct  Orders; 
that  in  which  Love,  and  the  Idea  of  Good,  that  is. 


JOY.  71 


of  something  either  beneficial  or  pleasing,  are 
more  immediately  present  to  the  mind  ;  and  that 
in  which  Hatred,  and  the  Idea  of  Evil  are  most 
impressive. 


ORDER  I. 

THE  PASSIONS  AN0   AFFECTIONS  FOUNDED   ON  SELF-IOVE,  WHICH  ARil 
EXCITED   BY    THE  IDEA   OF   GOOD.       , 

These  are  of  two  Kinds  :  the  one  relates  to 
Good  in  Possession,  the  other  to  that  in  Expectan- 
cy. 

That  in  Possession  inspires  the  following  pas- 
sions ana  affections,  Joy,  Contentment,  Satisfaction, 
Complacency. 


JOY. 

Joy  is  the  vivid  pleasure  or  delight,  inspired  by 
the  immediate  reception  of  something  peculiarly 
grateful ;  of  something  obviously  productive  of  an 
essential  advantage  ;  or  of  something  which  pro- 
mises to  contribute  to  our  present  or  future  well- 
being.  This  delight  may  be  communicated,  by 
our  liberation  from  fearful  apprehensions,  or  from 
a  state  of  actual  distress  ; — by  obtaining  some  new 
acquisition,  some  addition  to  our^stock  of  enjoyment ; 
— or  by  the  full  assurance  of  this,  without  any 
mixture  of  doubt. 


?2  JOT. 

The  various"  degrees  of  Impetus  produced  by 
this  passion,  will  depend  upon  the  sensibility  of 
the  subject,  his  supposed  ignorance  of  the  object, 
the  sudden  and  unexpected  manner  in  which  it  has 
been  communicated,  and  the  contrast  formed  be- 
tween the  preceding  and  the  present  state.  A  sud- 
den and  instantaneous  translation  from  extreme 
anxiety  or  the  depth  of  distress,  to  an  exalted  pin- 
nacle of  happiness,  constitutes  the  highest  possible 
degree.  In  this  case,  Surprise,  Wonder,  Astonish- 
ment, take  possession  of  the  soul ;  and  though  they 
may  at  first  confound,  they  afterwards  are  produc- 
tive of  unutterable  transports. 

On  the  first  impulse  of  Joy,  we  are  perfectly 
passive.  No  effort  of  the  will  can  check  the  sensa- 
tion itself;  and  where  the  Joy  is  excessive,  it  is  not 
in  the  power  of  resolution  to  suppress  every  external 
sign.  The  state  of  passive  impression  is  succeed- 
ed by  the  exertions  of  a  vigorous  imagination, 
which,  with  rapid  confusion,  runs  over  the  many 
supposed  advantages  to  be  derived  from  the  wel-' 
come  treasure  :  and  these  it  is  disposed  to  multiply 
and  aggrandize,  far  beyond  the  bounds  of  reason 
or  probability.  This  pleasing,  I  had  almost  said, 
intoxicated  state  of  mind,  produces  correspondent 
effects  upon  the  system.  A  brisk  and  delectable 
.flow  of  the  animal  spirits  diffuses  a  pleasurable 
sensation  over  the  whole  frame.  Every  species  of 
torpor  is  subdued  ;  an  exhilaration  succeeds,  indi- 
cating itself  by  emotions,  which  not  only  manifest 
the  influence  of  the  passion  to  spectators,  but  so- 


GLADNESS,  CHEERFULNESS.  73 

licit  their  participation.  The  subject  feels  himself 
too  much  animated  to  remain  in  a  tranquil  state. 
Unusual  vivacity  in  the  eyes,  and  smiles  upon  the 
countenance,  are  accompanied  by  joyful  acclama- 
tions, clapping  of  hands,  and  various  other  lively 
gestures.  Where  the  mind  is  strongly  agitated, 
and  under  no  restraint  from  a  sense  of  decorum,  or 
solicitude  for  character,  loud  laughter,  jumping, 
dancing,  and  the  most  wild  and  extravagant  ges- 
tures, indicate  the  frolicksomeness  of  the  heart. 

Intense  meditation  upon  some  supposed  good, 
the  contemplation  of  its  intrinsic  worth,  and  of 
the  happy  consequences  which  are  expected  to 
flow  from  it,  have  sometimes  raised  the  mind  to 
transports,  over  which  reason  has  lost  its  controul. 
But  these  instances  seldom  occur ;  as  they  require 
the  union  of  strong  conviction,  lively  imagination, 
and  a  warm  heart.  The  transports  of  Joy  usually 
proceed  from  sudden  impulse ;  and  of  consequence, 
ecstacies  will  sometimes  be  great,  from  very  trivial 
causes. 

Gladness  is  an  inferior  degree  of  Joy ;  it  may 
be  excited  by  incidents  agreeable  or  desirable  in 
themselves,  which  are  not  of  sufficient  moment 
to  raise  the  ecstasies  of  joy ;  or  it  may  consist 
in  that  lively  flow  of  spirits,  which  immediately 
succeeds  to  the  transports  of  Joy. 

Cheerfulness  is  an  emotion  of  still  gentler  in- 
fluence. It  is  often  inspired  by  very  trivial  cir- 
cumstances, in  persons  of  a  lively  disposition,  and 
free  from  anxious  care. 

16 


74  CONTENTMENT,  SATISFACTION, 

Mirth  is  a  higher  degree  of  cheerfuhiess,  gene 
rally  excited  by  things  facetious,  or  ludicrous; 
and  greatly  augmented  by  the  power  of  social 
sympathy'.  Thus  it  frequently  becomes  noisy  and 
boisterous,  from  causes  not  able  to  communicate 
the  smallest  emotion  to  an  individual  in  a  solitary 
state. 

When  the  mind  is  more  composed,  and  we 
are  able  to  reflect,  with  a  degree  of  calmness, 
upon  the  good  received  or  anticipated,  we  become 
variously  affected, — according  to  the  value  we 
place  upon  the  object, — according  to  its  apparent 
suitableness  to  our  state  and  situation, — and  ac- 
cording to  its  correspondence  with  our  previous 
desires  and  expectations :  and  if  the  good  be  not 
transitory  or  evanescent,  we  remain  under  the 
influence  of  Contentment,  Satisfaction,  or  Com- 
placency. 

Contentment  expresses  the  acquiescence  of  the 
mind  in  the  portion  of  good  we  possess.  It  im- 
plies a  perception  that  our  lot  might  have  been 
better,  or  that  it  is  inferior  to  what  others  enjoy, 
or  that  it  does  not  fully  answer  the  expectations 
w^e  had  formed.  An  eflbrt  of  reason  or  of  pru- 
dence is  necessary  to  produce  it.  We  compare 
our  present  with  our  former  situation,  or  with  the 
inferior  lot  of  others  ;  and  thus  learn  to  acquiesce 
in  the  degree  of  advantage  obtained. 

Satisfaction  denotes  a  pleasing  state  of  mind, 
exceeding  that  communicated  by  simple  Content- 
ment.    The  good  obtained  is  duly  appreciated : 


COMPLACENCY.  75 

it  is  found  to  be  correspondent  to  our  desires,  and 
adequate  to  our  wishes.  The  word  Satisfaction 
is  frequently  employed  to  express  the  full  accom- 
plishment of  some  particular  desire  ;  which  always 
communicates  a  temporary  pleasure,  whatever 
may  be  the  nature  of  that  desire.  This  affection 
by  no  means  implies,  that  felicity  is  complete,  as 
it  chiefly  refers  to  particular  objects;  and  when 
it  respects  our  state  and  situation,  it  admits  that 
greater  good  might  have  been  our  portion,  though 
we  are  more  than  contented,  we  are  well-pleased 
with  what  we  possess. 

Complacency  is  full  and  continued  satisfaction, 
connected  with  a  considerable  degree  of  Approba- 
tion. It  has  intrinsic  value,  or  some  species  of  worth 
for  its  object ; — some  mental  excellencies,  or  ad- 
vantages accruing  from  them ; — some  sentiment, 
disposition,  acquireuient,  conduct,  performance, 
either  of  ourselves,  or  of  others  with  whom  we 
are  immediately  connected,  which,  upon  close 
examination,  we  deem  deserving  of  esteem  or 
applause.  Complacency  may  be  enjoyed  as  the 
reward  of  our  own  conduct,  or  of  the  purity  and 
benevolence  of  our  motives:  it  may  be  inspired 
by  a  review  of  conduct,  acquirement,  disposition, 
on  which  we  can  pronounce  that  it  was  ivell  done, 
or  well  intended.  Complacency  may  also  relate 
to  the  approved  conduct,  sentiments,  attainments, 
dispositions  of  others,  for  whom  we  are  deeply 
concerned.  In  this  case,  the  affection  may  be 
inspired,  by  their  conduct  and  dispositions  towards 


76  COMPLACENCY. 

ourselves,  or  by  the  interest  we  take  in  whatever 
contributes  to  the  promotion  of  their  own  honour 
and  happiness. 

The  Satisfaction  produced  by  complacency, 
indicates  that  we  have,  in  some  respect  or  other, 
a  personal  interest  in  the  object  of  it ;  which 
distinguishes  the  affection  from  that  high  gratifi- 
cation we  may  enjoy,  when  we  contemplate  and 
applaud  the  sentiments,  dispositions,  and  actions 
of  great  and  respectable  characters,  with  which 
we  can  have  no  immediate  concern. 

The  Approbation  which  accompanies  compla- 
cency, distinguishes  its  object  from  the  more 
common  causes  of  satisfaction.  These  causes 
may  arise  from  whatever  quadrates  with  our  wish- 
es and  desires,  without  paying  attention  to  their 
intrinsic  merit.  A  suitableness  to  the  occasion 
is  the  only  requisite  to  inspire  satisfaction ;  but 
the  Approbation  implied  in  complacency,  conveys 
tbe  idea  of  some  kind  of  Excellency.  The  term 
has  never  been  profaned  by  the  application  of  it 
to  guilty  pursuits,  dishonourable  success,  or  un- 
worthy sentiments  ;  however  they  may  flatter  our 
vanity,  or  be  the  completion  of  our  wishes.  Nor 
are  things  of  a  trivial  or  transient  nature,  deemed 
worthy  of  this  affection.  It  is  not  said  of  a  mere 
spectator,  that  he  takes  Complacency  in  a  ball,  a 
concert,  or  at  a  theatrical  exhibition :  however 
highly  he  may  be  delighted  and  satisfied  with 
the  performance. 


COMPLACENCY.  T? 

Nt)r  can  the  term  be  applied  with  propriety  to 
any  beneficial  acquisition,  which  has  been  purely 
accidental.  The  highest  prize  which  the  wheel  of 
fortune  may  have  thrown  into  our  laps,  may  be 
received  with  joy,  delight,  and  satisfaction  ;  but 
the  terms  Approbation  and  Complacency  would  be 
improperly  employed  to  express  our  feelings. 

Complacency  may  be  inspired  by  some  parts  of 
the  inanimate  creation,  in  which  we  have  an  im- 
mediate concern,  and  which  communicate  pleasure 
on  the  review.  Works  of  art  well  executed,  may 
be  contemplated  with  Complacency  ;  certainly  by 
the  Artist,  if  he  has  succeeded  to  his  wishes  ;  and 
the  Possessor  will  enjoy  something  of  a  similar 
pleasure,  if  the  performance  be  calculated  to  recall 
pleasing  ideas,  or  if  he  should  have  manifested 
either  taste  or  address  in  the  purchase  of  it.  (See 
Note  H.) 

The  above  instances  will  evince  that,  in  strict 
propriety  of  language,  Complacency  is  alone  appli- 
cable to  that  species  of  Good,  which  originates 
from  some  mental  or  moral  excellence ;  where 
there  is  an  indication  of  propriety,  ingenuity,  wis- 
dom, address,  or  dignity  in  sentiment,  design,  exe- 
cution ;  or  of  rectitude  and  benevolence  in  the  mo- 
tive. 

It  is  obvious  that  the  affection  of  Complacency 
will  possess  different  degrees  of  strength,  according 
to  the  various  kinds  and  degrees  of  excellence  dis- 
cernible in  the  exciting  cause.  The  highest  degree 
of  Complacency  can  alone  be  inspired,  by  the  obvi- 


7S  COMPLACENCY. 

ous  use  of  wise  and  pertinent  measures,  from  benefit 
cent  motives,  which  are,  or  promised  to  be,  produc- 
tive of  the  most  desirable  ends  :  or  by  laudable 
dispositions,  and  powerful  exertions,  crowned 
with  the  success  we  most  ardently  desired.  When 
the  means  have  been  as  wise  as  the  nature  of  the 
thing  would  admit,  the  motives  the  most  noble  and 
generous  ;  when  the  execution  indicates  skill,  and 
the  result  proves  as  successful  as  could  have  been 
wished,  Complacency,  respecting  that  object,  is 
complete. 

High  Complacency  is  the  most  grateful  of  all 
the  Affections.  It  possesses  an  elevation  and  a 
suavity  peculiar  to  itself.  It  is  permanent  satisfac- 
tion, enjoying  the  full  approbation  of  reason  ;  and 
consequently  it  suffers  no  alloy  from  the  struggle 
of  contending  passions,  or  opposite  desires.  When 
it  is  inspired  by  our  own  conduct,  it  is  accompani- 
ed by  self-approbation,  or  the  testimony  of  an  ap- 
plauding conscience,  enlivened  perhaps  by  the  voice 
of  gratitude,  and  enriched  by  the  esteem  of  the 
worthy.  If  it  proceed  from  the  conduct  of  others, 
it  augments  the  pleasures  of  affection,  friendship, 
and  gratitude. 

According  to  the  above  view  of  the  affection, 
may  a  virtuous  and  comprehensive  mind,  contem- 
plate things  in  themselves  of  a  displeasing  nature, 
with  Complacency  ;  such  as  difficulties,  which  are 
introductory  to  benefits ;  and  sufferings,  which 
may  be  requisite  for  the  production  of  the  most 
essential  good. 


PRIDE.  t$ 

But  the  affection  of  Complacency  has  its  coun- 
terfeit. Being  more  complicate  than  either  of  the 
preceding,  and  the  approbation  of  the  mind  form- 
ing a  constituent  part  of  it,  an  erroneous  opinion  of 
ourselves  may  change  the  nature  of  this  sublime 
affection,  and  render  it  the  parent  of  vice  and  folly. 
Thus  false  conceptions  of  our  own  talents,  acquire- 
ment, conduct,  may  inspire  Pride,  Vanity,  Haugh- 
tiness, and  Arrogance. 

Notwithstanding  these  affections  are  evil  in  their 
nature  and  tendency,  yet  as  they  are  the  illegiti- 
mate offspring  of  Complacency,  violated  by  Self- 
love,  and  have  the  appearance  of  great  good  for 
their  object,  they  demand  a  place  in  this  arrange- 
ment. 

Pride  is  that  exalted  idea  of  our  state,  qualifica- 
tions, or  attainments,  which  exceeds  the  boundaries 
of  justice,  and  induces  us  to  look  down  upon  sup- 
posed inferiors,  with  some  degree  of  unmerited 
contempt. 

When  this  elevated  idea  of  ourselves  becomes  a 
motive  to  avoid  and  despise  any  thing  mean  and 
unworthy,  its  impropriety  is  overlooked ;  and  as  it 
leads  to  worthy  conduct,  it  is  honoured  with  the 
appellation  of  laudable  Pride. 

It  sometimes  consists  in  exaggerated  ideas  of  the 
superiority  of  our  own  country ;  of  merit  in  our 
relatives  or  intiihate  connections,  whose  character 
and  conduct  reflect  some  rays  of  honour  upon  our- 
selves ; — such  as  the  pride  of  family  descent, — that 


ao  VANITY. 

of  children  whose  parents  may  have  acquired  cele- 
brity,— or  of  parents  in  the  accomplishments  of 
their  children,  or  particular  honours  conferred  upon 
them.  This  proceeding  from  the  excess  of  affec- 
tion, where  affection  is  natural,  is  called  ^pardona- 
ble Pride. 

When  Pride  is  manifested  by  an  ostentatious 
display  of  wealth,  station,  or  accomplishments,  it  is 
deemed  a  vain  Pride. 

When  it  is  indulged  to  such  an  excess,  that  it 
looks  down  with  disdain  upon  others,  but  little  in- 
ferior, perhaps  equal,  possibly  much  superior  in 
real  merit,  it  is  branded  with  the  title  of  insufferable 
Pride.     (See  Note  1.) 

Vanity  is  that  species  of  Pride,  which,  while  it 
presumes  upon  a  degree  of  superiority  in  some 
particular  articles,  fondly  courts  the  applause  of 
every  one  within  its  sphere  of  action ;  seeking 
every  occasion  to  display  some  talent,  or  some 
supposed  excellency.  Generally  speaking,  it  is 
the  foible  of  superficial  and  frivolous  minds,  that 
think  much  more  of  their  attainments,  than  of 
their  remaining  deficiencies.  Yet  it  may  be  found- 
ed on  the  excessive  love  of  praise,  in  those 
who  possess  no  inconsiderable  share  of  merit. 

Haughtiness  is  an  overt  act  of  Pride,  manifested 
by  some  conduct  or  expression,  indicative  of  an 
unmerited  contempt  of  others.  It  may  be  deemed 
in  this  case,  the  swelling  of  Pride  into  an  emo- 
tion. 


DESIRE.  81 

Arrogance  indicates  itself  by  some  particular 
claims  to  precedency,  or  marks  of  distinction  and 
respect,  from  those  whom  Pride  considers  its 
inferiors  in  station  and  character ;  or  by  imper- 
tinent pretensions  to  an  equality  with  superiors. 

These  indications  of  false  complacency  in 
their  mildest  influence,  may  be  placed  with  strict 
propriety  among  the  affections.  Upon  sudden 
occasions  they  rise  into  emotions ;  and  some-times, 
particularly  when  connected  with  anger,  from  a 
supposed  insult  or  neglect,  they  possess  every 
characteristic  of  passion. 

Having  considered  the  Passions  and  Affections 
immediately  connected  with  the  Possession  of 
Good,  we  shall  proceed  to  the  Passions  and 
Affections  which  are  excited  by  the  contemplation 
of  Good,  when  it  is  not  in  our  possession,  but  of 
which  the  attainment  is  deemed  possible.  Which 
constitutes  our  second  division  under  the  present 
Order.     These  are  Desire  and  Hope. 


DESIRE. 

The  general  nature  of  Desire  has  already  en- 
gaged our  attention.  It  has  been  described  as  that 
influential  effect  which  the  perception  of  Good  or 
Evil  produces  within  us,  in  consequence  of  which 
we  seek  to  obtain  the  one  and  avoid  the  other. 

n 


m  DESIRE. 

Our  plan  demands  that  we  now  contemplate 
Desire  as  it  is  excited  by  particular  objects,  con- 
ducive of  some  apparent  good,  either  of  benefit 
or  pleasure,  which  we  have  not  yet  obtained. 

According  to  the  common  acceptation  of  the 
term,  Desire  may  be  considered  as  an  eager  long- 
ing for  some  Good,  centered,  or  apparently  cen- 
tered, in  particular  objects,  situations,  or  circum- 
stances. 

This  description  is  made  as  general  as  possible, 
in  order  to  comprehend  two  different  acts  of  the 
mind  concerning  such  objects ;  which  are  signified 
by  the  terms  Wish  and  Desire. 

Lord  Kaims  expresses  this  difference  in  the 
following  manner  :  "  Desire,  taken  in  its  proper 
"  sense,  is  that  internal  act  which  by  influencing 
-"  the  will,  makes  us  to  proceed  to  action.  Desire, 
"  in  a  lax  sense,  respects  also  actions  and  events 
"  that  depend  not  on  us  ;  as  when  I  desire  that  my 
"  friend  may  have  a  son  to  represent  him ;  or 
"  that  my  country  may  flourish  in  arts  and 
"  sciences  ;  but  such  internal  act  is  more  properly 
"  termed  a  wish  than  desire.''''^  Though  this 
observation  does  not  fully  mark  the  difference,  it 
plainly  indicates  there  is  one. 

We  will  therefore  first  consider  the  Desire 
which  is  influential  to  action ;  and  then  advert 
more  particularly  to  the  characteristic  distinctions 
between  that  and  a  Wish, 

*  Elements  of  Criticism,  vol,  i.  p.  42, 


PE&IRE.  83 

In  the  first  sense,  Desire  may  be  defined,  that 
uneasy  sensation  excited  in  the  mind  by  the  view, 
or  by  the  contemplation,  of  any  desirable  good, 
which  is  not  in  our  possession,  which  we  are 
solicitous  to  obtain,  and  of  which  the  attainment 
appears  at  least  possible. 

Desire  is  in  its  nature  restless.  Mr.  Locke 
justly  remarks  that  "  it  is  the  uneasiness  it  occa- 
"  sions,  which  excites  the  mind  to  pursue  its  object, 
"  and  rouses  it  from  its  natural  state  of  apathy  and 
"  inactivity."  Thus  it  is  founded  on  some  species 
6f  discontent ;  for  were  we  perfectly  contented 
and  satisfied  with  all  our  sensations,  and  with 
every  circumstance  surrounding  us,  all  desire  must 
cease.  It  relates  to  something  which  is  not  im- 
mediately in  our  power,  and  which  requires  either 
our  own  exertions,  or  the  agency  of  others  over 
whom  we  possess  some  influence.  It  implies, 
therefore,  that  something  is  to  be  done,  before  the 
end  can  be  obtained ;  and  this  necessarily  implies 
also  that  there  is  a  possibility  of  success  attending 
the  attempt.  It  is  not  always  discouraged  bj 
difficulties ;  but  our  most  active  desires  are  never 
so  ardent  as  to  attempt  known  impossibilities. 

Desires  are  excited  either  by  the  wretchedness 
of  our  present  situation, — by  periodical  wants, 
which  demand  gratification, — -by  comparing  the 
defects  and  imperfections  of  our  own  state,  with 
the  preferable  state  of  others, — or  by  the  recent 
perception  of  some  pleasing  and  useful  quality  in 
objects,  which  we  wish  to  appropriate. 


84  DESIRE. 

When  Desire  is  excited  by  wretchedness  itself, 
it  looks  forwards  towards  Good ;  towards  libera- 
tion from  this  state,  and  the  enjoyment  of  a  better. 
Relief,  and  the  means  of  relief,  are  the  predominant 
ideas  accompanying  Desire.  In  this  case,  the  idea 
of  a  good  is  immediately  engrafted  on  the  stock  of 
evil.  The  desires  excited  by  periodical  wants 
belong  to  the  appetites  exclusively.  When  the 
comparison  of  our  own  state  with  that  of  others  im- 
plants desires,  they  proceed  from  the  discovery  of 
new  sources  of  enjoyment,  to  which  we  were 
strangers,  united  with  a  conviction  that  there  is  a 
possibility  of  attaining  them.  The  recent  percep- 
tion of  pleasing  qualities  in  objects,  has  a  similar 
influence.  Our  natural  love  of  good  inspires  a 
wish  to  possess  whatever  promises  an  augmen- 
tation of  our  welfare. 

Hence  it  appears,  that  our  Ignorance  is  often 
the  parent  of  contentment.  We  must  acquire 
some  knowledge  of  stations  and  qualities  before 
we  can  desire  them.  The  enlargement  of  our 
ideas  becomes  a  copious  source  of  discontent  with 
our  present  possessions,  and  inspires  ardent  desires 
after  new  objects.  Nothing  can  injure  the  good 
we  possess,  so  much  as  the  idea  of  a  something 
better  :  and  the  superlative  is  equally  injurious  to 
the  comparative. 

The  objects  of  desire  are  infinite,  and  infinitely 
diversified.  They  relate  to  whatever  is  essential 
to  our  existence  and  welfare,  and  to  every  thing 


DESIRE.  8.5 

which  may  strike  the  fancy;  that  is,  to  all  our 
natural,  and  all  our  artificial  wants.  They  refer 
also  to  all  our  social  connections,  and  to  all  our 
mental  pursuits.  These  desires  acquire  such  a  di- 
versity of  character,  according  to  their  origin,  the 
degrees  of  their  strength,  and  other  circumstances, 
as  to  render  a  minute  analysis  impossible.  We 
shall  therefore  confine  ourselves  to  a  few  remarks. 

It  is  observable  that  many  of  those  Desires 
which  are  common  to  all  men,  and  without  which 
the  usual  offices  of  life  could  not  be  discharged,  are 
of  the  mildest  and  most  permanent  natures  ;  such 
as  the  desire  of  preserving  health,  a  desire  of  pro- 
curing a  competency  suitable  to  our  station,  to  pro- 
vide for  our  families,  &c.  Desires  of  this  class  are 
not  distinguished  by  any  particular  epithet;  nor  are 
they  denominated  either  Affections  or  Passions, 
though  they  obviously  belong  to  the  former.  But 
when  any  extraordinary  and  unusual  desire  pre- 
sents itself,  which  exceeds  the  common  tenour  of 
disposition;  or  when  the  object  of  desire  is  some- 
thing peculiarly  striking, and  important,  it  is  distin- 
guished by  some  discriminating  epithet,  and  fre- 
quently assumes  the  character  of  an  affection,  emo- 
tion, Qv  passion. 

Thus,  the  moderate  and  legitimate  gratification 
of  the  sensual  appetites,  is  not  marked  by  any 
particular  appellation  ;  but  inordinate  desires,  which 
transgress  the  bounds  of  sobriety  and  decency,  are 
stigmatized  by  the  names  of  Gluttony,  Drunken- 
ness,  Debauchery,  Lust,  ^^c.     When  we  expatiate 


86  DESIRE. 

upon  such  a  character,  we  remark  that  the  person 
to  whom  it  belongs,  is  passionately  fond  of  good 
eating,  or  of  his  bottle ;  that  he  is  led  by  his  pas- 
sions, &c.  An  exemplary  command  over  such  ex- 
cesses is  honoured  with  the  title  of  Temperance,  and 
Chastity.  These  virtues,  consisting  in  the  love  of 
moderation,  and  in  purity  of  mind,  deserve  a  place 
among  the  affections ;  although,  from  the  mildness 
of  their  perpetual  influence,  they  are  simply  term- 
ed virtuous  dispositions.  The  moderate  desire  of 
wealth  has  no  particular  name  ;  but  when  the  de- 
sire becomes  excessive,  when  it  consists  in  amas- 
sing riches,  without  applying  them  either  to  utility 
or  enjoyment,  it  is  termed  Avarice,  This  also  is 
denominated  a  passion ;  not  from  the  violence  of 
any  emotion,  but  from  its  permanent  effects,  and 
from  the  passive  and  abject  state  of  the  person  who 
is  under  its  influence.  When  riches  are  eagerly 
pursued,  in  defiance  of  justice  and  humanity,  the 
conduct  is  termed  Rapaciousness.  The  wish  to  im- 
prove in  any  valuable  qualification  or  to  acquire 
esteem,  when  moderate,  has  no  distinguishing 
character ;  but  an  eager  desire  to  equal  or  excel 
others  in  any  particular  accomplishment,  is  called 
Emulation ;  and  to  seek  pre-eminence  in  office, 
title,  or  station,  is  Ambition,  These  desires  are 
frequently  so  inordinate,  as  to  require  the  name  af 
Passions :  thus  the  ambitious  passions  is  a  familiar 
expression.  (See  Note  K,)  The  exemplary  desire 
of  regulating  our  thoughts  and  pursuits,  by  right 
principles,  constitutes   Virtue ;  and  all  the  duties 


DESIRE.  8f 

which  are  performed  with  warmth  and  feeling  are 
deemed  the  result  of  virtuous  affections  :  the  oppo- 
site propensities  and  conduct  constitute  Fice,  whose 
characteristic  consists  in  depraved  affections,  and 
ungoverned  passions.  The  desire  of  yielding  obe- 
dience to  the  divine  command,  and  habitual  solici- 
tude to  obtain  the  divine  favour,  is  Religion,  This, 
under  its  mildest  influence,  is  termed,  a  disposition 
or  character.  When  a  religious  temper  is  indicated 
by  prayer  and  meditation,  which  warmly  interest 
the  affections,  it  is  called  devotion.  If  any  one 
imagines  that  the  divine  favour  is  to  be  obtained, 
by  a  scrupulous  attention  to  frivolous  ceremonies, 
he  is  considered  as  superstitious.  Superstition  is 
deemed  a  principle  of  action  rather  than  an  affec- 
tion. It  is,  in  fact,  consecrated  frivolity,  devoid  of 
love  or  regard  to  the  supposed  duties  it  enjoins,  or 
to  its  object.  A  tenacious  reverence  for  unimport- 
ant sentiments,  with  a  censorious  disposition  to- 
wards those  whose  opinions  are  opposite,  is  the 
province  of  bigotry ;  which,  if  it  deserve  the  title 
of  an  affection,  certainly  does  not  belong  to  the 
benevolent  class.  An  earnest  desire,  and  unremit- 
ted endeavours,  to  propagate  any  particular  senti- 
ment, or  to  enforce  a  particular  rule  of  conduct, 
either  out  of  love  of  truth,  or  of  those  we  wish  to 
become  proselytes,  or  in  order  to  recommend  our- 
selves to  some  Principal,  by  our  assiduity,  is  de- 
nominated zeal;  which  is  deemed  an  affection. 
When  some  particular  object  gains  the  ascendancy 
over  every  other,  and  occupies  the  greater  portion 


88  DESIRE. 

of  our  attention,  it  is  occasionally  termed  r passion ; 
as  a  passion  for  music,  &c.  in  what  sense,  and 
with  what  propriety  has  already  been  considered. 
Such  an  invincible  predilection  for  any  subject  as 
shall  occupy  the  choicest  of  our  thoughts,  and  incite 
to  the  most  vigorous  exertions,  with  such  an  ardour 
and  constancy  as  to  brave  difficulties  and  danger, 
is  termed  enthusiasm ;  which  has  a  place  among  the 
Passions. 

The  very  Motives  by  which  we  are  actuated, 
and  the  choice  of  means  in  order  to  effectuate  our 
purpose,  form  various  species  of  desire,  sufficient  to 
characterize  the  prevailing  disposition.  These 
constitute  integrity,  honesty,  industry,  honour,  &c. 
or  artifice,  deceit,  cruelty,  &c.  according  as  the 
prevailing  desire  is  under  the  influence  of  worthy, 
or  base  and  unworthy  principles  and  dispositions. 

It  should  also  be  recollected,  that  a  particular 
desire  may,  in  certain  circumstances,  become  the 
parent  of  various  other  affections  and  passions.  Of 
this  the  Passion  of  Love  presents  us  with  striking 
instances ;  which,  in  its  progress,  is  so  frequently 
productive  of  hope,  fear,  joy,  grief,  and  tormenting 
jealousies.  In  short,  every  pursuit,  which  primari- 
ly respected  the  gratification  of  our  senses,  may 
become  the  occasion  of  hope,  joy,  feaT,  anger,  sor- 
row, envy,  &c.  according  to  the  impediments  or 
aids  received  from  others,  or  according  to  our  suc- 
cess or  disappointment?. 


DESIRE.  89 

The  Novelty  of  an  object  will  frequently  elevate 
desire  into  a  passion.  This  doubtless  proceeds 
from  the  force  of  imagination,  which  greatly  en- 
hances the  value  of  those  qualities  which  the  object 
m'Ay  possess,  and  is  very  prone  to  supply  defects. 
Love  at  first  sight  illustrates  and  confirms  this 
idea.  Those  charms  which  had  seized  the  mind 
by  surprise,  become  both  unrivalled  and  irresistible 
to  an  heated  imagination. 

Impediments  to  our  desires,  if  they  be  not  suffi- 
ciently powerful  to  subjugate  them,  redouble  their 
ardour.  The  affections  being  once  engaged, 
desires  being  once  enkindled,  we  are  placed  in  a 
very  different  state  of  mind,  from  that  we  experi- 
enced previous  to  the  excitement.  We  know  that 
the  disappointment  of  our  wishes  will  not  leave  us 
in  the  former  state  of  tranquillity,  but  will  become 
a  source  of  unhappiness ;  we  therefore  redouble 
our  energy  not  to  sufTer  a  disappointment.  This 
also  is  strongly  exemplified  in  the  passion  of  Love. 
Pride,  anger,  &c.  are  sometimes  called  in  as  power- 
ful auxiliaries  ;  and  they  exert  all  their  impetuosity 
in  support  of  our  pretensions.  Inordinate  Ambi- 
tion abundantly  illustrates  this  fact.  It  engenders 
a  thousand  evil  passions,  which  like  the  Imps  of 
Sin  in  Milton^  yelp  around  it.  Where  it  meets  with 
obstacles,  it  is  not  scrupulous  about  the  means  of 
opposing  them.  Success  increases  its  powers ;  and 
contrary  to  every  other    monster,  it   is  rendered 

more  insatiable  and  ravenous  by  being  fed.     In 

12 


90  DESIRE. 

either  state,  therefore,  it  becomes  the  terror  and 
the  scourge  of  the  earth. 

Mental  pursuits  seem  to  be  the  most  remote 
from  every  thing  passionate  and  turbulent.  An 
affection  for  science  is,  in  general,  the  most  produc- 
tive of  a  pleasing  serenity  of  mind.  Yet  even  here 
no  small  diversity  is  observable,  according  as  the 
memory,  the  reasoning  powers,  or  the  imagination 
are  employed.  The  knowledge  of  interesting  facts, 
and  the  examination  of  the  relation  of  things  to 
each  other,  are  generally  of  the  calmest  nature ; 
though  the  latter  may  justly  be  deemed  of  a  more 
elevated  character  than  the  former.  It  is  some- 
times also  rewarded  with  the  transports  of  joy,  in- 
spired by  the  surprise  of  some  new  and  important 
discovery.  The  creative  powers  of  the  mind  are 
as  various  in  their  effects,  as  they  are  unlimited  in 
their  operations.  They  are  the  sources  of  lively 
amusement,  and  they  may  excite  ecstacies.  Where 
the  imagination  is  the  most  vivid,  its  pleasures  are 
the  strongest ;  but  they  are  of  short  duration : 
whereas  the  pursuits  of  knowledge  furnish  a  tem- 
perate perpetuity  of  gratification,  sufficient  to  com- 
fort and  support  the  indefatigable  student,  in  his 
most  arduous  researches. 

The  Motives  to  study  are  accompanied  with 
various  effects  upon  the  mind.  When  science  is 
pursued  simply  from  the  pleasure  which  know- 
ledge affords,  that  pleasure  is  placid  and  mild. 
When  the  primary  motive  is  to  benefit  mankind 
by  useful  communications,  the  pursuit  itself  has 


DESIRE.  91 

self-complacency  for  its  companion.  When  the 
object  is  personal  advantage,  either  of  fortune  or 
of  reputation,  adventitious  passions  will  arise  ac- 
cording to  the  prospect  of  success,  or  the  actual 
accomplishment  of  our  desires ;  according  to  ap- 
prehensions entertained,  or  to  disappointments  ex- 
perienced. When  high  ambition  is  the  primary 
object,  the  passions  proceeding  from  success,  re- 
nown, disappointment,  uncertainty,  rivalship,  dis- 
grace; such  as  joy,  sorrow,  vexation,  hope,  fear, 
jealousy,  &c.  &c.  will  agitate  the  mind. 

The  desires  respecting  our  social  connections, 
are  for  the  reasons  given  above,  and  according 
to  the  plan  proposed,  referred  to  a  distinct  class. 

Desires,  inspired  by  religious  principles,  are 
of  all  others  the  most  diversified,  both  in  kind 
and  degree ;  they  are  according  to  the  notions 
we  entertain  of  religion,  and  the  stronger  or 
weaker  effect  of  these  notions  upon  our  feelings. 
The  most  extensive  signification  of  the  term 
Religion^  that  which  comprehends  the  greatest 
diversity  of  opinions,  and  meets  the  ideas  of 
most  philosophers,  seems  to  be  the  following  : 
An  impressive  sense  of  the  irresistible  influence  of 
one  or  more  superior  Beings,  over  the  concerns 
of  mortals^  which  may  become  beneficial  or  ini- 
mical to  our  welfare.  It  is  evident,  that  a  great 
diversity  of  the  most  opposite  principles  may  be 
included  under  this  general  definition ;  and  it  is 
no  less  evident,  that  these  principles,  as  often  as 
they  become  influential,  will  be  productive  of  ef- 


92  DESIRE. 

fects  correspondent  with  their  natures;  will  form 
the  temper,  and  implant  desires,  most  congenial 
with  themselves,  but  the  most  opposite  to  each 
other.  Zeal  and  enthusiasm  are  common  to  them 
all ;  but  their  indications  will  be  correspondent 
with  the  supposed  characters  of  the  Powers  they 
revere,  and  the  methods  supposed  to  be  necessary 
to  conciliate  their  favour,  and  avert  their  displeas- 
ure. Fear,  terror,  bigotry,  superstition,  cruelty, 
may  thus  be  engendered ;  every  evil  propensity 
and  atrocious  vice  may  thus  be  consecrated,  how- 
ever inconsistent  with  the  genuine  dictates  of  re- 
ligion, or  the  feelings  of  humanity.    (See  Note  L.) 

When,  on  the  contrary,  the  mind  is  inspired 
with  the  most  exalted  conceptions  of  Deity,  and 
with  correspondent  sentiments  of  moral  obligation, 
religion  may  cherish  the  purest  dispositions  and 
affections.  It  may  moderate  and  restrain  inordi- 
nate desires, — elevate  the  mind  by  the  contempla- 
tion of  perfection  in  character,  and  by  a  warm 
desire  to  imitate.  It  may  inspire  love,  joy,  hope, 
gratitude ; — correct  impatience  and  discontent ; — - 
foster  the  principles  of  universal  benevolence,  and 
of  every  social  virtue.  Thus  may  Religion,  ac- 
cording to  the  ideas  formed  of  its  object  and 
duties,  be  rendered  capable  of  exciting  the  most 
despicable,  or  the  most  noble  affections;  and  of 
forming  the  most  abject,  or  the  most  elevated  of 
characters ! 

Mr.  Hume  has  remarked,  that  Religion  is  the 
fulcrum,  which  Archimedes  required,  to  enable 


WISH.  93 

him  to  move  the  world.  He  might  have  added, 
that  according  to  the  manner  and  address  exer- 
cised, in  supplying  the  lever  of  Opinion  to  this 
fulcrum,  will  the  world  be  raised  up  to  the  hea- 
vens, or  depressed  down  to  the  abyss. 

A  Wish  is  an  inactive  desire.  It  is  the  result 
of  that  longing  after  happiness  so  natural  to  man, 
in  cases  where  no  expectations  can  be  formed, 
no  efforts  can  be  made.  It  is  the  breathing  after 
something  desirable,  where  the  means  to  obtain 
it  are  not  in  our  power ;  or  where  the  opportunity 
may  be  forever  lost.  It  is  excited  by  the  con- 
templation of  a  something,  which  if  it  could  possi- 
bly be  obtained,  might  augment  our  portion  of 
good ;  or  by  reflecting  upon  something,  which, 
had  it  been  possessed,  performed,  or  avoided, 
might  have  proved  peculiarly  advantageous.  Thus 
we  may  wish  for  impossibilities,  which  cannot 
be  the  objects  of  our  active  desires.  The  beggar 
may  wish  to  be  a  King,  who  cannot  seriously 
desire  it.  We  may  wish  that  we  could  fly,  even 
without  wings,  and  pay  a  visit  to  some  of  the 
planets;  though  we  know  that  the  wish  will  be 
in  vain. 

A  Wish  may  refer  to  past  scenes,  where  De- 
sire is  totally  inapplicable.  The  essence  of  re- 
pentance consists  in  wishing  that  we  had  conduct- 
ed ourselves  in  a  different  manner. 

These  instances  abundantly  confirm  the  re- 
mark  of  Lord,   Kaims^    that   we   may   wish   for 


94  HOPE. 

things  not  in  our  power ;  and  they  shew  that  the 
range  of  our  wishes  is  of  an  infinite  extent,  compre- 
hending impossibilities,  that  have  a  reference  to  the 
past,  present,  or  future.     (See  Note  M.) 

Hope  is  the  encouragement  given  to  desire  ;  the 
pleasing  expectancy  that  its  object  shall  be  obtain- 
ed. Without  this  affection,  desire  would  sink  into 
despondency ;  like  a  simple  wish  it  would  remain 
inactive,  and  prey  upon  itself;  producing  perpetual 
uneasiness,  destitute  of  any  advantage.  Hope  is 
so  pleasing,  and  so  invigorating  an  affection,  that 
it  is  emphatically  styled  the  Balm  of  Life.  It  pre- 
serves the  mind  from  stagnating  in  its  present  pos- 
sessions, corrects  the  uneasiness  of  desire,  and  ani- 
mates it  to  struggle  with  the  difficulties  it  may  have 
to  encounter.  Hope  possesses  the  happy  secret  of 
anticipating  the  good  we  desire.  By  the  pleasing 
sensation  it  communicates,  we  already  taste  the 
pleasures  we  seek.  Where  the  object  has  not 
been  of  the  first  importance,  the  pleasures  of  Hope 
have  frequently  been  experienced  to  surpass  those 
of  actual  possession  ;  for  the  imagination  is,  in  this 
affection,  solely  occupied  by  the  supposed  advanta- 
ges and  eligible  qualities  of  its  object,  without  at- 
tending to  any  of  its  imperfections.  In  its  genera, 
operation,  the  indulgence  of  Hope  is  mixed  with 
certain  portions  of  doubt  and  solicitude  ;  but  when 
doubt  is  removed,  and  the  expectation  becomes  san- 
guine, hope  rises  into  joy,  and  it  has  been  known 
to  produce  transports  and  ecstasies,  equally  with 


HOPE.  >       93 

the  full  accomplishment  of  ardent  desires.  Thus, 
according  to  the  degrees  of  force  with  which  it  af- 
fects the  mind,  it  may  be  considered  either  as  an 
affection  or  a  passion. 

It  also  appears  that  Joy  and  Hope  are  very  simi- 
lar in  their  natures  ;  and  that  the  pleasing  sensa- 
tions they  inspire,  are  very  correspondent.  The 
difference  consists  in  the  degree  of  uncertainty 
which  intervenes  before  possession,  and  checks  the 
ardour  of  hope ;  and  as  the  object  was  in  expec- 
tancy, the  pleasure  is  not  so  powerfully  quickened 
by  the  influence  of  Surprise.  Yet  where  the  ob- 
ject has  been  highly  valued,  and  the  anxiety  great 
concerning  its  attainment,  a  release  from  this  anxie- 
ty has  communicated  a  delectable  elasticity  to  the 
mind,  and  rendered  its  sensations  as  vivid  as  those 
excited  by  more  unexpected  causes. 

As  the  above  Passions  and  Affections  are  inspir- 
ed by  the  contemplation  of  Good,  thus  are  most  of 
them  of  a  pleasant  nature.  This  is  obviously  the 
case  with  Joy,  and  all  the  affections  connected  with 
it.  Hope  is  also,  uniformly,  a  pleasant  affection. 
Desire  will  vary  according  to  its  object,  degrees 
of  strength,  and  the  different  passions  and  affections 
so  frequently  arising  from  it.  Although  in  its  mild- 
est state,  it  possesses  a  degree  of  restlessness, 
which  serves  as  a  stimulus  to  exertions,  yet  its  im- 
mediate attendants  give  a  preponderancy  in  its  fa- 
vour. Desire,  as  defined  above,  has  always  some 
species  of  Good  for  its  object,  which  is  always  a 


96  HOPE. 

pleasant  object ;  and  it  is  encouraged  in  its  attempts? 
by  the  possibility  or  probability  of  attainment. 
These  two  circumstances  united,  more  than  com= 
pensate  for  the  degree  of  restlessness  it  in  general 
occasions.  The  sportsman,  who  delights  in  the 
chase,  who  endures  cold,  hunger,  and  fatigue,  with 
more  than  patience,  inspired  by  the  hopes  of  exer- 
cising his  skill,  and  carrying  home  the  triumphant, 
though  trifling,  reward  of  his  assiduity,  is  a  just 
emblem  of  the  state  of  our  minds,  in  the  pursuit  of 
objects  we  deem  of  superior  importance.  Desires 
are  not  only  comfortless,  but  approach  to  misery,^- 
when  they  are  impetuous  and  ungovernable, — when 
hopes  are  frequently  checked  by  disappointments — 
when  patience  is  wearied  out  by  procrastinations, 
— and  when  desires  are  borne  away  by  the  whirl- 
wind of  turbulent  passions,  which  they  have  excit- 
ed. 

The  Wish,  which  characterizes  the  benevolent 
heart,  is  of  a  pleasing  nature.  When  it  refers 
simply  to  the  melioration  of  our  state,  not  being 
supported  by  hope,  it  subsides  almost  as  soon  as  it 
is  formed.  It  is  most  painful,  when  it  is  excited 
by  our  own  improper  conduct,  or  by  the  neglect  of 
advantages  which  are  jiever  to  return. 


SORROW.  97 


ORDER  II. 

We  proceed  to  consider  those  Passions  and  Affec- 
tions operating  upon  the  Principle  of  Self-love^  in 
which  the  idea  of  Evil  is  immediately  present  to 
the  mind. 

These  are  distinguished  into  three  Kinds :  the 
first  relates  to  actual  losses  and  disappointments ; 
the  second,  to  evils  of  which  we  are  apprehensive  ; 
and  the  third,  to  the  conduct  which  seems  to  de- 
serve reprehension.  They  inspire  the  passions  of 
Sorrow,  Fear,  and  Anger,  with  their  different  modi- 
fications and  combinations. 

It  it  obvious  from  this  general  description  of 
each,  that  they  must  be  frequently  blended  together. 
Partial  evils  inspiring  Sorrow,  are  frequently  the 
harbingers  of  others  which  alarm  our  Fears ;  and 
both  the  evils  we  lament,  and  those  we  dread,  may 
be  occasioned  by  a  conduct  calculated  to  excite  our 
Anger.  In  consequence  of  such  combinations, 
many  of  the  affections  under  this  class  become  so 
complicated,  as  to  render  it  difficult  to  give  them  a 
specific  arrangement. 

Those  which  are  the  least  complex  demand  ouv 
first  attention. 

13 


§8  SORROW. 


I.  SORROW, 


It  is  scarcely  necessary  to  observe,  that  Sorrow 
is  the  direct  opposite  of  Joy.  It  expresses  a  men- 
tal suffering,  under  the  privation  of  some  good 
which  we  actually  possessed,  or  concerning  which 
we  entertained  a  pleasing  expectation.  The  one 
we  term  Loss,  the  other  a  Disappointment.  When 
the  loss  or  disappointment  has  been  very  great,  and 
we  feel  it  as  a  privation  of  something  upon  which 
our  affections  were  strongly  placed ;  when  the 
event  arrived  in  a  sudden  and  unexpected  manner, 
so  that  the  mind  was  not  able  to  collect  itself  or 
prepare  for  it,  this  passion  produces  extreme  an- 
guish. Surprise,  Wonder,  and  Astonishment,  exert 
their  powerful  influence,  and  greatly  augment  the 
pangs  of  sorrow.  The  senses  are  troubled ;  the 
soul  is  overwhelmed,  and  sometimes  sinks  into  a 
painful  stupefaction.  This  state  marks  the  Passion 
of  Sorrow,  according  to  the  distinctions  noticed  in 
the  preceding  pages  ;  for  it  is  here  that  the  mind 
is  perfectly  passive.  As  soon  as  it  is  able  to  collect 
its  powers,  it  wanders  over,  and  exaggerates,  every 
distressing  circumstance,  every  possible  disadvan- 
tage that  may  be  consequent  upon  the  loss,  until 
tumultuous  emotions  are  excited,  bordering  upon 
phrensy.  Violent  agitations,  and  restless  positions 
of  the  body,  extension  of  the  arms,  clapping  of  the 
hands,  beating  the  breast,  tearing  the  hair,  loud 


SORROW.  S9 

sobs  and  sighs,  manifest  to  the  spectator  the  inward 
agony  of  the  soul.  Such  are  the  Emotions,  which 
indicate  the  nature  and  strength  of  the  Passion. 
Sometimes  a  flood  of  tears  relieves  these  pathogno- 
monic symptoms.  Universal  lassitude  and  a  sense 
of  debility  succeed,  with  deep  dejection  of  coun- 
tenance, and  languor  in  the  eyes,  which  seem  to 
look  around,  and  solicit  in  vain  for  assistance  and 
relief.  Every  thing,  which  used  to  communicate 
pleasure  and  inspire  vivacity,  appears  frivolous,  or 
becomes  indifferent  to  the  mind.  The  only  delight 
which  is  now  enjoyed,  is  to  contemplate  the  cause 
of  its  affliction ;  to  enumerate  all  the  excellencies 
and  advantages  of  that  which  was  once  possessed, 
or  might  have  been  possessed  ;  and  fondly  to  dwell 
upon  each.  Thus  the  Emotions  gradually  sink 
into  permanent  Affections. 

Qrief  is  sometimes  considered  as  synonymous 
with  Sorrow ;  and  in  this  case  we  speak  of  the 
transports  of  grief.  At  other  times  it  expresses 
more  silent,  deep,  and  painful  affections  ;  such  as 
are  inspired  by  domestic  calamities ;  particularly 
by  the  loss  of  friends  and  relatives ;  or  by  the 
distress,  either  of  body  or  mind,  experienced  by 
those  whom  we  love  and  value. 

When  the  mind  is  very  deeply  impressed  with 
a  sense  of  calamity,  for  a  continuance,  and  the  at- 
tention cannot  by  any  means  be  diverted  from  it, 
the  subject  is  in  a  state  of  Melancholy. 

This  affection  manifests  itself  by  dejection  of 
spirits,  debility  of  mind  and  body,  obstinate  and 


100  SORROW. 

insuperable  love  of  solitude,  universal  apathy,  and 
a  confirmed  listlessness,  which  emaciate  the  cor- 
poreal  system,  and  not  unfrequently  trouble  the 
brain. 

It  is  a  striking  characteristic  of  deep  Sorrow 
that  it  is  of  a  tacit  and  uncommunicative  nature. 
In  this  also  it  is  the  opposite  to  Joy.  After  the 
violent  effusions  of  the  mind,  in  the  first  emotions, 
it  subsides  into  a  pensive  and  reserved  state.  It 
attempts  concealment,  even  from  the  bosom  of  a 
friend  ;  like  Viola  in  Shakspeare, 

Who  never  told  her  love; 
But  let  concealment,  like  a  worm  Id  the  bud, 
Feed  on  her  damask  cheek. 

This  disposition  may  proceed  from  some  peculiar 
delicacy  in  the  cause  of  grief,— from  that  indolenee, 
which  is  the  reverse  both  of  the  vivacity  and  loqua- 
city of  joy,- — from  the  apprehension  that  the  many 
will  not  sympathize  with  the  sufferer, — and  from  a 
reluctance  to  afflict  the  few  that  will. 

The  above  remarks  refer  to  Sorrow,  when  it  is 
excited  by  more  simple  causes,  and  is  unconnected 
with  any  other  affection ;  but  it  is  very  frequently 
blended  with  other  affections,  by  means  of  which 
it  is  greatly  diversified.  Sometimes  it  assumes 
the  appearance  of  discontent  and  dissatisfaction. 
The  first  is  mostly  inspired  by  a  comparison  of  our 
situation  with  that  of  others,  and  tlie  discovery  of 


SORROW.  101 

an  humiliating  inferiority.  The  other  principally 
refers  to  the  disappointment  of  our  desires,  or  to  a 
partial  and  imperfect  accomplishment  of  our  ardent 
wishes.  In  disappointments,  where  the  affections 
have  been  strongly  placed,  and  the  expectations 
sanguine,  particularly  where  the  agency  of  others 
is  concerned,  sorrow  may  degenerate  into  Vexation 
and  Chagrin ;  which  are  still  higher  degrees  of 
dissatisfaction.  They  all  imply  an  irritated,  as 
well  as  sorrowful  state  of  mind. 

Impatience,  is  also  a  mixture  of  Sorrow  and 
Anger,  under  the  immediate  sensation  of  something 
irksome ;  or  at  the  causes  of  delay,  where  any 
desirable  object  is  in  expectancy. 

Repitiing,  is  Sorrow  united  with  a  degree  of 
resentment  against  some  superior  agent,  where  the 
mind  dares  not  to  break  forth  into  strong  expres- 
sions of  anger. 

Sympathetic  Sorrow,  is  that  species  of  sorrow 
we  participate  with  others,  in  consequence  of  our 
social  connections,  or  the  general  benevolence  of 
our  natures.  This  will  be  more  amply  considered 
hereafter. 

Of  the  virtuous  affections  inspired  by  Sorrow, 
which  are  personal,  the  most  conspicuous  are, 
Patience,  Resignation,  and  Humility.  These  by 
their  habitual  influence  often  form  the  disposition 
and  character. 

In  the  exercise  of  Patience,  the  mind  has  wisely 
determined  to  render  the  evil  as  light  as  possible, 


1<)^  SORROW. 

by  counteracting  the  usual  effects  of  sorrow  or 
vexation.  It  endures  actual  sufferings  with  com- 
posure, or  waits  for  expected  blessings,  without  a 
culpable  restlessness.  In  short,  patience  is  a  calm 
acquiescence  in  a  state  of  which  we  perceive  the 
evils  and  discomfiture;  by  this  it  is  sufficiently 
distinguished  from  insensibility. 

Resignation,  superadds  to  patience  a  submis- 
sive disposition,  respecting  the  intelligent  cause 
of  our  uneasiness.  It  acknowledges  both  the  power 
and  the  right  of  a  Superior  to  afflict.  It  is  usually 
connected  with  a  confidence  in  his  justice;  and  it 
indulges  a  hope  also  in  some  future  exemption. 
Thus  it  opposes  a  fretful  repining  temper  of 
mind. 

Humility,  is  a  degree  of  habitual  sorrow,  or  of 
painful  apprehension, — by  which  it  is  connected 
with  fear, — concerning  our  deficiencies  in  intellec- 
tual or  moral  attainments.  It  is  inspired  either  by 
comparing  ourselves  with  others,  who  appear  to  be 
our  superior  in  these  excellencies  ;  or  by  the  con- 
templation of  their  intrinsic  value,  importance, 
extent,  and  the  obstacles  which  we  have  suffered 
to  impede  our  progress.     (See  Note  N.) 

We  have  considered  the  principal  cause  of 
Sorrow  to  the  privation ;  because  the  loss  of  some 
good  is,  in  most  instances,  the  prevalent  idea. 
Pecuniary  losses,  the  loss  of  relatives  and  friends, 
of  their  good- will  and  affection,  are  obvious  pri- 
vations.    Sickness  is  the  privation  of  health ;  im- 


SORROW.  103 

prisonment  the  privation  of  liberty ;  and  the  hard- 
ships endured  in  prison,  the  privation  of  accus- 
tomed indulgencies  ;  calumny  and  disgrace  are 
the  privations  of  a  good  character.  Yet  it  is 
acknowledged,  that  being  in  the  habit  of  consider- 
ing these  things  as  essential  to  comfort  and  happi- 
ness, we  view  this  privation  in  a  positive  light ; 
and  if  we  attend  simply  to  the  effects,  the  idea 
is  doubtless  pertinent ;  for  all  misery,  whatever 
be  the  cause,  is  a  positive  sensation.  In  bodily 
pains  or  corporal  sufferings,  the  evil  endured  is 
uniformly  considered  as  of  a  positive  nature ;  nor 
does  the  idea  of  a  Loss  present  itself  to  the  mind. 
It  would  be  an  affectation  of  philosophic  precision, 
to  consider  the  agonies  of  the  torture  as  a  privation 
of  former  ease.  Perhaps  the  reason  of  this  dis- 
tinction is  founded  in  our  claiming  an  exemption 
from  pain,  as  our  natural  and  only  inheritance. 
Every  thing  besides  is  an  acquisition,  either  as 
a  gift,  or  the  purchase  of  our  own  labour.  The 
following  peculiarity  confirms  this  idea ;  the  term 
Sorrow  cannot  with  any  propriety  be  applied  to 
our  bodily  sufferings.  We  should  smile  at  any 
one,  who  asserted  that  he  was  sorry  because  he 
had  a  fit  of  the  gout,  or  suffered  a  public  flagel- 
lation ;  though,  in  fact,  the  body  cannot  suffer 
without  the  participation  of  the  mind.  Hence  it 
appears  that  the  prevalent  cause  of  Sorrow  is  pri- 
vation, though  the  effects  are  positive  misery. 


104  .   FEAR. 


II.  FEAR. 


The  second  effect  produced  by  the  hatred  of 
Evil,  that  we  shall  mention,  is  Fear. 

Fear  is  a  painful  sensation,  produced  by  the 
immediate  apprehension  of  some  impending  Evil. 
This  evil  may  consist  in  being  deprived  of  Vfh^t 
we  at  present  enjoy,  in  being  disappointed  in 
what  we  had  expected,  or  in  the  infliction  of  a 
positive  misery. 

The  passion  of  Fear  is  still  more  painful  than 
that  of  Sorrow,  which  notwithstanding  its  seve- 
rity has,  when  calmed  into  an  affection,  some- 
thing soothing  in  its  nature.  Fear  produces  an 
agony  and  anxiety  about  the  heart,  not  to  be 
described ;  and  it  may  be  said  to  paralyze  the 
soul  in  such  a  manner,  as  to  render  it  insensible 
to  every  thing  but  to  its  own  misery.  Inert* 
ness  and  torpor  pervade  the  whole  system,  united 
with  a  constriction  of  the  integuments  of  the  body, 
and  also  a  certain  sense  of  being  fettered,  or  of 
being  rendered  incapable  of  motion.  The  eyes 
are  pallid,  wild,  and  sunk  in  their  sockets ;  the 
countenance  is  contracted  and  wan  ;  the  hair 
stands  erect,  or  at  least  this  sensation  is  excited, 
which  every  child  experiences,  as  often  as  he  is 
terrified  by  stories  of  ghosts,  witches,  &c. ;  the 
bowels  are  strongly  affected,  the  heart  palpitates, 
respiration  labours,  the  lips  tremble,  the  tongue 


FEAR.  103 

falters,  the  limbs  are  unable  to  obey  the  will,  or 
support  the  frame.  Dreadful  shrieks  denote  the 
inward  anguish.  These  are  often  succeeded  by 
syncopies,  which,  while  they  manifest  that  the 
sufferings  are  greater  than  nature  can  sustain, 
afford  a  temporary  relief. 

Such  are  the  external  signs  which  indicate  the 
wretched  state  of  mind,  under  this  horrid  passion. 
Since  torpor,  debility,  and  painful  constrictions, 
frequently  accompany  fear  more  than  any  other 
passion,  the  Emotions  W\\\  of  consequence  be  less 
vivid.  Instead  of  violent  transports,  a  deep  de- 
pression and  numbness,  as  it  were,  both  of  body 
and  mind,  characterize  the  passion.  These  may 
be  visible  to  the  attentive  spectator,  and  are  not 
less  expressive  of  inward  anguish. 

When  the  effects  of  fear  operate  powerfully, 
without  any  mixture  of  hope,  these  passive  im- 
pressions are  predominant :  but  when  there  is  a 
possibility  of  escape,  the  mind  re-acts  with  won- 
derful energy.  Abject  depression  is  changed  into 
violent  agitations ;  collected  force  takes  place  of 
debility,  and  tremendous  exertions  succeed  to  a 
state  of  torpor  and  immobility.  When  a  personal 
attack  is  apprehended,  momentary  and  trembling 
strength  is  thrown  into  the  muscles ; — the  body 
instinctively  places  itself  in  the  attitude  of  defence ; 
— a  mixture  of  fierceness  and  wild  horror  is  ex- 
pressed in  the  countenance,  well  adapted  to  alarm 
and  terrify  the  enemy.  If  escape  be  attempted,, 
an  unusual  energy  is  thrown  into  the  limbs,  en- 

14 


106  FEAR. 

abling  the  sufferer  to  precipitate  his  flight,  by 
exertions  that  would  have  been  impracticable  in 
a  more  composed  state  of  mind. 

Consternation.  This  species  of  fear  is  a  strong 
foreboding  of  tremendous  evils,  which  are  likely 
to  follow  misfortunes  that  have  already  taken 
place.  It  may  seize  an  Individual,  when  surprised 
by  the  arrival  of  some  dreadful  disaster  ;  or  at 
the  instant  of  his  being  made  acquainted  with  the 
event.  But  it  chiefly  refers  to  alarms  of  a  more 
extensive  nature ;  to  those  excited  by  some  general 
calamity,  which  threatens  evils  beyond  the  power 
of  calculation.  Earthquakes,  volcanic  eruptions, 
inundations,  conflagrations,  the  sudden  approach 
of  an  incensed  and  powerful  enemy,  are  of  this 
kind.  Here  the  danger  is  widely  diffused,  lear 
is  rendered  contagious ;  and  by  the  influence  of 
social  sympathy,  the  Consternation  becomes  uni- 
versal, without  having  any  particular  tendency, 
or  being  directed  to  any  particular  object.  When 
calamities  of  this  nature  arrive  in  a  sudden  and 
unexpected  manner ;  particularly  where  the  ideas 
of  perfect  security  had  been  indulged,  and  perhaps 
were  triumphant  and  insulting ;  Surprise,  Wonder, 
Astonishment,  manifest  their  powers,  by  the 
augmentation  of  misery  ;  while  a  troubled  imagina- 
tion aggravates  every  possibility  of  horror.  In  all 
these  cases,  the  expressions  of  fear  are  wild  and 
frantic.  Beating  the  breast,  tearing  the  hair,  loud 
lamentations,  indicate  the  agony  of  the  soul. 


FEAR.  107 

Perhaps  the  panic  which  has  sometimes  seized 
a  whole  army,  flushed  with  victory,  will  illustrate 
the  preceding  observations.  Rapid  success  had 
inspired  the  arrogant  idea  of  invincibility.  An  un- 
expected defeat  has  not  only  subdued  this  delusion, 
but  given  an  opposite  direction  to  the  active  im- 
agination, and  has  transferred  the  idea  of  invin- 
cibility to  the  Enemy.  The  troops  now  think 
that  it  will  be  in  vain,  any  longer  to  resist  a  power 
which  has  shewn  itself  superior  to  their  own 
wonted  prowess  ;  and  where  resistance  is  suppos- 
ed to  be  absolutely  in  vain,  it  never  will  be  at- 
tempted. The  force  of  superstition,  either  in  de- 
pressing or  animating  courage,  is  well  known. 
This  has  made  the  most  valiant  tremble  at 
shadows;  and  consecrated  banners  have  secured 
victory  over  an  host  of  enemies.  Even  the  war- 
like Achilles,  who  was  the  bulwark  of  the  Grecian 
cause,  and  whose  sole  delight  was  in  the  tumults 
of  war,  trembled  at  the  sudden  appearance  of 
Minerva.* 

Abject  fear,  which  is  accompanied  by  the  more 
silent  symptoms  of  depressed  spirits,  seems  to  be 
inspired  chiefly  by  the  idea  of  an  irresistible  power 
in  its  cause.  This  also  is  the  faithful  companion 
of  Superstition.  It  is  easily  excited  in  feeble  minds 
by  every  tale  of  horror.  It  is  very  observable  in 
those  who  are  led  into  captivity,  or  to  |)rison  ;  in 
those  detected  in  the  commission  of  a  crime,  which 
exposes  them  to  the  severity  of  the  law  ;   in  those 

*0«ft/S««y  (f'  h^ihhm.    See  Horaer.  Jliad.  A.  1.  199. 


108  FEAR. 

who  are  under  the  expectation  of  immediate  pun- 
ishment :  that  is,  in  cases  which  admit  of  no  escape 
or  redress. 

Terror  is  that  species  of  fear,  which  rouses  to 
defend  or  escape  ;  producing  the  violent  agitations 
which  have  been  already  noticed. 

So  painful  is  the  passion  of  Fear,  that  the  evil 
can  scarcely  exist,  which  induces  anguish  equal 
to  its  feelings.  Innumerable  are  the  instances  in 
which  the  fear  of  a  calamity  of  the  greatest  magni- 
tude, has  greatly  exceeded  the  miseries  inflicted 
by  the  calamity  itself ;  and  the  mind  has  resumed 
a  tranquillity  under  misfortunes,  which,  in  the 
prospect,  appeared  unsupportable.  Busy  imagina- 
tion always  magnifies  the  evil,  and  casts  the  darkest 
shades  over  every  possible  concomitant.  It  cannot 
indulge  the  supposition,  that  any  circumstances  of 
alleviation  can  be  attached  to  a  state  so  much 
dreaded.  But  when  the  dreaded  evil  is  arrived, 
an  immediate  release  from  the  agonies  of  fear,  is 
of  itself  a  species  of  consolation.  In  the  worst 
of  circumstances,  fear  yields  its  place  to  sorrow ; 
which  is  certainly  some  mitigation  of  suffering : — 
habit  reconciles  to  many  things,  which  were  at 
first  repugnant  to  our  nature : — experience  in  a 
short  time  points  out  many  comforts,  where  they 
were  least  expected : — in  most  cases,  as  soon  as 
we  cease  \o  fear,  we  begin  to  hope ;  for  there  are 
few  situations  so  completely  dark  and  gloomy,  as 
to  exclude  every  ray  of  consolatory  hope. 


FEAR.  109 

The  union  of  such  causes  sufficiently  explains 
the  reasons  why,  in  numberless  instances,  the 
agony  of  actual  sufferings,  is  not  so  great  as  the 
dread  of  their  arrival.     (See  Note  O.) 

The  Affections,  that  is,  the  more  permanent  im- 
pressions of  fear,  unaccompanied  with  external 
signs  to  characterize  emotions,  are  principally  the 
following : 

Dread.  This  is  a  degree  of  permanent  fear ; 
an  habitual  and  painful  apprehension  of  some 
tremendous  event,  which  may  be  too  remote  to 
excite  any  of  the  preceding  passions.  It  keeps  the 
mind  in  a  perpetual  alarm ;  in  an  eager  watch- 
fulness of  every  circumstance  which  bears  any 
relation  to  the  evil  apprehended. 

It  is  obvious,  that  this  strong  and  painful  affec- 
tion cannot  be  the  result,  or  the  residue  of  fear, 
in  the  same  manner  as  satisfaction  may  be  the 
result  of  joy,  and  melancholy  of  the  transports 
of  sorrow ;  because  it  is  not  susceptible  of  a  retros- 
pect. When  the  evil  is  arrived,  the  dread  of  that 
evil  is  removed  ;  though  the  affection  may  become 
attached  to  some  pernicious  consequences,  which 
may  possibly  follow.     (See  Note  P.) 

Despair,  This  is  a  permanent  fear  of  losing 
some  valuable  good,  of  suffering  some  dreadful 
evil,  or  of  remaining  in  a  state  of  actual  misery, 
without  any  mixture  of  hope.  It  generally  suc- 
ceeds to  ineffectual  efforts,  which  have  been  repeat- 


110  FEAR. 

edly  made;  and  of  consequence  it  is  excited  where 
no  means  can  be  devised,  equal  to  the  magnitude 
of  the  supposed  evil. 

Remorse  has  already  been  placed  under  Sorrow ; 
but  whenever  it  is  connected  with  a  fear  of  punish- 
ment, it  deserves  a  place  under  this  passion  also, 
which  greatly  increases  its  agonies.  When  Re- 
morse is  blended  with  the  fear  of  punishment,  and 
arises  to  despair,  it  constitutes  the  supreme  wretch- 
edness of  the  mind. 

Cowardice^  considered  as  distinct  from  the  oc- 
casional panic  mentioned  above,  is  that  habitual 
temper  and  disposition,  which  disqualifies  from 
opposing  the  dangers  and  difficulties,  which  it  is 
our  duty  or  interest  to  combat.  Every  indication 
of  cowardice,  is  an  indication  of  culpable  and  un- 
manly fear. 

Pusillanimity  is  a  feebleness  of  mind,  still  more 
disgraceful ;  by  which  it  is  terrified  at  mere  trifles, 
or  imaginary  dangers,  unauthorized  by  the  most 
distant  probability. 

Timidity,  though  similar,  is  not  so  reproachful. 
The  term  is  chiefly  used  where  there  is  some 
apology,  from  sex,  tender  years,  or  feebleness  of 
frame. 

Doubt,  considered  as  an  aflection,  and  distin- 
guished from  simple  deliberation  of  the  mind,  is  a 
comfortless  state,  occasioned  by  the  uncertainty  of 
an  event,  and  the  predominancy  of  fearful  appre- 
hension concerning  it,  though  a  degree  of  hope  is 
Still  indulged.     (See  Note.  Q.) 


FEAR.  Ill 

Irresolution  represents  the  mind  as  fluctuating 
between  hope  and  fear ;  between  fits  of  courage 
and  painful  apprehensions,  in  cases' where  it  ought 
to  determine.  It  is  suspended  between  probabili- 
ties of  success,  and  apparent  dangers  of  disappoint- 
ment* 

Shame  is  a  painful  sensation,  occasioned  by  the 
quick  apprehension,  that  reputation  and  character 
are  in  danger  ;  or  by  the  perception  that  they  are 
lost.  It  may  arise  from  the  immediate  detection, 
or  the  fear  of  detection,  in  something  ignominious. 
It  may  also  arise  from  native  diffidence  in  young 
ingenuous  minds,  when  surprised  into  situations 
where  they  attract  the  peculiar  attention  of  their 
superiors.  In  the  first  instance,  the  glow  of  Shame 
indicates,  that  the  mind  is  not  totally  abandoned  ; 
in  the  last,  it  manifests  a  nice  sense  of  honour,  and 
delicate  feelings,  united  with  inexperience  and 
ignorance  of  the  world. 

Modesty  may  be  deemed  an  habitual  solicitude 
not  to  offend  against  any  species  of  decorum  ;  either 
by  unsuitable  behaviour,  in  which  it  is  opposed  to 
indelicacy ;  or  by  too  exalted  an  opinion  of  our 
own  good  qualities,  in  which  it  is  opposed  to  vani- 
ty. It  sometimes  manifests  itself  by  resenting  in- 
decencies in  speech  or  conduct ;  in  this  case  it  is 
tmited  with  anger. 

Fortitude^  Courage,  Intrepidity,  are  affections 
and  dispositions  opposed  to  fear.  They  are  virtu- 
ous affections,  excited  alone  by  exposure  to  those 


^12  ANGER, 

evils,  which  are  usually  productive  of  that  emotioii, 
and  therefore  they  deserve  to  be  mentioned  in  this 
connection. 

Fortitude  expresses  that  firmness  of  mind,  which 
resists  dangers  and  sufferings.  It  is  founded  on  a 
resolution  of  the  will  to  counteract,  or  to  surmount 
those  cowardly  impressions,  which  terrific  objects 
will  infallibly  make  upon  inferior  minds.  It  is  se- 
cretly supported  by  hope,  and  greatly  invigorated 
by  some  portion  of  the  angry  affections. 

Courage  is  active  fortitude.  It  meets  dangers, 
and  attempts  to  repel  them. 

Intrepidity^  according  to  its  etymology,  proceeds 
yet  farther ;  it  expresses  a  courage  perfectly  un- 
daunted, a  superiority  to  the  very  sensation  of  fear ; 
boldly  impelling  the  mind  forwards  to  meet  the 
greatest  dangers  to  which  a  sense  of  obligation  may 
expose  it. 


III.  ANGER. 

This  is  the  third  strong  effect  produced  by  the 
immediate  perception  of  evil. 

Anger  has  been  considered  as  a  passion,  direct- 
ed against  the  real,  or  supposed  cause,  of  our  dan- 
ger or  our  sufferings.  In  the  first  transport  of  the 
passion,  a  sense  of  personal  evil,  unjustly  inflicted, 
is  the  primary  idea ;  and  thus  from  the  effect,  the 
mind  makes  an  instantaneous  and  powerful  transi- 
tion to  its  cause.     The  primary  idea  entitles,  it  to 


ANGER.  113 

a  place  among  the  passions  excited  by  Self-love  ; 
but  many  of  the  effects  derived  from  it  properly 
belong  to  the  social  affections,  and  constitute  no 
small  portion  of  Malevolence  and  Displacency. 
The  passions  of  Sorrow  or  of  Fear,  do  not  imme- 
diately or  necessarily,  direct  the  attention  to  their 
cause,  so  as  to  have  an  influence  upon  their  specific 
characters  ;  that  of  anger  does.  Thus  it  becomes, 
as  it  were,  the  connecting  medium  between  our- 
selves and  others ;  exciting  painful  and  irritating 
sensations,  which  relate  to  both.  We  shall  there- 
fore consider,  in  this  place,  the  general  nature  of 
the  passion,  as  excited  in  consequence  of  a  keen 
sense  of  personal  injuries,  without  paying  particu- 
lar attention  to  its  objective  cause ;  and  refer  its  in- 
fluence over  the  social  affections  to  the  Order  as- 
signed to  them. 

Anger  is  the  strong  passion  or  emotion,  impress- 
ed or  excited  by  a  sense  of  injury  received,  or  in 
contemplation  ;  that  is,  by  the  idea  of  something  of 
a  pernicious  nature  and  tendency  being  done  or 
intended,  in  violation  of  some  supposed  obligation 
to  a  contrary  conduct.  It  is  enkindled  by  the  per- 
ception of  an  undue  privation  of  that  to  which  we 
thought  ourselves,  in  some  degree  or  other,  entit- 
led ;  or  of  a  positive  suffering,  from  which  we 
claimed  an  exemption.  These  are  obviously  the 
exciting  causes ;  though  our  ignorance,  or  inordi- 
nate Self-Love,  may  suggest  erroneous  ideas  re- 
specting our  claims,  or  render  the  resentful  emo- 
tion very    disproportionate  to  the  offence.      The 

15 


114  ANGER. 

pain  we  suffer  from  the  injury,  the  unexpectedness 
of  the  offence,  our  wounded  pride,  fee.  are  so  apt 
to  disturb  our  reasoning  and  discriminating  powers, 
that  we  are,  at  the  first  instant,  prompted  to  con- 
sider every  injury  received,  as  an  injury  intended. 
Nor  are  there  wanting  numerous  instances,  in 
which  an  heated  and  irritated  imagination  attributes 
design  to  the  irrational  and  inanimate  creation,  in 
order  to  gratify  the  passion  of  resentment. 

Anger,  viewed  as  a  Passion,  that  is,  as  referring 
to  the  first  impression  in  which  we  are  passive, — 
or  the  impression  preceding  the  external  signs, 
which  constitute  the  Emotion, — may  be  considered 
as  a  painful  sensation  of  a  heating  and  irritating 
nature.  It  is  an  irksome  stimulus,  by  which  the 
animal  spirits  are  troubled  and  violently  agitated. 
Yet  the  sensation  is  not  so  painful  as  in  the  exces- 
ses of  Sorrow  or  of  Fear.  When  the  injury  ap- 
pears great,  totally  unprovoked,  too  recent  or  sud- 
den for  the  mind  to  call  up  motives  of  restraint, — 
when  surprise  at  receiving  an  offence  from  a  quar- 
ter the  most  remote  from  expectation, — or  astonish- 
ment at  base  and  ungrateful  returns  for  benefits 
conferred,  accompany  the  first  impulse  of  passion, 
an  ardent  desire  of  revenge  is  immediately  excited. 
The  imagination  runs  over  every  circumstance  of 
aggravation  ;  depicts  the  offence  as  a  crime  of  the 
most  atrocious  nature  ;  and  vengeance  is  denounc- 
ed against  the  aggressor,  as  an  mdispensible  obli- 
gation of  justice,  and  as  a  retribution  due  to  the 
violated  laws  of  morals,  of  honour,  or  of  gratitude. 


ANGER.  115 

The  emotions  strikingly  correspond  with  this  state 
of  mind.  The  corporeal  system  immediately  as- 
sumes attitudes  and  appearances,  calculated  to  in- 
spire the  offender  with  terror,  and  preparatory  to 
the  infliction  of  the  chastisement,  he  is  supposed  to 
have  deserved.  The  countenance  reddens,  the 
eyes  flash  indignant  fire,  and  the  aspect  speaks 
horror ;  muscular  strength  is  abundantly  increased  ; 
and  powers  of  exertion  are  acquired,  unknown  to 
cooler  moments.  This  new  appetite  for  revenge 
gains  the  ascendancy,  not  only  over  every  consid- 
eration of  compassion,  but  of  personal  safety,  and 
impels  to  dangerous  encounters,  totally  regardless 
of  the  danger.  In  some  instances,  an  apprehension 
of  dreadful  consequences,  a  kind  of  presage  of  the 
mischief  which  may  possibly  ensue,  and  become 
the  subject  of  future  regret,  intermixes  fear  with 
the  paroxysms  of  anger;  and  a  pallid  tremour 
unites  with  symptoms  peculiar  to  wrath,  or  accom- 
panies the  first  tokens  of  revenge. 

Anger  is  deservedly  placed  among  the  most  vio- 
lent emotions.  From  its  ungovernable  excesses,  it 
has  almost  appropriated  to  itself  the  term  passion. 
When  the  paroxysms  of  anger  are  excessive,  the 
subject  is  deaf  to  the  most  cogent  reasons,  or  to 
the  most  pathetic  representations  of  the  mischief  it 
may  occasion ;  and  being  worked  up  to  a  degree 
of  phrensy,  he  fully  vindicates  the  adage,  Tra  brevis 
furor.  While  he  is  under  the  influence  of  this  tur- 
bulent emotion,  the  incensed  person  often  imagines 
that  he  is  solely  actuated  by  the  purest  love  of  equi- 


116  ANGER. 

ty,  and  an  ardent  desire  to  administer  justice  ; 
though,  at  the  instant,  he  may  be  violating  the 
dictates  of  compassion,  in  the  perpetration  of  the 
most  atrocious  deeds. 

It  is  observable,  that  Sorrow  and  Fear,  though 
they  may  be  the  result  of  culpable  conduct,  or  even 
of  criminality,  are  calculated  to  excite  our  compas- 
sion. The  anguish  manifested  by  the  subject,  calls 
aloud  for  our  sympathy.  But  Anger,  though  it  is  a 
painful  emotion,  seldom  excites  our  sympathy  with 
the  object  himself,  unless  we  suppose  him  to  be  in- 
sane. In  most  cases  our  sympathy  is  chiefly  trans- 
ferred to  the  object  of  resentment ;  prompting  us  to 
act  as  mediators,  and  to  exert  all  our  influence  in 
order  to  mitigate  or  avert  the  punishment  to  which 
he  is  exposed. 

Anger,  in  the  excess  of  its  violence,  when  it  is 
excited  to  a  degree  of  phrensy,  so  that  the  mind 
has  totally  lost  self-command  ;  when  it  prompts  to 
threats  and  actions  extravagant  and  atrocious,  is 
termed  Rage. 

Wrath  is  violent  and  permanent  anger  ;  and  as 
such  it  may  be  deemed  an  affection.  This  may  be 
seated  in  a  breast  possessing  too  much  self-com- 
mand to  will  the  infliction  of  punishment,  though 
it  notices  and  dwells  upon  every  circumstance  of 
aggravation  ;  and  though  it  should  resolve  to  pun- 
ish, it  is  capable  of  being  appeased  by  the  conces- 
sions and  penitence  of  the  oflender. 

Resentment  is  a  lesser  degree  of  wrath,  excited 
by    smaller    offences,   or  by   offences   committed 


ANGER,  117 

against  less  irritable  minds.  It  is  a  deep  reflective 
displeasure  against  the  conduct  of  the  offender. 

Indignation  is  a  resentment  against  a  conduct 
which  appears  peculiarly  unworthy  ;  some  atrocious 
violation  of  the  principles  of  gratitude,  or  something 
which  appears  peculiarly  despicable  and  base. 

But  we  are  now  trespassing  upon  the  affections 
which  properly  belong  to  another  Class,  and  which 
will  demand  our  attention  under  the  article  of  Dis- 
placency. 

Anger,  and  its  principal  ramifications  are  general- 
ly directed  against  the  conduct  of  others,  and  al- 
most universally  with  superior  degrees  of  violence  ; 
however  they  are  sometimes  directed  against  our- 
selves, when  our  conduct  has  been  either  negligent 
or  criminal.  In  Repeiitance,  Contrition,  and  Re- 
morse, Self-reproach,  and  even  Indignation  are 
largely  intermixed  with  the  affection  of  Sorrow. 

Vexation,  Chagrin,  Impatience,  do  not  relate  to 
Persons  so  much  as  to  particular  circumstances  of 
a  teazing  nature.  They  are  chiefly  excited  by  dis- 
appointments, and  tedious  delays  to  the  accomplish- 
ment of  our  wishes. 

Peevishness  may  be  considered  as  a  slighter  de- 
gree of  anger,  perpetually  recurring  to  irritable 
persons,  from  trifling  causes.  It  is  such  a  soreness 
of  temper,  that  it  can  scarcely  suffer  the  touch  of 
the  gentlest  hand  ;  and  it  resents  upon  the  most 
innocent,  the  vexations  that  have  been  excited  by 
causes  with  which  they  had  no  concern. 


118  ANGER. 

Although  Fortitude,  Courage,  Intrepidity,  have 
been  considered  under  the  article  of  Fear,  as  they 
are  virtuous  resolutions  which  oppose  themselves  to 
the  objects  of  our  fear,  or  to  the  dangers  vt^hich 
threaten  us ;  yet  they  might  with  no  great  impro- 
priety have  been  placed  under  the  passion  of  Anger* 
If  we  advert  to  the  physiological,  or  rather  patho- 
logical effects  of  anger,  we  shall  perceive  that  it 
rouses  the  mind,  increases  muscular  strength, 
braces  the  system  for  action,  and  renders  the  sub- 
ject heedless  of  danger  ;  and  these  are  the  effects 
produced  by  Fortitude  and  Courage.  Though 
that  strong  irritation  of  mind  peculiar  to  anger, 
may  not  be  sensibly  felt  by  generous  spirits,  and 
self-command  may  calm  the  agitations  natural  to 
this  passion,  as  well  as  those  peculiar  to  terror,  yet 
some  modifications  of  it  obviously  remain.  Where 
courage  is  merely  instinctive,  it  is  manifestly  quick- 
ened by  anger ;  although  cultivation  and  noble 
principles  may  suppress  the  appearance,  and  almost 
the  sensations,  in  minds  endowed  with  the  virtues 
of  fortitude  and  magnanimity. 

It  may  perhaps  be  asserted  with  justice,  that 
some  degree  of  anger  is  naturally  excited  by  every 
object  of  hatred.  Though  Privation  or  Danger  be 
the  predominant  ideas  in  Sorrow  or  Fear,  yet  these 
are  mostly,  it  may  be  said,  always,  accompanied 
with  a  sense  of  injury,  in  minds  not  influenced  by 
moral  restraints.  In  sorrows  inflicted  by  a  Power 
against  which  we  dare  not  to  murmur,  the  irrita- 


ANGER.  119 

tions  natural  to  a  wounded  mind,  maj  be  subjugat- 
ed by  motives  of  virtue  and  piety;  but  without 
these,  it  would  be  strongly  disposed  to  burst  forth 
into  frantic  and  impotent  rage.  This  may  be  ex- 
plained by  the  strength  and  quickness  of  our  pain- 
ful feelings,  which,  at  the  first  instant,  dispose  us 
to  impute  blame  where  no  blame  can  be  attached. 
History  makes  us  acquainted  with  many  curious 
instances  in  the  heathen  world,  where  the  images 
of  the  deities  worshipped  have  been  very  roughly 
treated,  and  even  suffered  public  flagellation,  for 
not  having  averted  the  calamities  which  had  been 
deprecated  ;  and  the  repinings  of  those  who  have 
been  better  instructed,  manifest  a  similar  temper, 
though  it  may  be  checked  by  reverential  awe. 

It  is  an  indication  of  no  inconsiderable  progress 
in  reason  and  in  resolution,  always  to  distinguish, 
with  accuracy,  between  an  evil  endured  and  its  in- 
culpable cause  ;  and  to  support  the  calamity  with- 
out the  least  mixture  of  Resentment.  Nor  are 
these  observations  confined  to  the  occasions  of  Sor- 
row ;  in  the  passion  of  Fear,  the  first  object  being 
safety,  every  other  consideration  may  be  suppressed 
for  the  instant :  but  in  the  emotion  of  Terror,  not 
only  some  degree  of  courage,  but  a  very  considera- 
ble portion  of  Anger  is  perceptible  ;  the  rage  of  a 
coward  despairing  of  escape  by  flight  is  proverbial. 

The  most  accurate  distinctions,  therefore,  which 
we  have  been  capable  of  making  in  the  above  Ana- 
lysis of  the  Passions,  have  been  to  mark  the  lead- 


120  ANGER. 

ing  characteristics  of  each.  The  primary  idea  ex- 
citing Sorrow,  is  that  of  loss,  or  painful  privation  ; 
that  of  Fear  is  danger  ;  and  the  genuine  idea  ap- 
propriate to  Anger  is  that  of  injury,  or  some  species 
of  injustice.  These  are  very  distinct  in  themselves, 
though  inordinate  self-love  so  frequently  confounds 
them  together. 

We  have  thus  endeavoured  to  trace  the  various 
Passions  and  Affections,  which  are  of  a  personal 
nature  ;  and  which  are  more  immediately  excited 
in  consequence  of  the  principle  of  Self-Love.— A 
principle  seated  in  the  breast  of  every  individual  of 
our  species,  from  the  most  ignorant  to  the  most  in- 
telligent ;  from  the  capricious  infant,  to  the  subli- 
mest  philosopher.  All  who  are  able  to  discern,  or 
who  think  that  they  discern,  things  conducive  to 
their  happiness  or  enjoyment,  are  occasionally  plac- 
ed in  situations  which  expose  them  to  the  influence 
of  one  or  other  of  the  above  Passions,  Emotions, 
and  Affections,  in  their  individual  capacities. 

The  Passions  and  Affections,  which  belong  to 
the  social  Principle,  next  demand  our  attention. 


SOCIAL  PRINCIPLE.  121 


CLASS  II. 


ON     THE     PASSIONS     AND     AFFECTIONS,     DERIVED    FROM    THE    SOCIAji 
PRINCIPIiE. 


If  our  connections  with  the  inanimate  creation, 
expose  us  to  be  differently  influenced  by  various 
powers  and  properties,  discernible  in  every  part  of 
it;  if  many  things  around  us  call  forth  our  passions 
and  affections,  by  sustaining  certain  relations  with 
our  corporeal  and  intellectual  natures,  it  is  to  be  ex- 
pected that  a  still  more  intimate  connection  with 
the  animated  creation,  should  implant  within  us 
various  dispositions,  correspondent  to  those  higher 
qualities  and  properties  belonging  to  it.  The  ani- 
mated beings  around  us,  not  only  excite  certain  Pas- 
sions and  Affections,  arising  from  the  principle  of 
Self-love,  in  common  with  other  parts  of  nature, 
but  they  also  are  rendered  capable  of  enjoying  or  of 
suffering,  equally  with  ourselves ;  and  we  possess 
the  power  of  administering  to  their  well-being,  or 
of  proving  injurious  to  it. 

Rational  and  intelligent  agents,  being  furnished 
with  certain  rules  of  conduct,-  which  respect  both 
themselves  and  others,  are  subjected  to  various  de- 
grees of  approbation  or  censure,  according  as  they 
act  conformably  to  such  rules,  or  in  violation  of 
them. 

16 


122  SOCIAL  PRINCIPLE. 

These  peculiarities  introduce  a  train  of  Passions 
and  Affections,  very  distinct  from  those  which  are 
excited  by  the  selfish  principle  alone.  Self-love 
confines  its  attentions  to  certain  qualities  and  pro- 
perties, merely  as  they  have  an  influence  upon  our 
own  personal  welfare ;  and  we  deem  these  qualities 
good  or  bad,  solely  as  they  produce  certain  effects 
upon  Ourselves.  The  Social  Principle  extends  its 
regards  to  the  state,  the  conduct,  and  the  character 
of  Others ;  and  it  operates  according  to  the  degrees 
of  their  connection  with  us, — to  their  powers  of 
communicating  or  of  receiving  from  us  either  good 
or  evil, — to  their  actual  enjoyments  or  their  suffer- 
ings,— to  their  prospects  of  future  good  or  exposure 
to  evil, — to  their  occasional  or  habitual  deport- 
ment,— and  to  the  degrees  of  merit  or  demerit  at- 
tached to  their  dispositions  and  conduct,  as  con- 
scious and  intelligent  agents. 

Numberless  are  the  Passions,  Emotions,  and 
Affections  proceeding  from  these  different  causes ; 
and  they  vary  in  their  complexion  and  character, 
according  to  the  peculiarities  of  their  excitements. 
Yet  they  are  all  reducible  to  the  two  grand  distinc- 
tions which  have  been  already  pointed  out.  They 
may  be  placed  under  the  Cardinal  Affections  of 
Love  and  Hatred,  in  which  Good  or  Evil  are  the 
predominant  ideas.  Nor  can  there  be  a  disposi- 
tion in  the  class  of  objects  now  under  considera- 
tion, or  of  ourselves  towards  them,  which  may  not, 
in  one  point  of  view  or  other,  be  ranged  under 
these  general  heads. 


SOCIAL  PRINCIPLE.  123 

It  is  obvious  that  these  affections  of  Love  and 
Hatred,  primarily  relate  either  to  the  Persons,  or 
to  the  Characters  of  their  objects.  The  Good 
refers  to  that  which  we  behold  in  them,  or  wish 
them  to  possess ;  and  the  Evil  to  the  supposed  de- 
pravity of  their  characters,  or  the  malevolence  of 
disposition  we  may  entertain  towards  them.  The 
predominant  ideas  therefore  of  good  and  evil 
respect  these  alone.  The  affections  of  Love  and 
Hatred  are  excited,  by  the  immediate  interest  we 
take  in  the  merits  or  the  welfare  of  the  objects, 
or  by  the  personal  resentments  indulged  against 
them. 

No  one  general  term  is  adapted  to  all  those 
passions  and  affections,  which  belong  to  the  social 
principle.  Dr.  Hartley,  however,  has  comprehend- 
ed them  all  under  the  name  or  character  of  Sym- 
pathy. This  he  divides  into  four  Classes  :  rejoic- 
ing at  another's  happiness  ;  grieving  at  his  misery ; 
grieving  at  his  happiness ;  and  rejoicing  at  his 
misery.  But  the  word  sympathy,  whether  we 
advert  to  its  genuine  import  or  common  usage,  is 
ill  adapted  to  the  two  last  divisions.  The  usual 
idea  of  sympathy  is  that  of  suffering  with  another ; 
which  is  the  most  opposite  possible  to  grieving  at 
his  happiness,  or  rejoicing  at  his  misery  :  the  last  is 
not  suffering,  and  the  other  is  suffering  in  a  manner 
directly  contrary. 

These  two  opposite  dispositions  are  usually  ex- 
pressed  by  the   opposite   terms   Benevolence   and 


124  SOCIAL  PRINCIPLE. 

Malevolence ;  the  ifirst  referring  to  kindly  disposi- 
tions towards  its  objects,  and  the  other  to  the 
reverse.  But  should  they  be  the  best  terms  we  are 
able  to  employ,  yet  they  are  not  entirely  unexcep- 
tionable ;  as  they  do  not  always  convey  ideas  per- 
fectly correspondent  with  the  various  differences, 
comprised  under  these  general  heads. 

Benevolence,  signifying  ^oo^  will,  might,  accord- 
ing to  its  etymology,  be  considered  as  applicable  to 
Ourselves  as  well  as  to  others ;  yet  in  its  usual  ac- 
ceptation the  idea  of  Self  is  totally  excluded  ;  and 
it  expresses  a  disposition  directly  opposite  to  the 
selfish  Principle. — This  good- will  does  not  indicate 
itself  in  all  those  affections  which  are  ranged  under 
Benevolence.  Some  characters  inspire  us  with  the 
deepest  reverence  and  awe ;  which  affections, 
though  they  do  not  exclude  benevolence,  are  not 
immediately  inspired  by  it.  Notwithstanding 
these  slight  objections,  the  word  appears  to  be 
more  deserving  of  being  employed,  as  a  generic 
term,  than  any  other  that  can  be  adopted. 

Were  we  more  familiarized  to  the  signification 
given  to  the  term  Passion,  in  our  introductory 
Chapter ;  were  it  confined  to  the  idea  of  Passive- 
ness,  whether  the  cause  be  of  a  pleasing  or  displeas- 
ing nature,  then  might  we  with  the  strictest  pro- 
priety use  the  term  Sympathy  to  express  a  fellow- 
feeling  with  another,  both  upon  joyful  and  mourn- 
ful occasions.  It  would  be  applicable  to  every 
coincidence  of  sensation,  sentiment,  and  disposi- 


SOCIAL  PRINCIPLE.  125 

tion,  comprehending  our  good  wishes,  good  opin- 
ions, and  that  benignity  which  rejoices  in  their 
prosperity. 

But  even  in  this  case,  Sympathy  can  only  be  ap- 
plied to  incidental  indications  of  benevolence,  and 
is  not  to  be  substituted  for  the  word  itself.  It  will 
have  the  same  relation  to  the  benevolent  Principle 
as  Desire  has  to  that  of  Love.  The  Principle  of 
benevolence  pre-disposes  to  these  social  virtues,  and 
Sympathy  engages  in  particular  acts  of  benevolence. 
To  this  sense  its  etymology  necessarily  confines 
it ;  for  we  can  neither  suffer  with  another,  nor 
have  any  kind  of  sensation  in  common  with  him, 
until  he  be  placed  in  certain  situations,  with  which 
we  are  become  acquainted. 

There  are  much  stronger  objections  to  the  word 
Malevolence,  as  a  generic  term,  than  to  the  preced- 
ing. It  always  conveys  the  idea  of  ill  will  to  a 
considerable  degree :  but  hourly  instances  of  dis- 
placency,  and  even  of  anger  and  resentment,  present 
themselves  without  any  mixture  of  that  ill-will  it 
describes.  In  some  cases,  painful  resentments  may 
be  excited  by  the  purest  good-will;  as  in  the  anger 
of  a  parent  towards  his  child,  on  account  of  con- 
duct prejudicial  to  his  welfare.  Even  the  momen- 
tary ill-will  indulged  by  a  passionate  man,  seek- 
ing revenge  for  injuries  received,  deserves  not  to 
be  stigmatized  by  the  odious  name  of  malevolence, 
which  conveys  the  idea  of  permanent  ill-will. 


126  SOCIAL  PRINCIPLE. 

For  the  above  reasons,  and  from  a  reluctance  to 
use  a  term  so  unfavourable  in  its  complexion  and 
character,  more  frequently  than  absolute  necessity 
demands,  I  beg  leave  to  substitute  Displacency  as 
a  generic  term.  Its  superior  propriety  will  be 
manifest  from  the  consideration,  that  every  instance 
of  malevolence  is  an  indication  of  Displacency  to  a 
high  degree,  although  the  latter  is  not  at  all  times 
an  indication  of  the  former. 

The  reader  will  not  be  disposed  to  censure  as 
superfluous  these  minute  investigations  respecting 
the  signification  of  terms,  when  he  recollects  that 
the  want  of  precision  has  been  the  grand  source 
of  confusion  of  ideas,  even  among  philosophers. 
The  least  difference  in  our  conceptions,  respect- 
ing the  force  of  words,  may  direct  to  very  different 
conclusions.  The  smallest  deviation  from  the  re- 
quisite point  of  the  compass,  will  in  a  short  time 
steer  the  vessel  into  an  improper  latitude. 

In  the  prosecution  of  our  Analysis  under  this 
Second  class,  or  in  tracing  the  passions  and  Affec- 
tions which  belong  to  the  social  Principle,  I  shall, 
according  to  the  plan  proposed,  divide  the  subject 
into  two  Orders  ;  the  first  belonging  to  the  princi- 
ple of  Benevole?ice,  in  which  the  idea  of  Good  is 
the  more  immediate  and  predominant  idea ;  and 
the  second  to  Displacency,  in  which  the  idea  of 
Evil  prevails. 

The  benevolent  Principle  may  refer  to  good 
Desires  and  Dispositions,  and  to  good  Opinions : 


SOCIAL  AFFECTIONS.  127 

which  form  two  distinct  kinds  or  genera.  Dis- 
placency  may  also  be  divided  into  two  kinds, 
Malevolence,  properly  so  called;  and  disfavourahle 
Opinion,  or  Displacency,  according  to  its  usual 
signification. 


ORDER  I. 

PASSIONS  AND  AFFECTIONS  EXCITED  BY  BENEVOLENCE,  IN  WHICH 
GOOD  IS  THE  PREDOMINANT    IDEA. 

I.  Those  which  respect  Benevolent  Desires  and 
Dispositions. 

In  our  general  remarks  concerning  Love  as  a 
Principle,  we  inevitably  anticipated  some  things 
which  properly  belong  to  this  branch  of  our 
Subject.  It  was  then  hinted,  that  our  benevolent 
dispositions  may  be  directed  towards  those  who 
are  connected  with  us,  in  various  degrees  of  rela- 
tion or  intimacy  ; — to  the  whole  human  race  indis- 
criminately, in  which  it  is  termed  Philanthropy ; 
and  to  all  Beings  rendered  capable  of  any  portion 
of  enjoyment ;  or  universal  benevolence,  according 
to  the  most  extensive  sense  of  the  expression. 

It  will  not  be  necessary,  in  the  process  of  our 
investigation,  to  have  the  distinction  between  the 
rational  and  irrational  creation,  always  in  our 
view.  The  dispositions  towards  each  are  similar ; 
though  rational  Beings,  from  their  superior  impor- 


128  SOCIAL  AFFECTIONS. 

tance,  are  the  most  interesting,  and  the  diversity  of 
their  situations  admits  of  a  greater  variety  of  cor- 
respondent affections.  Both  may  be  comprehend- 
ed under  the  title  oi  general  benevolence. 

It  will  hovi^ever  be  proper  to  remark,  that  the 
benevolence  which  respects  our  most  intimate  con- 
nections, approximates  very  closely  to  the  principle 
of  Self-love,     It  considers  every  thing  belonging  to 
its  immediate  objects,  as  belonging  also  to  ourselves, 
and  thus  constitutes  one  common  interest.     Of  this 
kind  are  all  those  connections  which  form  the  inti- 
mate relations  of  life,  and  create  so    large  a  portion 
of  its  happiness  or  its  misery.     Such  are  the  conju- 
gal^ parental^  filial,  fraternal  relations,  various  de-- 
grees  of  consanguinity,  and   particular  friendships. 
Here  the  habitual  attachments,  and  benignant  dis- 
positions which  the  mind  experiences,  assume  the 
character  of  affections,  by  way  of  pre-eminence. 
For  it  is  in  these  relations  that  the  kindly  affections 
manifest  the  greatest  warmth  and  constancy.     The 
general  objects  of  our  philanthropy  may  possess  a 
portion  of  our  good-will  without   particular  interest 
being   habitually    taken   in   their   welfare.      The 
operation  of  this  principle  is  confined  to  particular 
cases  and  situations,  in  which  they   may  be  inci- 
dentally placed.     Those  animals  to  which  we  are 
the  most  strongly  attached,  or  which  we  may  have 
appropriated  to  ourselves,  are  considered  as  sustain- 
ing an  occasional  and   accidental   connection  ;  and 
when  they  are  the  most  requisite  for  our  use  and 
comfort,  we  chiefly  value  them  as  the  instruments 


SOCIAL  AFFECTIONS.  129 

and  means  of  our  convenience  and  pleasure.  Their 
influence  is  chiefly  temporary.  They  are  transfer- 
red with  little  regret.  The  mind  may  become 
versatile  and  changeable  towards  them,  without  the 
imputation  of  cruelty  or  injustice.  But  in  the 
social  relation,  the  kindly  affections  dwell  with  the 
well  disposed  mind,  and  are  perpetually  operative. 

These  social  affections  may  arise  from  various 
causes,  \^hich  give  them  their  distinguishing  cha- 
racteristics ;  and  they  may  possess  various  degrees 
of  strength;  which,  in  most  cases,  is  regulated  by 
the  degrees  of  their  utility.  Some  are  deemed  in- 
stinctive; that  is,  originally  implanted  in  the  breast, 
without  the  conscious  aid  of  reason  or  reflection. 
The  love  of  Parents  for  their  offspring  is  adduced 
as  an  evidence  of  instinctive  affection.  This  is 
observable  in  persons  who  seem  to  have  eradicated 
every  other  social  affection.  They  still  retain  a 
solicitude  for  their  young,  after  they  have  rendered 
themselves  strangers  to  every  other  virtue  ;  and  in- 
dulge a  fondness  here,  amidst  the  greatest  animosi- 
ties against  those  around  them.  But  whatever 
ideas  we  may  affix  to  the  word  instinct,  self-love 
seems  to  form  its  basis.  Parents  manifestly  con- 
template their  children  as  scions  from  the  stem ; 
and  the  selfish  affections  accompany  them,  not  only 
as  being  their  appointed  representatives,  but  as 
second  selves.  The  superior  strength  of  affection 
natural  to  the  female  breast,  which  receives  a  daily 
increase  by  unremitted  habits  of  care  and  attention, 

17 


130  SOCIAL  AFFECTIONS. 

gives  the  appearance  of  a  much  stronger  instinct  to 
the  maternal^  than  to  the  paternal  affections. 

Some  of  the  social  affections  arise  from  the  per- 
ception, or  the  persuasion  of  amiable  qualities,  per- 
sonal or  mental,  for  which  a  strong  predilection  is 
formed  ;  as  in  the  conjugal  relation.  This  predi- 
lection having  also  a  sexual  influence,  may  become 
a  passion,  the  most  impetuous  and  ungovernable. 
The  sexual  passion  is  rendered  remarkable  for  its 
contrarieties.  Tt  may  be  considered  as  the  roost 
generous  and  the  most  selfish  ; — at  once  the  most 
interested,  and  the  most  disinterested;  it  is  ready 
to  sacrifice  every  thing,  even  life  itself,  for  the  be- 
loved object ; — but  it  is  anxious  to  appropriate  the 
beloved  object  entirely  to  itself. 

Where  the  impetuosity  of  passion  is  not  succeed- 
ed by  indifference,  it  gives  place  to  the  milder  and 
more  permanent  joys  oi  conjugal  affection. 

Filial  affections,  if  they  do  not  originate  from, 
are  closely  connected  w^ith  an  early  sense  of  supe- 
riority, united  with  a  conviction  that  this  superiori- 
ty is  exercised  in  perpetual  cares  and  acts  of  kind- 
ness. 

Fraternal  affection  owes  much  of  its  strength  to 
the  closest  habits  of  intimacy,  the  perception  of 
one  common  interest,  and  an  impressive  sense  of 
the  inestimable  value  of  domestic  harmony. 

ThiQ  friendly  affections  ?iXQ  ms'^ued.  by  the  con- 
templation of  pleasing  qualities,  and  the  perception 
of  a  similarity  in  disposition.  They  are  always 
cherished  by  reciprocal  acts  of  kindness. 


BENEVOLENCE.  131 

All  these  connections  may  be  said  to  relate  most 
intimately  to  Self.  They  manifest  an  adoption  of 
others  into  our  hearts.  They  blend  and  intermix 
interests  so  completely,  that  the  ardent  desire  of 
good  towards  the  particular  objects  of  these  affec- 
tions, is  not  considered  as  a  branch  of  disinterested 
benevolence.  All  the  Passions  and  affections 
which  have  been  enumerated  under  the  preceding 
Class,  as  primarily  belonging  to  the  selfish  princi- 
ple, may  be  excited  by  the  state  and  situation  of 
those  we  love,  with  equal,  and  sometimes  with 
superior  vigour.  In  events  incidental  to  them,  Joy, 
Desire,  Hope,  Sorrow,  Fear,  Anger,  become  as 
quick  and  impetuous,  as  in  cases  where  our  own 
interests  are  exclusively  concerned :  and  wherever 
the  Universal  Parent  has  constituted  us  the  agents, 
or  the  guardians  of  the  good  fortune  of  others,  we 
enjoy  the  affections  of  Satisfaction,  Contentment, 
Complacency,  &c.  according  to  the  degrees  of  their 
prosperity,  or,  the  value  of  circumstances  contribut- 
ing to  it,  as  if  this  good  immediately  pertained  to 
Ourselves, 

To  the  good-will  which  extends  itself  beyond 
the  circle  of  personal  attachments,  and  with  which 
our  own  permanent  welfare  is  not  so  intimately 
connected, — to  the  good  will  which  is  often  exer- 
cised towards  strangers^  and  which  is  some  times 
exercised  by  generous  minds  towards  enemies,  is 
the  title  of  Benevolence  usually  applied.  Because 
it  is  here  that  the  innate  benignity  of  disposition 


132  SYMPATHY. 

appears  the  most  conspicuously.  In  these  instances 
of  good -will,  nothing  selfish  appears.  The  benevo- 
lence acquires  the  character  of  being  j?wre  and  dis- 
interested. . 

Considering  this  benevolence  as  a  Principle  con- 
stituting a  pre  disposition,  or  a  readiness  of  temper 
to  act  in  a  manner  correspondent  to  the  particular 
situation  of  the  object,  the  direct  operation  of  this 
principle  will  manifest  itself  by  emotions  and  affec- 
tions, to  which  the  term  Sympathy  seems  to  be 
peculiarly  applicable. 

According  to  the  observations  already  made  upon 
Sympathy,  it  may  be  considered  as  an  inward  feel- 
ing, which  is  excited  by  the  particular  and  extraor- 
dinary situation  of  another  ;  or  which  harmonizes 
with  the  condition  and  feelings  of  its  object. 
Sympathy  indicates  a  mind  attuned  to  correspond- 
ent vibrations,  whether  they  be  of  a  pleasing  or 
displeasing  kind.  Consequently  it  operates  with 
various  degrees  of  strength,  according  to  the  de- 
grees of  danger  to  which  its  objects  may  be  expos- 
ed ; — to  the  misery  they  suffer,  and  the  aggravating 
circumstances  attending  it ; — to  the  good  fortune 
with  which  they  are  surprised  and  delighted  ; — and 
to  their  capacities  of  receiving  good.  It  also  dis- 
poses the  mind  to  accommodate  itself  to  the  tastes, 
dispositions,  and  manners  of  others,  in  the  social 
intercourses  of  life. 

In  this  enlarged  sense  of  the  term  may  sympathy 
be  considered  as  :ai  passion,  an  affection,  and  a  dis- 
position. 


SYMPATHY.  133 

In  some  urgent  and  extraordinary  cases,  Sym- 
pathy rises  into  an  emotion,  which  yields  not,  in 
strength  and  exertions,  to  the  most  violent  of  the 
selfish  passions.  When  its  object  is  suddenly  ex- 
posed to  some  instantaneous  and  tremendous  dan- 
ger, which  demands  immediate  aid,  the  whole  soul 
is  devoted  to  the  sufferer.  Danger  and  relief  are 
the  thoughts  which  occupy  the  mind,  to  the  total 
exclusion  of  every  other.  Impelled  by  this  irresisti- 
ble emotion,  the  sympathizer  plunges  into  the 
ocean  and  braves  its  billows,  or  rushes  into  the 
midst  of  flames,  regardless  of  their  horrors,  to 
snatch  a  wretched  victim  from  destruction.  He  is 
insensible  to  personal  danger,  where  it  is  the  great- 
est. I  will  not  say  that  he  does  not  listen  to  the 
suggestions  of  prudence,  as  prudential  thoughts  are 
not  suggested.  There  is  no  passion,  excepting  an- 
ger, approaching  to  madness,  which  resembles  the 
heedless  impetuosity  of  this  emotion.  Rage,  eager 
to  punish  an  offence  or  to  revenge  an  insult,  will 
also  rush  into  danger,  and  expose  its  own  life  in 
order  to  glut  its  passion  ;  but  its  pallid  countenance 
and  the  tremour  of  its  limbs,  indicate  that  Self  is 
always  predominant.  The  impulse  of  Sympathy 
renders  the  generous  mind  completely  courageous. 
It  is  a  stranger  to  personal  fear ;  all  its  anxieties  are 
transferred  to  the  perils  of  the  object. 

When  the  evil  is  less  sudden  and  alarming; 
when  it  is  apparently  of  a  permanent  nature,  sym- 
pathy with  distress  becomes  an  affection. 


134  SYMPATHETIC  SORROW. 

Sympathetic  affections  are  distinguished  into 
various  species,  and  discriminated  by  various  ap- 
pellations, according  to  the  peculiarities  attendant 
upon  their  cause,  or  the  particular  state  of  their 
object. 

They  may  be  divided  into  those  which  respect 
Distress,  Prosperity^  Imitation. 

Of  those  which  respect  Distress,  the  following 
are  the  principal. 

Compassion.  Compassion  is  that  species  of  af- 
fection, which  is  excited,  either  by  the  actual  dis- 
tress of  its  object,  or  by  some  impending  calamity 
which  appears  inevitable.  It  is  a  benevolent  sor- 
row at  their  sufferings,  or  their  approaching  misery. 
The  etymology  of  the  word  expreses  this  idea  with 
strict  propriety ;  as  it  signifies  suffering  with  the 
object. 

Compassion  is  always  connected  with  a  disposi- 
tion to  relieve,  and  will  always  prompt  to  vigorous 
exertions,  wherever  there  is  a  possibility  of  suc- 
cess ;  unless  some  important  considerations  should 
render  the  endeavour  improper  or  unjust. 

Compassion  has  not  a  necessary  connection  with 
the  character  of  its  objects.  Their  distress  is  a 
sufficient  excitement.  It  is  frequently  exercised 
upon  the  unworthy,  whose  reiterated  imprudences 
or  vicious  conduct,  may  have  been  the  cause  of 
their  wretchedness.  From  the  great  extent  and 
universality  of  this  affection,  it  may  justly  be  con- 
sidered as  a  generic  name,  comprehending  several 


SYMPATHETIC  SORROW.  135 

Other  aifections  which  have  a  more  specific  appli- 
cation ;  as  Mercy,  Commiseration,  Pity,  ^c. 

Mercy  is  the  most  exalted  branch  of  compassion. 
It  particularly  refers  to  that  state  of  mind,  which 
induces  us  to  exercise  our  compassion  upon  per- 
sons whose  fate  is,  in  some  respect,  at  our  disposal. 
It  disposes  us  to  relinquish  demands,  which,  if  en- 
forced to  the  utmost,  would  render  us  the  immedi- 
ate agents  of  misery.  It  is  peculiarly  applicable  to 
unworthy  or  criminal  behaviour  towards  ourselves, 
which  would  inevitably  involve  the  offender  in  dis- 
tress, were  we  to  be  tenacious  of  our  rights.  In  a 
word,  it  is  that  dignified  compassion  which  induces 
us  to  suppress  resentment,  to  pardon  offences,  or 
mitigate  punishments,  as  far  as  discretion  may  ad- 
mit. 

Commiseration.  Although  this  term  seems  sy- 
nonymous with  the  preceding,  yet  in  its  general 
use,  it  is  somewhat  different.  It  is  always  pre- 
ferred when  we  wish  to  express  our  sympathy  for 
misfortunes,  which  it  is  not  in  our  power  to  re- 
move ;  or  for  which  there  is  no  apparent  remedy. 
Commiseration,  ruminating  upon  the  state  and  suf- 
ferings of  others,  induces  a  permanent  concern. 
In  such  cases  it  may  be  said  that  we  commiserate 
the  unfortunate  sufferer,  rather  than  that  we  have 
compassion  upon  him.  But  although  this  is  a 
more  helpless,  it  is  not  an  useless  affection.  It 
soothes  the  mind  of  the  afflicted,  and  greatly  alle- 
viates their  sorrows,  when  every  other  consolation 
fails. 


136  SYMPATHETIC  SORROW. 

Condolence  is  the  expression  of  our  commisera- 
tion. 

Pity  is  also  similar  to  the  two  preceding  affec- 
tions, but  is  more  frequently  applied  to  particular 
circumstances,  in  the  State  and  Situation  of  the 
object,  rather  than  his  immediate  feelings.  Thus 
we  often  pity  those  who  have  no  pity  upon  them- 
selves ;  whose  dispositions  and  conduct  are  leading 
them  into  evils,  of  which  they  entertain  no  appre- 
hensions, or  concerning  which  they  are  not  solicit- 
ous. The  decrepit  and  infirm  also  are  the  objects 
of  our  pity,  though  they  may  sustain  their  infirmi- 
ties with  an  enviable  cheerfulness.  Children  ren- 
dered destitute  of  worthy  and  affectionate  parents, 
and  exposed  to  future  calamities,  of  which  they  are 
unconscious,  are  deemed  peculiar  objects  of  pity. 
Nay,  their  ignorance  of  their  misfortunes  augments 
the  force  of  our  sympathetic  feelings. 

Generosity  is  the  disposition  which  prompts  us 
to  bestow  favours,  which  are  not  the  purchase  of 
any  particular  merit.  It  has  not,  like  mercy,  any 
immediate  relation  either  to  imprudences  or  crimi- 
nality. It  is  benevolence  sympathizing  with  some 
peculiarities  in  the  state  or  circumstances  of  ano- 
ther, which  demand  our  aid,  either  in  the  remis- 
sion of  pecuniary  claims,  ia  voluntary  grants,  or  in 
donations  and  benefactions  to  assist  their  indigence. 
It  generally  relates  to  some  concessions,  sacrifices, 
or  peculiar  exertions  which  have  been  made,  in  the 
exercise  of  the  benevolent  principle.  The  extent 
of  generosity  is  measured  by  the  advantages  and 


SYMPATHETIC  SORROW.  137 

pleasures,  which  have  been  relinquished  in  favour 
of  another  ;  or  according  to  the  troubles  and  diffi- 
culties which  have  been  encountered,  b}-  the  bene- 
factor on  one  hand,  and  the  slender  pretensions  of 
the  object  to  these  benevolent  offices,  on  the  other. 

Liberality  has  sometimes  a  similar  import  with 
Generosity.  Sometimes  it  has  a  particular  refe- 
rence to  the  largjeness  of  pecuniary  or  other  dona- 
tions. In  the  present  day  it  is  frequently  applied 
to  sentiments  respecting  another.  It  is  used  in  op- 
position to  a  narrow  contracted  mode  of  thinking, 
or  to  a  censorious  disposition,  inspired  by  a  diffe- 
rence of  opinion.  It  expresses  a  freedom  from  the 
bias  of  prejudice  or  partiality.  The  man  who  is 
disposed  to  think  well  of,  and  act  with  kindness 
towards  persons,  whose  religious  or  political  creed 
differs  materially  from  his  own,  is  deemed  Liberal- 
minded. 

Thus  may  Liberality  be  considered  as  a  species 
of  generosity,  which  usage  chiefly  applies  to  free 
donations,  or  to  subduing  unfavourable  pre-posses- 
sions  respecting  the  opinions  of  another.  It  is  a 
liberation  from  the  confined  manner  of  acting,  or 
of  thinking,  which  characterizes  either  tli€  parsi- 
monious or  the  bigot. 

Charity,  in  its  original  import,  is  synonymous 
with  Love.  In  its  application  it  is  sometimes  used 
to  express  a  disposition  to  entertain  a  favourable 
opinion  of  the  moral  character  or  conduct  of  others, 
in  opposition  to  unfavourable  reports,  until  the 
strongest  evidences  implant  conviction ;   at   other 

18 


138  SYMPATHETIC  SORROW. 

times,  it  signifies  giving  of  alms,  and  doing  good 
to  inferiors.  Benevolent  exertions  in  behalf  of  the 
wretched,  or  the  oppressed,  are  deemed  acts  of 
charity. 

Condescension  is  that  species  of  benevolence, 
which  designedly  waves  the  supposed  advantages 
of  birth,  title,  or  station,  in  order  to  accommodate 
ourselves  to  the  state  of  an  inferior,  and  to  dimin- 
ish that  restraint  which  the  apparent  distance  is 
calculated  to  produce  in  him.  It  greatly  enhances 
the  value  of  every  other  species  of  benevolence. 

From  the  above  analysis  we  perceive,  that  Mer- 
cy, Commiseration,  Pity,  Liberality,  &c.  are  diffe- 
rent branches  of  Compassion  adapted  to  the  pecu- 
liar situation  and  exigencies  of  its  objects.  While 
Compassion  relates  to  distress,  in  general,  without 
minute  distinctions,  its  raaiifications  respect  crimi- 
nality of  character  or  conduct, — iha  permanency  of 
distress,- — state  and  situations  which  strike  us  as 
peculiarly  unfortunate, — minuter  exigencies^ — re- 
putation,— and  inferiority  of  station.  It  is  not 
always  requisite  to  give  to  each  species  of  compas- 
sion its  appropriate  term  ;  yet  the  diversity  of  mis- 
fortunes, and  the  diverse  alleviations  of  each,  have 
imperceptibly  introduced  a  correspondent  phrase- 
ology, which  in  particular  cases,  manifests  its 
peculiar  propriety. 

Another  important  branch  of  Benevolence  con- 
sists in  partaking  of  the  good  fortune  of  others ;  in 


SYMPATHETIC  JOY.  139 

the  participation  of  their  Joy,  upon  the  accession  of 
good,  or  liberation  from  evil. 

If  the  term  Sympathy  be  employed  in  this  con- 
nection, it  will  denote  a  pleasurable  sensation  ex- 
cited within  us,  similar  to  that  enjoyed  by  the  pri- 
mary participant  of  good. 

It  is  observable  that  no  particular  terms  are  ap- 
propriated to  this  species  of  sympathy.  There  are 
no  nice  discriminations  which  indicate  the  different 
kinds  of  good,  or  the  circumstances  relative  to  it, 
in  a  manner  correspondent  with  those  which  have 
been  traced  under  sympathetic  sorrow.  Freedom 
from  distress,  or  the  increase  of  actual  enjoyment, 
produces,  as  it  were,  one  simple  efiect  upon  the 
mind  of  the  benevolent  sympathizer,  without  those 
various  and  more  complicated  sensations,  which  a 
diversity  in  misfortunes  may  occasion.  These 
pleasing  sensations  can  only  be  expressed  by  the 
general  terms  of  joy,  gladness^  happiness,  ^c. 
We  rejoice  at  the  fortunate  event  which  has  made 
another  happy  ;  we  are  glad  to  hear  of  their  suc- 
cess ;  are  happy  to  be  informed  of  their  welfare, 
&c. 

In  some  instances,  this  species  of  benevolence 
becomes  a  very  lively  emotion,  and  the  sudden  im- 
pulse of  joy  may  emulate  that  inspired  by  our  own 
good  fortune,  although  the  object  should  be  almost 
a  stranger  to  us.  When,  for  example,  our  minds 
have  been  previously  and  deeply  affected  with  the 
knowledge  of  his  distress ; — when  a  prosperous 
change  has  suddenly  taken  place  ; — and  particular- 


140  SYMPATHETIC  JOY. 

\y  when  this  change  has  been  accomplished  by  the 
triumph  of  the  party  over  crueUy  and  oppression. 
In  such  cases,  we  enjoy  this  sudden  transition  from 
painful  to  pleasing  sympathy,  and  we  participate 
in  that  exultation  over  tyranny  or  injustice,  to 
which  every  man  entertains  an  hatred,  unless  it  be 
his  own  act. 

But,  excepting  upon  extraordinary  occasions  of 
this  nature,  our  sympathies  with  the  good  fortune 
of  others,  are  much  inferiour  in  strength  to  those 
we  experience  from  their  distress.  Various  rea- 
sons may  be  assigned  for  this  difference. — The 
influence  of  many  blessings,  newly  acquired,  may 
not  be  so  extensive  and  important,  as  the  influence 
of  a  single  calamity  ; — it  is  scarcely  possible  for 
any  one  to  be  elevated  to  the  pinnacle  of  happi- 
ness, in  so  rapid  a  manner  as  he  may  be  plunged 
into  the  depth  of  distress  ; — good  fortune,  to  what- 
ever state  or  circumstances  we  may  apply  the  term, 
is  generally  of  slower  progress,  is  accumulated  by 
almost  imperceptible  degrees,  and  therefore  is  not 
calculated  to  make  a  vivid  impression  at  any  one 
period  of  its  progress ; — the  object  may  l)e  more 
deeply  afflicted  in  his  relative  and  social  connec- 
tions, by  the  misfortunes  or  irregular  conduct  of 
an  individual,  than  he  could  feel  himself  benefited 
by  their  prosperity  ;  consequently  were  we  to  sym- 
pathize with  him,  in  a  manner  correspondent  with 
his  own  feelings,  joyful  events  could  not  make  an 
impression  upon  us  equal  to  his  afflictions ; — those 
distresses  which  call  forth  our  sympathy  of  sorrow 


SYMPATHETIC  JOY.  141 

are  generally  promulgated  to  a  considerable  extent, 
while  recent  acquisitions  of  good,  with  all  the  strik- 
ing circumstances  attending  them,  are  mosvlj  con- 
fined to  the  narrow  circle  of  relatives  and  friends. 
— To  these  incidental  causes  we  may  justly  add 
the  wise  constitution  of  our  nature,  as  the  final 
cause.  Sympathy  with  the  distresses  of  another  is 
infinitely  more  useful  than  rejoi?nng  in  his  pros- 
perity. It  is  an  incentive  to  administer  relief,  to 
annihilate  his  distress,  and  to  restore  the  sufferer 
to  the  pristine  state  of  ease  and  conifort ;  and  there- 
fore is  it  rendered,  by  the  Great  Source  of  Benevo- 
lence, more  powerful  in  its  influence  and  opera- 
tions, than  the  sympathy  of  Joy  in  their  welfare ; 
which  cannot  be  productive  of  equal  good.  The 
different  kinds  of  sympathetic  sorrow,  are  admira- 
bly adapted  to  the  particular  state  of  its  objects,  in 
order  that  ea(  h  may  receive  its  correspondent 
benefit.  These  considerations  will  explain  the 
reason  why  an  insensibility  to  the  misfortunes  of 
any  one,  is  much  more  opprobrious  than  an  indiffe- 
rence to  his  actual  jgnjoyments. 

The  immediate  expressions  of  our  joy  are  term- 
ed Congratulations. 

All  the  affections  excited  by  the  contemplation 
of  Good  or  Evil,  which  relate  to  others,  are  mani- 
festly compound.  Sympathy  with  offerings,  is 
composed  of  benevolence  and  sorrow ;  and  cordial 


142  SYMPATHETIC  JOY. 

congratulations  are  the  effusions  of  benevolence 
and  joy. 

It  is  observable  that,  in  the  benevolence  we  are 
now  contemplating,  the  affection  of  Love  is  not 
necessarily  placed  upon  the  object  personallv,  on 
account  of  any  excellence  of  character,  or  peculiar 
amiableness  of  disposition,  it  rejoices  in  the  well- 
fare  of  another,  unconnected  with  his  virtues. 
The  Capacity  of  enjoyment  is  a  sufficient  motive 
for  attempting  to  impart  it ;  and  a  state  of  distress 
is  a  sufficient  incitement  to  attempt  relief.  In  its 
noblest  exertions,  benevolence  indicates  itself  by 
the  communication  of  good,  in  opposition  to  evil 
deserts,  and  in  a  strong  propensity  to  protect  from 
misery,  which  the  bad  conduct  of  the  offender  has 
not  been  able  to  subdue.  It  becomes  a  desire  of 
promoting  happiness,  too  ardent  to  be  extinguished 
by  injury  itself. 

Sympathy  is  also  applicable  to  the  Sociableness 
of  the  human  character  ;  to  the  nature  of  man  as 
formed  to  live  in  society.  Thfis  is  manifested  by 
the  reciprocal  pleasure  and  satisfaction  we  experi- 
ence in  our  daily  intercourse ; — by  the  eagerness 
with  which  we  receive  and  communicate  tidings 
that  interest  our  fellowmen  ; — by  the  love  of  imi- 
tation, and  the  readiness  with  which  we  conform 
to  the  customs,  manners,  and  dispositions,  and  ac- 
quiesce in  y^e  opinions  of  others,  without  attention 
to  the  higher  authority  of  propriety  or  impropriety, 
or  weighing  motives  and  arguments  in  the  balance 


COMPLACENTIAL  AFFECTIONS.  143 

of  reason.  In  short,  it  respects  every  act,  habit. 
and  sentiment,  of  which  to  participate  in  common 
is  gratifying  to  our  feelings,  and  constitutes  so 
large  a  portion  of  the  enjoyments  and  seductions 
of  life. 

This  sympathetic  Imitation  brings  us  by  imper- 
ceptible degrees  to  our  Second  Division. 

II.     The  Affections  derived  from  Good  Opinion. 

In  this  class  of  Social  Affections,  the  operations 
of  the  Benevolent  Principle  are  not  so  immediate. 
Though  benevolence  is  associated,  it  is  not  the  pri- 
mary agent.  It  is  rather  a  consequence  than  a 
cause.  It  is  not  our  benevolence  which  inspires  us 
with  these  favourable  opinions,  but  their  good 
qualities  which  awaken  and  direct  our  benevo- 
lence. Our  affections  are  drawn  forth  by  an  im- 
pressive sense  of  some  species  of  excellence  in  cha- 
racter;  and  they  may  be  placed  upon  objects, 
whose  situations  do  not  require  either  our  sympa- 
thetic joys  or  sorrows.  These  are  most  properly 
expressed  by  complacential  regards ;  for  they  con- 
sist both  in  the  approbation  of  the  mind,  and  feel- 
ings of  the  heart.  They  relate  to  conduct  and 
qualities,  concerning  which  our  judgment  pronoun- 
ces that  they  possess  merit,  while  they  are  render- 
ed interesting  by  virtue  of  our  social  connections. 

The  nature  of  Complacency,  as  it  refers  either 
to  ourselves,  or  to  our  most  intimate  connections. 


144  COMPLACENTIAL  AFFECTIONS. 

has  already  been  considered.*  I  shall  only  ob- 
serve in  this  place,  that  when  we  are  rendered 
participants  of  good,  fro?ii  those  qualities  which 
are  the  proper  objects  of  complacency  ;  or  when 
we  contemplate  peculiar  marks  of  mental  or  moral 
excellencies,  in  others  with  whom  we  are  con- 
versant, our  approbation  is  accompanied  with  va- 
rious degrees  of  affection  for  them,  although  they 
may  not  be  within  the  sphere  of  our  intimacy. 

Of  these  affections  the  following  are  the  most 
conspicuous. 

Gratitude.  Gratitude  is  a  pleasant  affection, 
excited  by  a  lively  sense  of  benefits  received  or 
intended,  or  even  by  the  desire  of  being  beneficial. 
It  is  the  lively  and  powerful  re-action  of  a  well 
disposed  mind,  upon  whom  benevolence  has  con- 
ferred some  importanit  good.  It  is  mostly  connect- 
ed with  an  impressive  sense  of  the  amiable  dispo- 
sition of  the  person  by  whom  the  benefit  is  con- 
ferred, and  it  immediately  produces  a  personal 
affection  towards  him.  When  the  affection  ope- 
rates according  to  the  natural  course  of  influence, 
it  will  be  correspondent  to  the  importance  of  the 
good  obtained, — the  distance  in  station  between 
the  recipient  and  his  benefactor, — the  smallness 
of  his  claims, — perhaps  the  consciousness  of  de- 
serving very  opposite  treatment.  These  circum- 
stances unite  to  warm  the  heart  into  raptures. 
The   grateful    mind  is  impatient  of  a  silent   and 

*  See  p.  69  passim. 


ADMIRATION.  145 

passive  reception  of  the  blessing.  It  cannot  be  re- 
strained from  acknowledging  its  obligations,  either 
by  expressions  or  deeds.  It  considers  every  return 
in  its  povi^er  as  an  act  of  the  strictest  justice  ;  nor 
is  it  deterred  by  difficulties  or  dangers  from  making 
the  attempt.  The  term  most  familiarly  employed 
was  originally  suggested  by  this  idea.  The  obli- 
gation is  perceived,  and  felt ;  and  the  person  bene- 
fited considers  himself  as  hound,  in  honour  and 
justice,  either  to  repay  or  acknowledge  the  debt, 
by  a  bond  that  cannot  be  cancelled. 

We  shall  not  wonder  at  the  peculiar  strength 
and  energy  of  this  affection,  when  we  consider 
that  it  is  compounded  of  love  placed  upon  the 
good  communicated,  affection  for  the  donor,  and 
joy  at  the  reception.  Thus  it  has  Goodness  for 
its  object,  and  the  most  pleasing,  perhaps  unex- 
pected,  if  not  unmerited,  exertions  of  goodness, 
.for  its  immediate  cause. 

Thankfulness  refers  to  verbal  expressions  of 
gratitude. 

Admiration.  Although  there  is  scarcely  a  word 
in  more  familiar  use  than  the  term  admiration, 
yet  much  ambiguity  has  attended  its  precise  signi- 
fication ;  nor  have  authors  of  the  greatest  celebrity, 
been  uniform  in  the  sense  they  have  affixed  to  it. 
Sometimes  it  has  been  deemed  synonymous  with 
Surprise  ;  sometimes  it  is  used  to  express  Wonder  ; 
sometimes  it  is  applied  to  subjects,  as  a  mark  of 

19 


146  ADMIRATtOK 

degradation ;  at  others,  as  expressive  of  excellen-' 
cies. 

In  Milton's  Paradise  Lost,  it  is  more  than  once 
employed  to  denote  wonder. 

Let  none  admire 

That  riches  grow  iu  he,ll. • 

BOOK.  I      L.  690. 

In  the  following  passage  of  Shakspeare,  it  ob- 
viously signifies  wonder  and  astonishment.  Lady 
Macbeth  says  to  her  husband,  terrified  at  the 
sight  of  Banquo's  Ghost, 

You  have  displac'd  the  mirth,  broke  the  good  meeting,  with  most  admired 
disorder. 

MACBETH. 

Mr.  Pope  has  used  it  to  express  the  indiscri- 
minating  applause  of  Ignorance : 

For  Fools  admire,  but  Meo  of  Sense  approve. 

Mr.  Grove  defines  admiration  to  be  "  That  sud- 
"den  surprise  at  the  novelty  of  an  object,  by 
"  which  the  soul  is  fastened  down  to  the  contem- 
"  plation  of  it."  He  also  asserts  that  "  according 
"  to  the  different  characters  of  its  object  it  is  called 
"  esteem  or  contempt.^^ 

These  significations  have  doubtless  been  given 
in  conformity  to  the  Latin  words,  miror  and  ad- 
miration which  are  equally  expressive  of  surprise, 
wonder,    astonishment,    and  that  vivid  pleasure 


ADMIRATION.  147 

which  the  sudden  perception  of  something  extra- 
ordinary is  calculated  to  produce  in  the  mind. 

But  in  the  most  pertinent  and  appropriate  use 
of  the  terms  to  admire,  and  admiration.,  they  are 
manifestly  deviating  from  a  generic  to  a  specific 
sense :  and  in  proportion  to  our  advances  in  pre- 
cision and  accuracy,  we  feel  not  only  the  advan- 
tage, but  the  necessity  of  applying  them  to  some 
\i\ndi  oi excellency  exclusively;  otherwise  we  shall 
be  destitute  of  words  to  discriminate  the  finest 
feelings  of  the  soul,  from  those  which  are  common 
to  the  most  ignorant  and  uncultivated.  Even 
Idiots  may  be  surprised :  the  most  ignorant  may 
wonder  and  frequently  do  wonder  the  most ;  but 
neither  of  them  are  susceptible  of  that  impression 
which  is  best  expressed  by  admiration. 

If  we  adhere  stedfastly  to  the  rule,  that  no  two 
words  are  perfectly  synonymous,  which  cannot  be 
used  with  equal  propriety  in  every  possible  connec- 
tion ;  we  shall  find  that  admiration  is  as  superior 
to  surprise  and  wonder,  simply  considered,  as 
knowledge  is  superior  to  ignorance  ;  for  its  appro- 
priate signification  is  that  act  of  the  mind,  by 
which  we  discover,  approve,  and  enjoy  some  un- 
usual species  of  excellevtce. 

The  authority  of  Poets  is  of  little  weight, 
when  we  aim  at  philosophical  precision.  Their 
object  is  to  produce  some  striking  effect ;  and 
this  must  be  accomplished  by  other  means,  than 
by  dividing  and  subdividing  ideas  into  their  com- 
ponent parts.     Their  subjects  frequently  borrow 


148  ADMIRATION. 

Strength  from  foreign  auxiliaries,  which  they  claim 
a  licence  to  press  into  their  service,  as  often  as 
they  require  their  aid,  in  direct  violation  of  primi- 
tive rights.  As  the  ancient  Poets,  by  the  per- 
sonification of  attributes  and  characters,  have 
peopled  both  Worlds  with  innumerable  deities, 
which  reason  has  found  it  very  difficult  to  expel ; 
thus  have  Poets,  in  general,  by  the  use  of  tropes 
and  figures,  by  availing  themselves  of  resemblances 
and  affinities  of  every  species,  given  energy  to 
their  thoughts ;  but  they  have  inspired  false  ideas, 
which  philosophical  precision  finds  it  difficult  to 
eradicate.  They  have  represented  things  which 
are  not,  as  if  they  were ;  and  thus  imposed  a  severe 
task  upon  philosophy,  to  discriminate  the  differ- 
ences which  they  have  confounded. 

Our  best  prose  writers,  whose  subjects  demand 
an  attention  to  just  distinctions,  generally  apply 
admiration  to  some  degree  of  Excellency. 

"  When  we  have  those  elevated  ideas  of  nature," 
says  Mr.  Dryden,  "the  result  of  that  view  is 
"  admiration,  which  is  always  the  cause  of  plea- 
"  sure."  Mr.  Addison  observes,  that  "  neither  Virgil 
"  nor  Horace  would  have  gained  so  great  reputa- 
"  tion  had  they  not  been  friends,  and  admirers  of 
"  each  other."  In  the  following  passage.  Arch- 
bishop Tillotson  gives  a  full  and  satisfactory 
explanation  of  the  term.  "  There  is  a  pleasure 
"  in  admiration  ;  and  this  is  that  which  properly 
"  causes  admiration,  when  we  discover  a  great 
"  deal  in  an  object  which  we  understand  to  be 


ADMIRATION.  149 

"  excellent :  and  yet  we  see  we  know  not  how 
"  much  more  beyond  that,  which  our  understand- 
*'  ings  cannot  fully  reach  and  comprehend."  (See 
Note  R.) 

That  Excellence  which  is  the  subject  of  admira- 
tion, may  either  consist  in  the  intellectual  powers 
of  mind,  or  dispositions  of  the  heart.  Admiration 
may  be  excited  by  the  contemplation  of  greatness 
and  extent  of  genius,  by  indications  of  superior 
talents,  by  plans  and  projects  which  discover  great 
ingenuity  in  contrivance  and  invention,  or  unusual 
skill  in  the  execution.  It  is  often  excited  by  ex- 
traordinary exertions  of  benevolence ;  such  as 
dangers  encountered  to  protect  and  save  a  friend, 
a  stranger,  or  an  enemy  ;  by  the  greatness  of  the 
sacrifice  made  to  misery,  and  the  compassion  that 
excites  to  extraordinary  acts  of  mercy.  In  short, 
the  objective  cause  of  admiration  is  whatever  in- 
dicates a  superior  degree  of  wisdom,  ingenuity, 
good  sense,  or  benevolence.  To  such  qualities  it 
is  properly  confined.  Power  abstractedly  consi- 
dered is  not  the  object  of  admiration  ;  though  the 
dignified  or  benevolent  exertions  of  power,  to  the 
production  of  good,  may  excite  the  highest  degree 
of  admiration,  and  place  it  among  the  strongest  of 
our  emotions. 

It  is  obvious  that  the  range  of  admiration  is, 
from  the  simpler  approbation  of  the  mind,  up  to 
the  most  lively  sensation,  according  to  our  con- 
ceptions of  the  extent  of  excellence,  and  the 
degrees  of  our  interest  in  its  effects.     It  is  also 


150  ADMIRATION. 

blended  with  various  other  emotions,  according  to 
different  circumstances  attendant  upon  the  pas- 
sion. It  is  frequently  introduced  by  Surprise; 
when,  for  example,  the  discovery  of  these  excel- 
lencies is  sudden  and  unexpected ;  and  then  it 
becomes  a  vivid  emotion.  It  is  generally  connec- 
ted with  some  degrees  of  Wonder ; — as  we  are  so 
frequently  ignorant  of  the  causes  which  enabled 
any  one  greatly  to  excel  ourselves  or  others :  but 
since  it  is  always  excited  by  the  real  discovery  of 
some  good  qualities,  it  is  not  to  be  confounded 
with  an  emotion  which  arises  from  ignorance  and 
embarrassment,  previous  to  the   discovery. 

When  the  evidences  of  wisdom  and  goodness 
exceed  our  utmost  comprehension,  or  proceed  far 
beyond  the  usual  extent  of  excellence  itself,  they 
may  excite  Astonishment. 

Whatever  is  Good,  or  productive  of  Good,  is 
the  proper  object  of  Love.  Excellence  must  of 
consequence  be  peculiarly  calculated  to  excite  this 
affection  in  a  superior  degree  :  hence  the  pleasing 
and  intimate  connection  between  Love  and  Ad- 
miration. When  these  are  united  with  Gratitude, 
they  constitute  the  happiest  and  sublimest  affec- 
tions of  the  soul.  When  the  object  manifests  ex- 
traordinary benevolence ; — when  immeasurable  ex- 
tents of  wisdom  and  goodness  direct  power  to  exe- 
cute their  purpose; — when  incalculable  advantages 
are  the  issue  of  their  united  operations,  admiration 
swells  into  delectable  astonishment,  and  our  con- 


ESTEEM,  RESPECT.  151 

scions  incapacity  to  fathom  is  an  augmentation  of 
enjoyment. 

Esteem  is  the  value  we  place  upon  some  degree 
of  worth.  It  is  higher  than  simple  approbation, 
which  is  a  decision  of  the  judgment.  Esteem  is 
the  commencement  of  aiFection.  It  is  a  degree  of 
love  entertained  for  others,  on  account  of  their 
pleasing  qualities,  though  they  should  not  immedi- 
ately interest  ourselves ;  by  which  it  is  distinguish- 
ed from  gratitude.  The  term  is  peculiarly  appli- 
cable to  virtuous  and  amiable  dispositions  of  the 
heart,  such  as  honesty,  integrity,  patience,  kind- 
ness, gentleness,  &c.  which  have  no  necessary 
connection  with  the  understanding.  Thus  may 
we  entertain  an  Esteem  for  persons  of  merif,  al- 
though they  are  at  a  remote  distance  from  our 
intimacy :  we  esteem  the  character  of  a  person 
merely  from  the  report  of  his  good  qualities. 

Respect  is  that  favourable  impression  which  the 
goodness  of  a  character  has  made  upon  the  person 
contemplating  it,  united  with  a  share  of  good 
sense.  An  union  of  both  these  qualities  is  requi- 
site. Goodness  alone  is  not  sufficient  to  create 
respect.  For  should  it  be  seated  in  a  mind  which 
indicates  extreme  imbecility,  it  cannot  be  deemed 
respectable.  On  the  other  hand,  superior  sense  in  a 
mind  destitute  of  goodness,  will  not  inspire  respect. 
It  will  either  waste  itself  in  idle  speculations, 
which  renders  it  indifferent  to  us  ;  or  it  may  de- 
generate into  low  cunning,  which  renders  it  hate- 


152  VENERATION,  &c. 

ful.  Should  it  be  connected  with  power,  in  a 
wicked  and  perverse  mind,  it  will  excite  horror  and 
dismay ;  which  are  very  remote  from  respect. 

This  affection  is  always  connected  with  a  cau- 
tious disposition  not  to  disoblige  its  objects  ;  in- 
spiring a  solicitude  to  obtain  their  good-will. 

Veneration  is  a  higher  degree  of  Respect ;  in 
which  the  mind  seems  to  be  more  forcibly  struck, 
with  wisdom,  connected  with  the  sterner  virtues. 
Hence  we  speak  of  characters  which  are  more 
venerable  than  amiable.  The  term  is  chiefly  ap- 
plicable to  wisdom  matured  by  years,  or  connected 
with  some  peculiar  dignity  of  title  or  office,  and 
indicated  by  integrity  and  uprightness.  Thus  we 
speak  of  venerable  ancestors,  venerable  parents, 
magistrates,  &c.  from  a  presumption  of  their  supe- 
riority in  wisdom. 

Awe  is  the  impression  made  upon  us  by  the 
lively  idea  of  Power ;  a  power  which  would  in- 
spire distressing  fear  or  terror,  were  it  not  modified 
by  other  circumstances  and  qualities,  suggesting 
the  idea  of  safety.  It  may  be  inspired  by  things 
inanimate,  when  the  perception  of  irresistible  pow- 
er is  united  with  a  confidence  of  safety.  Thus 
lofty  mountains,  steep  precipices,  deep  caverns, 
the  tempestuous  ocean,  inspire  the  mind  with  Awe, 
in  situations  where  they  cannot  injure  us.  When 
the  emotion  is  inspired  by  Character,  it  acknow- 
ledges a  power,  restrained  from  pernicious  exer^ 
tions,  either  by  justice,  or  benevolence. 


VENERATION,  &c.  153 

Reverence  is  the  veneration  paid  to  superior 
sanctity,  intermixed  with  a  certain  degree  of  awe. 
It  is  the  high  Respect  paid  to  the  sacred  character 
of  its  object,  attended  with  a  conscious  inferiority 
in  moral  worth.  Esteem  and  Respect  may  be  in- 
spired by  the  qualities  observable  in  our  equals, 
and  the  former  more  particularly  in  our  inferiors ; 
but  Veneration,  Awe,  and  Reverence  imply  various 
degrees  of  superiority  in  their  objects. 

It  is  manifest  from  the  above  Analysis,  that  the 
qualities  which  influence  our  favourable  opinions, 
are  various  degrees  and  modifications  of  Goodness, 
Wisdom,  and  Power  ;  that  some  of  our  com  placen- 
tal affections  are  inspired  by  the  predominance 
of  one,  some  by  the  predominance  of  another ; 
and  in  some  there  is  almost  an  indistinguisha- 
ble union.  Gratitude  refers  to  goodness  indi- 
cated by  our  reception  of  benefits.  Esteem  re- 
fers to  goodness  in  its  feeblest  indications  ;  there- 
fore it  is  that  we  frequently  express  our  esteem  for 
the  good  qualities  of  the  heart,  in  any  one,  more 
than  for  the  soundness  of  his  understanding.  Re- 
spect and  Veneration  refer  to  various  degrees  of 
wisdom,  or  intellectual  power  united  with  good- 
ness ;  and  Aioe  may  relate  either  to  physical  or 
intellectual  power,  which  becomes  impressive  with- 
out inspiring  dread.  Reverence  relates  to  superi- 
ority in  moral  endowments,  connected  with  awe 
at  intellectual  powers,  and  a  consciousness  of  our 
own  deficiencies  upon  a  comparative  view.  Ad- 
miratioti  may  refer  to  an  unusual  display  of  either 

20 


154  VENERATION,  &c. 

of  these  qualities,  separately ;  or  to  the  union  of 
them  in  an  extraordinary  degree. 

As  self-complacency  has  its  counterfeit  in  pride 
and  vanity,  thus  are  the  complacential  affections 
liable  to  similar  perversion,  and  give  rise  to  the  fol- 
lowing imperfections. 

Fondness.  Though  this  affection  is  frequently 
pardonable,  and  sometimes  amiable,  yet  it  is  an 
acknowledged  weakness.  It  indicates  an  attach- 
ment to  whatever  belongs  to  us,  or  is  immediately 
connected  with  us,  beyond  its  intrinsic  merit. 
Sometimes  it  is  inspired  simply  by  the  idea  of  its 
being  our  own  property  ;  sometimes  it  is  contract- 
ed or  strengthened  by  habit ; — sometimes  it  is  the 
excess  of  love,  where  love  is  most  natural,  which 
indicates  itself  by  infantile  manners,  or  culpable 
indulgences ; — and  sometimes  it  is  the  excess  of 
affection  manifested  to  inferior  animals,  to  which 
their  superiors  have  a  much  better  claim. 

Partiality.  This  is  such  an  excess  of  personal 
attachment  as  obscures  the  judgment,  or  corrupts 
the  heart.  It  inclines  to  a  more  favourable  opinion 
of  the  motives,  conduct,  and  general  merit  of  its 
object,  than  is  consistent  with  the  justice  due  to 
others.  , 

When  any  of  the  social  and  sympathetic  affec- 
tions are  very  strong,  they  rise  to  Emotions,  and 
produce  some  correspondent  tokens  in  the  counte- 
nance.    Complacency  indicates  itself  by  ineffable 


MALEVOLENT  DESIRES,  &c.  15& 

smiles ;  the  countenance  becomes  animated,  and 
the  eyes  sparkle  with  delight.  Sympathetic  joy 
manifests  itself  by  the  indications  characteristic  of 
joy.  Sympathy  with  distress  retains  something  of 
the  benignant  smile,  mixed  with  marks  of  dejec- 
tion, of  deep  concern,  or  inward  anguish.  When 
admiration  rises  into  transport,  all  the  symptoms 
peculiar  to  surprise  are  sometimes  mixed  with 
marks  of  complacential  love,  and  sometimes  check- 
ed by  veneration  and  awe,  in  which  some  portion 
of  fearful  apprehension  becomes  an  ingredient. 

In  all  these  sympathetic  affections,  the  Eye  is 
the  most  expressive.  It  is  properly  termed  the 
Index  of  the  Soul.  Particular  attitudes  and  ges- 
tures, and  the  various  forms  and  plaits  of  the  fea- 
tures may  be  counterfeited  by  the  unfeeling  heart  ; 
but  it  cannot  so  easily  imitate  the  brisk  suffusions 
of  joy,  the  sympathetic  tear,  the  deep  veneration 
and  awe,  and  the  eager  admiration,  which  real 
feelings  transmit  immediately  from  the  heart,  into 
that  wonderful  organ. 


ORDER  II. 

PASSIONS  AND  AFFECTIONS  EXCITKD  BY  DI«iPLACENCV,  IN  WHICH 
EVIL   IS  THE  PREDOMINANT    IDEA. 

The  reason  for  preferring  the  word  Displacency 
to  Malevolence,  as  a  generic  term,  has  already  been 
given.     Malevolence  is  rejected,  as  not  being  so 


156  MALEVOLENT  DESIRES 

applicable  to  every  branch  of  that  displeasure  we 
may  possibly  indulge  against  others  ;  whereas  Dis- 
placency  comprehends  those  various  kinds  of  dis- 
content to  which  we  are  exposed,  in  our  social  in- 
tercourse. Displacency  may  indicate  itself  by  dis- 
positions exceedingly  inimical  to  its  objects,  or  it 
may  consist  in  warm  disapprobation  of  their  con- 
duct. In  the  first  sense,  it  is  opposed  to  the  ope- 
rations of  the  benevolent  principle ;  and  in  the 
other,  it  is  the  reverse  of  complacency,  which  indi- 
cates various  degrees  of  affectionate  approbation. 

The  word  Displacency  is  solely  applicable  to 
our  intercourse  with  the  human  species,  and  is  not 
employed  to  express  discontent  or  uneasiness  from 
any  other  source. 

Displacency  divides  itself  also  into  two  kinds. 
It  may  be  indicated  by  malevolent  desires  and  dis- 
positions towards  the  object :  or  by  unfavourable 
opinions  and  disapprobations,  without  any  mixture 
of  Malevolence. 

I.  The  displacency  which  is  indicated  by  ma- 
levolent desires  and  dispositions. 

These  may  be  either  of  a  permanent  nature,  or 
merely  occasional.  The  former  relates  to  that 
Malevolence  or  ill-will  which  is  constant  and  uni- 
form in  its  influence  ;  the  other  to  the  passion  of 
Anger  and  its  various  modifications,  which  have 


AND  DISPOSITIONS.  157 

some  particular  acts  of  an  unpleasing  and  irritating 
nature  for  their  immediate  objects. 

The  first  species  of  Malevolence  is  a  branch  of 
that  general  principle  of  Hatred,  which  has  already 
occupied  our  attention.  (See  Ch.  i.  Sect,  hi.)  It 
originates  from  various  incidental  causes ; — such 
as  from  reiterated  injuries,  and  vexations ; — from 
unjust  or  exaggerated  representations  of  the  tem- 
per, designs,  motives,  conduct  of  another,  which 
are  unpleasant  or  pernicious ; — from  the  partialities 
so  intimately  connected  with  our  social  intimacies 
and  affections,  which  give  rise  to  violent  prejudices 
against  those  who  appear  inimical  to  their  inte- 
rests ; — from  a  spirit  of  envy  and  jealousy,  which 
connects  hatred  of  the  Person  with  repining  at 
his  good  fortune.  Clans  and  classes  of  Enmity 
may  thus  be  formed,  which,  augmented  by  the 
power  of  social  sympathy,  will  finally  become  in- 
veterate and  implacable.  Malevolence  therefore 
commences  with  some  idea  of  evil,  belonging  to 
and  connected  with  the  object ;  and  it  settles  into 
a  permanent  hatred  of  his  person,  and  of  every 
thing  relative  to  him. 

The  principle  thus  formed  gives  rise  to  the  fol- 
lowing malevolent  affections. 

Malignancy  or  Malignity.  Both  these  words 
express  a  disposition  which  cherishes  inveterate 
hatreds,  and  maintains  implacable  war  against  its 


158  MALEVOLENT  DESIRES 

object ;  a  disposition  which  deliberately  plans 
schemes  of  mischief,  and  employs  every  means 
that  power,  mental  or  physical,  can  furnish  to  the 
prejudice  of  another.  These  words  are  nearly 
synonymous.  In  some  connections,  Malignity 
seems  rather  more  pertinently  applied  to  a  radical 
depravity  of  nature,  and  Malignancy  to  indications 
of  this  dep'-avity,  in  temper  and  conduct  in  particu- 
lar instances. 

Both  may  be  manifested  by  the  perversion  of 
power,  whether  physical  or  intellectual ;  and  our 
dread  of  the  disposition  will  be  proportioned  to  our 
conceptions  of  the  magnitude  of  this  power. 
Hence  the  terror  inspired  by  the  idea  of  Demons 
and  wicked  Spirits,  or  Beings  of  an  higher  order, 
who  are  supposed  to  be  devoid  of  every  thing  that 
is  good,  and  replete  with  every  thing  that  is  evil. 
So  that 


To  do  ought  good  never  can  be  their  task, 
But  ever  to  do  ill  their  sole  delight. 

Ml  LTON. 


To  such  Beings  we  ascribe  Malignancy  to  an  in« 
finite  extent. 

Malice,  on  the  other  hand,  is  more  frequently 
employed  to  express  the  dispositions  of  inferior 
minds,  to  execute  every  purpose  of  mischief,  with- 
in the  more  limited  circle  of  their  abilities.  It 
often  shews  itself  by  little  incidents  ;  such  as, — by 
thwarting  the  favourite  purposes  of  another  ; — by 
refusing  the  good  that  might   be  communicated 


AND  DISPOSITIONS.  159 

without  personal  injury  ;  by  encouraging  unfa- 
vourable reports  ; — by  raising  unjust  suspicions  ; — 
by  perverse  misrepresentations,  &c.  This  temper  is 
sometimes  expressed  by  spite,  or  by  having  a  spite 
against  any  one.  Thus,  if  we  ascribe  Malignancy 
to  Beings  of  a  superior  order,  by  way  of  preemin- 
ence, malice  and  a  malicious  disposition,  may  with 
peculiar  propriety  be  reserved  for  the  minor  agents 
of  mischief,  whose  power  of  doing  evil  is  not  pro- 
portionate to  their  inclinations. 

Envy.  This  is  a  painful  sensation  excited  by 
the  view  of  something  desirable  in  the  state  and 
situation  of  another,  which  self-love  wishes  to  ap- 
propriate. To  envy,  is  to  repine  at  the  good  con- 
ferred upon  another,  or  possessed  by  him.  Thus 
it  is  a  perfect  contrast  to  the  sympathy  which  re- 
joices at  his  welfare.  Envy  entertains  a  degree  of 
sorrow  that  the  good  contemplated  should  escape 
ourselves,  and  of  anger  that  it  should  fall  to  the 
share  of  another.  The  inordinate  self-love  which 
excites  to  envy,  naturally  induces  the  envious  per- 
son to  imagine  that  he  is  more  deserving,  than  the 
object  who  has  been  favoured.  He  contemplates 
his  own  supposed  merit,  in  opposition  to  the  sup- 
posed demerit  of  the  more  happy  object,  until  he 
becomes  fully  convinced,  in  his  own  prejudiced 
judgment,  of  the  injustice  of  the  distribution  ;  and 
feels  a  spirit  of  resentment  arising  against  the  pos- 
sessor, and  every  cause  of  his  enjoyment. 

Thus  is  envy  that  species  of  malevolence,  which 
is  inspired  by  the  conjoined  influence  of  pride,  sor- 
row, and  anger. 


160  MALEVOLENT  DESIRES 

Envy  is  denomioated  a  passion,  together  with 
many  other  of  the  malevolent  affections;  partly 
because  it  may  be  very  strongly  excited  by  particu- 
lar incidents,  and  partly  in  consequence  of  that  sin- 
gular law  of  usuage  which  assigns  the  word  Affec- 
tions to  the  benevolent  feelings,  and  Passions  to 
the  powerful  influence  of  vicious  dispositions.  (See 
Ch.  I.  Page  3.) 

Rancour  is  that  degree  of  malice  which  preys 
upon  the  possessor.  His  heart  is  torn  with  vexation 
when  he  contemplates  the  happiness  of  another,  or 
when  he  is  foiled  in  his  evil  purposes  towards  him. 

Cruelty.  A  cruel  disposition  respects  the  particu- 
lar temper  manifested  in  the  contemplation  or  in- 
fliction of  absolute  misery.  It  has  various  degrees. 
Sometimes  it  is  expressive  of  that  hardness  of  heart, 
which  is  able  to  look  upon  extreme  distress  with- 
out any  sensations  of  humanity.  Sometimes  cruel- 
ty is  indicated  by  the  voluntary  and  unnecessary 
infliction  of  misery  :  and  in  its  highest  state  it  re- 
joices and  triumphs  in  the  diffusion  of  horrors ;  in 
the  wanton  shedding  of  blood,  and  spreading  deso- 
lation. It  is  gratified  with  the  convulsions  of 
agony ;  groans  and  lamentations  are  music  in  its 
ears. 

This  fiend-like  temper  may  proceed  from  a  natu- 
ral insensibility,  strengthened  by  a  perverse  educa- 
tion ; — from  envy  ;— from  a  spirit  of  revenge  for 
supposed  injuries  ; — from  cowardice,  resenting  the 
panic  it  feels  ; — or  from  insatiable  ambition,  which 
wades  through  torrents  of  blood,  and  renders  the 


AND  DISPOSITIONS.  161 

mangled  bodies  of  the  slain,  stepping-stones  to  that 
pre-eminence  of  station  after  which  it  aspires. 

Censoriousness  is  a  disposition  to  find  feult  with 
the  conduct,  sentiments,  or  dispositions  of  another, 
deeming  every  action  improper,  or  ascribing  it  to 
improper  motives. 

Prejudice  is  the  reverse  of  partiality.  This  in- 
clines to  the  favourable  side  in  judging  or  vindicat- 
ing of  conduct,  more  than  reason  or  charity  de- 
mands ;  prejudice,  on  the  contrary,  is  that  degree 
of  malevolence  which  disposes  us  to  pre-judge  the 
character,  conduct,  or  motives  of  another  to  his  dis- 
adimntage,  without  having  the  proper  evidences  be- 
fore us.  It  is  obvious  that  the  partiality  indulged 
for  one  person,  may  excite,  or  greatly  increase  our 
prejudice  against  another. 

It  is  observable  that  the  common  use  of  each  of 
these  terms  is  not  entirely  correspondent  with  their 
original  import.  Partiality  properly  signifying  a 
partial  and  imperfect  view  of  the  evidence,  is  in 
itself  applicable  to  an  undue  bias  of  opinion  or  dis- 
position, whether  it  be  favourable  or  disfavourable 
to  the  object ;  and  prejudice  as  it  originally  signi- 
fies pre-judging,  is  in  itself  equally  applicable  to  a 
precipitate  decision  for  or  against  any  one ;  but 
custom  applies  the  term  partiality  to  a  disposition 
in  favour,  and  prejudice,  without  an  expletive,  to  a 
disposition  against  another. 

There  is  a  personal  hatred,  which  has  no  specific 

name.     It  consists  of  an  habitual  dislike  against 

some  particular  object,   without  being  connected 
21 


162  MALEVOLENT  DESIRES 

with  ill-will^  or  a  desire  of  his  being  unhappy.  It 
avoids  social  intercourse  with  the  party,  or  renders 
social  intercourse  irksome.  It  is  sometimes  the  re- 
sidue of  anger  which  forgives^  as  it  is  frequently 
expressed,  but  does  not  forget.  It  is  sometimes  in- 
spired by  unfavourable  reports  and  misrepresenta- 
tions, constituting  insufferable  prejudices ;  and  not 
unfrequently,  by  some  very  disagreeable  peculiarity 
of  manners  in  the  object. 

Ingratitude  cannot  be  termed  an  affection.  It  is 
the  negative  of  a  virtue,  which  a  feeling  heart 
places  among  the  first  of  obligations.  It  is  an  in- 
sensibility to  benefits  received,  either  arising  from 
stupidity,  culpable  inattention,  or  innate  pride, 
which  annihilates  the  idea  of  a  favour,  and  con- 
siders every  service  rendered  as  the  discharge  of  a 
debt. 

Apathy  is  a  singular  stagnation  of  all  the  social 
feelings.  It  professes  neither  to  love  nor  to  hate  ; 
it  affects  an  indifference  to  which  it  cannot  pos- 
sibly attain,  as  it  terminates  in  a  disgust  of  life 
and  all  its  objects.  Apathy  is  a  kind  of  gangrene 
affecting  the  social  principle,  which  like  a  morti- 
fied limb  in  the  corporeal  system,  is  an  incum- 
brance to  the  patient,  and  a  nuisance  to  others. 

Neither  dislike,  ingratitude,  nor  apathy,  are 
absolutely  chargeable  with  malevolence;  but  as 
they  are  the  disgraceful  negatives  of  every  social 
affection,  and  are  much  more  prepared  to  hate 
than  to  love,  this  seems  to  be  their  proper  de- 
partment. 


AND  DISPOSITIONS.  163 

The  second  species  of  Malevolence  relates  to 
those  occasional  and  more  transient  fits  of  ill-will, 
which  are  excited  by  particular  provocations,  and 
which  are  not  totally  repugnant  to  the  benevolent 
affections.  These  are  indicated  by  Anger^  and 
its  various  modifications. 

Anger  has  already  been  considered  as  the  pas- 
sion which  is  excited  by  a  quick  sense  of  injury; 
and  it  has  been  described  as  having  a  double  re- 
lation ;  the  one  immediately  respecting  ourselves, 
the  other  respecting  the  offender.  To  the  first 
we  directed  our  thoughts  under  the  selfish  pas- 
sions ;  where  the  influence  of  anger  upon  our 
personal  feelings,  and  effects  upon  the  corporeal 
system,  were  particularly  considered.  We  shall 
now  confine  our  attention  to  the  changes  produced 
in  our  minds  respecting  its  object. 

As  long  as  we  are  under  the  influence  of  Anger, 
considered  either  as  a  passion  or  an  affection,  we 
experience  a  temporary  suspension  of  our  usual 
complacency,  and  even  of  our  good  will  and  general 
benevolence,  towards  the  object  of  our  displeasure. 
Under  the  impulse  of  the  first  emotion,  we  are  con- 
scious of  a  desire  that  the  offender  should  suffer, 
in  some  degree  proportionate  to  this  recent  instance 
of  his  demerit ;  we  are  prompted  to  imagine  that 
justice  itself  demands  a  punishment  adequate  to 
the  offence ;  we  feel  ourselves  much  inclined  to 
become  the  ministers  of  justice,  and  are  impatient 
of  delay  in  the  execution  of  her  commands. 


16*  MALEVOLENT  DESIRES 

When  the  provocation  arises  from  the  conduct  of 
any  one,  with  whom  we  are  intimately  connected, 
our  habitual  love  of  their  persons  and  regard  for 
their  welfare,  may  restrain  the  passion  within  the 
bounds  of  justice,  and  the  explosion  which  gave 
vent  to  the  passion  may  restore  the  calm.  When 
it  arises  from  the  misconduct  of  a  person,  for 
whom  we  are  particularly  interested,  and  when 
this  misconduct  endangers  his  welfare,  the  very 
principle  of  benevolence  converts  our  complacency 
into  its  contrary.  In  this  case,  being  such  an 
expressive  indication  of  our  displeasure  as  to  in- 
spire terror,  it  is  admirably  calculated  to  strike 
the  offender  with  awe,  and  reclaim  his  conduct. 
As  soon  as  passion  is  able  to  attend  to  the  united 
voices  of  reason  and  affection,  they  will  frequently 
join  to  palliate  the  offence,  by  ascribing  it  to  some 
incidental  cause ;  to  the  common  frailties  of  our 
nature,  to  the  strong  impulse  of  particular  cir- 
cumstances, &c.  and  the  offender  becomes  rein- 
stated in  our  favourable  regards.  But  reiterated 
provocations  being  indubitable  marks  of  culpable 
inattention,  disrespect,  or  depravity  of  disposition, 
will  entirely  change  our  opinion  of  character,  and 
inspire  us  with  indifference  or  permanent  displeas- 
ure against  the  cause. 

Rage  has  been  described  as  the  madness  of 
anger. 

Revenge  is  an  insatiable  desire  to  sacrifice 
every  consideration  of  pity  and  humanity,  to  the 
principle  of  vindictive  justice.     It  renders  the  de- 


AND  DISPOSITIONS.  165 

ftiands  of  that  terrific  giant  paramount  to  every 
other  claim.  It  is  a  propensity  to  retaliate  evil, 
too  fervent  to  be  cooled  by  time,  too  deep  and 
inveterate  to  be  obliterated  by  concessions  and 
entreaties.  It  anticipates  joy  in  the  contemplation 
of  sighs  and  groans,  and  the  only  moment  of  trans- 
port is  the  instant  of  inflicting  misery. 

We  see  that  this  disposition  approaches  very  near 
to  permanent  malevolence,  of  the  most  despicable 
character.  The  abstract  idea  of  justice,  h(  \^  ever, 
forms  a  partition  between  them  ;  for  to  this  malevo- 
lence has  no  rightful  claim.  But  its  more  honoura- 
ble distinction  consists  in  that  repentance,  which 
humanity  excites  in  the  mind  that  is  not  totally  ob- 
durate, after  the  gratification  of  this  dreadful  pas- 
sion. The  avenger  feels,  too  late,  that  he  has  sac- 
rificed realities  to  a  phantom ;  and  that  to  intlict 
misery  is  in  no  case,  the  path  to  happiness. 

Wrath  is  a  deep  and  irritating  sense  of  an  injury. 
It  is  deliberate  anger  ;  being  chiefly  inspired  by  the 
contemplation  of  various  aggravating  circumstances 
attendant  upon  the  oflence.  The  desire  of  retalia- 
tion is  not  a  constituent  part  of  it ;  by  this  it  is 
distinguished  from  revenge.  But  it  occasions  a 
ferment  in  the  spirits  incompatible  with  the  indul- 
gence of  complacency. 

Resentment.  This  affection  has  been  described 
to  be  a  deep  reflective  displeasure  against  the  con- 
duct of  an  offender.  We  may  now  observe,  that  re- 
sentment is  chiefly  excited  by  some  personal  offence, 
committed  against  the  laws  of  social  intercourse, 


166  MALEVOLENT  DESIRES 

of  friendship,  or  of  gratitude; — by  some  affront, 
that  wounds  our  self  love,  it  may  be,  our  pride; — 
by  some  reprehensible  inattention  to  our  minuter 
claims  ; — or  by  the  want  of  respect  and  affection, 
to  which  we  imagine  that  the  tenour  of  our  conduct 
towards  the  object,  has  given  us  an  undoubted 
right.  It  may  terminate  in  indifference,  and,  in 
weak  minds,  in  malice  ;  but  it  is  generally  appeased 
by  concessions  and  acknowledgments. 

Suspicion.  This  is  a  comfortless  state  of  doubt 
concerning  the  conduct  and  character  of  another. 
The  mind  is  greatly  embarrassed  respecting  the  de- 
gree of  esteem,  cordiality,  or  friendship,  which  is 
due  to  the  object.  Suspicion  may  be  excited  by 
some  kind  of  accusation,  not  supported  by  evidence 
sufficient  for  conviction,  but  sufficient  to  trouble 
the  repose  of  confidence.  When  exercised  towards 
Intimates^  it  is  an  anxious  suspension  of  mind  be- 
tween complacency  and  displacency  ;  between  that 
respect  we  were  accustomed  to  entertain  for  them, 
and  the  painful  apprehension  that  they  no  longer 
deserve  it.  We  feel  an  incipient  anger  and  resent- 
ment, which  we  dare  not  to  indulge,  and  cannot 
suppress. 

Jealousy  is  a  species  of  suspicion  that  relates  to 
conduct,  which  still  more  intimately  concerns  our- 
selves. It  is  a  painful  apprehension  of  rivalship, 
in  cases  that  are  peculiarly  interesting  to  us.  It 
will  of  consequence  increase  in  strength,  according 
to  the  value  we  place  upon  the  object,  and  to  the 
degrees  of  danger  to  which  we   imagine  it  may  be 


AND  DISPOSITIONS.  16*J 

exposed.  Ft  is  the  inseparable  companion  of  the 
ambitious,  who  view  every  competitor,  and  every 
one  capable  of  becoming  a  competitor,  with  a  jea- 
lous eye.  It  is  sometimes  engrafted  upon  pride, 
which  is  deeply  wounded  by  appearances  of  neglect. 
It  is  a  frequent  attendant  upon  love  ;  and  in  a  mild- 
er sense  of  the  term,  it  may  be  considered  as  an 
anxious  solicitude  least  we  should  be  supplanted  in 
the  affections  of  those  we  most  highly  esteem. 
The  passion  is  sometimes  excited  in  weak  minds, 
by  the  very  excess  of  affection  ;  for  this  excess  is 
prone  to  be  perpetually  upon  the  watch,  and  tor- 
ments itself  with  groundless  fears.  Jealousy,  in 
the  extreme,  contains  a  complication  of  the  most 
tremendous  passions  which  can  agitate  the  human 
breast.  Though  it  has  love  for  its  basis,  yet  it  suf- 
fers the  united  torments  of  every  painful  emotion. 
It  finds  equal  danger  in  the  most  opposite  appear- 
ances. Every  token  of  innocence  is  interpreted 
into  a  proof  of  guilt ;  and  every  instance  of  affec- 
tion, as  a  mark  of  insulting  hypocrisy. 


It  is  a  green-ey'd  monster,  which  doth  make 

The  meat  it  feeds  on. 

Trifles   light  as  air 

Are  to  the  jealous,  coofirmatioDS  strong 

As  proofs  of  holy  writ- 

shaksfbarb's  othbllo. 


Under  the  influence  of  this  baneful  passion  the 
mind  becomes,  at  intervals,  the  sport  of  transport- 
ing hope,  and  wild  despair  ;  is  alternately  torment- 


168  MALEVOLENT  DESIRES 

ed,  by  fits  of  rage  and  the  depth  of  contrition,  for 
excesses  committed  in  its  transports.  In  a  word, 
uniting  the  extremes  of  dreadful  hatred  and  pas- 
sionate fondness,  it  entertains  most  cruel  suspicions 
of  the  object  it  most  adores ;  and  is  tempted  to 
destroy  that  which  it  dreads  to  lose  ! 

The  class  of  evil  passions  under  permanent  Ma- 
levolence, are  indications  of  the  depraved  character 
and  dispositions  of  their  subject,  in  whom  they  are 
seated,  not  having  any  immediate  reference  to  the 
character  of  their  object.  Those  which  are  now 
described  as  the  modifications  of  anger,  respect  the 
impressions,  which  occasional  deviations  from  the 
usual  tenour  of  conduct,  make  upon  the  mind  of  the 
person  most  interested ;  in  which,  both  the  feelings 
and  indications  of  ill-will  are  of  a  more  transitory 
nature ;  so  that  they  deserve  not  to  be  confounded 
with  permanent  hatred. 

We  shall  now  proceed  to  consider  those  emotions 
and  affections  which  are  inspired  by  the  contempla- 
tion of  Evil ;  and  in  which  neither  malevolence, 
nor  any  of  the  selfish  affections,  are  necessary  in- 
gredients. 

11.  The  Displacency  which  is  indicated  by  uri' 
favourable  opinions  of  conduct  and  disposition. 
Tl/is  gives  rise  to  the  following  emotions  and  af- 
fedtions. 


AND  DISPOSITIONS.  169 

Horror.  Horror  is  that  very  strong  and  painful 
emotion,  which  is  excited  by  the  view  or  contem- 
plation of  something  peculiarly  atrocious  in  the 
conduct  of  another  ;  by  some  vice  which  exceeds 
the  usual  extravagance  of  vice  ;  enormities  that 
surpass  the  bounds  of  common  depravity — such  as 
impurities  too  gross  to  be  named,  profligacies  too 
shocking  to  be  repeated,  and  cruelties  which  make 
us  shudder  at  the  recital.  It  may  also  be  excited 
by  the  extremes  of  agony,  mental  or  corporeal,  or 
by  sufferings  and  punishments  at  which  our  natures 
recoil. 

This  passion  may  be  deemed  the  antipode  of 
admiration.  The  one  is  inspired  by  the  contem- 
platiqn  of  surpassing  excellency ;  the  other  by 
the  excess  of  vice  and  wretchedness.  As  that  is 
one  of  the  most  pleasing  sensations  we  can  possibly 
enjoy,  this  is  among  the  most  painful  we  can 
possibly  suffer.  Scenes  of  the  above  description 
excite  a  tremour  upon  the  mind,  a  species  of  terror, 
scarcely  equalled  by  the  most  lively  apprehensions 
of  danger. 

Indignation  expresses  a  strong  and  elevated  dis- 
approbation of  mind,  which  is  also  inspired  by 
something  flagitious  in  the  conduct  of  another. 
But  it  does  not  always  suppose  that  excess  of 
depravity  which  alone  is  capable  of  committing 
deeds  of  horror.  Indignation  always  refers  to 
culpability  of  conduct;  and  cannot,  like  the  passion 
of  horror,  be  extended  to  distress  either  of  mind  or 
body.     It  is  produced  by  the  violation  of  gome 

22 


170  MALEVOLENT  DESIRES 

indispensible  obligation,  connected  with  circum- 
stances peculiarly  aggravating  ; — bv  acts  of  treach- 
ery, the  abuse  of  confidence,  base  ingratitude,  &c. 
which  we  cannot  contemplate  without  being  pro- 
voked to  anger,  and  feeling  a  generous  resentment ; 
though  we  should  not  be  interested  in  the  con- 
sequences of  the  conduct  we  condemn.  Indignant 
emotions  are  always  excited  by  particular  inci- 
dents. 

Contempt.  This  is  a  more  calm  and  deliberate 
affection  of  the  mind.  It  directs  its  chief  atten- 
tion to  the  character  and  disposition,  which  is 
capable  of  committing  unworthy  and  disgraceful 
actions.  Its  objects  are  radical  baseness,  and 
radical  imbecility  where  it  ought  not  to  pxist. 
Thus  we  despise  the  man  who  is  capable  of  fraud, 
deceit,  falsehood,  and  every  species  of  moral  de- 
pravity, which  indicates  an  extraordinary  degree 
of  meanness.  The  man  who  makes  great  preten- 
sions to  more  exalted  powers,  and  better  qualities 
than  he  really  possesses,  and  the  man  who  vainly 
boasts  of  much  more  than  he  can  perform,  or 
courts  our  admiration  of  accomplishments  of  which 
he  is  destitute,  or  which  he  possesses  in  a  very 
inferior  degree,  renders  himself  also  an  object  of 
contempt. 

Thus  the  characters  which  are  sunk  below  the 
common  level  of  humanity,  and  those  which  ar- 
rogantly and  impotently  attempt  to  rise  above  it, 
are  universally  deemed  the  proper  objects  of  this 
emotion. 


AND  DISPOSITIONS.  171 

Both  indignation  and  contempt  are  accompanied 
with  a  certain  elevation  of  mind.  The  observer 
feels  and  enjoys  a  conscious  superiority,  when  he 
compares  himself  with  the  offender.  This  sense 
of  superiority  is  more  strongly  marked  in  contempt. 
When  it  rises  to  a  certain  height  it  indicates, 

Disdain.  Disdain  is  such  a  degree  of  contempt 
as  precludes  any  commerce  with  the  party  despis- 
ed. It  considers  him  as  totally  unworthy  of  our 
notice ; — even  of  our  reprehension,  which  always 
supposes  a  possibility  of  reclaim.  It  feels  as  if 
there  was  someting  so  repulsive  in  the  character  of 
the  aggressor,  that  he  is  no  longer  entitled  to  the 
rights  of  social  intercourse. 

Contempt  and  disdain  are  often  accompanied 
with  a  satirical  smile,  which  strongly  insinuates  that 
baseness  and  meanness  are  also  intermixed  with 
large  portions  of  folly. 

Irrision.  This  term  is  employed  to  express  an 
affection,  inspired  by  any  peculiarity  in  sentiment, 
disposition,  or  conduct,  that  we  deem  an  offence 
against  some  acknowledged  law  of  congruity, 
some  standard  of  propriety  universally  received 
and  respected ;  but  which  is  not  of  sufficient  magni- 
tude to  excite  anger,  or  any  of  its  ramifications. 
It  chiefly  refers  to  something  odd,  whimsical, 
absurd,  which  is  calculated  to  excite  laughter,  rather 
than  incur  our  displeasure.  Various  mistakes,  and 
egregious  blunders,  which  indicate  culpable  igno- 
rance, inattentions,  and  extravagances,  are  the 
proper  objects  of  irrision. 


47t  MALEVOLENT  DESIRES 

The  above  seem  to  be  the  principal  emotions 
and  affections  which  are  inspired  by  the  contem- 
plation of  conduct  and  character.  They  are  strong 
marks  of  displacency,  which  does  not  arise  from 
malevolence  in  our  dispositions,  but  on  the  con- 
trary, from  the  warm  love  of  beneficent  virtue. 
Nor  are  they  necessarily  connected  with  personal 
injuries,  though  a  sense  of  injuries  will  infallibly 
impart  great  energy  to  each  emotion. 

As  anger  is  the  guardian  of  our  own  personal 
interests,  thus  is  the  present  class  of  emotions 
and  affections  destined  to  be  the  guardians  of 
virtue,  decency,  and  propriety  in  general.  It 
is  remarkable  that  the  mind  is  affected  by  trans- 
gressions against  these,  in  exact  proportion  to 
the  degrees  of  culpability  obvious  in  the  of- 
fence. Horror  rouses  within  us  such  a  degree 
of  resentment,  as  becomes  the  severest  reproof 
to  the  enormities  at  which  it  shudders ;  and 
when  excited  by  deeds  of  cruelty  it  calls  up 
a  laudable  spirit  of  revenge ;  and  it  renders  the 
mildest  and  meekest  dispositions  solicitous  for  a 
power  of  retaliation.  Indignation  is  always  di- 
rected against  the  violation  of  some  sacred  law, 
which  is  respected  by  every  man  who  is  not  desti- 
tute of  virtue  and  honour.  Contempt  is  the  pun- 
ishment directed  against  that  meanness  of  charac- 
ter, and  perverseness  of  conduct,  which  sink  a  man 
below  the  level  of  social  intercourse,  and  disqualify 
him  for  decent  and  respectable  society.  Irrision 
and  ridicule  are  the  protectors  of  order,  decency, 


AND  DISPOSITIONS.  173 

and  propriety  in  the  lesser  departments ;  against 
which  the  transgressor  is  thus  made  to  feel  his  of- 
fence. He  is  taught  to  perceive  that  his  conduct 
or  principles  are  inconsistent  with  common  sense, 
and  to  suspect  that  he  is  in  danger  of  being  ranked 
in  the  opprobrious  class  of  fools. 

The  visible  tokens  of  emotion  under  each  species 
of  displacency,  are  characteristic  of  its  nature. 
Those  painful  sensations  which  are  peculiar  to  the 
most  malevolent  passions,  legibly  inscribe  their 
marks  upon  the  countenance.  The  deep  sunk  rye, 
the  pallid  anxiety  of  Malice  and  Envy,  indicate  the 
inward  torments  of  the  mind  ;  and  the  ineffectual 
attempts  to  smile,  in  transient  gleams  of  satisfac- 
tion at  misery,  only  serve  to  render  horror  more 
horrid.  Fear  and  dread  have  been  considered  as 
the  most  painful  emotions  inspired  by  the  selfish 
principle ;  and  their  pathological  symptoms  mani- 
fest an  insuperable  anxiety  and  depression.  Ma- 
lignity has  adopted  these  feelings  with  their  exter- 
nal marks  ;  intermixing  them  with  the  irritations  of 
anger ;  which,  however,  it  attempts  to  repress  from 
bursting  forth  into  emotions,  through  the  appre- 
hensions of  detection. 

The  displacency  of  anger  manifests  the  tokens 
descriptive  of  anger,  already  noticed  ;  which,  ac- 
cording to  the  degrees  of  their  violence,  strike  ter- 
ror into  great  offenders,  or  inspire  the  thoughtless 
and  inattentive  with  respect  and  awe. 


174  MALEVOLENT  DESIRES 

The  horror  excited  by  the  excess  of  wickedness 
or  of  misery,  approaches  to  terror,  both  in  sensa- 
tion and  in  external  marks.  Indignation,  contempt 
and  disdain,  paint  upon  the  countenance  a  singu- 
lar mixture  of  dignified  superiority  and  deep  disap- 
probation. A  certain  elevation,  becoming  the  ma- 
jesty of  insulted  virtue,  is  united  with  a  lively  sense 
of  the  depravity  and  meanness  of  the  offender  ;  and 
a  contrast  is  instantaneously  formed  between  ex- 
altedness  of  character,  and  the  state  of  degradation 
into  which  he  has  fallen.  The  satirical  jocularity 
accompanying  contempt,  in  irrision,  throws  into 
the  countenance,  marks  of  exultation  over  the  im- 
becility or  absurdities  of  the  person  ridiculed. 
Without  subscribing  to  the  hypothesis  of  Mr, 
Hobbes,  that  pride  is  the  efficient  cause  of  laughter, 
it  must  be  acknowledged,  that  this  species  of 
laughter  is  always  accompanied  with  an  insulting 
consciousness  of  superiority. 

In  the  above  Analysis  we  have  attempted  to 
trace  the  origin  of  the  Passions,  their  exciting 
causes,  their  immediate  objects,  and  their  numerous 
ramifications.  We  have  contemplated  the  infinite 
diversity  and  contrariety  of  effects,  which  proceed 
from  that  one  principle,  the  Love  of  Good,  in  Be- 
ings formed  as  we  are,  stationed  in  a  world  where 
every  surrounding  object  is  able  to  produce  its  own 
specific  impression  ;  Beings,  whose  individual,  and 
whose  social  interests,  are  so  many,  various  and 
complicated. 


AND  DISPOSITIONS.  175 

But  this  Analytical  Survey  does  not  terminate 
the  history  of  the  Passions.  There  are  various 
other  points  of  view  in  which  it  is  proper  to  con- 
template them,  in  order  to  increase  our  acquaint- 
ance with  the  rudiments  of  self-knowledge,  and 
enable  us  to  draw  those  moral  and  practical  infe- 
rences, which  may  prove  most  conducive  to  the 
love  and  practice  of  Virtue. 

These  are  reserved  for  the  Second  Part  of  our 
Treatise. 


END   OP   PART   THE   FIRST. 


PART   II. 
PHILOSOPHICAL  OBSERVATIONS 


AND 


INQUIRIES, 


FOUNDED  UPON  THE  PRECEDING  ANALYSIS. 


23 


PART  II. 
PHILOSOPHICAL    OBSERVATIONS 


AND 


INQUIRIES, 

FOUNDED  UPON  THE  PRECEDING  ANALYSIS. 


CHAPTER.  I. 

OBSERVATIONS   RESPECTING    THE    LAWS    OF    EXCITEMENT. 

OBSERVATION  I. 

SURPRISE    THE    EFFICIENT   CAUSE    OE   PASSION. 

In  different  parts  of  our  Analysis  of  the  Passions, 
the  influence  of  the  introductory  emotions,  in 
quickening  affections  of  the  most  opposite  nature 
into  a  passion,  has  fully  appeared.  It  has  been 
shewn,  that  whatever  strikes  us  in  a  sudden  and 
unexpected  manner,  generally  makes,  for  the  in- 
stant, a  more  vivid  impression,  than  things  and 
circumstances  of  much  greater  consequence,  with 
which  we  have  been  familiarized,  or  which  have 
been  more  slowly  and  progressively  introduced  to 
our  notice.     It  has  been  rendered  obvious,  that 


180  CAUSE  OF  PASSION, 

Wonder  is  compounded  of  surprise,  and  the  im- 
pression made  upon  the  mind  ;  by  the  idea  of  Intri- 
cacy ; — and  that  Astonishment  unites  the  percep- 
tion of  vastness  with  surprise  ; — we  have  remarked, 
that  these  are,  by  universal  suffrage,  emphatically 
termed  emotions ; — and  we  have  seen  the  influence 
of  these  introductory  emotions,  in  passions  of  the 
most  opposite  characters. 

These  considerations  united  make  it  highly  pro- 
bable, that  the  essential  and  characteristic  diffe- 
rence between  a  Passion  and  an  Affection,  depends 
upon  the  superaddition  of  Surprise,  to  the  natural 
effect  produced  by  the  real  or  supposed  quality  of 
an  object ; — that  this  Emotion,  conjoined  with  the 
specific  nature  of  its  exciting  cause,  is  virtually  the 
efficient  cause  of  a  Passion  ;  the  percussion  of  sur- 
prise rendering  the  affection  visible,  by  characteris- 
tic signs,  correspondent  with  its  specific  nature. 

Thus  for  example,  in  Joy,  the  pleasing  part  of 
the  impression  owes  its  origin  to  the  possession,  or 
undoubted  expectancy,  of  some  desirable  good. 
This,  in  its  lowest  influence,  produces  some  degree 
of  change  in  the  corporeal  frame.  It  is  a  sensa- 
tion, and  must  be  felt  somewhere.  The  vividness 
of  the  impression  occasioned  by  the  impetus  of  sur- 
prise, renders  this  sensation  more  vivid,  diffuses  its 
effects  over  the  whole  system,  and  occasions  a  de- 
lectable and  ungovernable  flow  of  spirits,  which 
becomes  conspicuous  to  every  spectator.  But  as 
Novelty  is  the  exciting  cause  of  surprise,  in  pro- 
portion as  the  novelty  of  good   subsides,  surprise 


CAUSE  OF  PASSION.  181 

gradually  diminishes,  and  leaves  the  mind  under 
the  influence  of  an  affection^  more  proportionate  to 
the  real  value  of  the  object. 

Thus  we  may  suppose  the  Passion  of  Anger,  to 
consist  of  that  disagreeable  sensation,  which  a 
sense  of  injury  will  always  occasion,  quickened  by 
surprise  into  an  ungovernable  emotion.  The  re- 
luctance with  which  we  part  with  any  thing  con- 
tributing to  our  benefit  or  enjoyment,  will  be 
quickened  by  surprise  into  the  agonies  of  sorrow; 
which  is  also  able  to  convert  painful  apprehensions 
into  the  excess  of  Fear. 

Nor  does  the  acknowledged  fact,  that  our  pas- 
sions are  sometimes  excited  by  deliberate  contem- 
plation, militate  against  the  opinion. 

This  can  only  take  place  in  affairs  of  high  im- 
portance ;  and  in  such  cases  the  more  deliberate 
survey  consists  in  examining,  and  reflecting  upon 
every  circumstance,  relative  to  the  nature  of  the 
exciting  cause,  which  necessarily  produces  a  varie- 
ty of  new  and  unexpected  combinations,  each  of 
which  will  be  attended  with  a  proportionate  de- 
gree of  surprise  ;  and  although  their  may  not  be  in 
any  one  circumstance,  that  quantum  of  Novelty 
which  so  powerfully  strikes  the  mind,  in  cases  that 
are  sudden  and  totally  unexpected,  yet,  the  com- 
bined influence  of  the  aggregate  number  of  Novel- 
ties, may  finally  produce  the  most  extravagant 
passions.  Thus  may  the  mind  calculate  the  varie- 
ty of  benefits  accruing  from  some  prosperous  event, 
until  it  be  transported  with  joy ; — enumerate  the 


182  AFFECTIONS  ALONE 

evils  of  privation,  until  it  becomes yr^w^ic  with  sor- 
row; — dwell  upon  the  number  and  magnitude  of 
provocations  which  aggravate  an  injury,  until  re- 
sentment shall  be  converted  into  rage; — and  by 
ruminating  upon  the  extent  of  danger,  it  may  be 
driven  into  despair. 

If  this  conjecture  be  admitted,  it  will  give  a 
beautiful  simplicity  to  the  theory  of  the  Passions. 
It  shews  that  they  may  be  decomposed  into  the 
simplest  elements  ;  while  it  indicates  the  manner, 
by  which  the  combination  of  these  elements  may 
be  productive  of  such  an  infinite  variety,  both  in 
nature  and  strength.  It  shews,  that  the  different 
degrees  of  force  in  the  quickening  agent,  or  of  its 
reiterated  influence,  are  calculated  to  give  various 
degrees  of  momentum  to  each  particular  affection. 


OBSERVATION  II. 

PASSIONS  AND  EMOTIONS  ARE  OF  A    TRANSITORY  NATDRE  J    THE 
AFFECTIONS  ALONE  ARE  PERMANENT. 

According  to  the  distinctions  which  have  been 
made  between  Passions,  Emotions,  and  Affections, 
it  clearly  appears  that  the  two  former  are  in  their 
nature  transient,  and  that  the  affections  are  capa- 
ble of  much  longer  duration.  The  passions  have 
been  represented  as  vivid  sensations,  passively  or 
involuntarily,  produced  by  some  strong  idea  excit- 


PERMANENT.  183 

ed  in  the  mind;   and   emotions  as  the   external 
marks  of  these.     But  as  this  passive  state  of  mind 
is  transitory,  so  are  its  external  marks ;  and  as  both 
gradually  subside,  they  give  place  to  some  corres- 
pondent affection,  which  remains  as  long  as  our 
opinion,  and  the  interest   we  take  in  the    object, 
shall  continue.     It  necessarily  follows  from  these 
facts,  that  we  are  not  to  look  to  the  passions  and 
emotions  either  for  permanent  well-being,  or  for 
permanent  wretchedness.     They  must  either  die 
away  and  leave  no  impression,  as  in  cases  where 
the  imagination  was  deceived,  respecting  the  value 
or  importance  of  the  exciting  cause,  or  they  are 
the  harbingers  of  some  more  durable  affections ; 
and  it  is  the  influence  of  these  affections  which  has 
the  permanent  effect  upon  our  well-being.     Thus, 
when   we  give   ourselves  over  to   the  delectable 
tumults  of  Joy,  the  joy  is  incidental.     It  is  hastily 
introduced  by  the  sudden  perception  or  impressive 
sense  of  some  acquisition,  which  we  deem  impor- 
tant to  present  or  future  welfare ;  of  a  something, 
which  we  expect  to  be  more  or  less  durable  in  its 
nature,  or  to  diffuse    its  beneficent  influence  to  a 
considerable   extent.     These  advantages  are  con- 
centrated, as  it  were,  in  the  imagination,  at  the 
instant  of  joy.     They   operate  upon  the  mind  as 
the  solar  rays  collected  in  a  focus  dart  upon  the 
surface  of  a  body ;  and  though  the  pleasures  of  joy 
are  often  greater  than  those  derived  from  its  causes, 
yet  we  naturally  expect  much  more  than  the  mo- 


1«4  AFFECTIONS  ALONE 

mentary  well-being  introduced  bjr  the  emotion  it- 
self. 

In  the  first  impulse  of  Sorrow,  the  magnitude  of 
the  loss  is  the  most  impressive  idea.  As  the  mind 
becomes  more  intimately  acquainted  with  the  na- 
ture and  extent  of  the  privation,  the  agonies  of  sor- 
row will  either  subside  into  indifference,  from  the 
perception  that  the  loss  was  not  of  that  importance 
as  had  been  imagined,  and  that  it  has  been  amply 
supplied  by  some  valuable  and  unexpected  bles- 
sing ;  or  the  vivid  impression  will  be  effaced  by 
time,  which  always  places  before  us  a  variety  of 
objects  new  and  interesting ;  or  finally,  the  trans- 
ports of  sorrow  will  gradually  give  way  to  habitual 
grief  and  melancholy. 

Thus  Fear  is  inspired,  and  becomes  agonizing, 
from  the  apprehension  of  some  species  of  calamity ; 
and  the  influential  idea  at  the  instant,  is,  that  by 
the  expected  calamity  we  shall  be  lastingly  deprived 
of  some  Good  we  wish  to  retain,  or  that  it  will  be 
introductory  to  some  durable  Evil ;  though  the  fear 
itself  may  be  much  more  painful  than  the  evil  we 
dread.  Anger  is  roused  by  an  immediate  sense  of 
injury  committed  or  threatened ;  that  is,  by  the 
apprehension  of  some  robbery  of  the  good  to  which 
we  have  a  claim.  Here  again  the  mind,  compar- 
ing the  present  with  the  past,  or  looking  forwards 
to  the  future,  perceives  or  apprehends  a  disagreea- 
ble change  of  circumstances  or  of  state  ;  and  is  in- 
censed against  the  offending  cause.  When  the 
first  impulse  subsides,  it  is  succeeded  by  the  afifec- 


PERMANENT.  185 

tions  oi  grief ,  resentment,  indignation,  &c.  accord- 
ing to  the  nature  of  the  insult  suffered,  or  the  ag- 
gravations of  the  offence  ,  and  these  become  dura- 
ble as  the  idea  or  perception  of  the  inj  ury  receiv- 
ed. 

Nor  does  the  transition  which  is  sometimes  made 
from  affection  to  passion  invalidate  these  remarks. 
It  has  been  observed,  that  when  the  object  posses- 
ses many  complicated  and  interesting  circumstan- 
ces, these,  by  lieing  placed  before  the  memory,  and 
distinctly  examined,  may  gradually  warm  the  im- 
agination, and  increase  the  strength  of  the  affec- 
tion, until  the  party  be   worked   up  into  violent 
emotions.     But  when  the  passions   are  excited  in 
this  manner,  they  are  also  of  short  duration.     The 
preternatural  state  of  mind  demands  too  great  an  ex- 
penditure of  animal  spirits,  to  render  the  passion 
lasting  ;  and  it  soon  relapses  into  the  kindred  affec- 
tion.    In  cases  deemed  peculiarly  interesting,  and 
in  persons  of  quick  and  lively  feelings,  gusts  and 
jhts  of  passion  may   be  frequently  excited   by  the 
same  cause,  and  the  mind  may  be  placed  alternate- 
ly under  the  influence  of  the  passion  and  affection ; 
but  wherever  passions  and  emotions  are  permanent- 
ly vehement,  it  becomes  an  indication  of  insanity. 
It  is  a  morbid  irritation,   over  which  reason  has  to- 
tally lost  its  controling  power. 

The  permanent  Affections  are  therefore  to  be  con- 
sidered as  constituting  that  habitual  state  of  mind, 
into  which  the  primary  passion  impelled   it.     Our 

ideas,  and  with  them  our  affections,  concerning  the 

24 


186  AFFECTIONS  ALONE  PERMANENT. 

object,  are  now  changed.  Instead  of  our  former 
indifference,  we  contemplate  it  with  some  degree  of 
pleasure  or  pain,  become  habitually  attached  to  it, 
or  indulge  an  habitual  aversion  respecting  it. 

Thus  it  is  obvious  that  none  of  the  leading  pas- 
sions and  emotions  constitute  our  permanent  Wel- 
fare, or  the  contrary.  They  simply  manifest  the 
first  impression  which  the  sudden  change  of  our 
state  has  made  upon  us.  The  lasting  effects,  in 
consequence  of  this  change,  are  to  be  learned  from 
the  Affections.  If  the  Good  introduced  by  Joy 
prove  itself  to  be  a  lasting  good,  though  it  may  be 
partial  and  incomplete,  it  may  inspire  Contentment. 
If  it  be  the  completion  of  an  ardent  desire,  it  com- 
municates Satisfaction.  If  it  meet  with  approbation, 
and  be  reflected  upon  as  the  result  of  a  plan  well- 
intended,  wisely  formed,  and  successfully  executed, 
it  becomes  the  source  of  Complacency.  Fear 
sinks  into  permanent  Dread,  or  unmixed  with  any 
particle  of  hope,  into  lasting  Despair  ;  Sorrow  into 
confirmed  Melancholy;  and  Anger  into  Resent- 
ment and  Displacency. 


PASSIONS  AND  AFFECTIONS.  187 

OBSERVATION  III. 

RELATION   OF   THE    PASSIONS   AND   AFFECTIONS  TO    EACH    OTHER. 

It  has  frequently  been  remarked,  that  the  influ- 
ence of  any  particular  passion  or  emotion,  disposes 
the  mind  to  be  subjected  to  some  other  that  is  of  a 
similar  nature  and  tendency ;  while  it  places  the 
disposition  at  a  remote  distance  from  the  affections 
of  a  contrary  complexion.  Dr.  Hartley  has  observ- 
ed, correspondent  to  the  grand  division  of  the  pas- 
sions which  he  had  adopted,  that  "  the  five  grateful 
"  passions.  Love,  Desire,  Hope,  Joy,  and  pleasing 
"  Recollection  enhance  each  other ;  as  do  the  five 
"  ungrateful  ones.  Hatred,  Aversion,  Fear,  Grief, 
"  and  Displeasure."  Addison^  Hume.,  Lord  Kaims, 
have  made  similar  remarks,  and  have  adduced  the 
association  of  ideas  as  the  cause.  But  as  the  temper 
of  mind  produced  by  one  affection,  predisposes  to 
the  affection  which  is  most  analogous,  though  it  may 
not  be  immediately  dependent  upon  it,  may  we  not 
infer  that  the  association  of  the  Affections  will  be 
prior  to,  and  introduce  that  of  Ideas  ? 

Thus,  according  to  the  division  which  has  been 
adopted  in  this  Treatise,  not  only  are  gladness, 
cheerfulness,  mirth,  contentment,  satisfaction,  com- 
placency, &c.  the  offspring  of  Joy,  but  while  the 
mind  is  under  their  pleasing  influence,  it  is  dispos- 
ed to  every  affection  of  the  pleasing  kind,  which 


188  RELATION  OF 

may  be  inspired  by  very  different  causes,  or  by 
circumstances  too  trivial  to  excite  either  of  these 
emotions  or  affections,  in  its  calm  and  influenced 
state  of  mind.  Let  us  siippose,  for  example,  the 
exciting  cause  to  consist  in  something  merely  per- 
sonal ;  yet  the  pleasing  sensation  produced,  inclines- 
at  the  moment,  to  the  affections  of  generosity, 
charity,  sympathy,  compassion,  and  mercy :  nay, 
at  such  seasons  it  is  disposed  to  expand,  that  it  may 
embrace  all  mankind  ;  and  the  humbler  acts  of  vir- 
tue, with  which  we  might  have  been  contented,  at 
another  period,  will  now  appear  contracted  and 
unsatisfactory. 

Upon  this  principle  is  the  custom  manifestly 
founded,  of  making  valuable  presents  to  the  mes- 
sengers of  welcome  tidings,  or  rewarding  them 
with  some  peculiar  marks  of  complacency  :  a  cus- 
tom which  has  been  practised  in  every  age  and 
nation.  The  overflowings  of  joy  inspire  a  gene- 
rosity of  temper,  which  absolutely  requires  an 
object;  and  none  can  immediately  appear  more 
meritorious,  than  the  person  who  has  been  the 
instrument,  as  it  were,  or  the  instrumental  cause 
of  Joy.  The  delectable  sensation  communicated 
to  the  mind  of  the  principal  participant,  immedi- 
ately excites  in  his  breast  a  grateful  affection  for  the 
person  whose  communications  have  been  the  cause 
of  it ;  though  he  may  have  merely  acted  in  an  offi- 
cial capacity ;  and  possibly,  contrary  to  his  secret 
inclinations.  The  liberation  of  captives,  and  pris- 
oners of  various  descriptions,   upon  accession  to 


PASSIONS  AND  AFFECTIONS.  189 

the  throne ; — the  institution  of  sports  and  pastimes, 
that  joy  may  be  dififused  among  the  muhitude, 
upon  events  apparently  replete  with  much  future 
happiness,  as  on  births,  marriages,  and  on  the 
arrival  of  a  young  heir  to  the  possession  of  an 
ample  fortune ; — the  pleasing  incitements  of  illu- 
minations, fire-vi^orks,  distributing  good  cheer  to 
the  populace,  are  universally  felt  as  harmonizing 
with  the  exhilarated  state  of  mind,  which  welcome 
tidings,  of  a  private  or  public  nature,  are  calculated 
to  excite.  In  like  manner  does  the  lustre  of  great 
actions  inspire  us  with  a  certain  respect  for  those 
most  intimately  connected  with  the  Agent,  whom 
we  consider  as  the  parent  stock,  productive  of 
merit  in  every  ramification  ;  or  as  able  to  shed 
desert  over  every  coimection.  Under  the  influ- 
ence of  these  grateful  and  liberal  principles,  we 
are  induced  to  imagine  that  children  are  entitled 
to  share  the  rewards  due  to  their  parents.  Hence 
those  hereditary  honours  which  too  frequently  ir- 
radiate the  Unworthy,  and  demonstrate  that  the 
generous  inference  is  not  always  conclusive. 

From  these  associating  affections  it  proceeds, 
that  the  perception  of  good  qualities  centered  in 
the  Mind  of  any  one,  disposes  to  an  attachment 
to  his  Person.  Favourable  impressions  inspire  an 
inclination  to  cultivate  friendship;  and  friendship 
between  the  sexes  has  a  powerful  tendency  to 
inspire  love.  That  love,  which,  in  delicate  minds, 
appears  to  be  at  the  remotest  distance  from  every 
thing  sensual,  will  finally  excite  the  stronger  and 


190  RELATION  OF 

warmer  passions.  Nor  are  we  without  many  in- 
stances of  these  becoming  most  impetuous,  from 
their  being  founded  upon  sentimental  refinements. 

As  the  passion  of  Sorrow  proceeds  from  the 
loss  of  what  we  have  loved,  it  may  imperceptibly 
dispose, — in  persons  whose  passions  are  strong  but 
very  transient, — to  the  affection  of  Love  towards 
the  object  commiserating  our  loss.  No  one  can 
appear  so  worthy  of  the  transfer,  as  the  friend 
who  sympathizes  deeply  with  the  affliction.  The 
Poet  has  justly  observed  that  "P%  is  akin  to 
love.^^  In  these  moments,  the  commiserator  for- 
gets every  fault,  even  where  he  knows  that  fault 
exists.  He  brings  forward  every  good  quality, 
which  in  his  opinion,  renders  the  Afflicted  less 
deserving  of  their  suiFerings.  We  may  also 
add,  that  the  gratitude  which  this  pity  inspires,  is 
accompanied  with  the  most  favourable  sentiments 
of  the  humane  disposition,  and  has  a  tendency  to 
produce  a  predilection  for  the  person  of  the  sym- 
pathizer. In  short,  whatever  gives  birth  to  any 
of  the  kindly  affections,  may  be  productive  of 
personal  predilections,  and  terminate  in  love,  both 
as  an  affection  and  a  passion.  Othello  says  of  Des- 
demona, 

*•  She  lov'd  me  for  the  dangers  I  had  pass'd, 
And  1  lov'd  her  that  she  did  pity  them." 

Nor  can  the  dramatic  Writer  be  accused  of  ex- 
aggeration, who  represents  the  beautiful  and  ac- 
complished Zemira,  as  passionately  fond  of  the 


PASSIONS  AND  AFI^ECTIONS.  191 

generous  monster  Azore,  whom  she  at  first  viewed 
with  horror  and  detestation. 

To  this  pleasing  association  is  it  also  to  be  as- 
cribed, that  we  are  so  prone  to  be  blind  to  the 
faults  of  those  we  love.  We  are  eager  to  represent 
to  ourselves  those  persons  who  have  taken  posses- 
sion of  our  esteem,  as  being  entirely  worthy  of  it. 
We  dwell  upon  every  good  quality ;  we  forget,  or 
discover  excuses  for  every  defect. 

It  has  been  remarked,  more  than  once,  that 
whenever  an  amorous  temper  has  taken  a  religious 
turn,  it  excels  in  the  warmth  and  fervour  of  its  de- 
votion. We  might  urge  as  an  apology,  that  what 
appears  excellent  can  alone  be  the  object  of  love ; 
and  where  the  mind  is  peculiarly  susceptible  of 
excellence,  it  will  evince  the  warmth  and  strength 
of  its  affection,  whether  it  be  placed  on  our  own 
species,  or  on  beings  of  a  superior  order. 

These  two  causes  united  may  serve  to  explain  a 
fact,  which  has  been  noted  by  Rousseau  and  many 
others,  that  the  language  of  religion  and  of  love  is 
so  very  similar.  The  Lover  also  has  his  idol; 
adores  her  perfections,  calls  her  angelic ;  talks  of 
altars,  prostrations,  vows,  sacrifices,  ^c.  That  is, 
what  is  human^  in  the  warmth  of  his  affection,  he 
contemplates  as  divine ;  and  the  person  who  has 
some  striking  accomplishments,  he  pronounces  to 
be  perfection  itself 

The  connection  between  the  disagreeable  pas- 
sions and  affections  is  not  less  obvious.     The  vari- 


192  RELATION  OF 

ous  affections  originating  from  the  idea  of  Evil, 
whether  it  be  past,  present,  or  apprehended,  are  so 
closely  united,  that  they  can  scarcely  be  consider- 
ed as  illustrations  of  the  subject.  We  are,  for  ex- 
ample, disposed  to  be  angry  at  whatever  occasions 
sorrow,  and  there  is  a  vindictiveness  in  fear,  which 
may  render  it  dangerous  to  its  most  innocent  cause. 
But  predispositions  to  the  indulgence  of  unplea- 
sant affections,  are  generated  in  cases  where  the 
connection  is  not  so  im mediate.  Disagreeable 
feelings,  induced  by  their  proper  object,  are  pro- 
ductive of  other  disagreeable  affections,  where, 
strictly  speaking,  there  is  no  proper  object.  What- 
ever irritates,  renders  the  mind  impatient,  peevish, 
quarrelsome ;  disposes  it  to  magnify  trifles  into  real 
grievances,  and  to  imagine  a  just  cause  of  offence, 
where,  perhaps,  approbation  has  been  merited.  It 
engenders  suspicions  and  jealousies,  and  disposes  to 
envy  the  peace,  tranquillity,  or  good  fortune  of  an- 
other. In  this  state  of  mind,  a  transition  is  also 
made  from  things  to  persons,  and  some  degree  of 
guilt  is  imputed  to  the  latter,  in  consequence  of  the 
evil  passions  stirred  up  by  the  former.  It  is  upon 
this  principle  that  Tyrants  have  been  known  to 
sacrifice,  in  the  impetuosity  of  their  vexation  and 
rage,  the  innocent  messengers  of  evil  tidings. 
Thus  has  Homer,  that  faithful  historian  of  nature, 
represented  Agamemnon,  as  pouring  out  a  torrent 
of  invectives  against  the  harmless  and  venerable 
priest,  who  was  compelled,  by  virtue  of  his  office, 
to  utter  unwelcome  truths. 


PASSIONS  AND  AFFECTIONS.  193 

"  Tlie  Propbei  spoke  :  when  with  a  gloomy  frown 
The  monarch  started  from  his  shinioa;  throne  ; 
Black  choler  fill'd  his  breast,  that  boil'd  with  ire, 
And  from  his  eye-balls  flash'd  the  living  fire. 
Augur  accurst !  denouncing  mischief  still, 
Prophet  of  plagues,  for  ever  boding  ill ! 
Still  must  that  tongue  some  wounJing  message  bring, 
And  still  Ihy  priestly  pride  provoke  thy  Kinj;  P" 

pope's  homer.  il.  I.  L.  127. 

It  is  thus  that  not  only  the  "  Genus  Irritahile  Va- 
^^  tum,^^  but  controversial  authors  of  all  descrip- 
tions, have  been  so  prone,  in  defence  of  their  par- 
ticular sentiments  against  their  opponents,  to  de- 
scend to  personalities.  Theologians  in  particular 
have  been  accustomed  to  evince  their  zeal  for  sac- 
red truths,  by  the  most  unchristian  hatred  against 
the  imagined  supporters  of  error  ;  and  they  have 
not  failed  to  ascribe  unworthy  motives,  or  depravity 
of  heart,  to  those  who  remain  unconvinced  by  the 
force  of  their  arguments.  This  is  the  latent  cause 
of  all  those  religious  persecutions,  which  have 
deluged  the  world  with  blood,  and  disgraced  hu- 
manity. 

As,  in  the  transports  of  Gratitude,  we  are  dispos- 
ed to  imagine  virtues,  where  they  do  not  exist,  thus 
in  the  transports  of  resentment,  we  are  prone 
to  the  contrary  extreme.  A  single  cause  of  en- 
mity blackens  the  whole  character  of  our  antago- 
nist; and  the  man  who  has  been  guilty  of  one 
fault,  that  touches  us  to  the  quick,  becomes,  to  an 
heated  imagination,  the  vilest  of  miscreants.  The 
friends  and  connections  of  the  Aggressor,  are  also 
considered  as  participants  in  his  crimes :  nay,  the 

25 


194  RELATION  OF 

adherents  and  dependants  upon  the  grand  offender, 
are  contaminated  by  his  guilt.     Thus  have  towns 
and  countries  been  laid  waste   without  remorse ; 
murder  and  rapine  have  been  deemed  laudable ; 
and  the  sacrifice  of  thousands,  in  resentment  of 
the  vices  and  disorders  of  a  few,  has  been  frequent- 
ly  celebrated,  as  an  heroic  display  of  vindictive 
justice!     Hence  it  is  that  disgrace  of  character  is 
unjustly   spread  over  a  whole  family,  on  account 
of  the  ill  conduct  or  ignominious  punishment  of 
one  of  its  members.     Even  the  unconscious  instru- 
ments of  mischief,  according  to  this  propensity  of 
our  nature,  are  frequently  treated  as  guilty,  or  as 
participants  in  the  crime.     Imprudent  parents  have 
thus  nourished  a  spirit  of  revenge  in  their  children, 
by  encouraging  them  to  beat  the  playthings  which 
have  accidentally  given  them  pain,  or  the  ground 
against  which  they  have  fallen. 

It  is  recorded  of  the  celebrated  Cranmer, 
who  flourished  in  the  reign  of  Queen  Mary,  that 
having  repented  of  his  impiety,  in  yielding  to  the 
solicitations  of  the  priesthood,  and  seductive  pro- 
mises of  the  court,  and  signed  an  acknowledgment 
of  the  Pope's  supremacy,  when  he  was  brought  to 
the  infernal  stake,  he  resolutely  held  the  offending 
hand  in  the  flames,  till  it  was  consumed  ;  from  a 
spirit  of  resentment  at  its  having  been  the  instru- 
ment of  his  apostasy.  In  this  singular  instance  of 
imputed  guilt,  our  sympathy  with  the  sufferings  of 
the  unfortunate  man,  our  admiration  of  his  mag- 
nanimity, and  our  surprise  at  the  strange  manner 


PASSIONS  AND  AFFECTIONS.  i9o 

in  which  he  indicated  a  pious  indignation  at  his 
former  conduct,  furnishes  an  apology  for  an  act, 
which,  under  other  circumstances,  must  have  been 
contemplated  as  the  excess  of  childish  cruelty. 
(See  Hume's  History  of  England,  Vol.  iv.  p.  431.) 
— For  the  same  reason  we  admire  the  undaunted 
courage  of  Mucins  Ssevola,  who,  as  we  are  inform-- 
ed  by  Florus,  thrust  his  hand  into  the  lire,  because 
it  had  not  succeeded  in  its  attempt  to  strike  the 
King  of  Etruria.  But  had  he  caused  a  Depen- 
dant to  be  punished  in  this  manner,  for  a  similar 
failure,  he  would  have  been  held  forth  to  execra- 
tion. 

It  is  upon  the  same  principles  that  the  strong 
impressions  of  Fear  or  of  Sorrow,  change  the  ap- 
pearance of  every  thing  around  us.  Every  trifle 
becomes  the  cause  of  terror ;  and  every  object 
loses  its  power  to  charm,  unless  it  should  adminis- 
ter to  our  melancholy.  Sorrow  naturally  disposes 
to  impatience,  discontent,  and  fearful  apprehension, 
in  cases  which  have  no  connection  with  the  primi- 
tive cause.  Heavy  disappointment,  where  expec- 
tation was  illfounded,  forbids  us  to  indulge  hope 
where  the  encouragement  is  the  greatest.  Fear 
and  dread  dispose  to  cruelty,  to  treachery,  and 
sometimes  to  acts  of  desperation  which  resemble 
courage. 

As  the  passions  and  affections  which  are  most 
analogous  to  each  other,  so  readily  blend  together, 
or  succeed  in  an  easy  currency,  it  is  natural  to 
suppose  that  those  which  are  of  an  opposite  nature 


196  RELATION  OF 

and  tendency  must  be  repulsive;  as  joy  and  sorrow, 
hope  and  fear,  love  and  hatred.  For  although 
complicated  circumstances  may  place  the  mind 
under  their  influence,  at  the  same  period,  yet  the 
one?  is  calculated  to  oppose  and  check  the  other ; 
each  exerting  its  characteristic  influence.  Thus 
when  the  success  of  any  desired  event  is  partial, 
sorrow  may  accompany  joy.  The  effects  of  glad 
tidings  are  rendered  incomplete,  by  the  addition  of 
some  mournful  catastrophe.  When  victory,  for 
example,  is  purchased  by  the  death  of  a  friend,  or 
of  a  favourite  general.  In  such  chequered  in- 
cidents, the  mind  passes  over  from  one  event  to 
the  other,  and  feels  the  influence  of  each,  separately 
and  alternately.  In  cases  of  a  dubious  nature,  the 
mind  is  sometimes  stagnated,  or  suspended  be- 
tween hope  and  fear ;  and  sometimes  agitated  by 
eiich  passion  by  turns.  In  this  manner  may  love 
have  some  intercourse  with  Rnger  ;  as  in  parents, 
whose  resentment,  at  the  improper  conduct  of  their 
children,  may  even  be  inspired  by  the  warmest 
affection ;  and  the  lover  may  be  tormented  by  the 
caprices  of  his  mistress,  whom  he  cannot  resolve 
to  hate.  The  opposite  passions  and  affections  are, 
in  instances  of  the  like  nature,  excited  by  different 
and  opposite  circumstances,  residing  in  the  same 
exciting  cause ;  each  producing  its  own  characteris- 
tic effect. 

Fear,  anxiety,  and  joy  in  the  extreme  are  so 
diametrically  opposite,  and  their  pathological  effects 
upon  t!ie  system  so  contrary,  that  an  immediate 
transition  from  the  one  to  the  other  is  extremely 


PASSIONS  AND  AFFECTIONS.  197 

difficult,  if  not  impossible  ;  and  by  the  violence 
committed  upon  the  animal  system,  it  might  be 
productive  of  fatal  consequences.  It  is  observable 
that  in  such  cases,  the  salutary  transition  is  made 
through  the  medium  of  the  pathological  effects, 
which  are  the  usual  indications  of  Sorrow.  Tears 
and  joyful  lamentations  are  the  first  tokens  of  the 
removal  of  excessive  fear.  A  sudden  relaxation, 
as  it  were,  succeeds  to  the  agonizing  constriction 
which  accompanies  that  passion,  and  this  prepares 
the  mind  for  the  pleasing  vivacity  which  is  the  na- 
tural character  of  joy.  Every  medical  practitioner, 
as  often  as  he  has  assisted  at  any  painful  and  dan- 
gerous operation,  which  has  proved  successful, 
must  have  observed  these  effects  produced  upon 
the  sympathizing  attendants ;  and  every  affection- 
ate Female  will  recollect  these  singular  emotions, 
upon  the  happy  delivery  of  her  friend,  whom  she 
has  supposed  to  be  in  imminent  danger.  The 
singularity  may  perhaps  be  explained  in  the  follow- 
ing manner.  Previous  to  the  fortunate  issue, 
Sorrow  for  the  sufferings  of  the  distressed  object, 
and  anxious  Fears  respecting  the  event,  were  in- 
timately blended  together  ;  while  the  pathological 
tokens  of  the  latter  suppressed  those  of  the  former. 
Upon  the  sudden  removal  of  Fear,  its  characteristic 
restrictions  are  removed,  the  residue  of  Sorrow 
becomes  permanent ;  and  the  agitated  spirits  are 
tranquillized  by  the  effusion  of  tears. 

A  Melancholy  state  of  mind  is  most  soothed,  at 
the  commencement,  by  what  seems  to  feed  its  me- 


198  RELATION  OF 

lancholy.  The  excess  of  grief  will  listen  to  noth- 
ing which  is  not  somewhat  in  unison  with  it.  It 
may  afterwards  be  alleviated  by  a  degree  of  cheer- 
fulness, in  a  friend  who  has  wept  for  the  distress, 
and  whose  sympathy  has  thus  inspired  a  confidence. 
But  no  greater  violence  can  be  committed  upon 
persons  in  the  anguish  of  sorrow,  than  an  attempt 
at  gaiety,  or  the  proposition  of  frivolous  amuse- 
ments. 

Nothing  so  effectually  subdues  the  violence  of 
Anger,  as  the  fortunate  suggestion  of  ludicrous 
ideas.  Whatever  excites  a  smile  or  a  laugh,  excites 
a  sensation  totally  incompatible  with  rage,  or  with 
deep  resentment.  It  has  often  happened  that  a 
something  ridiculous,  in  the  ideas  or  conduct  of 
the  offender,  has  averted  the  punishment  due  to 
his  carelessness  and  inadvertency  ;  or  that  some 
gay  and  cheerful  thought  has  at  once  obliterated 
resentment,  against  a  conduct  not  entirely  trivial. 
We  are  told  by  ancient  fabulists,  that  when  Apollo 
was  about  to  shoot  Mercury,  who  was  disguised  as 
a  herdsman,  being  incensed  at  this  thievish  deity, 
for  having  stolen  some  cattle  which  Apollo  was 
destined  to  watch,  he  applied  to  his  quiver  for  an 
arrow,  in  order  to  revenge  the  offence  ;  but  discov- 
ering that  the  arch  thief  had  prevented  the  effects 
of  his  anger,  by  previously  stealing  all  the  arrows, 
he  was  so  diverted  at  the  jest  that  his  anger  imme- 
diately subsided.     Iracundiam  voluptate  superante. 

In  the  quarrel  between  Jupiter  and  Juno,  Homer 
represents  the  Queen  of  Heaven  as  terrified  into 


PASSIONS  AND  AFFECTIONS.  199 

silence,  and  merely  attempting  to  suppress  the 
signs  of  a  resentment,  which  she  could  not  subdue. 
But  he  informs  us,  that  it  was  the  jest  of  Vulcan, 
in  taking  upon  him  an  office,  for  which  he  was  so 
ill  qualified,  and  becoming  cupbearer,  which  effec- 
tually restored  mirth  and  good-humour  among  the 
Celestials. 


Vulcan  with  awkward  grace  his  oflBce  plies ; 
And  unextinguished  laughter  shakes  the  skies. 


POPK. 


OBSERVATION  IV. 


ON   tHE    SEAT   OP  THE  PASSIONS. 


It  is  usual  for  Writers  on  the  Passions  to  specu- 
late concerning  their  Seat^  whether  it  be  in  the 
spiritual,  or  in  the  animated  material  part  of  Man. 
Some  philosophers  place  the  passions  solely  in  the 
corporeal  system.  Among  these  was  the  cele- 
brated Des  Cartes.  Mr.  Grove,  on  the  contrary, 
defines  the  passions  to  be  "  the  affections  attended 
"  with  peculiar  and  extraordinary  motions  of  the 
"  animal  spirits ;"  and  in  opposition  to  the  senti- 
ments of  Des  Cartes,  he  says,  "  I  am  inclined  to 
"  think  that  a  sensation  of  the  soul  generally  pre- 
*'  cedes  a  change  in  the  spirits ;  external  objects 
"  not  being  able  to  raise  a  ferment  in  the  spirits,  till 
"  they  have  first  struck  the  mind  with  an  idea  of 
"  something  noble,  frightful,  amiable,  &;c." 


200  RELATION  OF 

Others  again,  ascribe  some  of  the  affections  to 
the  animal  principle,  and  some  to  the  rational. 
Dr.  Reid  is  in  doubt  whether  "  the  principle  of 
"  esteem,  as  well  as  gratitude,  ought  to  be  rerkon- 
"  ed  in  the  order  of  animal  principles,  or  if  they 
*'  ought  not  rather  to  be  placed  in  a  higher  order." 
He  has  finally,  however,  placed  the  esteem  of  the 
Wise  and  Good  in  the  order  of  animal  principles  ; 
not  from  any  persuasion  that  it  is  to  be  found  in 
brute  animals,  but  because  it  appears  in  the  most 
unimproved,  and  the  most  degenerate  part  of  our 
species,  even  in  those  in  wnom  we  hardly  perceive 
any  exertion  either  of  reason  or  of  virtue. 

But,  what  is  still  more  singular,  the  same  affec- 
tion is  sometimes  placed,  by  this  philosopher,  under 
the  animal,  and  sometimes  under  the  rational  prin- 
ciple. Speaking  of  resentment  he  observes,  •'  that 
"  sudden  or  instinctive  resentment  is  an  animal 
"  principle,  common  to  us  with  brute  aninials  ;  but 
"  that  resentment,  which  some  authors  call  deliber- 
"  ate,  must  fall  under  the  class  of  rational  princi- 
"  pies."  He  also  excludes  "  the  parental  affection 
"  from  the  rational  principle,  because  it  is  not 
"  grounded  on  an  opinion  of  merit  in  the  object." 
(See  Reid's  Essays  on  the  active  powers  of  Man. 
Es.  III.  Ch.  4.) 

This  contrariety  of  opinions  among  philosophers 
themselves,  the  vague  conjectures  and  arbitrary 
positions  they  have  advanced,  too  plainly  evince 
that  we  are  not  prepared  for  disquisitioi.s  of  this 
kind.     They  prove  that  it  will  be  impossible  to  ar- 


PASSIONS.  201 

range  the  passions  and  affections,  with  any  preci- 
sion, under  these  two  heads,  until  we  shall  have 
obtained  more  accurate  ideas  of  the  nature  of  the 
rational  and  spiritual  part  of  man,  on  the  one  hand, 
and  of  the  vivified  matter  which  is  supposed  to 
constitute  his  animal  nature  on  the  other. 

Those  who  place  the  passions,  or  any  of  the  af- 
fections, in  the  Body,  confess  that  it  must  be  an 
animated  Body.  But  they  do  not  explain  to  us  the 
cause  of  this  animation  ;  or  what  is  that  vivifying 
principle,  which  so  wonderfully  changes  the  pro- 
perties of  the  dead,  insensible,  inactive  matter. 
When  we  shall  know  the  Cause  of  sensation  or  of 
perception,  in  its  lowest  stage  ;  and  when  we  shall 
have  discovered  what  that  is  which  thinks,  reasons, 
and  wills,  we  may  be  better  qualified  to  decide 
concerning  the  seat  of  the  passions  and  emotions. 

The  reason  which  induced  Des  Cartes  and 
others,  to  make  all  the  affections  sensual,  is  ob- 
vious. It  is  easy  to  perceive  that  we  cannot  as- 
cribe affhciions  to  the  spmtuaLl  part  of  man,  with- 
out admitting  the  passions  also ;  nor  these  without 
being  perplexed  with  the .  appetites ;  which,  al- 
though confessedly  sensual,  frequently  excite  those 
emotions  and  passions,  which  must  be  ascribed  to 
the  Spirit,  if  it  be  susceptible  of  emotions.  But 
this  combination,  or  reciprocal  influence,  they 
deem  to  be  totally  inconsistent  with  those  intellec- 
tual honours  which  they  are  solicitous  of  ascribing, 
exclusively,  to  our  spiritual  natures. 

26 


202  SEAT  OF  THE 

Dr.  Reid's  embarrassment  seems  to  arise  from 
the  expectation  that  the  rational  principle  must 
always  act  rationally;  which  leads  him  to  infer 
that  whenever  the  passions  and  affections  do  not 
receive  the  sanction  of  reason,  they  are  to  be  as- 
signed over  to  the  animal  principle.  But  this 
hypothesis  will  tempt  us  to  doubt  of  the  very 
existence  of  the  rational  principle,  in  numbers  of 
our  species.  It  leads  us  to  conclude  that  the  two 
natures,  deemed  so  diametrically  opposite  to  each 
other,  possess  powers  so  perfectly  similar,  that  it 
is  difficult  for  the  keenest  discernment  to  distin- 
guish between  their  operations ;  and  it  compels  us 
to  infer,  that  whenever  some  of  our  affections 
become  conformable  to  reason,  they  have  changed 
their  seat  from  the  animal  to  the  rational  prin- 
ciple. 

Philosophers  and  Divines,  who  distinguish  Man 
into  the  three  several  parts  of  Body,  Soul,  and 
Spirit,  which,  notwithstanding  the  intimacy  of 
their  union,  they  suppose  to  be  different  in  their 
natures;  ascribe  the  appetites  to  the  Body,  the 
passions  and  affections  to  the  Soul,  and  to  the 
Spirit,  those  intellectual  powers  which  seem  re- 
mote from  passions  or  emotions  of  any  kind.  By 
such  an  arrangement  they  mean  to  compliment  the 
Spirit  with  the  most  exalted  station  ;  but  the  hon- 
our, like  many  other  projects  of  ambition,  is  en- 
tirely at  the  expense  of  its  happiness.  If  the  affec- 
tions pertain  to  the  Soul  exclusively,  that  alone 
is  capable  of  enjoying.  The  Spirit  is  deprived 
of  every  motive  for  speculation  ;  and  since  it  some- 


PASSIONS.  203 

times  happens  that  speculations  of  the  most  obtruse 
kind,  excite  pleasing  sensations,  the  Spirit  must 
certainly  perceive,  though  it  has  no  faculties  to  la- 
merU  its  hard  lot,  as  often  as  it  is  conscious  that 
these  delightful  sensations,  which  are  its  own  work, 
are  transferred  to  the  Soul. 

Without  entering  therefore  into  enquiries  of  this 
nature,  which  for  want  of  data  must  be  conjec- 
tural and  unsatisfactory,  it  will  be  more  corres- 
pondent with  my  plan,  simply  to  state  interesting 
facts,  and  leave  it  to  the  Metaphysician  to  draw 
such  consequences  a&  he  may  deem  most  legiti- 
mate. 

It  must  be  admitted  that  every  passion,  emo- 
tion, and  affection,  proceeds  from  certain  impres- 
sions or  ideas  excited,  concerning  the  nature,  or 
state,  or  quality,  or  agency  of  the  exciting  cause. 
These  Ideas  have  undoubtedly  their  seat  in  that 
part  of  man  we  distinguish  by  the  appellation 
of  mind.  The  exciting  cause  therefore  changes 
the  state  of  the  Mind,  respecting  the  particular 
object.  From  total  indifference  it  becomes  some 
way  or  other  interested.  This  new  impression, 
if  it  possess  a  certain  degree  of  strength,  produces 
a  correspondent  change  upon  the  body.  Univer- 
sal observation  and  universal  phraseology,  which 
is  doubtless  founded  upon  this  observation,  unite 
to  evince  that  a  very  perceptible  influence  of  every 
strong  emotion  is  directed  towards  the  heart. 
The  Heart  experiences  various  kinds  of  sensation, 
pleasant  or  unpleasant,  over  which  it  has  no  con- 


SO^  SEAT  OF  THE 

troul ;  and  from  thence  the  influence  of  agitated 
spirits  seems  to  be  diffused  over  the  body.  Their 
more  gentle  effects  are  not  visible  to  the  spectator ; 
nay,  the  subject  himself  is  not  conscious  perhaps 
of  any  thing  more  than,  either  a  change  of  senti- 
ment, or  the  perception  of  the  stronger  influence 
of  a  former  sentiment,  connected  with  something 
agreeable  or  disagreeable  in  this  perception ;  a 
something  which  attaches  more  strongly  to  the 
object,  or  creates  some  degree  of  repugnance. 
This  state  of  mind  is  styled  an  affection,  and  it 
appears  to  be  totally  mental ;  but  stronger  influ- 
ences produce  such  changes,  that  the  inward  dis- 
position becomes  obvious  to  the  spectators,  through 
the  medium  of  the  corporeal  frame.  It  is  now 
called  an  emotion,  and  this  may  increase  in 
strength  until  the  whole  system  becomes  agitated 
and  convulsed. 

From  this  statement  it  appears  incontestible, 
that  the  Affections  and  Passions  have  their  origin 
in  the  Mind,  while  Emotions  are  corporeal  indi- 
cations of  what  passes  within ;  according  to  the 
conjecture  expressed  by  Mr.  Grove. 

It  also  proves,  that  to  confine  the  affections  to 
the  Mind,  and  refer  the  passions  to  the  animal  prin- 
ciple, is  to  theorize  in  opposition  to  facts.  For  nu- 
merous instances  have  presented  themselves,  in  the 
course  of  our  Analysis,  which  indicate  that  the 
difference  between  the  gentlest  affection  and  the 
most  turbulent  passions,  consists  in  degree,  not  in 
nature.  Whatever  produces  silent  satisfaction,  in 
its  mildest  influence,  will  produce  the  extravagance 


PASSIONS.  SdS 

of  joy  in  its  strongest.  Fearful  apprehension,  in 
its  excess,  is  terror ;  and  displeasure,  in  its  most  in- 
ordinate exertions,  is  rage.  When  the  gentlest  af^ 
fections  are  rendered  conspicuous,  their  existence 
is  known  by  some  visible  change  produced  in  the 
countenance,  through  the  medium  of  the  nervous 
system ;  while  the  most  violent  agitations  of  the 
mind,  operating  Upon  the  same  nervous  system, 
produce  ungovernable  transports.  Hence  it  is  ra- 
tional to  infer,  that  the  finest  affections,  and  the 
strongest  passions,  are  equally  sensitive,  or  equally 
spiritual  in  their  natures. 

It  is  natural  for  those  who  favour  the  hypothe- 
sis, that  man  consists  of  "  different  natures  marvel- 
"  lously  mixt,"  to  ascribe  the  appetites  solely  to  the 
corporeal  system,  or  to  the  animal  nature  of  man, 
and  to  call  them  carnal^  because  the  immediate  ob- 
jects of  the  appetites  relate  to  the  wants  and  grati- 
fications of  the  body.  But  do  they  recollect  that 
these  appetites  are  frequently  awakened  by  the  at- 
tention paid  by  the  Mind,  to  their  particular  objects^ 
exciting  Concupiscence,  which  is  always  attri- 
buted to  the  Mind  ?  When  the  desires  considered 
as  carnal,  are  excited  by  a  particular  state  of  the 
body,  that  is  by  certain  changes  made  in  the  cor- 
poreal system,  which  generate  particular  wants, 
as  in  the  sensations  of  hunger  and  thirst,  the  men- 
tal part  of  our  nature  is  immediately  conscious  of 
these  uneasy  sensations,  wills  to  remove  them,  and 
expects  gratification  in  attending  to  the  demands 
of  appetite.     Thus  the  whole  man  becomes  inte- 


206  SEAT  OF  THE 

rested,  without  the  possibility  of  placing  a  barrier, 
to  arrest  the  operations  of  the  mind,  and  render 
the  appetite  purely  corporeal. 

When  the  power  of  immediate  gratification  is 
possessed,  none  of  the  accessary  passions  and  emo- 
tions are  called  forth,  and,  in  some  cases,  we  are 
not  conscious  of  mental  exertions.  But  if  the 
gratification  cannot  be  immediate ;  if  it  be  uncer- 
tain ;  if  any  formidable  impediments  present  them- 
selves ;  then  the  whole  soul  is  powerfully  aroused : 
hopes  and  fears  are  excited  concerning  the  event ; 
anger  and  jealousies  are  indulged  against  rivals 
and  causes  of  impediments ;  sorrows  and  vexations 
are  inspired  by  our  disappointment.  These  betray 
the  interest  which  the  Mind  has  taken  in  pleasures 
which  are  termed  sensual.  Where  the  indulgence 
has  been  illicit,  repentance  also,  and  remorse  con- 
fess that  the  Soul  feels  itself  responsible  for  grati- 
fications which  are  deemed  merely  carnal. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  finer  affections  of  Love, 
such  as  the  filial,  the  parental,  the  social ;  and  be- 
nevolence in  its  more  tranquil  exertions,  being  so 
much  exalted  above  the  appearance  of  every  thing 
selfish,  and  having  no  immediate  personal  gratifi- 
cation for  their  object,  are  generally  attributed  to 
the  higher  principle  in  our  nature.  But  the  love 
of  beauty  and  of  attractive  qualifications  between 
the  sexes,  becoming  sexual,  may  create  desires  de- 
nominated carnal ;  and  benevolence  becoming  sym- 
pathy and  compassion  with  deep  distress,  produces 
the  corporeal  effects  of  agonizing  grief  or  fear,  and 


PASSIONS.  207 

is  virtually  as  sensual  or  carnal  as  any  of  the  appe- 
tites ;  though  usage  is  offended  at  such  an  applica- 
tion of  the  terms. 

Thus  it  appears  that  the  grand  principles  of  love 
and  hatred,  desire  and  aversion,  produce  their  ef- 
fects upon  the  whole  system,  when  they  operate 
with  a  certain  degree  of  force  :  though  for  the  sake 
of  discrimination  we  give  different  names  to  these 
effects  ;  and  to  manifest  our  sense  of  the  superiority 
of  one  class  of  our  desires  and  affections,  when 
compared  with  another,  we  annex  various  degrees 
of  respectability  to  those  which  are  most  remote 
from  the  gratification  of  corporeal  wants. 

When  the  affections  of  love  and  desire  are  placed 
upon  objects  deemed  the  most  sensual,  they  are 
called  appetites ;  and  they  are  stigmatized  with  the 
epithet  of  carnal  appetites,  because  they  are  merely 
corporeal  in  their  object,  and  are  peculiarly  liable 
to  the  most  shameful  abuse.  They  begin  and 
terminate  in  gratifications  which  do  not  call  forth 
one  amiable  quality,  or  respectable  exertion  of  the 
Mind.  When  indulged  within  the  limits  permit- 
ted, they  are  void  of  merit ;  if  illegitimate,  or  in- 
dulged to  excess,  they  are  accounted  ignominious. 
In  this  singular  predicament  are  those  gratifica- 
tions, which  have  for  their  final  cause,  the  support 
or  production  of  life,  exclusively  placed. 

The  finer  species  of  corporeal  enjoyments,  re- 
ject the  degrading  epithets  of  sensual  and  car- 
nal with  disdain.  No  one  is  said  to  be  carnally 
disposed,   when   his  ears   are   gratified   with  the 


SEAT  OF  THE 

charms  of  music ;  when  his  eye  surveys  the 
beauties  of  nature.  He  is  not  charged  with  hav- 
ing an  insatiable  Appetite  for  paintings,  or  con- 
demned for  inordinate  Concupiscence,  though 
he  should  expend  his  fortune  in  making  purchases, 
or  exhaust  his  health  by  incessant  application  to 
the  art.  For  though  his  senses  are  equally  gratified, 
as  in  the  other  instances,  yet  the  enjoyment  is  fur- 
nished by  objects  which  are  more  dignified  in  their 
nature,  and  have  been  the  result  of  skill  and  inge- 
nuity. It  is  here  that  merit  commences,  both  in 
the  power  of  enjoyment,  and  in  the  power  of  exe- 
cution ;  and  language  distinguishes  gratifications, 
from  these  sources,  by  the  more  elevated  appella- 
tion of  taste.  This  very  term,  by  the  way,  is  an 
indication  of  the  power  of  the  object  of  our  pursuit, 
to  elevate  our  ideas,  respecting  the  expressions  em- 
ployed. The  word  taste,  although  it  is  a  metaphor 
borrowed  from  one  of  the  carnal  sensations,  loses 
the  grossness  of  its  original  meaning  in  the  new 
mode  of  its  application.  It  is  ennobled  by  its  ob- 
ject, till  we  forget  that  it  is  of  a  plebeian  origin. 

The  pleasure  derived  from  agreeable  odours 
being,  as  it  were,  the  medium  between  the  grosser 
appetites,  and  the  pleasure  inspired  by  harmonious 
sounds,  or  the  objects  of  vision,  neither  exposed  to 
the  disgrace  of  the  former,  nor  possessing  the  merit 
of  the  latter,  has  no  epithet  either  of  contempt  or 
respectability. 

When  Love  and  Desire  are  placed  upon  nobler 
objects  than  any  of  the  preceding  ;  such  as  know- 


PASSIONS.  209 

ledge,  virtue,  or  any  other  mental  qualification, 
the  superior  dignity  of  these  pursuits,  and  their  ele- 
vation above  every  thing  deemed  sensual,  and 
above  the  gratification  of  3.  refined  taste,  confer  a 
dignity  upon  the  affections  themselves,  until  they 
seem  to  be  of  an  higher  origin,  and  emulate  every 
thing  w^e  can  conceive  of  the  most  exalted  Spirits. 
For  we  cannot  entertain  more  elevated  sentiments 
of  immaterial  created  Intelligences,  than  that  they 
possess  an  ardent  love  of  knowledge,  wisdom,  and 
moral  obligation. 

Nor  have  we  any  reason  to  ascribe  those  powers 
of  the  mind,  which  by  way  of  pre-eminence  we  de- 
nominate intellectual^  to  any  other  principle  than 
that  w  hich  is  the  source  of  the  affections,  and  is  in- 
terested in  the  cravings  of  the  appetites.  The  state 
of  mind,  and  its  conscious  perceptions,  must  vary 
according  to  the  kind  of  employment  in  which  it  is 
engaged.  When  its  occupation  is  simply  to  investi- 
gate truths  of  any  kind,  to  examine,  deliberate, 
judge,  and  resolve,  it  is  in  a  very  different  state, 
than  when  it  is  forcibly  struck  with  the  beneficial 
or  pernicious  nature  and  tendency  of  these  truths, 
or  of  any  influential  quality  with  w  hich  it  is  be- 
come acquainted.  Tt  contemplates  abstract  ideas, 
which  may  have  a  distant  reference  to  utilit}^,  in  a 
mood  very  different  from  that  which  it  experiences 
when  very  attractive,  or  very  alarming  properties 
present  themselves  to  the  imagination,  whoi;e  influ- 
ence upon  our  well-being  seems  to  be  direct  and 
immediate. 

27 


210  SEAT  OF  THE 

Yet  in  the  calmer  exercise  {?F  the  mind,  in  its 
most  abstruse  speculations,  there  is  a  species  of 
permanent  pleasure  of  which  it  is  conscious,  and 
which  is  preferred,  bj  the  philosopher,  to  the  stron- 
gest emotions,  which  are  as  transient  as   they    are 
violent ;   until  by  some  new   and  interesting  dis- 
covery, he  is  surprised  into  joy,  or  intricacies  occur 
which  disturb  and  irritate.     He   then    experiences, 
that  passions  arid  emotions  will  sometimes  intrude 
themselves   into    the    apartment,   where  the  door 
seems  to  be  most  obstinately  shut  against   them. 
Nor  can  his  more  tranquil   pleasures  be  ascribed  to 
any  other  cause  than  to  a  strong  predilection  for 
the  study  which  most  occupies  his  attention,  to  his 
love  of  knowledge,  to  the  gratification  of  his  curi- 
osity, to  the  satisfaction  derived  from  the  enlarge- 
ment of  his  ideas  and  improvement  of  his  under- 
standing, to  his  ardent  desire  of  discovering  some- 
thing which  may  extend  his  fame, ^  or  prove  benefi- 
cial to  humanity  ;  that  is,  to  honourable,  noble,  and 
useful  affections. 

The  Reader  will  perceive  that  these  remarks 
have  not  the  most  distant  reference  to  the  grand 
question,  concerning  the  materiality  or  immateriali- 
ty of  the  Soul.  They  are  simply  opposed  to  those 
unfounded  hypotheses,  and  vague  conjectures, 
which,  instead  of  explaining  any  one  phenomenon, 
render  our  ideas  more  embarrassed.  They  indicate 
that  we  ought  not  to  multiply  principles,  until  we 
are  qualified  to  assig;n  to  them  their  distinct  offices, 
without  encroachments  or  confusion.     What  can  be 


PASSIONS.  211 

more  unsatisfactory  than  to  suppose  the  existence 
of  principles,  totally  opposite  in  their  natures,  in 
order  to  explain  the  contrarieties  observable  in 
human  character  and  conduct ;  and  yet  to  allow 
that,  in  some  instances,  the  operations  of  these  prin- 
ciples are  so  similar,  that  philosophers  themselves 
cannot  ascertain  the  distinct  province  of  each  ?  Or 
what  can  be  more  superfluous  than  to  imagine  the 
existence  of  these  distinct  principles,  merely  to 
confer  honour  upon  the  one,  and  load  the  other 
with  disgrace,  when  the  nature  of  the  object  pursued, 
and  the  dispositions  towards  it,  will  solve  every 
difficulty ;  will  indicate  an  exalted  or  a  depraved 
state  of  the  Mind,  without  suggesting  a  single  doubt 
whether  the  spiritual  man  ought,  in  any  respect,  to 
become  responsible  for  the  disgraceful  propensities 
of  the  carnal  man,  with  whom  he  is  compelled  to 
inhabit  ? 

It  has  been  alleged  that,  during  the  impetus  of 
passion,  the  soul  is  in  a  state  of  much  greater  ac- 
tivity than  at  any  other  period.  In  most  instances 
this  is  probably  the  case.  Yet  we  should  recollect 
that  during  the  excitements  of  passion,  the  soul 
must  necessarily  manifest  the  greatest  activity  to 
the  spectator,  from  its  peculiar  exertions  upon  the 
corporeal  system.  Whereas  in  the  exercise  of 
deep  thought,  the  activity  of  the  soul  is  concentrat- 
ed within.  Of  consequence,  when  the  mind  is  ab- 
sorbed in  profound  meditation,  instead  of  indicating 
more  activity  than  usual,  the  external   appearance 


212  CAUSES,  &c. 

will  indicate  less.  Hence  it  is  that  deep  thinkers 
are  so  frequently  confounded,  by  those  who  are 
not  deep  thinkers,  with  the  stupid.  In  such  cases, 
the  activity  of  the  soul  can  discover  itself  only  by 
the  result  of  its  labours  ;  or  by  the  injuries  which 
intense  aj)piication  may  have  committed  upon  the 
constitution.  Instances  have  existed  in  which 
mental  occupation  has  produced  an  insensibility  to 
every  foreign  impression.  The  subject  has  re- 
mained unmoved,  in  the  midst  of  scenes  calculated 
to  excite  the  most  horrid  tumults  of  soak  V/hen 
the  Philosopher  of  Syracuse  was  so  wrapped  in 
contemplation,  as  to  be  insensible  to  all  the  hor- 
rors of  a  siege,  his  mind  could  not  be  less  active 
than  theirs  who  were  the  most  agitated,  by  the 
scenes  of  complicated  distress  which  surrounded 
them. 


CHAPTER   II. 

CAUSES   WHICH    CREATE    A    DIVERSITY    IN    OUR    AFFECTIONS, 
ENUMERATED. 

It  may  seem  natural  to  expect  that  men,  formed 
with  similar,  and  often  with  equal  powers  of  dis- 
criminating the  nature  of  objects, — in  whom  the 
sensations  of  pleasure  and  pain,  happiness  or 
misery,  are  also  similar, — and  who  are  exposed  to 
similar  causes  of  excitement,  should  indicate  a  cor- 
respondent similarity  in  their  affections,  instead  of 


INFLUENCE  OF  EXPERIENCE.  213 

such  a  diversity  which  is  so  conspicuous,  not  only 
in  liifFerent  persons,  but  frequently  in  the  same 
person.  It  is  well  known  that  the  predilections  of 
individuals,  for  the  supposed  means  of  happiness, 
are  extremely  various ;  ihat  one  man  will  pursue 
with  ardour,  what  another  will  contemplate  with 
indifference,  or  with  disapprobation  and  disgust. 
Nor  is  there  any  person  who  entertains,  invariably, 
the  same  disposition  towards  the  same  object.  At 
one  instant,  he  will  not  only  feel  a  much  stronger 
affection  for  it  than  he  did  at  the  preceding,  but  he 
may  to-day  contemplate,  with  contempt  and  abhor- 
rence, that  which  yesterday  may  have  excited  rap- 
tures. 

It  is  of  considerable  moment  to  trace  the  princi- 
pal causes  of  these  diversities,  or  point  out  some  of 
the  circumstances  which  have  a  very  powerful  in- 
fluence over  our  minds.  The  number  and  extent 
of  these  will  permit  little  more  than  an  enumeration. 


§  1.     The  Influence  of  Experience. 

These  diversities  and  changes  may,  in  many 
cases,  be  ascribed  to  the  difference  observable  be- 
tween the  suggestions  of  a  lively  imagination,  and 
the  more  faithful  reports  of  Experience.  Our  pre- 
conceptions are  seldom  accurate.  If  they  be  not 
entirely  false,  or  totally  opposite  to  the  nature  of 
the  subject,  they  are  almost  sure  to  err  on  the  side 
of  excess  or  of  defect.     Experience,  in  numberless 


214  CAUSES,  &c. 

instances,  corrects  such  errors,  and  teaches  us  to 
estimate  the  qualities  of  objects  as  they  really  ex- 
ist, and  not  according  to  a  prejudiced  conception, 
or  an  heated  imagination.  This  will  of  conse- 
quence teach  us  highly  to  prize  many  things, 
which  we  had  before  neglected  or  despised,  and  to 
dismiss,  with  indifference  and  contempt,  many 
things  on  which  a  deluded  imagination  had  placed 
our  supreme  happiness.  Such  changes  will  take 
place  in  every  individual  in  his  passage  through 
life.  Their  nature,  and  the  uses  made  of  them, 
constitute  the  difference  between  the  wise  man  and 
the  fool. 

But  there  are  many  other  causes,  which  act 
more  uniformly,  upon  whole  classes  and  bodies  of 
people,  and  give  to  each  class  a  certain  cast  of  cha- 
racter. Some  of  these  are  very  similar  in  their 
effects ;  others  dissimilar,  irregular,  and  capricious. 

Among  those  which  are  more  uniform  in  their 
influence,  may  be  placed  the  distinctions  in  charac- 
ter and  dispositions  observable  in  the 


§  2.     Difference  of  Sex. 

In  most  animals,  of  the  inferior  order,  there  is 
a  manifest  difference  between  the  male  and  female, 
both  in  external  appearance  and  instinctive  proper- 
ties, the  former  being  generally  of  a  stronger  make 
than  the  latter ;  and  excepting  at  the  moments 
when  the  powers  of  the  female  are  called  forth 


DIFFERENCE  OF  SEX.  215 

to  the  protection  of  their  young,  more  courageous 
in  disposition. 

Similar  laws  manifestly  prevail  in  the  human 
species.  The  very  form  and  constitution  of  the 
Man  indicate  that  he  is  rendered  capable  of  more 
robust  employments  ;  and  his  stronger  contexture 
is,  generally  speaking,  connected  with  a  disposition 
to  greater  exertions :  whereas  the  superior  delicacy 
of  contexture  which  distinguishes  the  Female,  is 
mostly  accompanied  with  a  much  greater  delicacy 
of  character.  Her  dispositions  to  strong  and 
vigorous  exertions,  either  of  body  or  of  mind,  are 
not  so  universal,  and  she  generally  places  her  affec- 
tions upon  objects  and  duties  which  are  more  con- 
fined and  domesticated. 

Nor  do  the  customs  prevalent  in  savage,  or  less 
polished  nations,  invalidate  the  above  remarks.  In 
those  countries  where  bodily  labour,  or  the  fatigues 
of  husbandry,  are  wholly  consigned  to  the  females, 
while  their  husbands  appear  indolent  and  inactive, 
this  indolence  is  merely  the  repose  enjoyed  in  the 
intervals  of  still  greater  exertions.  War,  or  the 
chace,  are  exclusively  their  province,  and  when 
engaged  in  these,  the  men  endure  much  greater 
fatigues  and  hardships  than  those  allotted  to  their 
partners. 

It  is  readily  acknowledged  that  these  peculiari- 
ties of  make  and  of  character,  are  not  so  uniform 
as  to  resist  the  influence  of  causes  which  have  a 
tendency  to  counteract  them.  Singularity  of  tem- 
perament, the  force  of  custom  and  education,  par- 


216  CAUSES,  &c. 

ticular  situations  in  life,  may  place  individuals  ot 
each  sex  out  of  their  proper  sphere,  and  induce  a 
peculiarity  of  individual  character.  But  this 
change  seldom  meets  with  the  approbation  of  either 
sex.  An  effeminate  Man  is  despised,  and  a  mascu- 
line Female  has  little  power  to  charm. 

An  essential  difference  is  also  observable  in  sexual 
predilections.  The  female  prefers  the  strong,  the 
bold  and  courageous,  the  spirited  and  enterprising. 
Her  ideas  of  beauty  and  comeliness,  are,  instinc- 
tively, such  as  correspond  the  least  with  the  delica- 
cy of  her  own  person.  Men  in  general  are  most 
enamoured  of  tbose  qualities  and  dispositions  which 
indicate  a  contrary  character.  They  talk  of  the 
delicacy  of  form  and  amiable  softness  of  the  sex. 
They  think,  that  the  milder  virtues  sit  with 
peculiar  grace  upon  the  female  ;  such  as  gentleness, 
patience,  compassion,  and  tenderness.  It  is  expect- 
ed that  she  should  excel  in  piety,  in  faith,  hope, 
and  resignation.  Men  coutempiate  a  female  atheist 
with  more  disgust  and  horror,  than  if  she  possessed 
the  hardest  features  embossed  with  carbuncles. 
They  excuse,  and  many  are  disposed  to  be  pleased 
with,  such  foibles  as  proceed  from  delicacy  of 
frame,  or  greater  sensibility  of  mind  ;  while  they 
express  their  disapprobation  of  a  bold  forward  tem- 
per, though  it  should  be  accompanied  with  a  great 
superiority  of  talents.  Although  moral  obligation, 
as  referring  to  the  grand  standard  of  virtuous  con- 
duct, may  be  the  same ;  yet  the  rougher  vices  of 
oaths  and  intoxication  are  appropriated  by  men ; 


DIFFERENCE  OF  SEX.  n1 

while  the  evasive  ones  of  artifice,   &c.  are  deemed 
less  opprohrious  in  the  female. 

It  is  maintained  that   men  are  most  impetnousj 
but  that  females  are  most  deeply  affected   with  the 
tender  passion  :  that  if  the  man  have  not  a  speedy 
recourse  to  the  pistol  or  the  rope,  he  will  probably 
survive  the  agonies  of  disappointment,  under  which 
the  softer  sex  will  gradually  pine  and  die.     These 
facts  have  induced  a  French  author  to  remark,  that 
women  consider  love  as  the  serious  business  of  life, 
and  men  render  it  subordinate  to  many  others.     It 
is  however  universally  deemed  to  be  the  province  of 
man,  first  to  declare  his  passion  ;  and  it  is  univer- 
sally expected  that  the  female  should  receive  the 
declaration  with  a  modest  coyness,  and  experience 
some  degree  of  struggle  with  her  delicacy,  before 
she  acknowledge  the  passion  to  be  reciprocal.     The 
female  has,  in    general,  a   stronger  affection   for 
every  thing  she  pursues  than  men,  who  are  more 
frequently   impelled  to  act   from  necessity.     She 
generally  follows  her  inclination  in  the  discharge 
of  her  social  and  domestic  duties,   as  well  as  in  the 
pursuits  of  pleasure,  elegant  accomplishments,  or  of 
literature.     Those   who  are  of  a  scientific   turn, 
compensate  for  any  defect   in  extent  of  erudition, 
or   depth    of  investigation,  with   which  they  are 
sometimes  charged,  by  brilliancy  of  language  and 
beauty  of  sentiment,  which  so  frequently  pervade 
and  embellish  their  writings.     Females  are  suppos- 
ed to  be  much  fonder  of  ornaments  than  those  of 

the  other  sex,  who  are  not  reputed  fops  ;  and  it  is 
28 


218  CAUSES,  &c. 

said  that  they  more  deeply  resent  any  neglect  or 
slight  of  their  persons.  They  are  warmer  in  their 
friendships,  and  their  strong  attachments  can  scarce- 
ly be  weakened  by  any  thing  but  rivalships.  If 
slighter  incidents  more  easily  discompose  their  tem- 
pers, this  is  abundantly  recompensed  by  their  su- 
periour  patience  under  severer  trials.  In  cases  of 
extreme  danger  and  difficulty,  they  have  not  only 
been  equal  to  the  support  of  their  own  spirits,  but 
they  have  set  an  example  of  heroic  courage  to  their 
desponding  Lords.  But  it  is  also  allowed,  that  when 
the  female  mind  becomes  thoroughly  depraved, 
they  greatly  surpass  the  other  sex  in  cruelty,  re- 
venge, and  every  enormity  ;  which  is  justly  sup- 
posed to  elucidate  the  common  proverb,  "  Corrup- 
tio  optimi  est  pessima.^^ 

In  giving  the  above  epitome,  either  of  facts  or 
opinions,  the  author  has  purposely  avoided  entering 
into  the  controversy  relative  to  rights  and  powers, 
or  to  Equality  or  Superiority  of  capacities.  He 
does  not  wish  to  draw  a  comparison  between  the 
lustre  of  the  respective  virtues,  or  nicely  to  balance 
the  respective  vices  of  each  sex.  His  concern  is 
with  differences  alone.  If  these  exist ;  if  cha- 
racteristic differences,  commencing  with  early  child- 
hood,— when  the  little  Miss  delights  in  her  doll, 
and  arranges  her  domestic  play-things,  while  her 
more  hardy  brother  is  driving  a  hoop  or  whipping 
a  top, — run  through  every  period  of  life,  it  is  of  no 
moment  to  the  subject  under  consideration,  whether 
they  are  to  be  ascribed  to  natural  and  physical,  or 


DIFFERENCE  OF  SEX.  219 

to  artificial  or  incidental  causes ;  or  lohich  cha- 
racteristics have  a  prepouderancy  of  excellence. 
(See  Note  S.) 

This  manifest  diversity,  and  in  some  respects 
total  contrariety  in  disposition  and  character,  is 
necessarily  connected  vvath  an  equal  diversity  and 
contrariety  of  tastes  and  affections  :  for  the  former 
derive  their  origin  from  the  latter ;  the  character 
being  itself  both  formed  and  indicated,  by  a  series 
of  predilections  and  aversions.  If  therefore  each 
sex  has  its  distinguishing  characteristics,  if  their 
tastes  and  inclinations  be  not  precisely  similar, 
sexual  difference  must  be  productive  of  different 
ideas  respecting  the  qualities  of  objects,  and  create 
the  most  opposite  affections  respecting  them :  so 
that  objects  and  circumstances  perfectly  the  same, 
shall  to  each  sex  appear  in  different  points  of  view. 
That  which  makes  little  or  no  impression  on  the 
one,  being  calculated  to  produce  strong  emotions 
in  the  other  ;  becoming  the  source  of  pleasure  or 
displeasure,  of  enjoyment,  or  of  infelicity. 

Another  cause  which  operates  in  a  similar  man- 
ner is 


§  3.     Diversity  of  Temperament. 

Not  to  enter  into  the  physiological  characteristic 
of  each  temperament,  concerning  which  physiolo- 
gists themselves  are  not  agreed,  we  shall  only  ob- 
serve, what  has  never  been  disputed,  that  there  is 


220  CAUSES,  &c.   ' 

such  a  diversity  in  the  original  constitution  of  in- 
dividuals of  each  sex,  as  may  not  only  influence 
the  mental  pov^ers,  but  also  the  affections  of  the 
mind  ;  such  as  may  predispose  one  person  to  be 
affected  by  scenes  and  circumstances,  in  a  manner 
very  different  from  another. 

Some  are  naturally  more  irritable  in  their  tem- 
pers, others  more  placid  :  that  is,  one  will  perceive 
and  feel  causes  of  provocation  in  situations  or  con- 
duct, which  excite  no  emotions  in  the  mind  of 
another.  Some  are  naturally  of  a  melancholy 
cast,  which  spreading  a  gloom  over  every  object, 
prevents  them  from  observing  and  enjoying  those 
qualities  which  may  excite  cheerful  ideas,  and  com- 
municate pleasurable  sensations  to  another.  This 
man  is  naturally  sanguine  in  his  disposition  :  he 
forms  a  thousand  projects,  and  is  full  of  hopes  res- 
pecting each.  He  is  highly  delighted  with  such 
prospects  as  are  invisible  to  others ;  and  is  charmed 
with  ideal  properties,  which  never  entered  into  the 
imagination  of  those  who  are  not  under  the  agreea- 
ble delusion.  The  disappointments  to  which  such 
a  temper  is  inevitably  exposed,  become  plentiful 
sources  of  vexation,  which  the  less  sanguine  for- 
tunately escape.  The  timid,  on  the  contrary, 
ruminate  over  every  possibility  of  evil.  They  dare 
not  to  indulge  hope  through  fear  of  disappointment. 
They  see  and  magnify  pernicious  tendencies,  which 
were  totally  overlooked  by  persons  of  the  contrary 
disposition.  Some  are  naturally  indolent;  and 
this  indolence  of  temper  prevents  them  from  pei" 


DIVERSITY  OF  TEMPERAMENT.  221 

ceiving  those  qualities  in  objects,  which  arouse  the 
attention  of  the  more  active  ;  and  it  induces  them 
to  give  the  preference  to  their  beloved  ease.  Some 
are  of  a  social  cast ;  and  they  discover  a  thousand 
joys  in  society,  which  appear  indifferent  or  insipid 
to  the  lover  of  retirement. 

Thus  is  there  a  natural  and  habitual  disposition, 
to  be  differently  affected  by  the  same  objects ;  to 
each  of  which  the  imagination  gives  a  colouring, 
corresponding  with  the  permanent  and  characte- 
ristic state  of  mind. 

Another  cause  invariably  produces  a  change  in 
our  ideas  and  dispositions,  towards  particular  ob- 
jects, in  a  manner  equally  uniform  and  characte- 
ristic ;  and  that  is 


§  4.     The  Regular  Progress  of  Human  Nature^ 
from  Infancy  to  Advanced  Agei 

The  changes  which  take  place  in  our  affections 
and  pursuits,  from  this  cause,  are  incontestibly 
marked  by  the  hand  of  Nature  herself;  and  they 
maintain  a  degree  of  uniformity  in  every  person, 
of  every  nation  and  age,  whose  longevity  carries 
him  through  each  period. 

The  strong  desires  of  the  Infant  are  at  first 
confined  to  its  corporeal  wants.  No  part  of  na- 
ture is  known  to  him,  excepting  that  which  serves 
to  satisfy  the  cravings  of  appetite,  and  the  nurse 


222  CAUSES,  &c. 

who  administers  it.  During  this  state,  agonies 
of  grief  and  ecstacies  of  joy  are  instantaneously 
excited,  and  as  instantaneously  subside.  In  ad- 
vancing Childhood,  curiosity  begins  to  awake,  and 
increased  attention  is  paid  to  every  thing  around 
us.  Our  pursuits,  our  pleasures,  our  pains,  be- 
come daily  more  numerous  and  complicated.  With 
growing  powers,  the  love  of  action  accompanies 
this  inquisitive  disposition.  The  healthy  and  vi- 
gorous chiefly  delight  in  those  amusements  which 
occupy  the  mind,  increase  corporeal  strength  and 
address,  and  imperceptibly  enlarge  the  stock  of 
ideas.  At  this  period,  varied  affections,  and  a 
thousand  gushes  of  passion,  engage  and  agitate  the 
breast  by  turns.  Hopes  and  fears,  quarrels  and 
reconciliations,  eager  pursuits  and  quick  satiety, 
occupy  every  hour. 

Upon  advancing  towards  Manhood,  new  passions 
and  desires  are  implanted.  Social  connections  ac- 
quire strength  and  permanency.  Sexual  affections 
arise,  and  the  multitudinous  passions  which  sur- 
round them.  Ambition  is  roused,  and  means  are 
pursued  productive  of  important  ends.  Interesting 
objects  crowd  upon  the  attention,  increasing  the 
ardour  of  the  mind,  and  calling  forth  the  most 
vigorous  exertions.  Gay  and  lively  imagination 
gilds  every  scene  with  delight,  and  to  enjoy  seems 
to  be  the  whole  object  of  our  existence. 

Parental  affections,  cares,  solicitudes,  hopes  and 
disappointments,  joys  and  griefs,  of  a  more  durable 
and  serious  nature,  succeed  to  the  thoughtlessness 


REGULAR  PROGRESS,  &c.  223 

of  younger  years.  The  social  affections,  which 
seemed,  at  an  early  period,  to  be  instinctive,  ripen 
into  a  lasting  and  benevolent  concern  for  the  good 
of  others.  These  manifest  themselves,  in  some 
characters,  by  directing  the  attention  to  plans  and 
projects  of  public  utility  ;  while  in  others,  inordi- 
nate self-love  and  insatiable  ambition  become  the 
first  springs  of  action. 

A  placid  state  of  mind  and  love  of  ease,  naturally 
form  the  habitual  disposition  of  the  aged.  Their 
other  affections  mostly  derive  their  complexion 
from  the  scenes  of  their  preceding  years.  Repeat- 
ed injuries,  confidence  abused,  and  various  disap- 
pointments, united  with  their  growing  infirmities, 
are  apt  to  inspire  a  peevish  humour,  and  render 
suspicion  and  the  excess  of  caution,  the  prevailing 
disposition.  Long  habits  of  frugal  industry,  joined 
with  repeated  observations,  or  with  personal  expe- 
rience, of  the  dependent  and  neglected  state  of  the 
needy,  will  often  create  an  inordinate  love  of  wealth, 
which,  a  conviction  that  it  cannot  be  long  enjoyed, 
is  not  able  to  subdue.  A  desire  of  ease  and  tran- 
quillity, which  now  constitute  their  principal  enjoy- 
ment, is  apt  to  render  the  Aged  vexed  and  irritated 
at  the  smallest  interruptions.  Some  aged  persons, 
on  the  other  hand,  acquire  a  placid  cheerfulness, 
by  the  recollection  both  of  difficulties  surmounted, 
and  of  arduous  duties  performed,  which  are  never 
to  recur.  Conscious  of  having  filled  the  various 
connections  and  relations  of  life,  with  propriety  and 
usefulness,  they  have  treasured  up  a  fund  of  com- 


224  CAUSES,  &c. 

placency  and  lively  hope,  to  console  the  decline  of 
life.  Even  the  difficulties  with  which  they  strug- 
gled, and  the  dangers  they  have  escaped,  now  be- 
come the  sources  of  satisfaction. 

Thus  has  every  period  of  life  its  characteristic 
influence  upon  our  ideas  and  our  affections ;  plac- 
ing objects  before  the  mind,  and  representing  the 
former  ones  in  very  different  shapes  and  colours, 
from  those  which  first  occupied  the   imagination. 


^  5.  National  Customs. 

National  customs,  however  widely  they  may 
differ  from  each  other,  have  also  a  very  powerful 
and  permanent  hold  on  the  affections.  For  these 
the  inhabitants  of  every  country  imbibe  a  prepos- 
session, from  the  earliest  infancy.  Early  habits 
seem  to  be  propagated  with  the  species ;  so  inti- 
mately are  they  formed  and  moulded  into  the 
growing  frame !  and  these  early  propensities  are 
every  day  strengthened  and  confirmed  by  universal 
example.  Custom  and  habits  reconcile  whole  na- 
tions to  climates  the  most  unfriendly,  and  to  occu- 
pations the  most  arduous  and  servile. 

What  softer  natures  start  at  with  affright, 
The  hard  inhabitant  contends  is  right. 

The  history  of  the  manners  and  customs  of  diffe- 
rent nations,  fully  demonstrates  that  they  are  di- 


NATIONAL  CUSTOMS.  225 

vided  into  large  masses  of  predilections  and  preju- 
dices, strong  attachments  and  strong  aversions ! 
It  evinces  the  feeble  influence  of  the  rational  facul- 
ties, either  in  forming  or  correcting  customs,  the 
most  beneficial,  or  the  most  pernicious.  Nay, 
should  experience  itself  begin  to  suggest  better 
principles  to  some  superior  and  reflecting  minds, 
ages  may  roll  before  any  one  will  venture  out  of 
the  common  course,  and  attempt  to  reduce  them  to 
action ;  and  his  best  endeavours  will  probably  be 
rewarded  with  ridicule  and  contempt.  Though 
causes  merely  incidental  may  have  conspired  to  in- 
troduce a  peculiarity  of  manners,  and  to  form  na- 
tional characters,  yet  being  once  formed,  they  be- 
come the  sovereign  rule  of  thought  and  action. 
They  are  diffused  over  the  most  extensive  comuni- 
ties ;  and  unless  freedom  of  intercourse  be  held 
with  neighbouring  nations,  not  an  individual  can 
escape  the  impression.  Thus  it  is  that  the  inhabi- 
tants of  one  district,  contemplate  those  things 
as  essential  to  well-being,  which  others  hold  in 
abhorrence  ; — that  one  class  of  people  reveres  as 
incumbent  duties,  observances  which  others  con- 
template as  the  greatest  absurdities  ; — that  some 
fi>,!^  L^TSi&r  invincible  attachments  to  rites,  which  those 
*^  who  are  not  under  the  influence  of  the  same  pre- 
possessions, justly  consider  as  a  disgrace  to  hu- 
manity. 

Whether  custom  should  influence  opinion,  or 
opinion  introduce  custom,  they  both  operate  upon 
the  aflections,  and  generally  manifest  the  plenitude 

29 


226  CAUSES,  &c. 

of  their  power,  by  the  number  and  magnitude  of 
the  absurdities  they  render  familiar  and  acceptable 
to  the  mind.     These  have  for  successive  genera- 
tions established  the  empire  of  imaginary  beings ; 
and  the  affections  of  reverence,  love,  and  gratitude 
have  been  thrown  away  upon  ideal  objects!  These 
have  sanctioned  the  most  inveterate  hatreds.     They 
have  consecrated  immoralities,   and  dignified  theft, 
prostitution,  and  murder  !    They  have  rendered  the 
austerities    of  Bramins  and  Monks  venerable    to 
the  multitude ;  have  laden  the  Gentoo  Female  with 
insufferable  disgrace,  who  refuses  to  expire  in  tor- 
ments, from  affection  to   her  deceased   husband  ! 
These,  in  the  most  enlightened  countries,   enjoin 
it  upon  the  Man  of  Honour  to  murder  his  best 
friend  for  a  hasty  expression,  or  some  other  indis- 
cretion of  a  momentary  transport !     Opinion  has 
clothed  a  frail  mortal  with  Infallibility ;   has  com- 
municated  that    exclusive   attribute   of  Deity   to 
Councils  and  Synods,  and  bowed  the  neck  of  my- 
riads to  the  empire  of  their  decrees.     It  has  elevat- 
ed the  worthless  into  the  character  of  saints,  and 
those  who  have  most  deserved  the  divine  indigna- 
tion have  been  invoked  as  the  most  prevalent  in- 
tercessors !    It  has  represented  the  Universal  Pa- 
rent as  the  tyrant,  instead  of  the  benevolent  friend 
of  mankind ;  and  it  has  conducted  to  the  torture 
those  who  presumed  to  think  more  worthily  of  him. 
But  the  diversities   of  opinions   and    manners, 
with  their  correspondent  predilections  and   aver- 
sions, exceed  enumeration.     It  is  these  diversities 


THE  FORCE  OF  HABIT.  227 

which  furnish  the  amusement  derived  from  the 
perusal  of  travels ;  and  as  no  two  nations  on  the 
globe  correspond  in  every  instance,  the  peculiari- 
ties of  each,  illustrate,  in  a  striking  manner,  the 
truth  of  our  observation.  They  indicate  the  in- 
conceivable variety  of  sentiments  and  affections, 
which  incidentally  take  place  among  beings  of  the 
same  species,  inhabitants  of  the  same  sublunary 
system,  conversant  with  similar  objects,  and  pos- 
sessing similar  powers  of  mind. 


§  6.     The  force  of  Habit. 

Similar  to  the  customs  which  pervade  large 
bodies  of  men,  is  the  force  of  habit  over  Individu- 
als. The  mind  frequently  acquires  a  strong  and 
invincible  attachment  to  whatever  has  been  fa- 
miliar to  it  for  any  length  of  time.  Habits  pri- 
marily introduced  by  accident  or  by  necessity,  will 
inspire  an  affection  for  peculiarities,  which  have 
the  reverse  of  intrinsic  merit  to  recommend  them. 
These  become,  as  it  were,  assimilated  to  our  na- 
tures. We  contemplate  them  as  belonging  to  our- 
selves so  intimately,  that  we  feel  an  irksome  vacui- 
ty in  their  absence,  and  enjoy  a  great  degree  of 
satisfaction  in  their  being  re-placed ;  merely  be- 
cause we  have  been  habituated  to  them.  How 
frequently  does  it  happen  that  the  most  trifling  cir- 
cumstances, in  early  life,  will  decide  the  lot  of  our 
future  years;    creating   affections   and   aversions, 


228  CAUSES,  &c. 

which  have  the  most  lasting  influence  !  To  this 
cause  we  may  frequently  ascribe,  a  preference  for 
one  trade,  pursuit,  or  profession,  rather  than  for 
another.  Thus  we  perceive  that  children  some- 
times make  choice  of  the  employments  of  their 
parents  or  their  neighbours,  because  it  had  agreea- 
bly engaged  the  attention  of  their  juvenile  hours. 
They  love  to  imitate  and  play  the  man,  till  an  af- 
fection is  acquired  for  the  occupation  itself.  This 
is  generally  the  case  where  the  occupation  is  of  an 
active  nature,  and  most  adapted  to  the  vivacity  of 
youth.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  their  minds  are 
strongly  impressed  with  the  confinement,  slavery, 
or  any  other  disagreeable  circumstance  attending 
the  employment,  to  which  they  are  daily  witnesses, 
tbey  are  inclined  to  the  contrary  extreme,  eon- 
tract  an  aversion,  and  give  the  preference  to  any 
other  pursuit,  the  inconveniences  of  which  are  un- 
known to  them. 

It  is  needless  to  enlarge  farther  upon  these  par- 
ticulars ;  as  every  individual  must  be  conscious  of 
their  truth.  There  is  no  one  who  does  not  feel 
the  power  of  habit,  both  as  the  source  of  pleasure 
and  of  displeasure.  It  is  experienced  in  every  sta- 
tion and  connexion  in  life.  It  is  experienced  in 
what  we  eat,  or  drink,  in  particular  modes  of 
dress,  in  our  habitations  and  their  furniture,  and  in 
our  own  characteristic  peculiarities. 


PRINCIPLE  OF  SELF-LOVE. 


§  7.     Principle  of  Self-love. 

The  influence  of  this  principle  has  frequently 
shewn  itself  in  the  course  of  our  Analysis.  Its 
tendency  to  magnify  the  good  or  evil  which  relates 
to  ourselves,  is  perpetually  felt.  But  we  shall 
now  confine  our  attention  to  the  effects  of  appro- 
priation ;  or  the  attachment  generated,  and  the  af- 
fections indulged,  respecting  every  thing  we  call 
our  own. 

Mr.  Hume  has  collected  together  many  striking 
instances  of  the  effect  of  this  principle.  (See  Dis- 
sertation on  the  Passions.)  He  attributes  it  to 
pride ;  but  then  he  defines  pride  to  be  a  certain 
satisfaction  in  ourselves,  on  account  of  some  accom- 
plishment or  possession  which  we  enjoy.  Without 
examining  the  propriety  of  this  definition  in  this 
place,  (See  Note  I.)  the  influence  of  Self  respect- 
ing appropriation,  must  be  universally  admitted. 
"  It  is  always,"  says  he,  "  our  knowledge,  our 
"  sense,  beauty,  possessions,  family,  on  which  we 
"  value  ourselves. — We  found  vanity  upon  houses, 
"  gardens,  equipage,  and  other  external  objects  ;  as 
^*  well  as  upon  personal  merit  and  accomplish- 
"  ments. — Men  are  vain  of  the  beauty  either  of 
"  their  country,  or  their  county,  or  even  of  their 
"  parish  ;  of  the  happy  temperature  of  the  climate, 
"in  which  they  are  born;  of  the  fertility  of  iheir 
"native  soil ;  of  the  goodness  of  the  wines,  fruits, 
"  or  victuals  produced  by  it ;  &c."     "  Every  thing 


230  CAUSES,  &c. 

"  belonging  to  a  vain  man,  is  the  best  that  is  any 
"  where  to  be  found.  His  houses,  equipage,  furni- 
"  ture,  clothes,  horses,  hounds,  excel  all  others  in 
"  his  conceit,  &c." 

These,  and  many  other  facts,  which  might  be 
enumerated,  indicate  an  innate  propensity  to  value 
whatever  we  possess,  merely  from  the  incidental 
circumstance  of  its  being  our  own.  That  this  dis- 
position frequently  gives  rise  to  the  excess  of  vani- 
ty, is  not  to  be  disputed  :  but  the  disposition  itself 
is  so  important  that  it  cannot  be  dispensed  with. 
The  strong  attachment  to  whatever  is  our  own, 
because  it  is  our  own,  is  one  of  the  happiest 
propensities  of  human  nature.  It  is  the  recom- 
pence  of  all  our  desires,  pursuits,  and  exertions. 
Without  this  principle,  every  object  in  life  would 
appear  uninteresting  and  insipid  ;  and  the  majority 
of  our  habitual  affections  would  be  annihilated.  It 
is  this  which  forms  that  intimate  and  pleasing 
connection  with  every  thing  around  us ;  and  en- 
ables trifles  themselves  greatly  to  administer  to  our 
comfort  and  satisfaction. 

But  the  diversity  which  it  creates  in  our  indi- 
vidual affections  is  no  less  obvious.  Every  man 
has  a  distinct  atmosphere  of  good.  A  circle  which 
is  his  own.  Every  particle  composing  it,  is  viewed 
by  another  with  eyes  of  indifference  ;  but  by  him- 
self with  complacency  and  delight. 


INFLUENCE  OF  EDUCATION.  231 


^  8.     The  Influence  of  Education. 

By  education  is  understood  in  this  place,  any  at- 
tempt to  enlarge  the  ideas  and  improve  the  mind 
by  the  acquisition  of  general  knowledge,  or  pro- 
ficiency in  any  particular  branch.  Education  in- 
troduces to  an  intimate  acquaintance  with  number- 
less objects,  which  are  totally  unknown  to  the 
ignorant ;  and  every  object  possesses  some  quality 
of  a  pleasant  or  unpleasant  nature,  proportionably 
multiplying  or  diversifying  our  agreeable  or  disa- 
greeable sensations.  With  the  Ignorant,  objects 
are  comparatively  {ew.  Scenes  before  them  are 
of  no  great  extent ;  and  even  these  are  overlooked 
by  the  majority,  whose  years  pass  away  in  a  kind 
of  sensitive  indolence,  without  their  testifying  the 
marks  either  of  apathy  or  affection. 

Sometimes,  however,  a  natural  acuteness  of  un- 
derstanding is  observable  among  the  most  illiterate, 
accompanied  with  lively  sensations  and  very  strong 
affections  ;  and  when  they  are  once  roused,  by 
objects  which  appear  interesting,  their  passions  are 
most  violent.  What  they  knoio  can  alone  appear 
important  to  them,  and  the  very  little  the}'  possess 
is  their  all  Their  whole  souls  are  concentrated 
in  that  which  gives  pleasure,  and  all  the  powers  of 
body  and  mind  are  exerted  to  repel  whatever  gives 
pain.  This  will  indicate  the  cause  of  that  re- 
markable strength  of  passions  and  affections,  both 
of  the  benevolent  and  malevolent  kind,  so  observa- 


232  CAUSES,  &c. 

ble  in  savage  nations  ;  and  the  impetuosity  of  cha- 
racter so  often  manifested  by  the  active  and  unin- 
formed in  every  nation. 

The  cuhivated  mind,  by  increasing  its  acquaint- 
ance with  innumerable  subjects,  will  inevitably  dis- 
cover some  pleasing  quality  in  every  object  of  its 
pursuit ;  of  consequence,  both  attention  and  affec- 
tions are  divided  and  subdivided  into  innumerable 
ramifications  ;  and  thus,  although  enjoyment  may 
upon  the  whole  be  augmented,  by  aggregate  num- 
bers, yet  each  individual  quality  possesses  but  a 
moderate  share  of  influence. 

The  Young  and  Inexperienced  are  generally  af- 
fected by  simple  objects.  The  causes  of  their  joy 
or  anger,  sorrow  or  fear,  are  seldom  complex. 
When  the  powers  of  the  mind  become  more  enlarg- 
ed, the  affections  are  more  diversified  and  rendered 
more  complicated !  Thus  upon  the  perception  of 
favours  and  obligations,  the  joy  from  good  becomes 
united  with  gratitude  to  the  author  of  that  good ; 
with  love,  veneration,  respect,  for  his  character ; 
with  admiration  at  the  extent  of  the  good,  or  at 
some  peculiarity  in  the  delicacy  and  liberality  with 
which  it  was  conferred.  Experience  introduces 
the  passions  of  hope  and  fear,  by  teaching  us  the 
knowledge  of  Good  worth  possessing,  on  the  one 
hand,  and  the  accidents  to  which  it  is  liable  on  the 
other. 

It  is  observable  further,  that  the  Young  and  In- 
experienced, whose  habits  are  not  yet  formed,  and 
to  whom  every  thing  is  new,  are  most  apt  to  be  in- 


INFLUENCE  OF  EDUCATION.  233 

fluenced  by  the  introductory  emotions  of  surprise 
and  wonder.  Their  inexperience  renders  things 
and  events,  which  are  familiar  to  others,  new  and 
strange  to  them.  They  are  prone  to  be  in  ecstacies 
from  acquisitions  and  advantages,  comparatively 
trifling  ;  and  to  be  agitated  by  small  or  imaginary 
evils,  because  their  imaginations  have  not  been  cor- 
rected by  experience.  But,  if  these  passions  from 
more  simple  causes,  are  frequently  stronger  in  them 
than  in  others,  it  is  equally  true  that  their  affections 
are  less  permanent.  A  rapid  succession  of  novel- 
ties, and  the  immense  variety  which  increased 
knowledge  introduces,  quickly  efface  the  preced- 
ing impression. 

But  this  subject  is  inexhaustible.  A  whole  En- 
cyclopedia could  not  do  it  justice.  The  infinite 
diversity  of  pursuits,  which,  in  the  present  day,  en- 
gage the  attention  of  an  awakened  world,  exceeds 
enumeration.  Each  pursuit  is  accompanied  with 
its  peculiar  predilection,  and  presents  an  infinite 
variety  of  qualities  to  the  inquisitive  mind,  which 
excite  their  correspondent  emotions  and  affec- 
tions. 

Other  causes  which  influence  our  ideas  of  quali- 
ties have  a  very  powerful,  though  very  transient 
effect.  They  are  merely  the  ephemera  of  the 
mind ;  nor  have  they  that  immediate  relation  to 
the  supposed  merit  or  demerit  of  the  object,  which 
exerts  its   influence    in   all   the   preceding  cases. 

These  are  the  influence  of  Novelty  and  of  Fashion. 
30 


S34  CAUSES,  &c. 


§  9.   Influence  of  Novelty. 

As  by  the  power  of  habit  we  are  reconciled  to 
circumstances,  and  even  enjoy  complacency  in 
situations,  merely  because  we  are  accustomed  to 
them  ;  thus  will  the  Novelty  of  an  object  frequent- 
ly render  it  interesting  for  the  moment,  and  give  it 
a  temporary  pre-eminence  to  many  things  which 
we  know  to  possess  intrinsic  merit.  Novelty  is  in 
itself  the  most  transient  of  all  qualities ;  it  begins 
to  decay  from  the  first  moment  of  its  existence ; 
being  solely  adapted  to  that  instinctive  curiosity, 
which  may  be  considered  as  an  appetite  for  know- 
ledge. Novel  objects  will,  at  first,  excite  a  degree 
of  wonder  and  admiration,  from  their  being  sup- 
posed to  possess  something  strange,  rare,  or  pecu- 
liar :  but  as  these  are  relative  qualities  alone,  and 
as  this  relation  refers  solely  to  our  ignorance  and 
inexperience,  their  effects  are  evanescent ;  for  when 
the  subject  is  no  longer  novel  to  us,  it  does  not 
seem  any  longer  to  possess  them.  When  novelty 
is  no  more,  we  shall  either  reject  them  with  indif- 
ference or  displeasure,  or  they  may  continue  to  at- 
tract our  attention,  by  our  perception  of  other  and 
more  permanent  qualities. 

The  love  of  novelty  may,  in  some  minds,  be 
considered  as  a  disease  ;  as  a  false  appetite  which 
craves  more  than  it  can  digest,  and  seeks  a  variety 
of  viands,  from  whence  it  derives  but  very  little 


POWER  OF  FASHION.  235 

nourishment.  This  passion,  though  it  render  us 
perpetually  inquisitive,  perpetually  impels  us  to  see 
objects  through  a  false  medium.  At  first,  they  are 
rendered  peculiarly  attractive,  through  the  adven- 
titious colouring  which  the  imagination  has  given 
them.  They  appear  insipid  when  their  novelty  is 
gone,  or  become  depreciated  beyond  their  deserts, 
from  the  disappointment  of  our  expectations  con- 
cerning them.  Fondness  for  novelty,  when  carried 
to  an  excess,  renders  a  person  whimsical  in  his 
choice,  and  unsteady  in  his  pursuits.  Momentary 
pleasures  terminate  in  satiety  and  disappointment ; 
which  are  insuperable  impediments  to  that  delib- 
erate investigation  and  habitual  experience,  which 
alone  can  enable  us  to  judge  of  the  real  nature  and 
intrinsic  qualities,  of  the  objects  around  us. 

But  no  cause  whatever  is  so  whimsically  ver- 
satile and  tyrannical,  in  exciting  attachments  and 
aversions,  as  the 


§  10.  Power  of  Fashion. 

This  power  is  an  ideal  influenza,  spreading 
with  the  utmost  rapidity,  and  infecting  a  whole 
community  where  it  commenced ;  sometimes  ex- 
tending to  distant  nations,  and  acquiring  such 
strength,  in  its  progress,  that  nothing  can  resist 
its  force !  It  does  not  possess  the  degree  of 
merit  attendant  upon  the  excessive  love  of  novelty, 
which  always  imagines  the  object  to  possess  some 


236  CAUSES,  &c. 

degree  of  worth ;  a  circumstance  this,  by  no  means 
essential  to  the  influence  of  fashion ;  whose  au- 
thority is,  in  general,  derived  from  things  known 
to  be  idle  and  insignificant.     Fashion  gives  abso- 
lute sway  to  modes,  forms,  colours,  &c.  wantonly 
introduced  by  the  whim  of  an   Individual,   with 
whom  the  majority  have  not  the  most  distant  con- 
nection, and  concerning   whom  they  are  totally 
ignorant ;  unless  circumstances  and  situations  of 
notoriety    should    render   their   characters    either 
equivocal,  or  unequivocal.     It  is  capable  of  instan- 
taneously altering  our  opinion  of  the  nature  and 
qualities  of  things,  without  demanding  any  painful 
exertions  of  the   understanding,  or  requiring  the 
slow  process  of  investigation.     With  the  quickness 
of  a  magic  wand,  it  in  a  moment   subverts   all 
those   ideas  of  beauty,   elegance,   and  propriety, 
we  had  before  cherished.     It  makes  us  reject,  as 
odious,   what  we  had  lately  contemplated  as  most 
desirable ;  and  raptures  are  inspired  by  qualities, 
we  had  just  considered  as  pernicious  and  deform- 
ed.    Unwilling  to  renounce  our  title  to  rationality, 
unable  to  resist  the  power  of  fashion,  we  make 
every  attempt  to  reconcile  reason  with  absurdity. 
Thus,  in  numberless  instances,  do  we  attempt  to 
vindicate   to   ourselves   and  to  others,   the   novel 
affection.     We  are  assiduous  to  find  out  some  pe- 
culiar  excellence  or  advantage,  in  whatever   be- 
comes the  idol  of  the  day ;  and  to  discover  some 
insufferable    defect  in  the   divinity   we   have   dis- 
carded.    That    which  was  once  deemed    grand 


POWER  OF  FASHION.  237 

and  majestic,  in  size  or  form,  \viD  now  strike 
the  eye  as  insupportably  clumsy ;  and  the  regu- 
larity we  once  admired,  now  renders  an  object 
stiff,  precise,  and  formal.  Colours,  which  were 
3^esterday  so  delicately  elegant,  will  appear  to-day 
faint,  faded,  and  lifeless ;  and  those  which  were 
lately  much  too  strong  and  glaring  for  our  weak 
optics,  become  in  an  instant,  bright,  glowing  and 
majestic.  Fashion  will  render  that  particular  garb 
which  we  once  thought  so  warm  and  comfortable, 
hot  and  insupportable  as  the  sultry  dog-days ;  and 
it  makes  the  slightest  covering,  contrary  to  its 
pristine  nature,  remarkably  pleasant  in  the  depth 
of  winter.  The  flowing  hair,  or  adjusted  ringlets, 
shall  at  one  period  be  considered  as  becoming  and 
elegant ;  at  another,  be  rejected  as  an  insufferable 
mark  of  effeminacy,  and  reprobated  as  demanding 
a  culpable  waste  of  our  most  precious  time  ;  while 
their  close  amputation  is  deemed  both  manly  and 
commodious.  Fashion  has  power  to  influence  our 
ideas  of  graceful  proportions  ;  it  elongates  or  con- 
tracts the  form  of  the  leg  in  one  sex,  and  of  the 
waist  in  the  other.  It  directs  decency  to  excite  a 
blush,  at  being  detected  without  any  other  head- 
dress than  that  ordained  by  nature ;  and  it  is  also 
able  to  suppress  the  blush  of  female  delicacy,  at 
exposures  which  scarcely  leave  any  room  for  the 
exercise  of  the  most  licentious  imagination. 

Thus  does  fashion  powerfully,  expeditiously, 
and  absurdly  change  both  our  Opinions  and  our 
Affections,  according  to  the  dictates  of  the  most 
wanton  caprice ! 


238  CAUSES,  &c. 


§  11.     Love  of  Singularity, 

This  is  the  direct  opposite  of  the  former ;   and 
though  the  love  of  singularity  cannot,  in  its  own 
nature,  be  so  extensive  as  the  power  of  fashion, 
yet  it  is  very  operative,   where  it  does  exist.     It 
constitutes  the  motive  and  the  pleasure  of  those, 
who  are  bold  enough  to  deviate  from  the  accustom- 
ed modes  of  thinking  and  acting,  in  order  to  attract 
the  public  attention.     As  the  servile  imitators  of 
fashion  are  ashamed  of  being  singular,  these  on 
the  other  hand,  glory  in  singularity.     They  disdain 
to  be  placed  in  the  line  with   common  men,  and 
think  that  they  shall  be  respected  as  commanding 
officers^    by  starting   out  of  the  ranks.     This   dis- 
position always  indicates  itself  in  those  who  are 
the  first  introducers  of  fashions,  which  the  multi- 
tude so  eagerly  follow.     But  it  has  its  influence  in 
more  important  cases.     It  has  eventually  a  power- 
ful sway  over  the  public  at  large ;  who  seem  ready 
to  enlist  themselves   under   some   chief,   without 
being  choice  about  either  the  nature  of  the  service, 
or   of  the   recompense.      Speculative   philosophy, 
politics,  and  religion,  are  the  three  provinces  in 
which  the  influence  of  this  disposition  is  remark- 
ably conspicuous.     It  is  often  the  source  of  new 
theories,    which    sometimes   instruct,    sometimes 
astonish,  and  sometimes  infatuate  the  world.     It  is 
always  discontented  with  whatever  «5,  and  is  always 


LOVE  OF  SINGULARITY.  239 

stimulated  to  seek  something  different.  In  politics^ 
it  is  inimical  to  monarchy,  aristocracy,  or  demo- 
cracy, according  as  either  of  them  is  the  established 
form  of  government.  In  religion,  it  deviates  from 
the  popular  creed,  whatever  that  may  be.  The 
creed  being  popular,  is  deemed  a  sufficient  indica- 
tion of  its  being  erroneous.  This  disposition  has  a 
much  closer  affinity  with  very  superficial  thinking, 
than  with  free  inquiry  ;  for  it  generally  proposes 
crude  opinions  as  the  only  counterpoise  to  public 
opinions,  without  paying  any  respect  to  the  weight 
of  evidence,  on  either  side.  The  love  of  Singulari- 
ty has  too  often  a  pernicious  effect  in  disputing 
societies,  and  sometimes  in  seminaries  of  learning ; 
and  it  is  highly  prejudicial  to  that  investigation  of 
truth,  which  is  the  professed  object  of  these  insti- 
tutions. The  disputant  opposes  sentiments  gener- 
ally received,  from  the  love  of  disputation,  or  from 
the  desire  of  exercising  and  displaying  his  talents. 
He  directs  all  his  attention  to  the  arguments  which 
appear  to  be  the  most  novel,  specious,  and  embar- 
rassing. Thus  he  not  only  excites  doubts  in  the 
minds  of  others,  and  triumphs  in  his  success,  but 
being  habituated  to  search  arguments  of  opposition, 
without  attending  impartially  to  the  force  of  evi- 
dence, he  is  finally  caught  in  the  web  of  his  own 
sophistry.  He  finally  imagines  that  truth  is  on 
the  side  which  he  at  first  supported  from  vanity  ; 
and  he  rejects  as  errors,  sentiments  he  secretly 
revered,  when  he  wantonly  began  to  combat  them. 
Thus  does  he  experience  a  total  revolution  in  his 


240  CAUSES,  &c. 

manner  of  thinking  and  acting.  He  considers 
those  things  as  indifferent,  absurd,  and  pernicious, 
which  he  has  once  thought  of  the  highest  impor- 
tance ;  and  this  state  of  mind  is  necessarily  pro- 
ductive of  a  change  in  his  affections  and  disposi- 
tions towards  them. 


§  12.     Popular  Prejudices. 

As  whole  communities  sometimes  entertain  an 
uniformity  in  sentiment,  with  their  correspondent 
predilections  and  aversions  ;  thus  are  they  not  un- 
frequently  divided  and  subdivided  into  sects  and 
parties,  each  of  which  is  rigidly  tenacious  of  a 
particular  class  of  ideas,  contracts  very  strong  at- 
tachments to  the  espousers  of  the  same  cause,  and 
thinks  itself  fully  authorized  to  treat  those  of  oppo- 
site sentiments,  with  contempt  and  hatred.  Phi- 
losophy, religion,  and  politics  manifest  also,  in  a 
thousand  instances,  the  influence  of  this  principle. 
The  two  former  are  distinguished  into  a  diversity 
of  schools  and  sects,  which  cherish  the  flattering 
idea  that  they  are  the  sole  supporters  of  truth. 
Thus  it  is  that  a  zealous  attachment  to  particular 
sentiments,  is  seldom  the  result  of  an  impartial  ex- 
amination. It  is  often  the  consequence  of  an  early 
education,  and  often  it  proceeds  from  an  implicit 
confidence  in  the  virtues,  talents,  and  superior 
judgment  of  their  chief,  or  some  other  incidental 
circumstance,   which    has  cast   the    mind  in  the 


POPULAR  PREJUDICES.  241 

mould  of  particular  opinions,  and  made  an  impres- 
sion upon  it  too  deep  ever  to  be  obliterated. 

Nor  does  this  principle  cease  to  operate,  in 
countries  which  deem  themselves  the  most  remote 
from  servile  attachments,  or  unfounded  prejudices. 
The  rancorous  spirit  which  too  frequently  prevails 
in  every  contested  election,  will  avouch  the  truth 
of  our  assertion.  Candidates  for  some  particular 
office,  professedly  of  high  importance  to  the  inte- 
rests of  the  community,  at  once  start  forth  from 
obscurity.  They  are  immediately  idolized  by  one 
party,  as  the  mirrors  of  every  excellence,  and  stig- 
matized by  the  other,  as  totally  devoid  of  merit, 
and  unworthy  the  name  of  man.  Social  inter- 
course is  interrupted ; — intimate  friends  become 
implacable  enemies  ; — and  during  this  wretched 
ferment,  a  total  suspension  takes  place  of  all  the 
principles  of  honour  and  integrity ;  while  every 
sluice  of  scandal  and  defamation  is  thrown  open, 
without  reserve  and  without  remorse.  Partiality 
and  prejudice  act  and  re-act  like  the  waves  of  the 
troubled  sea,  until  they  are  worked  up  into  a  tre- 
mendous storm.  At  these  periods  such  phrensies 
have  been  known  to  disturb  the  brain,  that  the 
wanton  shouts  of  a  mob  have  been  productive  of 
outrage  and  murder,  and  the  colour  of  a  ribband 
has  excited  convulsions,  as  violent  as  those  produc- 
ed by  the  sight  of  water  in  the  canine  madness  ! 

To  this  principle  also  may  we  not  ascribe  a  phe- 
nomenon, which  appears  otherwise  inexplicable. 
Persons   who  in   their   individual   characters   are 

31 


242  CAUSES,  &c. 

highly  respectable,  both  for  sound  sense  and  integ- 
rity, will  frequently  in  their  'political  capacities, 
pursue  a  conduct  the  most  inconsistent  with  either  ; 
— uniformly  act  on  the  extravagant  idea,  that  the 
existent  Minister,  whoever  he  may  be,  is  uniformly 
right  in  his  principles,  perfectly  disinterested  in  all 
his  actions,  and  infallible  in  his  plans :  or,  on  the 
contrary,  will  regularly  and  incessantly  oppose 
him,  as  a  compound  of  depravity  and  ignorance ; 
whose  every  plan  is  big  with  mischief,  and  every 
exertion  of  power  the  application  of  the  strength 
of  a  Samson,  to  overthrow  the  pillars  of  the  con- 
stitution ! 


§  13.     Associated  Affections. 

The  influence  of  Association,  in  suggesting  of 
thoughts,  has  frequently  engaged  the  attention  of 
philosophers ;  and  the  power  of  trivial  incidents  to 
recall  former  ideas,  is  universally  confessed.  But 
their  power  is  perhaps  equally  extensive  over  the 
affections. 

As  one  passion  or  affection  pre-disposes  the 
mind  to  the  indulgence  of  that  which  most  nearly 
resembles  it,  thus  all  the  affections  which  have 
been  indulged  to  a  considerable  degree,  seem  to 
change  the  complexion  of  every  surrounding  ob-, 
ject.  Places  in  which  we  have  been  happy,  strike 
us,  as  if  they  had  been  both  witnesses  and  partici- 
pants of  our  bliss;  while  distress  invariably  diffu- 


ASSOCIATED  AFFECTIONS.  243 

ses  a  gloom  over  locality  itself,  and  over  every  cir- 
cumstance that  reminds  us  of  what  we  have  felt. 
Nor  can  we  call  to  our  recollection  any  place,  in 
which  we  have  enjoyed  peculiar  satisfaction,  with- 
out feeling  an  affection  for  that  spot ;  or  recollect 
scenes  of  unhappiness,  without  feeling  something 
like  resentment  against  the  theatre  of  our  suffer- 
ings. The  traveller,  who  has  been  happy  in  a 
foreign  country,  contracts  a  partiality  for  every 
thing  belonging  to  it :  if  he  has  been  ill  received 
and  ill  treated,  the  gayest  scenes  and  most  advan- 
tageous circumstances  belonging  to  that  country, 
will,  upon  recollection,  inspire  him  with  displacen- 
cy,  if  not  with  horror. 

This  principle  is  very  extensive  in  its  influence. 
Jt  is  this  which  renders  the  spot  where  the  lover 
enjoys  the  company  of  his  mistress,  a  paradise 
in  his  sight,  however  different  its  aspect  may  be  to 
another.  The  slightest  present,  as  a  token  of  Af- 
fection, inspires  exquisite  delight :  a  trinket,  or  a 
lock  of  hair,  are,  to  him,  of  more  worth  than  a 
kingdom.  It  is  this  principle  which  enstamps  an 
inestimable  value  upon  the  relicts  of  Saints  and 
Martyrs  ;  and  empowers  fragments  of  their  gar- 
ments, their  very  teeth  and  nails,  to  work  miracles, 
in  the  opinion  of  the  devotee.  In  its  more  moder- 
ate exertions,  it  inspires  a  strong  attachment  to 
every  thing  which  was  once  our  friend's.  It  is  this 
principle  of  association,  which  so  easily  implants  in 
the  religious  and  devout  mind,  a  veneration  for  the 
place  destined  to  the  offices  of  religion  ;  and  inscribes 
Holiness  upon  the  edifice  devoted  to  sacred  purposes. 


244  CAUSES,  &c. 

The  same  principle  renders  innumerable  circum- 
tances,  in  common  life,  of  considerable  importance; 
and  in  conjunction  with  habit,  enables  us  to  derive 
comfort  from  peculiarities  of  state  and  situation, 
which  do  not  possess  any  intrinsic  advantage. 
Every  thing  around  us  becomes,  as  it  were,  conge- 
nial to  our  natures  ;  and  the  pleasures  of  yesterday 
are  revived  in  the  objects  of  to-day. 

This  associating  principle  extends  its  influence  to 
the  article  of  dress,  and  inspires  a  degree  of  respec- 
tability, or  the  contrary,  according  to  the  shape  of 
a  coat,  or  the  cock  of  a  hat.  In  the  days  of  our 
ancestors  it  was  reduced  to  a  regular  system,  and 
occasioned  that  classification  in  dress,  which  dis- 
tinguished individuals  in  the  three  professions,  and 
in  our  courts  of  justice,  from  the  vulgar  herd.  In 
those  days  the  venerable  wig,  the  robe,  and  the 
band,  invariably  excited  the  ideas  of  superior  skill, 
gravity,  piety,  and  equity.  These  were  venerated 
as  emblems,  until  they  were  so  frequently  employ- 
as  substitutes,  that  the  charm  was  finally  dispel- 
led. 

But  although  this  kind  of  association  has  not,  in 
the  present  day,  so  extensive  an  effect  as  at  former 
periods,  yet  it  is  not  entirely  destroyed.  It  is  felt 
in  our  navies  and  armies,  where  the  raw  recruit  is 
despised,  and  often  very  roughly  treated  by  his 
more  veteran  associates,  until  they  have  lost  sight 
of  his  ignorance  and  inexperience,  in  the  uniformi- 
ty of  garb.  It  is  felt  by  every  actor,  who  cannot 
fully  enter  into  the  spirit  of  his  part,  until  he  has 


ASSOCIATED  AFFECTIONS.  245 

assumed  the  character,  in  his  external  appearance. 
It  is  invariably  felt  by  those  distinguished  for  their 
attachment  to  ornaments  ;  who  so  frequently  mis- 
take the  elegance  of  their  dress,  and  the  value  of 
their  jewels,  for  their  own  personal  accomplish- 
ments. It  is,  at  times,  felt  by  every  one  in  a  grea- 
ter or  less  degree  ;  for  his  mind  experiences  some- 
thing of  a  conformity  with  the  state  of  his  dress  ; 
and  the  remark  of  Sterne^  that  a  propensity  to 
meanness  is  increased  by  the  want  of  clean  linen, 
possesses  a  portion  of  philosophy  as  well  as  of  hu- 
mour. 

This  principle  of  association  exerts  an  illicit  in- 
fluence in  more  important  matters.  It  inspires  a 
disposition  to  substitute  one  thing  for  another,  be- 
cause of  some  points  of  similarity  ;  however  they 
may  differ  in  more  essential  articles.  Thus  it  fre- 
quently substitutes  the  means  for  the  end.  In  re- 
ligion, it  confounds  the  observance  of  rites  and 
ceremonies  with  the  spirit  of  true  devotion  ;  and  a 
punctual  attendance  upon  the  means  of  improve- 
ment, is  deemed  equivalent  to  progress  in  improv- 
ment.  In  morals,  it  sometimes  respects  a  vice  that 
is  contiguous  to  a  virtue  ;  and  it  degrades  a  virtue, 
that  is  contiguous  to  a  vice.  Thus  because  a  gen- 
erous man  is  liberal  in  his  donations,  the  Prodigal, 
who  squanders  in  thoughtless  profusion  his  own 
property  and  that  of  others,  boasts  of  his  liberality. 
Because  oeconomy  is  a  virtue,  avarice  assumes  the 
title.     The  rash  and  impetuous  give  the  character 


246  CAtPSflS,  &c. 

of  cowardice  to  caution;  and  the  coward  confounds 
genuine  courage  with  unpardonable  rashness. 

In  like  manner  are  degrees  of  atrocity  calculated, 
not  by  the  innate  baseness  of  an  act,  or  by  the 
quantity  of  misery  it  diffuses,  but  according  to  the 
nature  of  the  punishment  inflicted  by  human  laws ; 
or  to  the  quantity  of  reputation  that  is  in  danger 
by  the  commission.  Thus  some  have  imagined 
that  they  respect  virtue,  because  they  abhor  igno- 
miny. They  cautiously  select,  and  adhere  to  the 
vices  which  are  least  injurious  to  to  reputation  ; 
and  they  will  pay  peculiar  attention  to  mere  appel- 
lations^ and  modes  of  expression,  which  are  design- 
edly adopted  to  conceal  the  enormities  of  guilt. 
The  man,  who,  in  his  social  habits,  apparently 
scorns  to  be  unjust,  will  not  scruple  to  ruin  his  best 
friends  by  rash  and  adventurous  projects ;  and  he 
simply  call  the  issue,  an  unfortunate  speculation. 
The  ruin  of  female  honour,  to  the  destruction  of  the 
peace  and  happiness  of  respectable  relatives,  being 
termed  an  act  of  gallantry,  is  scarcely  deemed  in- 
consistent with  the  character  of  a  man  of  honour. 

These  few  specimens  shew  the  nature  and  ex- 
tent of  the  associating  principle.  They  indicate 
that  it  sometimes  operates  as  a  remembrancer, 
sometimes  as  an  emblem  or  representative,  and 
sometimes  as  a  substitute ; — that  it  may  be  the 
handmaid  of  innocent  and  virtuous  affections  ;  the 
source  of  bigotry  and  superstition,  and  an  apology 
for  the  deepest  depravity. 


THE  MANNEll,  &c.  847 

Wheii  our  ideas  of  the  qualities  of  objects,  and 
our  dispositions  towards  them,  are  not  under  the 
influence  of  these  adventitious  circumstances,  when 
they  are  the  most  correspondent  with  their  real 
natures,  yet  the  impressions,  they  make  upon  our 
feelings  are  extremely  different,  at  diiferent  sea- 
sons. Sometimes  we  perceive  that  they  exist,  but 
we  contemplate  them  without  either  emotion  or 
affection  ;  at  other  times  they  acquire  such  an  irre- 
sistible influence,  that  they  will  not  suffer  a  com- 
petitor. We  have  already  observed  that  the  Nov- 
elty of  an  object,  and  the  sudden  manner  in  which 
it  is  presented  to  our  notice,  have  a  very  powerful 
influence  over  our  affections ;  but  there  are  many 
other  adventitious  circumstances,  which  from  their 
striking  effects  upon  the  mind,  deserve  to  be 
enumerated.     For  example  : 


§  14     The  Manner  in  which  Information  is 
conveyed  to  us. 

It  is  natural  to  expect  that  a  full  conviction  of 
the  truth  of  interesting  particulars,  would,  at  all 
times,  be  attended  with  an  impression  proportion- 
ate to  their  importance.  But  this  is  not  the  case  : 
much  depends  upon  the  manner  in  which  such  in- 
teresting subjects  are  presented  to  the  mind.  The 
information  obtained  by  reading  a  plain  and  sim- 
ple statement  of  events,  for  example,  is  the  weak- 
est in   its   influence.     A   narrative    of  the   same 


248  CAUSES,  &c. 

events,  from  an  eye-witness,  whose  credit  may  not 
be  superior  to  that  of  the  historian,  brings  us,  as 
it  were,  nearer  to  the  object,  and  makes  a  much 
deeper  impression.  Both  of  these  are  feeble  com- 
pared with  the  influence  of  sight.  It  is  through 
the  organs  of  sight  alone,  that  the  most  vivid  and 
most  permanent  eifects  are  produced.  Every 
minute  circumstance  is  now  placed  before  us,  and 
each  exerts  its  own  impressive  influence  at  the 
same  instant.  The  information  thus  becomes 
complete  and  indubitable,  without  any  mixture  of 
obscurity  in  the  mode  of  representation,  or  remains 
of  incredulity  on  our  parts ; — which,  perhaps, 
weakens  the  evidence  of  what  is  considered  to  be 
authentic  history,  more  than  is  generally  suspected. 
We  are  our  own  evidence,  and  we  must  give 
credit  to  ourselves.  Hence  we  speak  of  ocular 
demonstration,  and  agree  that  seeing  is  believing. 

It  is  a  singular  fact,  that  in  reading  the  most 
terrible  events  with  which  the  pages  of  history  are 
filled,  we  not  only  hear  to  read,  but  take  delight  in 
the  perusal  of  those  incidents  which  would  be  too 
aflecting,  were  they  immediately  described  to  us 
by  an  eye-witness ;  and  which  would  excite  in- 
suflerable  anguish  were  we  ourselves  spectators  of 
the  scenes.  The  cool  narration  of  those  vices, 
follies,  intrigues,  cruelties,  oppressions,  of  which 
the  history  of  states  and  kingdoms  is  chiefly  com- 
posed, is  just  sufficient  to  awaken  within  us  a  de- 
gree of  horror,  indignation,  and  sympathy,  which 
is  not  inconsistent  with  the  pleasure  we  take  in  the 


THE  MANNER,  &c.  249 

gratification  of  curiosity.  We  feel  also  self-appro- 
bation, which  is  far  from  being  unpleasant,  in  the 
perception  that  we  are  always  interested  in  the 
cause  of  the  innocent,  the  weak,  and  the  oppres- 
sed ;  that  we  can  detest  vice,  and  rejoice  in  the 
triumphs  of  virtue. 

Nor  does  the  professed  Historian  descend  to 
those  minuti{B,  which,  in  scenes  of  this  kind,  have 
the  strongest  hold  upon  the  mind.  His  narrative 
consists  in  a  general  representation  of  facts.  He 
tells  us  of  thousands  and  tens  of  thousands  who 
were  destroyed,  or  led  into  captivity,  or  reduced  to 
extreme  distress  by  pestilence  and  famine,  without 
expatiating  upon  minuter  circumstances,  which  are 
absolutely  necessary  to  compose  an  interesting  pic- 
ture. Thus  are  we  much  more  affected  with  the 
parting  of  Hector  from  Andromache,  than  with  the 
conflagration  of  Troy  ;  and  we  sympathize  more 
deeply  with  the  fate  of  this  hero,  when  his  lifeless 
body  was  dragged  at  the  chariot-wheels  of  his 
proud  conqueror,  although  it  was  insensible  to 
pain,  than  with  all  the  real  distresses  of  the  Tro- 
jan war.  We  suffer  more  from  the  simple  story  of 
La  Feme,  than  from  the  reports  of  an  hospital ; 
and  the  countryman's  pathetic  lamentations  over 
his  dead  ass,  have  called  forth  tears  of  commisera- 
tion, which  much  more  extensive  distress  will  not 
always  produce. 

We  shall  now  advert  to  other  causes,  which 
have  also  a  powerful  influence  in  exciting  or  direct- 

32 


250  CAUSES,  &c. 

ing  our  affections ;  and  have  so«ie  relation  both 
with  the  sympathy  of  our  natures,  and  with  the 
association  of  ideas  and  affections  already  noticed  ; 
these  are 


§  15.     Imitative  Tones  and  Representations. 

We  are  so  constituted  as  to  be  strongly  affected 
by  the  representation  of  particular  states  and  situa- 
tions, notwithstanding  we  may  be  convinced  that 
they  are  imaginary  or  artificial.  Mere  tones,  at- 
titudes, gestures,  imitating  or  resembling  any  of 
those  produced  by  one  or  other  of  the  passions  and 
affections,  are  calculated  to  excite  correspondent 
feelings  and  emotions,  in  susceptible  minds.  Like 
musical  instruments  attuned  to  the  same  key,  'our 
feelings  are  ijiade  to  vibrate  with  the  vibrations  of 
surrounding  objects.  Even  the  Voice  and  Accents 
of  inferior  animals,  expressive  either  of  fear,  or 
pain,  or  lamentation,  or  joy,  or  affection,  have  a 
tendency  to  render  us  apprehensive,  cheerful,  me- 
lancholy, or  sympathizing.  Rude  and  harsh  sounds 
not  only  create  unpleasant  sensations,  but  sug- 
gest unpleasant  and  foreboding  ideas,  in  all  those 
who  have  not  corrected  their  sensations  by  their 
reason.  It  is  from  this  kind  of  association  pro- 
bably, that  the  croaking  of  the  raven,  and  the 
scream  of  a  night  owl,  are  so  universally  deemed 
ominous  of  mischief,  by  the  ignorant.  The  spright- 
ly music  of  the  feathered  songsters  inspires  an  ex- 
hilarating  vivacity.     The  solitary  and  melodious 


IMITATIVE  TONES,  &c.  251 

notes  of  the  nightingale,  the  cooing  of  the  turtle 
dove,  &c.  have  always  furnished  imagery  for 
Poets,  in  their  descriptions  of  the  tender  passion  of 
love,  or  sympathetic  sorrow.  The  bleating  of  the 
sheep,  and  lowing  of  the  kine,  &c.  although  they 
possess  no  real  melody  in  themselves,  yet  as  they 
denote  the  affection  of  the  dam  for  its  offspring, 
they  universally  inspire  a  pleasing  sympathetic  ten- 
derness. 

The  principal  charms  of  the  Music,  which  aims 
at  a  higher  character  than  that  of  difficult  or  rapid 
execution,  consist  in  the  imitation  of  those  tones  and 
movements  which  are  most  intimately  connected 
with  the  passions  and  affections  of  the  soul ;  which 
exhilarate  the  spirits,  and  excite  to  the  sprightly  or 
graceful  dance ;  arouse  and  animate  to  martial 
deeds  ;  induce  a  bewitching  melancholy  ;  or  diffuse 
a  pleasing  serenity  over  the  mind  ; — which  charm 
by  displaying  something  like  the  power  of  persua- 
sive eloquence  without  words, — by  holding  a  kind 
of  conversation  without  ideas, — and  by  exciting 
whatever  disposition  the  artist  pleases,  without  sug- 
gesting a  motive. 

It  has  been  occasionally  remarked,  in  our  Analy- 
sis, that  the  powerful  influence  of  any  exciting 
cause,  manifests  itself  by  Emotions  correspondent 
to  the  nature  of  the  passions ;  to  seize  these  exter- 
nal appearances,  or  to  imitate  the  expressive  looks, 
attitudes,  and  gestures  peculiar  to  each,  is  the  pro- 
fessed object  of  the  statuary  and  historic  painter  ; 


252      ■  CAUSES,  &c. 

and  to  do  justice  to  these  characteristic  emotions, 
constitutes  the  difficulty  and  excellence  of  their  art. 
It  is  the  professed  design  of  the  Artist  to  excite 
some  emotion,  or  call  forth  some  particular  affec- 
tion, correspondent  to  the  nature  of  his  object. 
Although  the  power  of  the  sculptor  is  confined  to 
forms  and  attitudes  principally,  yet  how  interesting 
may  these  be  rendered  to  the  spectator !  Who  can 
contemplate  the  Apollo  Belvedere^  the  Venus  de 
Medicis,  without  admiring  the  human  shape  in  its 
characteristic  beauties  ?  or  the  dancing  Fawns, 
without  partaking  of  their  vivacity  ?  Or  the  Far- 
nese  Hercules,  without  a  degree  of  awe  ?  or  the 
Laocoon  and  his  sons,  without  a  mixture  of  com- 
passion and  horror  ?  Or  any  of  these,  without 
being  astonished  at  the  skill,  ingenuity,  or  sublimi- 
ty of  the  artist  ?  The  enthusiastic  encomiums  be- 
stowed upon  the  paintings  of  celebrated  masters; 
the  eagerness  with  which  their  labours  are  purchas- 
ed ;  the  wealth  and  renown  which  the  most  dis- 
tinguished of  them  enjoy  ;  and  the  respect  paid  to 
their  memories,  demonstrate  the  amazing  effect  of 
their  performances  upon  the  mind  ; — the  strength 
of  our  sympathy  with  every  representation  of  pas- 
sion ; — and  the  surprise  we  experience,  that  these 
powerful  effects  are  produced  by  the  mere  distri- 
bution of  colours,  or  of  lights  and  shades  upon 
board  or  canvas  I 


RHETORIC,  ORATORY,  &c.  25J 


§  16.  Rhetoric^  Oratory,  Eloquence. 

If  mere  tones  and  representations  so  warmly  in- 
terest the  affections,  though  they  are  not  able  to 
convey  information,  or  suggest  any  ideas  to  the 
mind,  perfectly  novel  ;  much  deeper  impressions 
are  to  be  expected  from  means,  whose  professed 
object  it  is,  to  increase  our  knowledge  of  particular 
subjects,  to  extend  our  views,  enlarge  our  concep- 
tions, to  employ  all  the  force  of  language,  and  all 
the  power  of  sympathy,  in  order  to  give  them 
weight  and  energy ;  which  is  the  province  of  Rhe- 
toric and  Oratory. 

Rhetoric  is  generally  considered  as  the  art  of 
persuasion.  It  attempts  to  inspire  conviction  con- 
cerning some  particular  object,  that  it  may  influ- 
ence the  will  to  determine  in  a  manner  correspon- 
dent. It  seeks  either  to  arouse  the  mind  to  action, 
or  to  dissuade  it  from  acting  upon  the  resolutions 
already  taken,  or  which  are  in  contemplation.  Its 
immediate  employment  is  not  to  search  after  truth, 
but  to  render  acknowledged  or  supposed  truths  in- 
fluential. It  leaves  to  Logic  the  province  of  cool 
investigation,  and  of  drawing  legitimate  conclusions 
from  admitted  premises,  without  any  regard  to 
motives.  The  Rhetorician  is  solicitous  to  effect 
some  particular  purpose,  and  calls  in  the  aid  of  rea- 
son merely  as  an  auxiliary.  He  attempts  to  influ- 
ence the  Will  by  reasoning   with  the  affections ; 


254  CAUSES,  &c. 

knowing  that  if  they  be  gained  over  to  the  party 
espoused,  the  will  is  ready  to  follow.  He  there- 
fore artfully  conceals,  or  slightly  passes  over  every 
circumstance  which  is  not  favourable  to  his  views, 
and  he  brings  forward,  and  largely  expatiates  upon 
those  which  are.  He  suggests  motives  of  pleasure, 
utility,  safety,  honour,  pity.  Sic.  as  the  subject  ad- 
mits. He  not  only  pre-supposes  the  object  in  view 
to  be  of  the  first  importance,  but  he  employs  every 
method  to  implant  this  conviction,  in  the  minds  of 
those  whom  he  endeavours  to  persuade,    v 

These  attempts  become  most  successful,  by  a 
close  imitation  of  that  train  of  ideas,  and  those 
modes  of  expression,  which  any  particular  passion 
or  affection  is  prone  to  suggest.  If  the  design  be 
to  excite  anger  and  resentment,  rhetoric  imitates 
the  language  of  anger.  It  places  the  supposed  of- 
fence in  the  strongest  point  of  view,  and  describes 
it  in  the  most  vivid  colours.  It  assiduously  collects 
and  expatiates  upon  every  circumstance,  which 
contributes  to  the  aggravation  of  the  crime.  It  is 
indignant  against  that  spiritless  tranquillity  which 
can  patiently  endure  such  insults,  and  attributes 
reluctance  to  revenge,  to  some  mean  and  cowardly 
motive.  If  its  object  be  to  excite  terror,  it  assem- 
bles together  every  circumstance  which  has  a  ten- 
dency to  alarm  with  a  sense  of  Danger.  It  stig- 
matizes courage  with  the  epithet  of  rashness,  and 
flight  is  dignified  with  the  title  of  prudence,  &c. 
\{  compassion  be  the  oVyect,  it  expatiates  upon  the 
wretched  state  of  the  sufferer  ;  his  fears,  his  appre- 


RHETORIC,  ORATORY,  &c.  255 

hensions,  his  penitence.  It  palliates  his  faults, 
extols  his  good  qualities  ;  and  thus  collects  in  one 
point  of  view  all  his  claims  to  commiseration. 

The  species  of  argument,  which  persons  under 
the  influence  of  passions  and  strong  affections  per- 
petually adopt,  is  rendered  more  efficacious  bj  ap- 
propriate language.  The  rhetorician  therefore 
studies  and  imitates  the  particular  language  of  each 
passion,  either  in  its  energy,  vivacity,  or  diffuse- 
ness.  Hence  he  liberally  employs  all  those  tropes 
and  figures  of  speech,  which  nature  suggests,  and 
art  has  classified. 

Oratory  adds  to  rhetorical  compositions  the  ad- 
vantages of  elocution.  It  adapts  the  manner  of  de- 
livery to  the  nature  of  the  subject,  and  the  appro- 
priate language.  It  takes  the  characteristic  signs 
of  each  emotion  for  its  model,  as  far  as  it  dares  to 
imitate  without  the  imputation  of  mimickry.  It 
enters  into  the  attitudes,  gestures,  tones  of  voice, 
accents,  emphasis,  expressions  of  countenance,  in- 
spired by  the  particular  emotion,  in  such  a  manner, 
that  not  an  idea  is  suffered  to  lose  its  proper  effect, 
by  any  deficiency,  in  kind  or  degree  of  energy 
communicated  to  it ;  and  thus  it  enjoys  every  ad- 
vantage to  be  derived  from  the  power  of  sympathy. 

Eloquence,  according  to  the  modern  ideas  of  it, 
appears  to  be  the  medium  between  the  impetuosity 
which  oratory  admits,  and  which  was  highly  cha- 
racteristic of  ancient  oratory,  and  the  studied  arti- 
fice of  the  professed  rhetorician.  The  term  is 
sometimes  applied  to  composition^  sometimes  to  de- 


256  CAUSES,  &c. 

livery.  When  applied  to  both,  it  comprehends  a  cer- 
tain degree  of  elegance,  both  of  diction  and  of  man- 
ner. The  want  of  that  energy  which  approaches  to 
violence,  is  compensated  by  pertinency  of  language, 
fluency  of  utterance,  and  guarded  chastity  of  address. 
Its  excellency  consists  in  a  pleasing  adaptation  of 
language  to  the  subject,  and  of  manner  to  both.  It 
refuses  too  close  an  imitation  of  the  turbid  emo- 
tions, but  it  delights  in  animated  description.  It 
seems  rather  partial  to  the  pathetic :  the  elegance 
and  graces  which  it  loves,  harmonizing  most  easily 
and  successfully,  wdth  the  softest  and  finest  feelings 
of  our  nature. 

The  power  of  oratorial  Eloquence  is  almost  irre- 
sistible. It  penetrates  into  the  inmost  recesses  of 
the  soul.  It  is  able  to  excite  or  to  calm,  the  pas- 
sions of  men  at  will ;  to  drive  the  multitude  for- 
wards to  acts  of  madness,  or  to  say  to  the  contend- 
ing passions,  "  Peace,  be  still."  It  changes  the 
whole  current  of  our  ideas,  concerning  the  nature 
and  importance  of  objects,  and  of  our  obligations 
and  advantages  respecting  them.  It  rouses  from 
pernicious  indolence  ;  and  it  renders  the  sentiments 
and  dispositions  already  formed,  most  influential. 
In  a  word,  it  has  made  of  the  human  species  both 
angels  and  monsters.  It  has  animated  to  the  most 
noble  and  generous  exertions,  and  it  has  impelled 
to  deeds  of  horror ! 


THE  DRAMA.  2B7 


§  1 7.     The  Drama. 

The  successful  dramatic  Writer  catches  the 
ideas,  and  imitates  the  language  of  every  passion, 
emotion,  and  affection,  in  their  different  stages 
and  degrees.  His  professed  object  is  to  suppose 
a  diversity  of  characters,  and  to  support  them 
with  a  correspondent  train  of  ideas ;  to  inspire 
them  with  predilections  and  aversions ;  or  call  forth 
particular  passions  and  affections,  according  to  the 
situations  in  which  he  has  placed  them.  His 
hopes  of  success  depend  on  the  closeness  of  the 
imitation ;  and  success  itself  consists  in  being  able 
to  interest  the  heart,  by  exciting  affections  and 
emotions  similar  to  those  which  would  be  felt  by 
the  reader  or  spectator,  were  he  an  immediate 
witness  to  similar  scenes,  in  real  life. 

The  complete  Actor  possesses  the  happy  talent 
of  expressing,  by  manner,  the  state  of  mind  repre- 
sented by  his  author.  He  adopts  what  modern 
orators  reject.  He  attempts  to  give  force  to  per- 
tinent ideas  and  language,  by  imitative  tones,  ges- 
tures, and  countenance.  These  he  varies,  accord- 
ing to  the  versatile  state  of  those  who  are  tossed 
upon  the  billows  of  passion,  agitated  by  some 
contending  emotions,  or  under  the  more  permanent 
influence  of  particular  affections.. 

In  theatrical  exhibitions  there  is  a  conspiracy 
to  delude  the  imagination  ;   and  all  the   powers 

33 


258  CAUSES,  &c. 

of  sympathy  are  called  forth  to  produce  the  effect. 
By  appropriate  dresses,  the  persons  of  the  actors 
are  lost  in  the  characters  they  assume ;  and  cor- 
respondent scenery  points  out  the  very  spot  of 
action.  The  spectator  leaves  every  idea  of  real 
life  at  the  door  of  entrance,  and  voluntarily  yields 
himself  up  to  the  pleasing  delusion.  He  finds 
himself  in  a  new  world.  He  is  transported,  in 
an  instant,  into  distant  regions  and  remote  ages, 
and  feels  in  fiction  all  the  force  of  truth.  He 
laughs  at  mimic  folly,  sincerely  weeps  at  arti- 
ficial misery,  is  inspired  with  horror  and  indigna- 
tion at  imaginary  baseness,  and  is  in  an  ecstacy 
of  joy  at  counterfeit  happiness ! 


§  18.     Pre-disposing  Causes. 

All  the  above  causes,  which  operate  so  power- 
fully upon  the  mind,  and  impress  it  with  such 
a  diversity  or  contrariety  of  sensations,  have  still 
a  degree  of  uniformity  in  their  mode  of  action. 
We  may  still  suppose  that  the  same  individual, 
placed  under  their  immediate  influence,  would 
always  entertain  similar  ideas,  and  receive  similar 
impressions.  But  this  is  not  always  the  case. 
Certain  circumstances  create  such  a  pre-disposition 
within  us,  that  we  shall,  at  different  seasons,  be 
very  differently  affected  by  the  same  object,  both 
respecting  the  kind  of  passion  or  affection  excited, 
and  the  degree  of  power  it  may  exercise  over  us : 


PRE-DISPOSING  CAUSES.  259 

and  they  constitute  that  state  of  mind,  which  we 
frequently  describe  by  being  in  the  humour,  or  not 
in  the  humour.  The  circumstances  to  which  we 
now  refer,  exert  their  primary  effect  upon  the  cor- 
poreal or  nervous  system,  render  that  more  sus- 
ceptible of  impressions,  at  one  time  than  another ; 
dispose  it  to  be  very  differently  affected  by  the 
same  objects ;  and  through  its  channel,  to  affect 
the  state  of  our  minds  concerning  them. 

These  observations  relate  to  the  power  of  what 
the  medical  world  has  termed  the  non-naturals, 
which  exert  as  great  an  influence  over  the  dis- 
positions of  the  mind,  as  they  are  productive  of 
salutary  or  morbid  pre-dispositions  respecting  the 
body.  All  those  circumstances,  for  example, 
which  are  calculated  to  invigorate  the  frame,  and 
rouse  it  from  a  state  of  indolence  and  inactivity, 
necessarily  communicate  a  correspondent  vigour 
to  the  Mind,  by  which  it  becomes  more  adapted 
to  receive  inpressions  of  a  certain  class,  and  to 
be  more  powerfully  influenced  by  particular  cir- 
cumstances and  qualities  in  objects,  than  at  the 
preceding  period.  Such  are  the  manifest  effects 
of  refreshing  sleep  to  fatigued  and  exhausted  na- 
tures,— of  invigorating  viands, — of  cheerful  wea- 
ther, &c.  Whatever  produces  an  uneasy  sensation 
in  the  corporeal  system,  is  apt  to  render  the  Mind 
peevish  and  fretful,  and  dispose  it  to  be  more 
powerfully  affected  than  usual,  by  incidents  of 
a  disagreeable  nature ;  such  as  losses,  disappoint- 
ments, the  improper   conduct  of  others,   &c.     It 


260  CAUSES,  &c. 

has  been  frequently  noticed  by  practitioners, 
that  patients  are  much  more  fretful  and  impatient 
m  a  state  of  convalescence,  than  they  were 
during  the  severer  periods  of  their  disease. 
Their  returning  powders  of  sensation,  make  them 
feel  the  state  of  the  disordered  frame,  more  mi- 
nutely than  during  the  oppressive  state  of  the 
disease  ;  and  their  comfortless  sensation  com- 
municates an  unusual  fretfulness  to  the  temper. 
Again,  those  things  which  heat  and  irritate  to  a 
considerable  degree,  foster  all  turbulent  and 
irritable  passions  ;  while  those  which  diffuse  a 
pleasing  sensation  over  the  system,  dispose  to 
benevolence  and  good-will.  It  is  a  maxim  with 
some,  in  modern  days,  never  to  ask  a  favour  of 
an  epicure,  till  after  his  meals ;  and  the  Ancients 
were  not  unacquainted  with  the  mollia  tempora 
fandi.  AVhatever  chills  and  debilitates,  disposes 
to  timidity ;  and  local  situations  which  are  retired 
and  gloomy,  are  most  conducive  to  melancholy 
impressions.  Indeed,  so  dependent  is  the  state 
of  the  Mind  upon  that  of  the  body,  that  nothing 
can  produce  a  considerable  change  in  the  latter, 
without  exciting  pre-dispositions,  somewhat  an- 
alogous, in  the  former.  The  food  which  recruits 
the  exhausted  powers  of  animal  nature,  exhilarates 
and  invigorates  the  Mind :  the  excess  which 
burdens  the  body,  benumbs  the  powers  of  the 
soul.  The  painful  and  comfortless  sensations 
produced  by  flatulencies  and  indigestions,  in  hypo- 
condriac  temperaments,  have  sometimes  produced, 


PRE-DISPOSING  CAUSES.  261 

and  sometimes  been  mistaken  for  an  anxious  state 
of  Mind  ;  and  the  medicines  which  relieve  the 
one  will  administer  comfort  to  the  other.  The 
sensations  of  hunger,  cold,  fatigue,  &c.  being 
disagreeable  in  themselves,  induce  a  painful  rest- 
lessness in  the  disposition,  and  great  petulance  of 
temper.  The  state  of  the  atmosphere,  peculiari- 
ties of  climate,  seasons  of  the  year,  have  their 
mental  influence.  They  dispose  to  a  cheerful 
vivacity  or  gloominess  of  disposition ;  induce  a 
languor,  or  invigorate  the  mental  powers.  The 
influence  of  Narcotics  upon  the  mind  is  universally 
noticed.  The  exhilarating  effects  of  opiates,  the 
extravagant  wildness,  the  pleasing  delirium  with 
which  they  affect  the  brain,  the  Elysian  pleasures 
they  sometimes  communicate  to  the  imagination, 
and  the  consequent  torpor  and  debility  diffused 
over  the  whole  system,  have  been  frequently 
noticed.  Under  their  stimulating  influence,  man 
has  shewn  himself  equal  to  undertakings  which 
it  was  apparent  madness  to  attempt ;  and  the  sub- 
sequent depression  has  marked  him  for  a  coward. 
The  effects  of  spirituous  and  fermented  liquors  are 
no  less  obvious,  as  every  one  has  too  frequent  oc- 
casions to  remark.  These  effects  are  observed  to 
vary  according  to  the  quality  of  the  liquor,  the 
previous  state  of  the  subject's  mind,  or  the  tem- 
perament of  his  body.  Some  kinds  of  potations 
have  a  tendency  to  induce  a  pleasing  stupefaction  ; 
so  that  if  they  do  not  in*^pire  new  ideas,  they  seem 
to  render  the  Sot  perfectly  contented  with  the  few 


262  CAUSES,  &c. 

he  possesses.  These  are  the  frequent  effects  of 
malt  liquors,  and  the  ingredients  mixed  with  them. 
While  other  liquors,  as  the  sparkling  Champaign, 
exhilarate  the  spirits  to  an  unusual  degree,  and 
promote  a  flow  of  lively  and  witty  ideas.  Tempers 
naturally  warm  and  impetuous  are,  generally,  very 
litigious  and  quarrelsome  in  their  cups.  Others 
are  rendered  quarrelsome  in  a  state  of  intoxication, 
contrary  to  their  usual  dispositions,  through  the  dis- 
agreeable irritation  diffused  over  the  system,  by  the 
unusual  stimulus.  Some  persons,  on  the  other 
hand,  who  are  surrounded  with  distracting  cares, 
or  oppressed  with  extreme  poverty,  having,  for 
the  instant,  drowned  thought  and  reflection  in  the 
bewitching  draught,  which  operates  like  the  waters 
of  Lethe^  obtain  a  temporary  release  from  their 
mental  sufferings,  and  enjoy  an  extraordinary 
and  frantic  flow  of  spirits,  in  the  oblivion  of  their 
misery. 

Instances  similar  to  the  above  are  infinitely  nu- 
merous ;  but  these  are  sufficient  to  illustrate  the 
fact,  that  many  circumstances,  by  primarily  affect- 
ing the  body,  produce  a  correspondent  change 
upon  the  Mind ;  strengthen  many  of  its  affections, 
and  pre-dispose  to  passions  and  emotions,  by 
which  it  would  not  otherwise  have  been  affected. 
It  may  be  remarked,  in  general,  that  the  sensibility 
of  the  system,  or  susceptibility  of  impression,  when 
greatly  increased  by  intoxication  or  any  other 
cause,  will  render  the  same  individual,  amorous, 
or  generous,   or   courageous,    or  passionate   and 


PRE-DISPOSING  CAUSES.  263 

quarrelsome,  according  as  occasions  and  incidents, 
favourable  to  one  or  other  of  these  affections  and 
emotions,  may  present  themselves. 

Thus  have  we  enumerated  the  principal  causes, 
exerting  a  povrerful  influence  over  the  affections  ; 
which  occasion  that  great  diversity  observable  in 
the  human  species,  endowed  with  similar  capaci- 
ties, and  apparently  placed  in  similar  situations : 
causes,  by  the  influence  of  which,  one  class  of 
rational  beings  differs  so  essentially  from  another 
equally  rational ;  Individuals  from  Individuals 
in  each  class,  and  Individuals  so  frequently  from 
themselves. 

Our  remarks  have  been  extended  far  beyond 
the  limits  proposed :  but  we  have  been  imper- 
ceptibly carried  forwards  both  by  the  singularity 
and  importance  of  the  subject ;  which  would 
require  volumes  to  do  it  justice,  and  which  vol- 
umes could  scarcely  exhaust. 


264  MEDICAL  INFLUENCE 


CHAPTER  III. 


PARTICULAR   EFFECTS    RESULTING    FROM    THE    OPERATION    OF 
THE    PASSIONS    AND    AFFECTIONS,   CONSIDERED. 

In  every  part  of  our  Analytical  Inquiries,  the 
powerful  influence  of  the  passions  and  stronger  af- 
fections, upon  the  whole  system,  has  been  mani- 
fested. The  sudden  changes  made  in  the  state  of 
the  mind,  respecting  particular  objects,  and  the 
effects  as  instantaneously  communicated  to  the  cor- 
poreal frame,  according  to  the  nature  and  force  of 
the  impression,  have  been  repeatedly  considered. 
We  have  also  remarked,  that  as  the  exciting  causes 
are  of  very  different  and  opposite  natures,  they  pos- 
sess various  degrees  of  merit  and  demerit ;  and  that 
some  of  them  being  of  a  pleasant,  others  of  an  un- 
pleasant influence,  they  excite  correspondent  sen- 
sations within  us,  as  long  as  we  remain  under  this 
immediate  influence.  Such  peculiarities  are  pro- 
ductive of  certain  effects  and  characteristic  states, 
different  from  the  primary  object  of  the  passion, 
although  they  are  so  intimately  connected  with  it. 
/  These  effects  may  be  placed  under  the  following 
heads  :  The  physical,  or  medical  influence  of  the 
passions  ;  their  metaphysical,  or  influence  upon  the 
train  of  our  ideas,  correspondent  language,  &c. ; 
their  moral,  or  influence  upon  character  and  happi- 
ness.    These  remain  to  be  briefly  considered. 


OF  THE  PASSIONS.  265 

SECTION  I. 

MEDICAL    INFLUENCE    OF    THE    PASSIONS. 

If  we  advert  to  the  strong  impression  made  by 
every  violent  emotion  upon  the  corporeal  system, 
we  shall  not  be  surprised  that  the  sudden  and 
powerful  changes  produced  should,  under  certain 
circumstances,  exert  a  medical  influence,  in  com- 
mon with  many  other  causes  which  act  powerfully 
upon  the  body.  Accordingly,  have  the  Passions 
and  Affections  of  the  Mind,  uniformly  had  a  place 
given  them  among  the  non-naturals^  as  they  are 
termed,  or  those  incidental  causes,  which  may  oc- 
casionally induce  either  a  salutary  or  morbid  effect 
upon  the  body  ;  such  as  air,  exercise,  rest,  watch- 
ings,  medicaments,  food,  heat,  cold,  &c. 

To  enter  minutely  into  this  subject,  to  enume- 
rate the  various  facts,  upon  which  our  observations 
and  assertions  are  founded,  to  advance  and  defend 
any  particular  theory,  would  be  totally  foreign 
from  the  nature  and  design  of  this  treatise,  and  be- 
come tedious  to  the  class  of  Readers,  for  whom  it 
is  principally  designed.  Yet  some  observations 
upon  the  influence  of  the  passions  in  the  medical 
department,  necessarily  belong  to  a  general  history 
of  the  passions. 

It  is  not  agreed  in  what  manner  salutary  or  per- 
nicious effects  are  produced,  by  the  instrumentality 
of  the  passions.     Without  adopting  any  particular 

34 


266  MEDICAL  INFLUENCE 

hypothesis,  it  will  be  sufficient  for  our  purpose  to 
remark,  that  the  Physicians  of  the  present  day 
generally  ascribe  the  primary  changes  to  their  in- 
fluence upon  the  nervous  power,  or  grand  princi- 
ple of  vitality  ;  by  which  animated  bodies  are  ren- 
dered susceptible  of  an  infinite  variety  of  impres- 
sions. In  consequence  of  this  influence,  either  the 
system  in  general,  or  some  particular  organ,  is 
made  to  deviate  from  the  exercise  of  those  func- 
tions on  which  health  depends  ;  or  is  restored  to  its 
pristine  office,  after  such  deviations  have  taken 
place. 

Not  to  inquire  deeply  into  the  laws  of  physiolo- 
gy  and  pathology,   I  shall   only   add,   that  such 
bodies,  or  such  circumstances,  as  are  able  to  effect 
any   important  changes,  produce  these  effects, — 
either  by  temperating  every  inordinate  and  irregu- 
lar action, — by  infusing  a  salutary  vigour,  in  oppo- 
sition to  languor  and  inactivity, — by  exciting  to 
some  excess,  through  the  power  of  their  stimulus, 
— ^by  inducing  a  temporary  torpor, — or  by  perma- 
nently debilitating  the  frame.     These  are  proper- 
ties which  perfectly  correspond  with  effects  pro- 
educed  by  the  different  Passions  and  Affections  of 
the  mind  :  some  of  which  manifestly  elevate  and 
invigorate  the  system, — others  greatly  depress, — 
some  of  them  violently  irritate, — others  induce  a 
torpid  languor, — and  others  an  incurable  atonia. 
A  few  instances  will  illustrate  these  remarks. 

But  as  deviation  and  restoration  refer  to  some 
standard,  we  must  first  suggest  that  the  lively,  yet 


OF  THE  PASSIONS.  267 

temperate   action  of  the   vital  influence,  through 
every  part  of  the  system,  constitutes  the  perfection 
of  health.     The  Mind,  undisturbed  by  any  violent 
emotions,  agitations,  or  depressions  of  a  corporeal 
nature,  is  able  to  exercise  its  noblest  powers  with 
a  tranquil  vigour.     The  Body  continues  in   the 
regular  discharge  of  its  proper  functions,  without 
the  least  sensation  of  difficulty  and  embarrassment. 
Respiration  is  free  and  easy,  neither  requiring  con- 
scious exertion,  nor  even  a  thought.     The  action 
of  the  heart  and  arteries,  with  the  consequent  cir- 
culation of  the  blood,  are  regular  and  placid,  neith- 
er too  rapid  nor  too  indolent,  neither  laboured   nor 
oppressed.     Perspiration  is  neither  checked  nor  ex- 
cessive.    Aliments  are  sought  with  appetite,  enjoy- 
ed with  a  relish,  and  digested  with  facility.     Every 
secretion  and  excretion  is  duly  performed.     The 
body  is  perfectly  free  from  pain,  oppression,   hebe- 
tude, and  every  species  of  uneasiness ;   and  a  cer- 
tain vivacity  and  vigour,  not  to  be  described,  reign 
through  the  system. 


Hope. 

The  effects  of  that  cordial,  Hope^  are  peculiarly 
favourable  to  this  envied  state.  In  its  more  tem- 
perate exercise,  it  communicates  a  mild,  but  delec- 
table sensation  to  the  heart.  It  elevates  and  in- 
vigorates both  mind  and  body.  Its  grateful  stimu- 
lus produces  a  pleasing  and  salutary  flow  of  the 


268  MEDICAL  INFLUENCE 

animal  spirits,  and  diffuses  a  temperate  vivacity 
over  the  system,  directing  a  due  degree  of  energy 
to  every  part.  In  short,  it  is  the  only  passion  or 
affection,  which  unites  moderation  with  vigour, 
checks  every  violent  impetus,  and  removes  every 
species  of  morbid  languor. 

By  comparing  the  effects  peculiar  to  the  passion 
of  Hope,  with  the  above  description  of  perfect 
health,  the  closest  analogy  will  immediately  become 
obvious.  Its  characteristic  is  to  produce  a  salutary 
medium,  between  every  excess  and  defect  of  opera- 
tion, in  every  function.  Consequently,  it  has  a 
tendency  to  calm  the  troubled  action  of  the  vessels, 
to  check  and  sooth  the  violent  and  irregular  im- 
petus of  the  nervous  system,  and  to  administer  a 
beneficial  stimulus  to  the  oppressed  and  debilitated 
powers  of  nature.  Hence  it  has  been  the  constant 
practice  of  Physicians,  to  support  the  hopes  of  their 
patients  in  the  most  alarming  diseases,  of  almost 
every  description.  But  it  is  peculiarly  beneficial 
in  those  disorders  which  proceed  from  fear,  sorrow, 
and  every  species  of  anxiety,  or  which  occasion  a 
great  prostration  of  strength,  and  dejection  of  spirits. 
In  intermittent  and  pestilential  fevers,  and  in  vari- 
ous chronic  complaints,  the  most  efficacious  reme- 
dies have  proved  inert,  if  administered  to  persons 
destitute  of  Hope ;  while  an  unmeaning  farrago, 
which  could  scarcely  be  deemed  innocent,  taken 
with  a  confidence  of  success,  have  exceeded,  in 
their  efficacy,  the  utmost  efforts  of  the  most  skilful 
practitioner. 


OF  THE  PASSIONS.  269 

Hope  therefore  demands  a  place  among  the  me- 
dicaments that  are  the  mildest  and  most  grateful  in 
their  operation,  and  exhilarating  in  their  effects. 


Joy. 


The  medicinal  influence  of  Joy  is  very  similar  to 
that  of  hope.  But  in  its  general  effect,  it  is  a  more 
powerful  stimulant.  Joy  diffuses  a  much  greater 
vivacity  over  the  whole  system.  It  quickens  the 
circulation  of  the  blood,  and,  in  its  first  impulse,  it 
frequently  excites  violent  palpitations  of  the  heart. 
It  renders  the  eyes  peculiarly  lively  and  animated, 
and  sometimes,  when  the  mind  has  been  previously 
in  a  state  of  anxious  fear,  it  stimulates  the  lachry- 
mal gland  to  the  secretion  of  tears,  accompanied 
with  redness,  and  a  sensation  of  warmth  in  the 
countenance.  Both  Mind  and  Body  become  so 
alert,  that  they  cannot  refrain  from  some  lively 
manifestation  of  their  feelings,  either  by  loud  accla- 
mations, or  extravagant  gestures. 

All  that  has  been  said  of  hope  is  applicable  to 
this  passion,  under  its  more  moderate  influence. 
But  as  it  is  in  general  a  much  more  powerful  stimu- 
lus, in  many  cases  it  is  still  more  efficacious.  In 
all  those  diseases,  where  the  powers  of  nature  are 
particularly  oppressed  and  impeded,  it  is  a  potent 
remedy.  In  leucho-phlegmatic  habits,  where  lan- 
guid circulation,  hebetude,  chilness,  &c.  are  preva- 
lent, the  grateful  cordial  of  Joy,  acts  like  a  charm. 


270  MEDICAL  INFLUENCE 

Pervading  the  whole  system,  it  instantaneously 
produces  universal  vigour,  imparts  vivacity  to  the 
most  indolent,  and  paints  the  most  pallid  cheek 
with  the  glow  of  health.  We  are  also  assured  that 
by  its  penetrating,  exciting,  and  exhilarating  power, 
it  has  cured  Paralytics  ;  and  it  has  restored  to  their 
senses  those  who  had  been  rendered  insane  through 
the  excess  of  melancholy. 

But,  as  every  thing  possessing  great  energy  may, 
in  some  circumstances,  prove  injurious,  either  by 
its  own  excess,  or  by  co-operating  with  other 
causes,  thus  have  the  transports  of  Joy,  though  in 
their  nature  so  salutary,  sometimes  induced  diseases, 
and  sometimes  rendered  them  more  severe.  They 
have  increased  the  paroxysms  of  acute  fevers,  ag- 
gravated inflammatory  symptoms  ;  and  in  plethoric 
habits,  have  been  productive  of  apoplexies.  Im- 
moderate and  ungovernable  transports  of  Joy,  have 
sometimes  induced  epilepsies,  catalepsies,  paralysis, 
and  that  class  of  maladies  which  arise  from  too  great 
agitation  of  mind,  in  delicate  and  susceptible 
frames. 

There  are  many  instances  upon  record,  of  sud- 
den death  having  been  occasioned  by  the  hasty 
communication  of  very  joyful  tidings.  Like  a 
stroke  of  electricity,  indiscreetly  directed,  the  vio- 
lent percussion  has  probably  produced  a  paralysis 
of  the  heart,  by  the  excess  of  its  stimulus.  These 
incidents  are  most  likely  to  take  place  in  subjects 
who  were,  at  the  instant,  deeply  oppressed  with 
the  opposite  passions  of  fear  and  anxiety ;  by  which 


OF  THE  PASSIONS.  271 

the  natural  and  salutary  action  of  the  heart  and 
arteries  was  greatly  impeded.  This,  of  conse- 
quence, will  create  a  resistance  to  the  impulse, 
and  render  it  more  liable  to  destroy  the  tone  of  that 
sensible  organ.  In  most  of  the  instances  recorded, 
the  persons  who  have  fallen  a  sacrifice  to  the  ex- 
cess of  Joy  were  in  this  particular  situation  ;  nor 
was  there  an  opportunity  given  to  soften  the  agony 
of  fear,  by  a  cautious  manner  of  communicating 
the  tidings.     (See  Note  T.) 

Cheerfulness,  hilarity,  and  social  mirth,  are  in 
their  effects  so  similar  to  hope  and  moderate  joy, 
that  their  medical  powers  may  be  collected  from 
what  has  been  observed  concerning  these.  Ope- 
rating also  by  the  laws  of  social  sympathy,  they 
promote  a  delectable  flow  of  spirits,  which  affords 
a  temporary  relief  from  the  oppressive  and  perni- 
cious influence  of  cares  and  solicitudes,  refreshes 
and  exhilarates,  after  the  fatigues  of  labour,  either 
corporeal  or  mental ;  and  thus,  by  renovating  the 
Man,  inspires  him  with  fresh  vigour,  to  discharge 
the  arduous  duties  which  his  station  in  life  may 
require. 


Love. 

Love  has  been  considered,  in  the  former  part  of 
this  Treatise,  both  as  an  Affection  and  a  Passion. 
As  an  Affection,  in  which  complacency  and  good- 
will are  the  principal  ingredients,  it  places  the 


272  MEDICAL  INFLUENCE 

corporeal  frame  in  a  state  of  pleasing  tranquillity  ; 
in  the  salutary  medium  between  languor  and  inert- 
ness on  the  one  side,  or  of  violent  incitement  on 
the  other.  Its  influence,  therefore,  is  too  mild  to 
be  at  any  time  prejudicial ;  and  it  is  calculated  to 
moderate  the  effects  each  extreme  is  capable  of 
producing.  General  benevolence  has  also  a  simi- 
lar tendency.  It  escapes  the  rude  effects  of  all  the 
irritating  passions,  and  diffuses  a  salutary  placid- 
ness  over  the  whole  system. 

Love  between  the  sexes,  commencing  with  pre- 
dilection, and  stealing  into  warm  personal  attach- 
ment, when  reciprocal,  and  unalloyed  by  adventi- 
tious causes,  inspires  the  mind  with  delight,  con- 
nected with  a  satisfaction  unknown  to  other  de- 
lights. It  is  the  reward  of  persevering  hope,  and 
corresponds  with  that  pleasing  passion,  in  its  be- 
neficent effects  on  the  corporeal  system.  It  is  so 
inimical  to  the  rougher  passions  and  emotions,  that 
they  cannot  possibly  subsist  together.  The  blan- 
dishments of  Love  have  tamed  the  most  ferocious 
natures,  and  calmed  the  most  turbulent  spirits. 
The  Passion  rising  to  desire,  acts  as  a  powerful 
stimulant ;  gives  fresh  energy  to  the  system,  diffus- 
ing a  general  warmth,  and  increasing  the  sensibili- 
ty of  the  frame. 

As  sexual  attachment  is  one  of  the  strongest 
propensities  of  animal  nature,  and  as  it  is  peculiar- 
ly exposed,  in  civil  society,  to  numberless  contra- 
rieties, it  frequently  becomes  the  source  of  many 
other  affections  and  emotions,  such  as  hope,  fear, 
joy,  sorrow,  anger,  envy,  jealousy,  Stc. 


OF  THE  PASSIONS.  273 

Such  various  effects  of  Love,  according  to  their 
complexities  and  degrees,  must,  it  is  self-apparent, 
vary  their  pathological  and  therapeutic  influence 
on  the  animal  ceconomy ;  and  medical  Writers 
have  accordingly  given  us  numerous  instances  both 
of  its  salutary  and  pernicious  powers.  Its  brisk 
incitements,  in  cold  and  torpid  temperaments,  have 
removed  the  various  indispositions,  to  which  such 
temperaments  are  exposed.  It  has  fortified  the 
body  against  dangers,  difficulties,  and  hardships, 
which  appeared  superior  to  human  force.  It  is 
said  to  have  cured  intermittents  ;  acting,  probably, 
like  invigorating  cordials,  administered  before  the 
access  of  the  cold  fit,  by  which  its  return  is  pre- 
vented, and  the  habit  destroyed,  to  the  influence  of 
which  this  disease  is  particularly  exposed.  In  its 
violent  and  impetuous  energies,  it  has  excited  in- 
flammatory fevers,  and  a  larger  train  of  evils  pro- 
ceeding from  the  excess  of  stimulus,  than  it  will 
be  necessary  to  enumerate.  It  has,  also,  in  conse- 
quence of  that  contrariety  of  passions  to  which  it 
is  subject,  occasioned  the  most  dangerous  and  ob- 
stinate maladies  ;  hysterics,  epilepsies,  hectic  fevers, 
the  rage  of  madness,  or  the  still  more  pitiable  state 
of  confirmed  and  wasting  melancholy. 


Anger, 

The  symptoms  indicating  a  violent  paroxysm  of 
Anger,  as  strongly  indicate  the  excessive  perturba- 

35 


274  MEDICAL  INFLUENCE 

tion  it  occasions  throughout  the  system.  The  red- 
ness of  countenance,  the  fire  flashing  in  the  eyes, 
the  strong  and  agitated  pulse,  the  wonderful  in- 
crease of  muscular  strength,  for  the  instant,  mani- 
fest that  all  the  powers  of  nature  are  roused  to  the 
most  violent  exertions.  Anger  acts  as  a  stimulus 
of  the  most  potent  kind,  upon  the  muscular, 
vascular,  and  nervous  systems.  It  is  not  surpris- 
ing, therefore,  that  its  pathological  effects  should 
be  numerous  and  alarming.  Inflammatory  and 
bilious  fevers,  haemorrhages,  apoplexies,  inflamma- 
tion of  the  brain,  mania,  have  arisen  from  the  in- 
creased impetuosity  it  has  given  to  the  vascular  sys-^ 
tern ;  as  also  sudden  death,  either  from  ruptured 
vessels,  or  the  excess  of  its  stimulating  power, 
upon  the  vital  organs ;  particularly  in  plethoric 
and  sanguineous  temperaments.  Palsies,  epilep- 
sies, aphonia,  or  loss  of  voice,  diarrhoeas,  involu- 
tion of  the  intestines,  and  those  diseases  which 
may  be  attributed  to  the  excessive  perturbation  of 
the  nervous  system,  and  also  to  exhausted  strength, 
have  too  frequently  succeeded  to  its  tremendous 
exertions.  In  short,  as  there  is  no  passion  so 
turbulent,  so  is  there  none  so  immediately  danger- 
ous as  excessive  anger. 

Yet  even  this  passion  has  been  occasionally 
beneficial.  As  there  are  cases  in  which  arsenic 
itself  exerts  a  medicinal  virtue,  thus  are  we  assured, 
by  writers  of  veracity,  that  there  are  instances  in 
which  the  passion  of  Anger,  by  giving  unusual 
energy  to  the  system,  has  conquered  such  diseases 


OF  THE  PASSIONS.  275 

as  demanded  a  potent  stimulus.  We  are  told  that 
it  has  cured  agues,  restored  speech  to  the  dumb, 
and  for  several  days  arrested  the  cold  hand  of 
death  ;  that  its  stimulating  power  has,  like  the 
electric  shock,  proved  a  remedy  in  rheumatic  affec- 
tions, palsies,  and  various  chronic  complaints. 


Fortitude. 

The  medical  virtues  of  Fortitude  are  universally 
admitted.  The  determined  resolution  of  the  Mind, 
communicates  a  correspondent  energy  to  the  body. 
Cheery  hope  is,  in  these  cases,  a  povi^erful  auxili- 
ary. Fortitude  is  not  only  a  preservative  against 
the  pathological  effects  of  fear  and  grief,  but  it 
renders  the  body  less  subject  to  the  morbid  in- 
fluence of  putrid  and  contagious  diseases.  It 
enables  the  warrior  to  support  hardships  and  fa- 
tigues, which  would  otherwise  prove  fatal  to  him. 
In  the  hour  of  conflict,  the  hopes  of  conquest,  the 
power  of  social  sympathy,  a  spirit  of  emulation, 
and  enkindled  anger  against  the  foe,  impel  to 
achievements,  to  which  the  powers  of  nature  would 
be  unequal,  at  any  other  period.  Those  who 
have  had  the  best  opportunity  of  observing,  assure 
us  that  an  army  is  most  exposed  to  diseases  when 
it  is  in  a  state  of  total  inactivity. 


276  MEDICAL  INFLUENCE 


Sorrow. 

Whoever  attends  to  the  pathological  effects  of 
SGrrow,  and  niarks  its  different  stages ; — the  stu- 
pefaction and  horror  with  which  the  sufferer  is 
sometimes  seized,  upon  the  sudden  communica- 
tion of  evil  tidings ; — the  agitations  which'  imme- 
diately succeed,  introducing  subsequent  languor 
and  debility  ; — and  the  deep  melancholy  into 
which  the  mind  subsides,  after  the  first  conflicts 
are  passed,  will  be  prepared  to  credit  the  narra- 
tions, that  excessive  sorrow  has  been  the  cause 
of  sudden  deaths,  of  confirmed  melancholj',  loss 
of  memory,  imbecility  of  mind,  of  nervous  fevers, 
of  hypochondriac  complaints  : — that  it  renders  the 
body  peculiarly  susceptible  of  contagious  disorders; 
and  that  the  loss  of  appetite,  perpetual  watchful- 
ness, confirmed  apathy  to  every  thing  social  and 
exhilarating,  the  attention  immutably  fixed  upon 
the  cause  of  its  distress,  Sic.  have  rapidly  intro- 
duced the  most  terrible  diseases,  and  hastened  the 
dissolution  of  the   sufferer. 

Nor  does  any  case  present  itself,  in  which  the 
passion  of  Sorrow,  or  the  affection  of  grief,  have 
produced  salutary  effects,  unless  by  their  being 
calculated  to  moderate  the  transports  of  anger ; 
and  thus  they  may  have  prevented  or  removed 
the  pathological  symptoms  of  which  such  trans- 
ports are  productive. 


OF  THE  PASSIONS.  277 


Fear. 


The  changes  instantly  induced  upon  the  body 
by  abject  Fear ;  the  universal  rigour,  the  con- 
tracted and  pallid  countenance,  the  deep  sunk 
eye,  the  quivering  lip,  the  chillness,  torpor,  pros- 
tration of  strength,  insufferable  anxiety  about  the 
region  of  the  heart,  &c.  are  so  perfectly  analogous 
to  the  morbid  influence  of  excessive  cold,  to  the 
symptoms  of  typhus  fevers,  and  the  first  stage  of 
intermittents,  that  no  one  can  doubt  of  the  per- 
nicious influence  of  this  passion,  in  pre-disposing 
the  body  to  the  like  diseases,  and  in  aggravating 
their  symptoms.  Fear  is  peculiarly  dangerous  in 
every  species  of  contagion.  It  has  instantaneously 
changed  the  complexion  of  wounds,  and  rendered 
them  fatal.  It  has  occasioned  gangrenes,  indura- 
tions of  the  glands,  epilepsies,  the  suppression 
of  natural  or  beneficial  secretions.  It  has  induced 
a  permanent  stupor  on  the  brain  ;  and  the  first 
horrors  of  the  imagination  have,  in  some  cases, 
made  too  deep  an  impression  to  be  effaced,  by  the 
most  favourable  change  of  circumstances.  We  have 
seen  that  Joy  itself,  though  in  its  nature  so  pleas- 
ing, and  in  its  general  effect  so  salutary,  has  proved 
the  cause  of  sudden  death  ;  it  is  therefore  not  diffi- 
cult to  admit  that  the  agonizing  effects  of  this 
dreadful  passion,  may  be  able  to  paralyze  the 
grand  organ  of  circulation,  and  like  some  pesiilen- 


278  MEDICAL  INFLUENCE 

tial  diseases,  instantaneously  induce  the   torpor  of 
death. 

So  pernicious  are  the  natural  and  characteristic 
effects  of  Fear  !  Yet  in  that  state  of  body  where  a 
sedative  power  is  requisite,  and  where  a  considera- 
ble degree  of  torpor  has  a  tendency  to  check  too 
great  incitement,  even  this  passion  may  become 
beneficial.  Thus  it  has  been  known  to  relieve  ex- 
cruciating fits  of  the  gout;  to  have  rendered  maniacs 
calm  and  composed  ;  and  in  some  cases,  it  has  re- 
stored them  to  the  regular  use  of  their  faculties. 
The  effects  of  Fear,  in  affording  temporary  relief 
in  the  tooth-ache,  are  universally  known ;  acting 
as  some  systematics  express  themselves,  by  its 
sedative  power,  by  which  an  inflammatory  tension 
is  appeased  ;  or  as  others,  by  inducing  a  torpor  on 
the  nerves,  and  thus  rendering  them  insensible  to 
pain. 

Terror,  which  is  the  agitation  of  Fear,  sometimes 
produces  effects  upon  the  body,  common  to  agita- 
tion, simply.  In  some  cases,  it  rouses  the  energy 
of  the  system  to  an  unusual  degree  ;  and  in  others, 
it  produces  the  irregular  and  convulsive  action  of 
the  muscular  system.  Hence  it  is  said  to  have 
caused,  in  some  instances,  and  in  others,  to  have 
cured  the  attacks  of  catalepsies,  epilepsies,  and 
other  spasmodic  disorders.  We  read  of  its  having 
cured  tertian  fevers  induced  by  fear; — restored 
speech  to  the  dumb,  and  motion  to  paralytic  limbs; 
— that  by  agitating  the  vascular  system,  it  has  been 


OF  THE  PASSIONS.  279 

productive  of  haemorrhages  ; — and  also  that  it  has 
been  successful  in  dropsical  habits.  Perhaps  the 
contractile  power  of  fear,  united  with  the  agitations 
of  terror,  have  both  constricted  and  stimulated  the 
relaxed  and  indolent  absorbents,  and  enabled  them 
to  renew  their  office.  The  passion  of  Terror  has 
frequently  excited  languid  hypochondriacs,  to  exer- 
tions they  had  deemed  impossible ;  and  all  their 
former  maladies  have  been  obliterated  by  their  ap- 
prehensions of  impending  danger. 


Shame, 

Shame  is  sometimes  connected  with  Fear,  some- 
times with  Terror  ;  and  consequently  it  will,  in 
particular  instances,  manifest  symptoms  belonging 
to  these  emotions.  But  young  persons  of  great 
sensibility,  who  are  delicately  susceptible  of  honour 
or  disgrace,  are  apt  to  blush  at  every  trifle,  without 
violent  paroxysms  either  of  fear  or  of  terror.  In 
these  eases,  where  the  effects  of  Shame  are  the 
least  complicated,  though  they  be  strong,  they  are 
momentary.  The  heart  is  certainly  agitated,  some- 
times with  pleasure,  sometimes  with  pain  ;  but  as 
the  suffusion  chiefly  manifests  itself  in  the  face,  and 
in  the  smaller  vessels  spread  over  the  neck  and 
breast,  the  singular  effects  of  Shame  cannot  be  at- 
tributed, solely,  to  the  sudden  impetus  given  to  the 
heart.  The  Passion  itself  seems  to  have  an  influ- 
ence principally  local ;  which  we  know  to  be  the 


280  MEDICAL  INFLUENCE 

case  with  some  other  stimulants.  The  modest 
blush,  unmixed  with  guilt  or  fear,  seems  to  be 
inert,  respecting  medical  effects.  Nor  are  there 
any  instances  of  its  having  been  decidedly  benefi- 
cial or  injurious.  It  seems  most  calculated  to  in- 
crease cutaneous  inflammations ;  but  facts  are 
^vanting  to  confirm  this  idea. 


Attention  of  Mind. 

Habitual  attention  of  mind,  to  any  particular  ob- 
ject, should  it  be  of  a  pleasing  nature,  and  proceed 
from  a  passionate  fondness  for  that  object,  has  proved 
pernicious  to  the  constitution.  The  fatigue  of  the 
brain  has  indicated  itself  by  cephalalgias,  giddiness, 
&ic. — the  animal  spirits  have  been  exhausted  :  the 
body  has  been  rendered  insensible  to  its  accustom- 
ed stimuli ;  weariness  and  universal  lassitude,  pro- 
stration of  strength,  loss  of  appetite,  indigestion, 
flatulencies,  &c.  have  ensued ;  and  the  whole  sys- 
tem has  been  rendered  very  susceptible  of  various 
morbid  impressions.  Yet  salutary  effects  have  is- 
sued from  an  eager  attention  to  things  novel,  inter- 
esting, and  mysterious.  It  has  thus  proved  effica- 
cious in  diseases  subjected  to  periodical  returns. 
It  has  prevented  hysteric  and  epileptic  fits,  and 
charmed  away  agues.  By  connecting  the  perni- 
cious effects  of  habitual  attention  to  the  same  ob- 
ject, with  those  accompanying  fear,  anxiety,  sor- 
row, it  is  easy  to  perceive  that  the  union  of  these 


OF  THE  PASSIONS.  281 

must  be  peculiarly  pernicious ;  that  when  the 
whole  attention  is  employed  upon  things  mournful, 
irritating,  or  calculated  to  inspire  painful  apprehen- 
sions,— when  it  is  absorbed  by  corroding  cares  and 
anxious  fears, — when  it  is  the  prey  of  chagrin  and 
disappointment,  the  body  may  be  expected  to  fall  a 
speedy  victim  to  the  combined  influence  of  such 
deadly  poisons. 


Imagination, 

The  power  of  Imagination  in  inducing  and  re- 
moving diseases,  has  been  generally  acknowledged. 
But  this  imagination  could  only  produce  its  effects 
by  the  strong  Affections  which  accompany  it ; 
otherwise  it  would  be  as  inert  as  the  most  abstract 
idea.  These  affections  are  indicated  in  the  various 
passions  and  emotions  we  have  been  contemplating. 
It  is,  moreover,  worthy  of  notice,  that  in  every 
powerful  exertion  of  the  Imagination,  some  change 
takes  place  in  the  body  correspondent  with  its 
nature.  In  a  keen  appetite,  upon  the  thoughts  of 
some  favourite  viand,  the  salivary  glands  are  stimu- 
lated to  a  secretion  of  saliva,  as  preparatory  to 
deglutition.  We  feel  ourselves  collected,  firm, 
elevated,  upon  the  lively  representation  of  the  firm, 
heroic,  dignified  conduct  of  another.  The  blood 
thrills  in  our  veins,  and  the  skin  corrugates,  at  the 
description  of  any  thing  peculiarly  horrible ;  and 
under  the  strong  impression  of  fictitious  danger,  the 

36 


^82  MEDICAL  INFLUENCE,  &c. 

attitude  of  our  bodies  attempts  to  evade  it !  Full 
confidence  in  the  mystic  power  of  another,  places 
the  whole  system  in  a  situation  most  favourable  to 
the  effects,  which  the  object  of  his  confidence  un- 
dertakes to  produce.  This  will  explain  much  of 
what  is  genuine,  in  the  pretensions  of  magnetizers  ; 
and  the  exaggerating  dispositions  of  both  operator 
and  patient,  will  contribute  to  explain  the  rest. 
(See  Note  U.) 

The  above  sketch,  concise  and  imperfect  as  it  is, 
will  be  sufficient  to  evince,  that  the  Passions  and 
Emotions  have  a  medical  influence  upon  the  body  : 
and  that  each  of  them  has  its  own  characteristic 
influence,  in  its  general  mode  of  acting,  although 
various  and  opposite  effects  may  sometimes  be  pro- 
duced by  incidental  circumstances.  This,  how- 
ever, is  precisely  the  case  with  the  most  esteemed 
medicaments  ; — with  every  thing  which  is  deemed 
noxious  or  beneficial  in  the  mineral,  vegetable, 
and  animal  kingdoms ; — and  with  every  part  of 
nature,  which  possesses  the  power  of  acting  upon 
the  human  frame. 

In  this  investigation  the  Author  has  simply  en- 
deavoured to  be  the  historian  of  facts,  without  in- 
tending to  pay  any  deference  to  theory.  But  as 
medical  language  has  chiefly  been  formed  by  diffe- 
rent theories,  which  have  most  rapidly  succeeded 
to  each  other,  it  is  difficult  to  use  terms  which  do 
not  acknowledge  some  system  or  other  for  their 
parent ;  or  to  express  ideas,  without  seeming  to 
have  a  predilection   for  one  hypothesis  in  prefe- 


ON  THOUGHT,  &c.  283 

rence  to  others,  where  the  sole  object  is  to  estab- 
lish indisputable  facts.     (See  Note  W.) 


SECTION  II. 

INFLUENCE    OF    THE    PASSIONS    ON     THOUGHTS    AND    LANGUAGE. 

It  has  been  remarked  in  our  Analysis,  that  when- 
ever any  subject  presents  itself  to  the  mind,  with 
sufficient  force  to  excite  a  passion,  or  a  very  strong 
affection,  all  the  powers  of  the  imagination  become 
immediately  active.  The  whole  soul  is  engaged 
upon  its  object,  and  the  whole  train  of  ideas  is 
turned  into  a  channel  correspondent  with  the  view 
we  entertain  of  that.  The  mind,  with  wonderful 
facility,  collects  together  whatever  has  been  laid 
up  in  the  storehouse  of  the  memory,  or  can  be 
combined  by  the  force  of  the  imagination.  Every 
thing  alien  is  totally  excluded  ;  and  it  is  in  vain 
that  others  who  are  free  from  the  impulse,  attempt 
to  suggest  ideas  of  a  contrary  tendency.  Reason 
becomes  impotent,  nor  can  the  attention  be  direct- 
ed from  such  circumstances  as  are  intimately  con- 
nected with  the  exciting  cause ;  and  these  are 
magnified  and  aggravated  to  the  utmost  extent. 
Subjects  of  joy  appear,  at  the  instant,  to  be  the 
harbingers  of  essential  and  permanent  bliss.  The 
evils  we  fear,  the  injuries  we  suffer,  the  losses  we 


284  INFLUENCE  OF  THE  PASSIONS 

sustain,  seem  to  be  the  greatest  that  could  possibly 
have  been  endured. 

This  state  of  mind  not  only  manifests  itself  by 
gestures,  looks,  and  tones,  correspondent  with  the 
nature  of  the  passion  ;  but  it  has  a  characteristic 
influence  upon  the  language  and  expressions  em- 
ployed to  give  vent  to  the  passion,  as  it  is  emphati- 
cally termed. 

Upon  the  first  impulse,  the  thoughts  are  tu- 
multuous and  confused.  A  thousand  half-formed 
suggestions  and  apprehensions  crowd  in  upon  us, 
in  rapid  or  disorderly  succession  ! 

Whoever  contemplates  the  effects  of  the  pas- 
sions, at  this  moment,  will  discover  their  perfect 
correspondence  with  the  nature  of  those  introduc- 
tory emotions  of  Surprise,  Wonder,  and  Astonish- 
ment, described  in  the  analytical  part  of  this  Trea- 
tise. It  is  manifestly  through  their  influence  that 
the  mind  is  thus  confused,  and  that  every  idea  is 
embarrassment  and  conjecture.  The  Wonder  and 
Amazement,  so  precipitately  excited,  are  accom- 
panied by  strong,  abrupt,  and  indefinite  language. 
The  first  impulse  of  Surprise  deprives  the  subject 
of  the  power  of  utterance  ;  and  the  first  exertions 
of  this  returning  power  consists  in  loud  exclama- 
tions, adapted  both  to  the  nature  of  the  emotion 
itself,  and  to  its  confusion  and  wonder,  relative  to 
the  object. 

As  all  these  introductory  emotions  are  obviously 
founded  on  the  weakness,  ignorance,  and  conscious 
inferiority  of  our  nature,  thus  do  they  prompt  to 


ON  THOUGHT,  &c.  285 

Language  which  confesses  an  humiliated  state. 
Powers  above  us  are,  as  it  were,  instinctively 
addressed,  either  with  exclamations  of  gratitude, 
of  appeal,  imprecation,  or  invocation  of  aid  ! 
Incredulity  itself  becomes  most  credulous ;  will 
thank  the  heavens  for  causes  of  excessive  joy, — 
call  aloud  upon  higher  Beings  for  help  in  the  mo- 
ment of  danger, — mourn  its  destiny^ — or  curse  its 
stars  in  the  hour  of  vexation  and  disappointment  ! 
Those  who,  in  a  tranquil  state  of  mind,  ridicule  the 
idea  of  future  retribution,  often  become  the  most 
Extravagant  in  their  benedictions  or  imprecations, 
at  the  instant  of  tumultuous  passion  ! 

After  the  first  impulse  of  passion,  we  begin  to 
advert  to  the  particular  state  in  which  the  exciting 
cause  has  placed  us.  As  a  lively  imagination  is 
always  disposed  to  magnify,  we  deem  ourselves  for 
the  instant,  the  most  happy  or  the  most  wretched  of 
mortals ;  and  a  new  train  of  thoughts  is  suggested 
to  prove  or  illustrate  the  supposition. 

Thus  as  the  passion  approaches  somewhat  nearer 
to  an  affection,  the  mind  recovers,  in  some  degree, 
its  power  over  itself;  yet  it  is  still  carried  forwards 
by  the  torrent  of  ideas,  which  this  novel  situation 
has  inspired,  and  which  never  would  have  been 
suggested,  with  such  copiousness  and  energy,  in  a 
more  tranquil  state.  As  it  still  continues  to  feel 
strongly,  so  is  it  eager  to  do  justice  to  its  feelings, 
by  the  strength,  pertinency,  and  impetuosity  of  its 
Language.  Common  terms  are  too  cold,  or  too 
limited,  to  do  justice  to  the  energy  of  thought : 


286  INFLUENCE  OF  THE  PASSIONS 

and  it  perceives  no  exaggerations  in  expressions  the 
most  exaggerated !  All  nature  is  ransacked  for 
points  of  resemblance,  to  set  forth  the  novel  situa- 
tion, in  the  strongest  colours.  Impetuosity  equally 
despises  precision  or  detail.  It  eagerly  seizes  upon 
tropes  and  figures  the  most  concise,  and  the  most 
suited  to  its  new  conceptions  ! 

All  nature  is  full  of  analogy  !  Every  thing  that 
exists  possesses  certain  qualities  or  properties, 
which  are  not  so  peculiar  to  the  individual,  as  to 
be  destitute  of  some  resemblance  to  other  things 
that  may  be,  in  various  respects,  essentially  diffep- 
ent :  and  many  of  these  properties  are  possessed, 
in  an  extraordinary  degree  by  particular  objects. 
To  these  the  mind  rapidly  adverts,  as  descriptive  of 
the  peculiarities  of  its  own  situation  ;  and  as  in  the 
warmth  of  our  sensations  we  are  disposed  to  exag- 
gerate every  thing,  thus  are  we  disposed  to  make 
quick  transitions  from  one  property  to  another, 
seated  in  the  object  referred  to,  by  which  a  peculiar 
colouring  or  cast  of  character,  is  given  to  the  sub- 
ject which  interests  us,  and  the  desired  energy  is 
imparted  to  our  feelings  concerning  it.  To  this, 
associated  ideas  and  affections  lend  a  very  consid- 
erable aid.  Thus  it  is  that  we  not  only  catch  the 
precise  point  of  resemblance,  but  we  instantaneous- 
ly elevate  or  debase  a  subject,  hold  it  forth  to  ad- 
miration or  contempt,  render  it  respectable  or  ridicu- 
lous, according  to  the  sources  from  whence  our  al- 
lusions are  borrowed. 


ON  THOUGHT,  &c.  287 

When  passions  and  emotions  have  given  place  to 
more  permanent  affections,  Language  hecomes  less 
vehement  and  more  diffuse.  Under  the  influence 
of  a  particular  affection,  the  mind  loves  to  expand 
itself  upon  the  circumstances  which  gave  it  exist- 
ence, and  to  dwell  upon  such  minutise  as  have  a 
tendency  to  feed  its  flame.  Thus  under  the  ihflu- 
ence  of  Resentment,  every  species  of  aggravation  is 
deliberately  dwelt  upon ;  every  thing  in  the  con- 
duct of  the  aggressor  which  may  augment  his  cul- 
pability, and  every  part  of  our  own  demeanor,  are 
brought  forwards  to  manifest  the  greatness  of  the 
offence,  and  how  little  we  deserved  it.  In  a  state 
of  fearful  Apprehension,  every  possibility  of  danger 
is  placed  before  us  with  all  its  horrors ; — every  dif- 
ficulty is  magnified  ; — and  in  every  remedy  or  plan 
of  security  proposed,  busy  apprehension  suggests 
reasons  to  evince  that  it  will  be  ineffectual.  In 
Sorrow  we  delight  to  expatiate  upon  the  excel- 
lent qualities  of  the  particular  object,  the  pleasures 
and  advantages  of  which  we  are  now  deprived ; 
and  the  imagination  enumerates  all  the  evils  that 
will  probably  ensue  from  the  privation.  Under  the 
influence  of  Love,  the  mind  dwells  upon  the  ac- 
complishments which  have  inspired  the  affection, 
recalls  the  scenes  of  pleasure  past,  anticipates  those 
which  are  to  come ;  and  in  the  expression  of  these 
feelings,  or  in  the  acknowledgment  of  this  influ- 
ence, it  purposely  prolongs  the  phraseology,  which 
best  prolongs  the  fascinating  idea. 


288  INFLUENCE  OF  THE  PASSIONS 

The  address  of  Eve  to  her  consort,  in  a  state 
where  the  best  affections  alone  could  be  indulged, 
is  so  beautiful  an  illustration  of  this  subject,  that  a 
transcript  of  the  whole  passage  cannot  appear 
tedious. 


With  thee  conversiDg,  1  forget  all  time; 
All  seasons  aud  their  change,  all  please  alike. 
Sweet  is  the  breath  of  morn,  her  rising  sweet, 
With  charm  of  earliest  birds ;  pleasant  the  sun, 
When  first  on  this  delightful  land  he  spreads 
His  orient  beams,  on  herb,  tree,  fruit  and  flower, 
Glist'ning  with  dew  :  fragrant  the  fertile  earth 
After  soft  showers,  and  sweet  the  coming  oa 
Of  grateful  evening  mild  ;  then  silent  night, 
With  this  her  solemn  bird,  and  tliis  fair  moon, 
And  these  the  gems  of  heav'n  her  starry  train  ; 
But  neither  breath  of  morn,  when  she  ascends 
With  charms  of  earliest  birds ;  nor  rising  sun 
On  this  delightful  land-,  nor  herb,  fruit,  flower, 
Glist'ning  with  dew  ;  nor  fragrance  after  showers  : 
Nor  grateful  evening  mild  ;  nor  silent  niglit, 
With  this  her  solemn  bird,  nor  walk  by  noon, 
Or  glittering  star  light,  without  thee  is  sweet. 

PARADISE    LOST.    B.    IV.    L.    639. 


It  is  observable,  that  when  a  passion  or  a  strong 
affection  is  not  suddenly  raised,  but  is  produced  by 
deliberate  meditation  upon  the  subject,  the  process 
is  opposite  to  the  preceding.  From  Indifference, 
the  mind  begins  to  conceive  an  Affection  of  one 
kind  or  other ;  and  according  to  the  discovered  na- 
ture, magnitude,  or  importance  of  the  object,  it 
may  gradually  work  itself  up,  as  the  phrase  is,  into 
passion  and  ecstasy.  In  such  cases,  the  train  of 
thoughts  will  flow  with  increased  velocity  and  force, 
according  to  the  increased  interest  taken  in  the 


ON  THOUGHT,  &c.  289 

subject.  Sterility  of  sentiment  and  of  language  is 
succeeded  by  a  rapid  flow  of  each.  Pertinent 
thoughts  and  copious  expressions  immediately  pre- 
sent themselves,  which  the  deepest  study,  and  all 
the  powers  of  recollection,  would  not  have  been 
able  to  produce.  They  are  only  to  be  inspired  by 
affections.  In  this  state  of  mind,  the  Language 
gradually  changes  its  tone  ;  from  the  cool  didactic 
style,  it  rises  into  the  animated  and  energetic; 
though  it  seldom,  if  ever,  indicates  the  embarrass- 
ment and  confusion  of  thought,  which  are  the 
offspring  of  wonder  and  surprise.  Excess  of  ani- 
mation will  indeed  sometimes  check  utterance,  and 
the  orator  will  feel  a  deficiency  of  Language,  to  do 
justice  to  the  numerous  ideas  which  crowd  in  upon 
the  mind.  See  many  excellent  observations  on 
this  subject  in  Elements  of  Criticism,  Vol.  IL 
Comparisons :  Figures. 

If  the  above  remarks  be  admitted  as  pertinent, 
they  will  point  out  the  difference  betwixt  the 
language  of  the  Passions  and  Affections,  and  that 
of  cool  dispassionate  reason.  The  one  is  the 
language  of  feeUng,  which  attempts  to  enforce 
some  interesting  idea  ;  the  other  that  of  discrimina- 
tion, which  carefully  marks  the  distinctions  and 
differences  which  subsist  in  things  apparently  an- 
alogous. The  one  is  prone  to  substitute  strong 
impressions  for  realities,  and  to  mistake  exaggera- 
tions for  accurate  statements :  the  other  analyzes 
and  separates  truth  from  error,  facts  from  misrep- 

37 


29.Q  INFLUENCE  OF  THE  PASSIONS 

resentations.  The  language  of  Passion  and  of 
strong  Affections  is  always  employed  in  pleading 
some  cause.  Aiming  to  give  to  that,  the  ascen- 
dancy over  every  other  consideration,  it  rapidly 
collects  and  sets  forth,  in  glowing  colours,  every 
circumstance  favourable  to  its  object,  regardless  of 
whatever  may  be  advanced  in  opposition  ;  while 
the  language  of  Reason  is  that  of  a  Judge,  who 
compares,  balances,  and  decides,  according  to  the 
force  of  evidence^  without  being  deceived  by  the 
force  of  expression,  or  seduced  by  the  sympathy  of 
the  passions. 

In  these  characters  it  is  that  the  distinction  be- 
tween rhetoric  and  logic  indicates  itself.  The  for- 
mer attempts  to  persuade  ;  it  is  the  province  of  the 
latter  to  convince.  This  employs  itself  in  demon- 
strations, respecting  the  truth  and  nature  of  things  ; 
the  other  excites  to  feel  and  act,  according  to  the 
opinion  entertained  of  the  good  or  bad  properties 
which  they  possess,  and  are  capable  of  exerting. 

In  our  description  of  the  different  Passions  and 
Affections,  it  was  requisite  to  point  out  those  ex- 
ternal signs  which  wore  the  characteristic  marks  of 
each  ;  and  to  note  the  attitudes,  gestures,  and  ex- 
pressions of  countenance,  which  are  most  corres- 
pondent to  the  nature  of  the  emotion.  We  have 
only  to  subjoin  upon  the  subject,  that  when  utte- 
rance is  given  to  thought,  the  tone  of  voice  be- 
comes a  powerful  auxiliary  to  the  train  of  ideas 
suggested.     Nature  has  accommodated  the  mode 


ON  THOUGHT,  &c.  291 

of  utterance  to  the  character  of  the  passion.  Thus 
it  has  rendered 

Joy  loud  and  vociferous,  producing  strong  excla- 
mations, mixed  with  triumphant  Laughter. 

Sorrow  communicates  a  plaintiveness  to  the 
voice,  best  adapted  to  w^ailings  and  lamentations. 

Anger  is  loud  and  turbulent.  The  voice  rises 
with  the  passion,  in  order  to  strike  terror,  and 
silence  opposition. 

Fear  is  oppressed  and  breathless,  or  screams 
aloud  for  help. 

Love  is  soft,  soothing,  insinuating,  and  gentle  ; 
sometimes  assuming  the  plaintiveness  of  sorrow, 
sometimes  the  vivacity  of  hope,  and  the  transports 
of  joy. 

The  other  compounds  partake  of  mixed  effects. 
(See  Note  X.) 

The  minute  investigation  of  the  passions  in 
which  we  have  been  engaged,  presents  us  with 
numerous  observations  of  a  moral  and  practical 
nature.  But  as  the  present  Treatise  is  purposely 
confined  to  philosophical  researches,  we  shall  not 
enlarge  upon  so  copious  a  subject.  There  are 
two  inquiries,  however,  which,  although  they  have 
an  intimate  relation  to  morals,  cannot  be  refused  a 
place  in  the  philosophical  department.  They  re- 
fer to  the  influence  of  the  passions  upon  character, 
and  upon  happiness ;  and  with  these  we  shall  close 
the  subject. 


292  INFLUENCE  OF  THE  PASSIONS 


SECTION  III. 

INFLUENCE   OF    THE    PASSIONS    AND    AFFECTIONS   ON   CHARACTER. 

The  Nature  of  the  Passions  and  Affections  in- 
dulged, of  the  objects  by  which  they  are  excited, 
and  the  degrees  of  influence  and  permanency, 
which  they  are  suffered  to  exert  upon  us,  consti- 
tute the  moral  characters  of  men ;  pointing  out 
either  their  innocence,  their  excellencies,  or  defects. 

By  Character  is  generally  understood  the  kind 
of  reputation  acquired,  by  the  prevalent  disposition 
of  temper,  which  suggests  almost  every  motive, 
and  takes  the  lead  in  almost  every  action :  and 
moral  character  refers  to  that  prevalent  temper 
which  relates  to  the  moral  duties  respecting  either 
ourselves  or  others.  This  disposition  consists  in 
the  prevalence  of  affection^  that  is,  in  the  habitual 
pleasure  or  displeasure  we  take  in  certain  modes 
of  thinking  and  acting  ;  and  our  opinion  of  the  dis- 
position, is  regulated  by  the  different  degrees  of 
merit  or  demerit,  which  in  our  judgnvent  is  annex- 
ed to  it.  Mankind  so  far  agree  in  their  opinions, 
that  they  universally  acknowledge  some  actions 
and  the  affections  which  produce  them,  either  to 
be  innocent,  or  to  be  deserving  of  various  degrees 
of  approbation  or  censure.  They  pay  due  hon- 
ours to  characters,  which  appear  to  be  formed  upon 
the  best  of  principles,  and  load  the  opposite  with 
proportionate  disgrace.  * 


ON  CHARACTER.  293 

The  grand  distinctions  in  moral  conduct  are  in- 
dicated by  the  terms  Virtue  and  Vice :  and  the 
subordinate  ones  under  each,  are  either  not  mark- 
ed, or  they  are  discriminated  by  appropriate  appel- 
lations. 

The  cardinal  affections  of  Love  and  Hatred,  in 
themselves  possess  neither  merit  or  demerit. — 
Founded  upon  the  ideas  of  Good  and  Evil,  which 
may  render  our  existence  a  blessing  or  a  curse, 
they  are,  as  it  were,  moulded  in  the  very  frame 
and  constitution  of  all  percipient  beings.  It  is, 
therefore,  neither  a  duty  nor  a  possibility  to  divest 
ourselves  of  them.  The  passions,  emotions,  and 
affections,  which  are  immediately  consequent  upon 
these,  or  may  be  deemed  simple  modifications  of 
them,  are  also  inseparable  from  our  nature,  and  are 
both  unavoidable  and  innocent:  such  as  joy,  satis- 
faction, contentment,  hope,  desire,  fear,  sorrow, 
anger,  resentment,  &c.  These  being  derived  from 
situations  and  circumstances,  to  which  we  are  per- 
petually and  necessarily  exposed,  are  the  natural 
result  of  impressions  made  upon  susceptible  beings. 
A  virtuous  or  vicious  Character  therefore  depends 
upon  the  nature  of  our  choice,  and  the  manner  and 
extent  to  which  those  passions  and  emotions  in- 
dulged, are  permitted  by  the  law  of  morals.  Thus 
Virtue  requires  that  the  affections  of  love  and  ha- 
tred be  properly  placed ;  that  real,  not  imaginary 
good  ;  real,  not  imaginary  evil,  be  the  objects  of 
them.  It  requires  that  we  proportion  the  degrees 
of  our  affection  to  the  value  and  importance  of 


294  INFLUENCE  OF  THE  PASSIONS 

objects ;  that  we  be  neither  indifferent  to  essential 
worth,  nor  suffer  things  trifling  and  insignificant  to 
engross  the  best  of  our  affections.  Virtue  allows 
the  first  impulse  of  anger  where  the  provocation  is 
great;  as  insensibility  would  invite  injuries,  and 
give  to  unreasonable  and  wicked  men  a  decided 
superiority  over  the  moderate  and  just.  But  Vir- 
tue forbids  anger  to  exceed  the  magnitude  of  the 
offence  :  being  in  every  case  a  species  of  punish- 
ment, if  it  be  excessive,  the  surplus  becomes  an  in- 
justice. Virtue  requires  anger  to  be  of  short  du- 
ration, where  offences  are  not  permanent ;  strictly 
prohibits  it  from  seeking  revenge.  Its  grand  ob- 
ject is  private  or  public  security,  and  it  abhors  ha- 
bitual hatred  and  malignity.  It  allows  and  re- 
quires us  to  cherish  the  feelings  of  contempt  and 
indignation,  as  long  as  mean  and  atrocious  vices 
continue  ;  but  it  absolutely  commands  us  to  pardon, 
where  the  character  and  conduct  of  the  offender  are 
changed,  by  repentance  and  reformation.  Virtue 
stigmatizes,  with  peculiar  disgrace,  the  want  of 
those  affections  which  benefits  received,  and  a  great 
superiority  of  character  ought  to  call  forth  ;  such 
as  ingratitude  to  benefactors,  and  want  of  respect 
for  superiors  in  wisdom  and  goodness.  As  we 
experience  that  the  possession  of  the  good  things 
of  life  contribute  to  our  happiness,  we  cannot 
be  insensible  to  the  privation  of  them  ;  Virtue  ac- 
cordingly permits  a  degree  of  sorrow  and  grief, 
correspondent  to  the  nature  of  our  loss ;  but  it  for- 
bids the  obstinate  indulgence  of  melancholy,  as  this 


ON  CHARACTER,  295 

forgets,  or  destroys,  the  benignant  effects  of  every 
remaining  blessing  ;  and  it  is  of  consequence  char- 
geable with  both  folly  and  ingratitude.  Virtue  re- 
quires repentance,  as  the  medium  of  restoration  to 
order  and  to  duty  ;  for  this  purpose  it  permits  re- 
morse, but  never  enjoins  despair.  It  allovrs  of  fear  as 
far  as  this  excites  to  caution;  and  even  of  terror,  when 
the  mind  has  been  surprised  by  something  tremen- 
dous ;  but  habitual  fear  it  terms  cowardice,  and  to 
terror  perpetually  excited  by  small  causes,  it  gives 
the  appellation  of  pusillanimity.  It  approves  of  the 
emulation  which  animates  to  worthy  deeds,  or  to 
advancement  in  every  species  of  excellence :  nor 
does  it  forbid  the  ambition  which  is  productive  of 
general  good  ;  but  it  execrates  the  wretch  who 
wades  through  seas  of  blood,  and  tramples  upon 
the  slain,  to  rise  above  all  those  whom  his  baneful 
sword  has  spared.  Envy,  which  is  the  antipode 
to  benevolence.  Virtue  knows  not :  and  though  it 
admits  of  jealous  alarms  upon  great  occasions, 
and  prompted  by  strong  presumptive  evidence,  yet 
it  is  a  stranger  to  unauthorised  suspicions.  It  per- 
mits the  moderate  desire  of  wealth,  as  the  means 
both  of  comfort  and  usefulness ;  but  it  lays  rapa- 
ciousness  and  avarice  under  the  severest  interdict. 
It  allows  of  self-defence,  and  we  are  occasionally 
inspired  with  strength  and  courage  for  the  purpose  ; 
but  it  disdains  the  use  of  treacherous  means  of  se- 
curity, and  the  acts  of  cruelty  which  characterize 
the  barbarian  and  the  coward. 


296  INFLUENCE  OF  THE  PASSIONS 

These  remarks  point  out  another  distinction  of 
the  passions  and  affections,  as  they  relate  to  the 
moral  character,  indicating  a  scale  of  comparative 
merit  and  demerit.  Some  are  innocent  simply ; 
as  hope,  joy,  moderate  grief.  Some  are  laudable  : 
as  contentment,  satisfaction,  complacency.  Others 
are  deemed  peculiarly  noble.  Thus  the  virtue  of 
Benevolence  is  much  more  dignified  than  any  of 
the  affections  which  originate  and  terminate  in 
Self.  In  the  different  branches  of  this  virtue  there 
are  also  degrees  of  excellence.  Warm  sympathe- 
tic emotions,  when  they  prompt  to  peculiar  exertions, 
are  in  higher  estimation  than  the  calmer  feelings  and 
offices  of  charity  ;  and  Mercy,  by  subduing  resent- 
ment, is  justly  deemed  more  transcendent  than 
either.  Some  feelings  are  so  essential,  that  to  be 
destitute  of  them  is  highly  disgraceful  ;  as  the 
want  of  Gratitude.  The  angry  passions,  though 
they  may  be  innocent,  yet  they  stand  upon  the  very 
brink  of  demerit,  being  so  proximate  to  injustice 
and  cruelty.  Some  affections  and  dispositions  are 
contemptible ;  as  sordid  avarice,  envy,  malice : 
these  are  despised  by  all  who  are  not  under  their 
influence.  Ingenuous  shame  is  viewed  with  ap- 
probation, as  it  indicates  a  consciousness  of  defect, 
united  with  reverence  for  opinion.  Guilty  shame, 
though  not  criminal  in  iiself,  yet  being  the  detection 
of  criminality,  it  sometimes  exposes  the  offender  to 
the  severest  contempt ;  as  when  it  marks  the  coun- 
tenance of  a  detected  hypocrite  :  sometimes  it  will 
excite  compassion,    and  prompt  to  forgiveness ; 


ON  CHARACTER.  297 

when,  for  example,  an  offence,  highly  disreputable, 
is  proved  to  be  a  total  deviation  from  the  general 
tenour  of  conduct.  The  blush  indicates  a  mind 
not  inured  to  vice.  It  sues  for  compassion,  and 
proves  that  it  is  not  totally  unworthy  of  it. 

Again,  in  our  search  after  happiness,  each  par- 
ticular desire  and  pursuit  is  either  deemed  innocent, 
or  it  assumes  an  honourable  or  ignominious  cha- 
racter, according  to  the  nature  of  the  object,  the 
eagerness  with  which  it  is  followed,  and  the  means 
employed  for  its  attainment.  Some  desires  are 
discriminated  by  particular  appellations,  which 
serve  to  stigmatize,  or  do  honour  to  the  affections  ; 
while  others,  not  marking  either  excellence  or  cul- 
pability, have  no  terms  of  discrimination. 

Several  instances  of  this  nature  have  been  given 
under  the  article  of  Desire,  by  which  it  appears 
that  a  prevalent  love  of  virtue  and  detestation  of 
vice  have,  in  every  case  where  personal  interest  has 
not  perverted  the  judgment,  and  alienated  the  af- 
fections, taught  all  mankind,  without  previous  con- 
sultation or  conspiracy,  to  invent  the  concisest 
mode  of  testifying  approbation  or  disapprobation, 
according  to  the  apparent  degrees  of  merit  or  de- 
merit. Similar  to  the  plem  of  an  universal  lan- 
guage, which  some  have  deemed  practicable,  or  to 
pre-concerted  signals,  and  telegraphic  signs,  very 
complex  ideas  are  conveyed  by  simple  terms,  which 
immediately  express  satire  or  applause,  crown  with 
honour,  or  call  forth  abhorrence.  The  numerous 
38 


§98  INFLUENCE  OF  THE  PASSIONS 

occasions  which  incessantly  present  themselves,  of 
expressing  our  opinions  of  human  actions,  and  our 
eagerness  to  approve  or  censure,  render  us  impa- 
tient of  paraphrase,  or  circumlocution. 

It  is  also  observable  that  our  ideas  of  Character 
are  invariably  formed,  according  to  the  habitual 
tendency  of  disposition  and  conduct  to  become 
beneficial  or  pernicious ;  that  is  to  promote  or  to 
destroy  Good  !  Where  conduct  has  no  immediate 
relation  to  these,  it  does  not  call  forth  animad- 
version. In  proportion  as  it  produces  and  dissemi- 
nates Good  ;  as  it  makes  exertions  and  consents 
to  liberal  sacrifices  for  this  purpose,  does  it  meet 
with  our  applause  and  admiration.  In  proportion 
as  vice  diffuses  Misery,  as  it  is  the  result  of  mean 
and  selfish  principles,  indicated  by  pre-concerted 
plans  and  propensities,  to  sacrifice  the  felicity 
of  others  to  our  own  narrow  personal  gratifica- 
tions, it  becomes  detestable  and  abhorrent.  Hence 
Compassion  meets  with  warmer  applause  than  the 
simple  love  of  Justice,  because  Compassion  is  an 
actual  participation  in  the  sufferings  of  another ; 
while  Justice  is  only  a  due  solicitude  that  they 
shall  not  suffer  any  unmerited  injury  from  us.  A 
merciful  and  forgiving  disposition  is  still  more 
noble,  because  it  generously  removes  a  very  power- 
ful impediment,  which  the  offending  party  him- 
self has  raised,  against  the  exercise  of  our  com- 
passion, for  the  distress  to  which  his  injustice 
towards  us  has  exposed  him.  On  the  other  side, 
Treachery  and  Cruelty  are  more  detestable  than 
common  acts  of  injustice,   because  the  one  is  a 


ON  CHARACTER.  299 

grosser  abuse  of  that  confidence  without  which 
society  cannot  subsist ;  and  the  other  manifests 
not  only  inordinate  self-love,  but  the  want  of  that 
natural  affection  which  is  due  to  every  being ; 
substituting  the  affection  of  hatred  in  its  place. 

It  is  further  manifest  from  the  above  remarks, 
that  both  Virtue  and  Vice  are  the  offspring  of 
passions  and  affections  in  themselves  innocent. 
The  natural  desires  and  affections  implanted  in 
our  very  make,  are  void  of  guilt.  Respecting 
these,  virtue  simply  requires  a  proper  choice,  inno- 
cent pursuits,  and  moderation  in  our  enjoyments. 
Vice  consists  in  an  improper,  or  forbidden  choice, 
in  the  excess  or  perversion,  of  the  natural  pro- 
pensity of  our  natures.  Lawless  ambition  is  the 
excess  of  a  desire  to  distinguish  ourselves,  which, 
under  certain  restrictions,  is  a  blameless  incentive 
to  useful  actions.  As  every  species  of  debauchery 
consists  in  the  irregular  indulgence  of  the  appe- 
tites, in  themselves  natural  and  innocent,  thus  are 
the  most  disorderly  and  malevolent  affections  the 
abuse  of  some  affections,  which  in  certain  cir- 
cumstances, may  be  allowable  and  beneficial. 
Envy  is  anger,  unjust,  and  pettish,  at  the  good 
fortune  of  another,  mixed  with  a  very  false  idea 
of  our  superior  deserts.  Cruelty  is  the  excess  of 
a  severity,  which  in  itself  may  be  justifiable  ;  and 
Malice  the  most  inveterate,  is  the  cruelty  of  envy, 
attempting  by  words  and  actions  to  destroy  or 
diminish  the  good  we  cannot  participate. 


300  INFLUENCE  OF  THE  PASSIONS 

Thus  then  it  appears,  that  Character  depends 
upon  the  prevalent  use  or  abuse  of  certain  pro- 
pensities or  affections  of  our  nature.  Those  who 
select  and  cultivate  the  most  beneficial  are  the 
best  of  characters ;  those,  who  are  habituated  to 
the  most  injurious,  are  the  worst. 


SECTION  IV. 

INFLUENCE    OF    THE    PASSIONS    AND    AFFECTIONS    ON    HAPPINESS. 

Though  the  desire  of  Good  is  in  reality  the 
efficient  cause  of  every  passion,  emotion,  and  affec- 
tion, yet  the  immediate  effects  of  each  on  our 
sensations,  are  correspondent  to  its  own  specific 
nature.  To  be  under  the  influence  of  some,  is 
productive  of  temporary  well  being ;  while  others 
are  comfortless,  irksome,  or  productive  of  a  great 
degree  of  wretchedness. 

Love  considered  as  an  affection  placed  upon  a 
deserving  object,  and  recompensed  with  reciprocal 
affection,  Joy,  Ecstasy,  Complacency,  Satisfac- 
tion, Contentment,  lively  Hope,  these  are  decided- 
ly the  sources  of  present  enjoyment.  The  social 
affections  of  Benevolence,  Sympathy,  Compassion, 
and  Mercy,  are  also  other  ingredients  of  happi- 
ness, from  a  less  selfish  and  more  refined  source 
than  the  preceding.     A  steady,  uniform  disposi- 


ON  HAPPINESS.  301 

tion  manifested  by  incessant  endeavours  to  promote 
happiness,  is  invariably  rewarded  with  a  large  por- 
tion of  it.  Benevolence  places  the  mind  at  a 
remote  distance  from  little  jealousies  and  envy- 
ings  :  it  tempers  the  irritative  nature  of  anger,  and 
teaches  compassion  to  subdue  it.  Through  Bene- 
volence, the  good  enjoyed  by  another  becomes 
our  own,  without  a  robbery  or  privation.  This 
divine  principle  harmonizes  the  mind  with  every 
thing  around,  and  feels  itself  pleasingly  con- 
nected with  every  living  being.  It  generates, 
communicates,  and  enjoys  happiness.  When  be- 
nevolence manifests  itself  by  sympathy,  compas- 
sion, and  mercy,  some  portion  of  uneasiness,  it  is 
acknowledged,  accompanies  the  sensation  con- 
genial to  its  nature  :  but  the  exercise  of  these  af- 
fections communicates  a  pleasing  pain.  The  de- 
gree of  uneasiness  is  more  than  recompensed,  by 
the  satisfaction  enjoyed  from  the  relief  of  distress  ; 
and  even  from  the  consciousness  of  a  disposition  to 
relieve.  There  is  often  a  luxury  in  sympathetic 
sorrow ;  and  the  tear  shed  over  distress  becomes  a 
pearl  of  inestimable  price.  Every  species  of  Be- 
nevolence possesses  the  quality  which  our  great 
dramatic  Poet  has  ascribed  to  a  merciful  disposi- 
tion. 

The  quality  of  Mercy's  not  restrain'd  : 
It  droppeili  as  the  gentle  rain  from  heaven, 
Upon  the  land  beneath.     It  is  twice  blefsed  ; 
It  blesses  him  tbi;at  givts,  and  him  that  takts. 

BBAKSFBARI. 


302  INFLUENCE  OF  THE  PASSIONS 

The  mildest  of  the  affections  which  belong  to 
the  family  of  Love,  diffuse  a  pleasurable  tranquilli- 
ty over  the  mind.  They  constitute  the  healthy 
state  of  the  soul,  united  with  a  consciousness  of 
this  health.  The  more  lively  affections  invigorate 
the  frame,  exciting  a  delectable  vivacity  ;  and  the 
impetuous  emotions,  termed  ecstasies  and  tran- 
sports, infuse  a  wild  tumultuous  pleasure !  Im- 
moderation leaves  the  helm ;  the  animal  spirits  un- 
controuled  violently  agitate  the  corporeal  frame, 
and  confound  the  mental  faculties  in  a  pleasing  de- 
lirium. 

In  some  of  these  kindly  emotions,  circumstances 
and  situations,  in  themselves  displeasing,  are  ren- 
dered  capable  of  communicating  pleasure.  Thus 
in  the  sudden  possession  of  good  conferred  by  a 
superior.  Gratitude,  though  it  is  so  closely  connect- 
ed with  the  idea  of  our  own  wants,  and  the  de- 
pendancy  of  our  state,  rises  above  these  natural 
causes  of  depressed  spirits.  The  attention  is 
arrested  by  the  Good  received,  and  the  heart  glows 
with  Affection  towards  the  benefactor  ;  which  is  a 
more  pleasing  sensation  than  Independency  itself 
could  ensure.  Thus  in  the  contemplation  of  the 
unrivalled  excellencies  possessed  by  another,  lively 
enjoyment  becomes  intimately  connected  with  the 
deepest  sense  of  inferiority  :  as  in  the  emotions  of 
admiration,  reverence,  and  awe.  Nor  is  Humility, 
notwithstanding  its  abject  appearance,  devoid  of 
Dignity.  It  is  accompanied  with  a  strong  Affec- 
tion for  excellencies,  while  it  laments  that  it  can- 


ON  HAPPINESS.  303 

not  attain  them  :  and  a  conscious  wish,  to  subdue 
remaining  defects,  inspires  more  Satisfaction  than 
the  self-sufficiency  of  arrogance  can  boast.  Even 
Desire  itself,  which  is  an  eager  longing  for  gratifi- 
cation,— if  it  be  not  intemperate, — if  it  be  united 
with  hope, — if  it  be  not  prolonged  to  the  weariness 
of  patience,  is  cherished  with  a  great  degree  of 
pleasure.  The  expectancy  of  enjoyment  more 
than  counterpoises  the  pain  created  by  suspense. 

Another  set  of  emotions  and  affections  are  of  the 
unquiet  and  irritating  class ;  as  the  whole  family  of 
Anger.  The  exciting  objects  are  unwelcome  to 
the  mind  which  contemplates  them,  and  the  sensa- 
tions they  produce  are  turbulent  and  painful.  It  is 
true,  some  degree  of  satisfaction  may  be  inspired 
by  the  vivid  idea  entertained,  at  the  instant,  of  the 
justice  of  our  cause,  as  also  by  the  gratification,  or 
even  the  resolution  to  gratify,  the  newly-created 
desire  of  revenge,  or  by  the  conscious  superiority 
which  accompanies  contempt  and  disdain;  but 
these  are  purchased  at  the  expence  of  the  infinitely 
superior  pleasures,  infused  by  the  opposite  spirit  of 
love,  complacency,  and  benevolence.  The  mind 
finds  itself  in  bondage  to  its  emotions,  and  feels 
that  it  is  driven  by  their  impetuosity,  not  only  to 
the  greatest  distance  from  the  nobler  sources  of  en- 
joyment, but  to  the  verge  of  misery  itself.  Dan- 
ger is  apprehended  from  the  excess  of  passion, 
while  it  is  indulged  ;  and  the  subject  himself 
trembles,  lest  it  should  be  productive  of  irreparable 
evil,  repentance,  and  remorse. 


304  INFLUENCE  OF  THE  PASSIONS 

Sorrow  and  Grief,  though  they  are  certainly  in 
the  class  of  the  most  unpleasant  affections,  yet  they 
have  something  so  fascinating  in  them,  that  the 
mind  under  their  influence,  is  arrested  and  absorb- 
ed, as  it  were,  in  the  contemplation  of  their  cause. 
The  good  of  which  we  are  deprived  is  now  appre- 
ciated, perhaps,  for  the  first  time,  according  to  its 
value  ;  perhaps  beyond  its  value.  This  contempla- 
tion of  qualities,  which  once  gave  delight,  or  which 
were  fondly  expected  to  give  delight,  mingles  a 
pleasure  with  the  severe  pain,  which  privation  or 
disappointment  has  occasioned. 

Even  Penitence  and  Contrition,  when  they  are 
inspired  by  ingenuous  motives, — when  a  detesta- 
tion of  former  conduct  proceeds  from  a  conviction 
of  its  baseness,  and  sorrow  for  the  injury  it  has 
done,  and  not  from  the  apprehension  of  punish- 
ment or  the  shame  of  detection,  even  penitence  and 
contrition  are  not  devoid  of  pleasure  !  The  Peni- 
tent, in  the  midst  of  his  painful  self-condemnation, 
feels  a  latent  satisfaction  in  the  disposition  and  re- 
solution to  return  to  the  paths  of  virtue. 

The  emotions  and  affections,  of  Fear,  Dread, 
Horror,  Despair,  are  of  the  most  horrid  and  tre- 
mendous class.  They  vary  in  degrees  of  wretch- 
edness, according  to  the  degrees  of  their  intense- 
ness,  whether  this  be  increased  by  temperament, 
by  the  extreme  importance,  or  by  the  complicated 
nature  of  the  exciting  cause.  Excessive  Jealousy, 
Envy,  Remorse,  Despair,  Shame  arising  from  the 
detection  of  guilt,  are  misery  unmixed.     They  ren- 


Uoit0 


TO    THE 


PRECEDING    TREATISE. 


ON  HAPPINESS.  306 

der  life  insufferable,  and  tempt  the  despondent  and 
distracted  mind  to  venture  upon  all  the  horrors  of 
an  unknown  state,  rather  than  support  the  pangs 
of  its  present  feelings. 

Surprise,  Wonder,  Astonishment,  principally  re- 
ceive their  complexion  from  the  subjects  that  in- 
spire them  ;  and  they  are  introductory  to  happiness 
or  misery,  according  to  the  nature  of  the  cause  ex- 
citing them.  In  Surprise  particularly,  the  sudden 
and  unexpected  arrival  of  an  interesting  event,  cor- 
respondent with  the  nature  of  the  affection  already 
indulged,  will  turn  hope  and  joy  into  ecstasy,  dis- 
pleasure into  anger,  and  fear  into  terror  and  dis- 
may. 

Thus,  in  the  pleasing  emotions,  the  idea  of  Good 
necessarily  predominates  ;  and  in  the  painful  ones, 
the  idea  of  Evil.  Accordingly,  those  emotions 
which  are  produced  by  complicated  good,  or  by 
the  union  of  such  causes,  as  separately  possess  the 
power  of  calling  forth  pleasing  emotions  and  affec- 
tions, contribute  most  to  happiness.  In  the  emo- 
tions of  hope,  satisfaction,  and  joy,  when  personal 
concerns  are  intimately  connected  with  some  com- 
mon interest,  and  the  blessings  received  have  an 
extensive  influence,  the  emotions  receive  additional 
vigour,  and  are  enjoyed  with  peculiar  suavity. 
Social  affections  are  now  blended  with  self-love. 
The  two  torrents  which  so  frequently  oppose  each 
other,  fortunately  unite  and  enlarge  the  stream  of 
enjoyment ;  and  the  most  desireable  branch  of  be- 
nevolence, rejoicing  with   those  that  rejoice,    is 

39 


306  INFLUENCE  OF  THE  PASSIONS,  &c. 

super-added  to  the  natural  pleasure  we  take  in  our 
own  good. 

Again,  Gratitude,  unites  to  the  joy  inspired  by  a 
benefit  received,  the  pleasure  derived  from  an  affec- 
tionate sense  of  the  obligation,  and  of  love  to  the 
benefactor  ;  and  if  the  magnitude  of  the  benefit,  or 
the  mode  of  conferrhig  it,  be  productive  of  surprise, 
wonder,  admiration,  the  delectable  affections  of  joy, 
gratitude,  and  love,  will,  by  the  operation  of  these 
vivid  passions,  be  proportionably  augmented. 

Were  the  imagination  commanded  to  paint  the 
highest  felicity  to  be  enjoyed  by  created  beings,  it 
would  surely  point  out  the  union  of  the  following 
emotions  and  affections.  Ardent  Love  for  an  object 
decidedly  worthy  of  our  love,  chastened  with  high 
Veneration ; — Astonishment  inspired  by  the  con- 
templation of  the  number  and  extent  of  its  excel- 
lencies, and  at  the  unremitted  exertion  of  these  ex- 
cellencies in  the  diffusion  of  good ; — Admiration  at 
the  wise  means  adapted  to  the  accomplishment  of 
the  interesting  purpose  ; — Joy  and  Gratitude  for 
benefits  already  received ; — lively  Hope  of  good  in- 
calculable in  reserve  for  ourselves,  conjointly  with 
others  whose  welfare  we  ardently  desire,  accompa- 
nied with  a  Consciousness  that  we  also  have  con- 
tributed a  something  to  the  general  mass  of  felicity, 
according  to  the  extent  of  our  ability !  These  are 
ingredients  to  constitute  the  perfection  of  bliss ! 
Love,  Joy,  Gratitude,  Surprise,  Admiration,  Com- 
placency, Hope,  and  Benevolence  unbounded,  may 
thus  occupy  the  mind  in  a  transporting  variety,  or 
by  exerting  their  united  powers  at  the  same  instant, 
occasion  inconceivable  raptures !  ! ! 


PRECEDING  TREATISE.  311 

emotion,  and  a  desire  to  obtain  the  object  which  occasioned 
it.  "  An  internal  motion  or  agitation  of  the  mind,"  says  he, 
"  when  it  passeth  away  without  desire,  is  denominated  an 
"  emetion  ;  when  desire  follows,  the  motion  or  agitation  is 
"  denominated  a  passion."  Numerous  objectioas  might  be 
opposed  to  the  position.  I  shall  only  observe  that  according 
to  this  hypothesis,  the  external  signs  of  the  passions  would 
be  the  strongest  where  desires  are  the  strongest ;  which  is 
directly  opposite  to  what  we  perceive  in  the  avaricious 
man  : — that  joy  can  neither  be  considered  as  a  passion  nor 
an  emotion  ;  because  its  visible  transports  would  destroy  its 
title  to  the  latter,  and  its  being  excited,  not  by  desire  itself, 
but  by  the  accomplishment  of  a  desire,  will  exclude  it  from 
the  former  : — Nor  can  we  discover  what  should,  at  any  time, 
excite  those  transports  which  are  sometimes  both  visible  and 
tremendous  ;  for  emotions  being  quiescent,  and  desires 
not  being  of  themselves  turbulent,  their  union,  could  they 
possibly  exist  together,  is  not  likely  to  produce  those  corpo- 
real agitations  so  frequently  observable  ;  unless  \ve  were  to 
admit  a  process  similar  to  a  chemical  fermentation.  But 
they  cannot  exist  together,  and  consequently  an  emotion  can 
receive  no  assistance  from  desire,  by  which  it  may  be  trans- 
formed into  a  passion  ;  for,  according  to  his  own  system,  desire 
succeeds  to  emotion. 

His  Lordship's  embarrassment  on  this  subject,  which  he  in- 
genuously acknowledges,  manifestly  proceeds  from  his  not  hav- 
ing made  a  fortunate  selection  of  terms,  to  discriminate  exist- 
ent differences.  To  every  simple  impression  he  has  given  the 
name  of  an  emotion  ;  and  he  has  applied  the  term  passion  ex- 
clusively, to  what  is  in  its  own  nature  an  affection  ;  and  when- 
ever it  is  considered  as  a  Passion,  it  is  merely  in  its  secon- 
dary sense  ;  expressing  the  captivating  influence  of  any 
particular  object  of  desire  or  of  an  irresistible  attachment  to 
it.  By  admitting  these  kvj  alterations,  what  he  has  written 
on  the  subject  may  be  read  with  much  edification  and  pleas- 
ure. 


312  NOTES  TO   THE 

Note  C. 

After  "  It  would  be  to  annihilate  misery."     Page  36. 

Dr.  Hartley,  in  establishing  the  doctrine  of  vibrations,  and 
the  hypothesis  of  associated  ideas  founded  upon  it,  asserts  that 
"  the  desire  of  happiness,  and  aversion  to  misery,  are  not  iti- 
"  separable  from  and  essential  to  all  intelligent  natures." 

Without  venturing  to  oppfse,  unnecessarily,  so  cautious  and 
conclusive  a  reasoner,  I  shall  just  observe,  that  the  above  as- 
sertion is  expressed  in  much  stronger  language,  than  the  prin- 
ciples which  he  attempts  to  enforce  absolutely  require.  It 
is  acknowledged  that  his  theory  opposes  the  existence  of  in- 
nate ideas  ;  and  whoever  admits  the  theory  must  allow,  that 
there  can  be  no  desire  after  happiness,  or  fear  of  misery,  be- 
fore we  have  been  made  acquainted,  some  way  or  other,  with 
their  natures.  Therefore,  when  he  asserts  that  the  desire  of 
happiness,  and  aversion  of  misery,  are  not  inseparable  from,  and 
essential  to  all  intelligent  natures,  he  can  only  mean,  that  they 
are  not  co-existent  with  the  power  of  intelligence,  and  that 
they  are  desires  and  aversions  acquired  by  experience  ;  not 
that  the  reflective  mind  can,  at  any  time,  be  totally  indifferent 
about  happiness  and  misery.  For  by  whatever  method  we 
may  have  obtained  a  knowledge  of  either,  the  position  remains 
indubitable,  that  no  one  ever  tasted  of  happiness,  or  possessed 
the  smallest  degree  of  ease  or  pleasure,  without  contracting 
an  affection  for  them ;  or  experienced  misery  and  uneasiness, 
without  contracting  an  hatred  towards  them. 

Note   D. 

After  "  The  individual  stock  of  each  would  render  happiness  universal.". 

Page  40. 

It  would  not  only  be  a  severe  but  an  ahsurd  requisition,  to 
expect  that  mankind  should  universally  be  more  attentive  to 


PRECEDING   TREATISE. 


Note  A. 

After  "Whether  its  influence  be  of  a  pleasant  or  unpleasant  nature." 
Page  21. 

J.  HIS  opinion  has  the  support  of  respectable  authorities.  Dr. 
Watts  remarks,  that  "  the  word  properly  signifies  receiving 
"the  action  of  some  agent."  (See  Watts  on  the  Passions.) 
Mr.  Grove  observes,  that  "  the  mind  in  certain  circumstan- 
"  ces,  and  within  certain  degrees,  has  no  dominion  over  itself, 
"  or  the  body.  It  is  in  a  manner  passive,  can  neither  help 
"  the  agitation  of  the  blood  and  spirits,  nor  help  being  itself 
"  affected  by  them."  (See  Sys.  of  Moral  Phil.  Vol.  1.  Ch.  vii.) 
Seneca  also  thus  expresses  himself:  "  Omnes  motus  qui 
"  non  voluntate  nostra  fiunt,  invicti,  et  inevitabiles  sunt : 
"  ut  horror  frigidaaspersis  ;  ad  quosdam  ictus,  aspernatio  ; 
"  ad  pejores  nuntios  subriguntur  pili  ;  et  ruber  ad  improba 
"  verba  suffuoditur  ;  sequitur  vertigo  praerupta  cernentes. 
"  Ista  ut  ita  dicaokf  patitur  magis  animus  quam/act^"  (De  Ira. 
L.  2.  C.  2.) 


Note  B. 

After  "  are  the  most  appropriate."    Page  28. 

It  is  acknowledged  that  these  words  are  frequently  used  in- 
discriminately, and  sometimes  without  manifest  impropriety  ; 


310  NOTES  TO  THE 

but  if  they  cannot  be  used  at  all  times,  with  equal  propriety/, 
there  must  be  a  specific  difference  between  them.  Now  it  is 
observable  that  the  word  Emotion  is  not  frequently  applied 
to  those  passions  in  which  the  external  signs  are  the  least  vio- 
lent. We  seldom  say  that  any  one  is  under  the  emotion  of 
Fear  ;  because  abject  fear  has  something  oppressive  in  its  na- 
ture, and  is  frequently  silent  and  motionless.  When  fear  is 
indicated  by  violent  agitations,  it  acquires  the  character  of 
terror  ;  and  we  feel  that  the  phrase  emotions  of  terror  is  strict- 
ly proper.  We  never  apply  the  epithet  to  hope,  distinctly 
considered,  because  though  it  be  lively  and  animating,  it  is  not 
accompanied  by  external  signs  of  transport.  When  these  ap- 
pear they  are  always  ascribed  to  the  joy,  which  is  frequently 
connected  with  hope  ;  and  we  perceive  a  peculiar  propri- 
ety in  the  term  joyful  emotions,  hecause  joy  is  so  frequently 
indicated  by  some  eccentric  tokens. 

Whoever  attends  to  these  circumstances,  in  addition  to  the 
principles  already  advanced,  will  be  surprised  at  the  assertion 
of  Lord  Kaims,  that  "  an  emotion  is  in  its  nature  quiescent,  and 
"  merely  a  passive  feeling."  (Elements  of  Criticism,  5th 
Edit.  Vol.  1.  Page  44.)  Both  the  etymology  of  the  word, 
and  almost  every  connection  in  which  it  is  used  with  decided 
propriety,  confute  this  strange  position.  The  Author  was 
probably  led  into  the  idea  by  the  very  confined  view  he  has 
taken  of  the  passions,  in  his  elegant  Essay.  He  chiefly  con- 
siders them  as  connected  with  the  fine  Arts,  and  subjects  of 
taste  ;  and  as  expressive  of  those  agreeable  or  disagreeable 
effects  which  they  produce,  when  first  presented  to  our  no- 
tice. These  effects,  it  is  allowed,  are  seldom  so  violent,  in 
cultivated  minds,  as  to  occasion  the  emotions  which  indicate 
themselves  by  strong  and  characteristic  marks. 

His  Lordship  having  denied  external  signs  to  emotions,  has 
transferred  them  to  the  passions.  But  in  order  to  establish 
his  hypothesis,  he  is  obliged  to  give  a  very  different  definition 
of  the  passions  from  any  that  his  predecessors  have  adopted, 
or  that  either  etymology  or  usage  will  justify.  According 
to  his   system,  a  passion  is  compounded   of  this  quiescent 


PRECEDING  TREATISE.  313 

the  welfare  of  others  than  to  their  own.  This  would  be 
to  love  our  neighbours  better  than  ourselves,  without  ascribing 
to  them  any  of  the  qualities  requisite  to  attract  our  love.  Nor 
would  this  mode  of  exercising  benevolence  be  so  productive 
of  good  as  the  present  constitution  of  our  nature,  as  it  would 
be  impossible  to  obtain  an  equal  knowledge  of  their  wants 
and  desires  ;  nor  would  it  be  so  favourable  to  the  cause  of 
benevolence  as  has  been  imagined  No  mind  tru  ly  generous, 
or  deserving  of  attention,  could  possibly  receive  the  gift  of 
Well  being  entirely  at  the  expence  of  the  Donor.  Thus, 
were  the  selfish  principle  totally  extinguished,  the  reciprocal 
communication  of  good  would  be  little  more  than  a  compli^ 
mentary  exchange. 


Note  E. 

After  "  Not  always  in  our  recollection."    Page  43. 

Some  Authors,  of  great  respectability,  have  expressed 
themselves  in  a  manner  which  conveys  ideas  very  different 
from  those  we  have  attempted  to  establish.  Dr.  Reid  speaks 
of  loving  things  for  their  own  sakes,  and  considers  the  class 
of  philosophers  who  suppose  that  the  love  of  every  object 
may  be  resolved  into  its  utility,  to  be  in  an  error.  Lord 
Kaims  maintains  that  some  affections  are  neither  selfish  nor 
social. 

These  opinions  seem  to  receive  support  from  the  sentiment 
of  Cicero,  v/ho  observes  *■•  Est  qoiddam  quod  sua  vi  nos  illiciat 
"  ad  se  ;,  non  emolumento  captans  aliquo,  sed  trahens  sua 
"  dignitate  :  quod  genus,  virttis,  scientia,  Veritas.'' 

It  is  so  presumptuous  to  differ  from  such  authorities  that  I 
am  reluctant  to  expose  myself  to  the  suspicion.  Their  doc- 
trine is  expressed  in  very  ambiguous  language.  It  is  possible 
that  a  proper  investigation  of  the  subject  will  indicate  that  it 
does  not,  in  its  tenour,  oppose  the  sentiments  advanced  in  the 

40 


314  NOTES  TO  THE 

text.     If  I  fall  in  this  attempt,  it  may  still  appear  that  it  has 
not  confuted  them. 

When  it  is  said  that  we  love  things  for  their  own  sakes,  let  us 
examine  what  signification  can  be  attached  to  the  expression  ? 
We  could  not  possibly  love  any  thing  totally  void  of  qualities, 
were  it  possible  for  such  a  thing  to  exist  ;  because  there 
would  be  nothing  to  love.  But  the  things  specified  by  these 
authors,  as  being  attractive  by  their  dignity  alone,  manifestly 
possess  qualities  of  the  highest  utility  :  for  their  dignity  it- 
self consists  in  the  superiority  of  their  usefulness.  When, 
therefore,  it  is  alleged  that  such  things  are  loved  for  their 
own  sakes,  the  only  consistent  idea  we  can  annex  to  the  phrase 
must  be,  that  we  love  them  from  their  capacity  of  produc- 
ing, in  certain  circumstances,  some  great  and  extensive  good  ; 
though  we  should  not  experience  the  good,  or  observe  the 
application  of  this  power,  in  particular  instances,  either  ia 
ourselves  or  others.  For  example,  it  is  as  certain  that  virtue^ 
science,  truth,  are  of  infinite  importance  to  the  welfare  of  the 
whole  intelligent  creation,  as  that  they  possess  the  powerful  at- 
tractions ascribed  to  them  by  Cicero.  A  society  of  liars  would 
create  greater  confusion  than  that  of  Babel  ;  nor  could  it  ex- 
ist for  a  day.  Science  dispels  pernicious  ignorance  ;  it  makes 
us  acquainted  with  the  choicest  qualities  existent ;  and  univer- 
sal Virtue  would  be  productive  of  universal  happiness.  Eve- 
ry roan,  therefore,  whose  mind  is  not  upon  a  level  with  the 
brute  creation,  and  who  has  perceived,  in  a  single  instance,  the 
beneficial  effects,  flowing  from  these  excellencies,  or  the 
baneful  consequences  engendered  by  their  contraries,  must 
respect  them.  This  respect,  however,  will  be  founded  either 
upon  his  own  experience,  or  upon  his  observation  of  their  in- 
fluence on  others.  In  the  first  case  they  are  the  result  of 
personal  love  of  good  ;  and  in  the  second,  of  the  benevolent 
principle.  For  it  is  very  obvious  that  the  class  of  objects,  of 
which  it  is  asserted  that  rhey  are  loved  for  their  own  sakes, 
alone  attract  the  attention  of  the  cultivated  mind,  or  of  such 
as  possess  a  considerable  share  of  natural  benevolence. 


PRECEDING  TREATISE.  315 

Innumerable  are  the  proofs  that  the  very  capacity  of  being 
useful,  will  inspire  an  affection  for  many  things,  which  are 
permitted  to  remain  in  a  dormant  state.  The  miser  loves  his 
gold  so  intensely,  that  he  will  not  part  with  it,  in  exchange  for 
the  choicest  blessing  it  is  able  to  purchase.  The  man  of 
science  loves  his  library,  though  it  may  contain  many  hundred 
volumes  which  he  has  never  consulted.  The  good  housewife 
delights  in  the  plate  or  porcelain,  which  is  perpetually  locked 
up  in  her  cabinet ;  and  the  eastern  monarch  is  watchful  over  a 
seraglio  infinitely  too  extensive  for  his  enjoyment. 

The  above  instances  point  out  the  sense  in  which  we  may 
be  said  to  love  any  thing  for  its  own  sake.  These  different  ob- 
jects are  loved,  as  powers  of  utility  or  gratification  in  reserve, 
that  is,  we  are  so  constituted  that  we  cannot  avoid  approving, 
admiring  or  loving,  whatever  possesses  in  a  great  degree,  ei- 
ther the  capacity  or  the  disposition  to  promote,  what  we  deem 
to  be  good  for  us,  or  what  is  pleasing  to  us. 


Note  F. 

After  "  threaten  to  endanger  our  well-being."     Page  51. 

Mr.  Hume  commences  his  Dissertation  on  the  Passions  in  the 
following  manner  :  "  Some  objects  produce  an  agreeable  sen- 
"sation,by  the  original  structure  of  our  organs  ;  and  are  thence 
♦♦  denominated  Good  ;  as  others,  from  immediate  disagree- 
*'  able  sensations,  acquire  the  appellation  of  Evil.  Thus 
*'  moderate  warmth  is  agreeable  and  good  ;  excessive  heat, 
"  painful  and  evil. 

"  Some  objects  again  by  being  naturally  conformable  or  con- 
*'  trary  to  passion,  excite  an  agreeable  or  painful  sensation, 
*'  and  are  thence  called  good  or  evil.  The  punishment  of  an 
"  adversary  by  gratifying  revenge  is  Good  ;  the  sickness  of  a 
'*  companion   by  affecting  friendship,  is  evil,^' 

Will  it  be  necessary  to  point  out  to  any  of  my  readers  the  per- 
nicious sophistry  of  this  statement  ?  Is  it  not  a  wanton  introduc- 


31&  NOTES  TO  THE 

tion  of  a  chaos,  I  will  not  say  in  morals,  but  in  the  nature  and 
character  of  human  motives  and  human  conduct  ?  It  gives  the 
important  appellation  of  G  od,  to  the  greatest  opposites, 
without  discriminating  the  specific  natures  of  each  ;  merely 
because,  in  some  circumstances,  and  in  some  characters,  they 
may  produce  pleasing  or  painful  sensations.  Thus  is 
moderate  warmth  placed  upon  a  level  with  sentiments  and  dis- 
positions, calculated  to  produce  the  most  exalted  felicity  ;  and 
to  the  gratification  of  revenge,  is  given  the  same  colouring 
as  to  the  pardon  of  an  injury,  or  alleviating  distress  1 

This  studied  confusion  of  ideas  may,  in  some  connections, 
be  productive  of  wit.  It  is  always  ^^  such  .stuff  a^  conundrums 
*'  are  made  oj,^''  but  it  is  directly  opposite  to  the  genius  of  true 
philosophy. 

If  my  ideas  of  a  conundrum  be  accurate,  it  consists  in  an  at- 
tempt to  make  two  things  appear  closelj  to  resemble  each  oth- 
er, which  are  the  most  opposite  in  their  natures.  This  is 
done  by  directing  the  attention  to  some  medium  thought  or 
middle  term,  which  may,  in  one  sense  or  other,  be  applicable 
to  each.  For  example,  if  it  be  asked  why  is  a  person  in  the 
upper  part  of  a  house  committing  theft,  like  a  man  of  the 
strictest  virtue  ?  The  answer  is,  because  he  is  above,  doing  a 
bad  action.  The  word  above  being  in  certain  senses  applica- 
ble to  each  subject,  we  are  surprised  and  amused  at  the  un- 
expected points  of  resemblance.  Thus  again  if  it  be  asked.  In 
what  does  a  person,  who  attempts  to  kill  another  in  a  fit  of  an- 
ger, resemble  the  man  who  protcts  his  life  ?  The  answer  of 
Mr.  Hume  will  be,  both  actions  excite  agreeable  sensations, 
and  are  therefore  Gjod !  The  first  conundrum  is  allowed 
to  be  better  than  the  second  ;  but  this  will  only  prove  that 
there  are  degrees  of  excellence  in  this  kind  of  writing,  as 
well  as  in  every  other  ;  and  that  it  is  much  better  adapted  to 
subjects  of  amusement,  than  to  philosophy. 


PRECEDING  TREATISE.  Sl'f 

Note  G. 

^fter  "  the  passions  and  aifections  could  not  have  been  excited."  Page  53. 

Perhaps  there  is  no  branch  of  philosophy  more  difficult,  than 
that  of  distinguishing;  between  rea/ and  apparent  qu^-lities  ia 
objects.  Since  all  that  we  know  of  qualities  is  derived  from 
the  impression  made  upon  us,  a  previous  qtiestion  presents 
itself,  whether  our  susceptibility  of  impressions  be  always  ac- 
curate, or  perfectly  correspondent  with  the  real  nature  of  the 
object  ?  Until  this  point  be  settled,  our  ideas  of  qualities  must 
be  vague  and  indeterminate.  Lord  Kaims  has.  in  one  in- 
stance, made  the  attempt  ;  but  his  observations  are  so  unsatis- 
factory, and  his  mode  of  reasoning  so  inconclusive,  that  I  feel 
myself  much  relieved  in  not  being  obliged  to  imitate  his  ex- 
ample. 

In  a  chapter  where  he  treats  of  Emotions  and  Passions  as 
pleasant  and  painful^  agreeable  and  disagreeable,  he  attempts  to 
prove  that  agreeable  and  disagreeable  are  qualities  in  tne  Ob- 
ject ^QVceivQA.  pleasant  and  unpleasant  are  descriptive  of  the 
Emotions  we  feel.  The  former  are  perceived  as  adhering  to 
the  object,  the  latter  are  felt  as  existing  in  us.  At  first  view, 
these  distinctions  appear  specious,  but,  upon  critical  examina- 
tion, apprehensions  may  be  justly  entertained,  whether  they 
be  not  instances  of  that  inaccuracy  which  he  considers  to  be 
"  not  at  all  venial  in  the  science  of  Ethics." 

"  Viewing  a  garden,"  says  he.  "I  perceive  it  to  be  beauti- 
**  ful  or  agreeable  ;  and  1  consider  the  beauty  or  agreeable- 
"  ness  as  belonging  to  the  object,  or  as  one  of  its  qualities. 
"  When  I  turn  ray  attention  from  the  garden  to  what  passes 
*'  in  my  mind,  I  am  conscious  of  a  pleasant  emotion,  of  which 
"  the  garden  is  the  cause  ;  the  pleasure  here  is  felt  as  a 
"  quality,  not  of  the  garden,  but  of  the  emotion  produced  by 
"  it.  I  give  another  example.  A  rotten  carcase  is  disagreea- 
'*  ble,  and  raises  in  the  spectator  a  painful  emotion  :  the  disa- 


318  NOTES  TO  THE 

"  greeableness  is  a  quality  of  the  Object ;  the  pain  is  a  quali- 
"  ty  of  the  Emotion  prodaced  by  it."  (Elements  of  Criticism, 
"  vol.  i.  chap.   ii.  part  II.) 

With  deference  to  so  respectable  an  authority,  this  distinc- 
tion does  not  appear  to  be  just.     Agreeable,  according  to  its 
etymology,  manifestly  relates  to  the  eflects  produced  upon  us, 
as  much  as  the   word  pleasant.     The  difference   is  in  degree, 
not  in  nature.     Agreeable   expresses  something  that  appears 
suitable  or  correspondent  with  our  nature,  dispositions,  and 
tastes  ;  something  that  perfectly  agrees  with  us  ;  exciting  the 
idea  of  comfort,  and  inspiring   contentment  and   satibfaction. 
What  is  pleasant  goes  farther.     It  excites  a  sensation  within 
us,  more  nearly  approaching  to  an  emotion.     That  agreeable- 
ness  cannot  be  allowed  to  exist  in  the  subject  itself,  is  plain, 
from  the  diversity  of  opinions  concerning  it,  without  the  poS' 
sibility  of  discovering  a  standard,  by  which  to  mark  a  devia- 
tion from  the  law  of  nature.     Were  it  resident  in  Objects, 
the  effects  must  be  uniform  and  absolute,  in  every  one  whose 
powers  of  perception  are  not  disordered.     But  this  is  not  the 
case.     Numberless  causes  conspire  to  change  our  ideas  of  the 
qualities  of  Objects,  and  may  render  some  objects  agreeable 
or  disagreeable,  pleasant  or  unpleasant  to  the  same  person  at 
different  times.     To  give  a  familar  instance.     Sweet   things 
are  most  agreeable  to  children  ;  but  when  they  become  adults 
the  taste  is  changed.     It  is  possible  that  the  smoke  of  tobacco, 
and  the  taste  of  porter  may  become  agreeable  to  the  man.,  who 
detested  them  when  a  child.      Can   we  say,  therefore,  that 
there  is  an  inherent  agreeableness  in   tobacco  which  pleases 
the  adult,  and  an  inherent  disagreeableness  which  disgusts  the 
infant?  Or  to  admit  his  Lordship's  example  of  a  ^ar  Jen.     It 
is  acknowledged  that  the  idea  of  a  garden  excites  pleasant  sen- 
sations, in  most  persons.     Plenty  of  the  delicate  luxuries  of 
nature,  beauty,  verdure,  variegated  flowers,  &c.  elegant  retire- 
ment from  the  noise  and  bustle  of  the  world,  crowd  in  upon 
the  imagination.     But  are  we  agreed  in   every  circumstance 
respecting  a  garden  ?  Was   not  the   stiffest   formality   once 
deemed  an  essential  beauty  ?  Has  not  this  taste  given  way  to 


PRECEDING  TREATISE.  319* 

irregular  clumps  and  clusters  ?  Are  not  these  of  late  become 
the  subject  of  ridicule,  and  a  style  more  corre«poDdent  with 
the  wild  beauties  of  nature  preferred  ?  And  when  these  have 
been  enjoyed  for  some  time,  a  future  race  may  possibly  ob- 
serve that  the  distinction  between  a  garden  and  afield  is  not 
sufficiently  marked,  and  may  again  place  their  ideas  of  beauty 
in  that  formal  regularity,  which  is  at  present  so  much  despis- 
ed. 


Note  H. 

After  "  Either  taste  or  address,  &c."  Page  77. 

Db  Watts  does  not  seem  to  have  expressed  himself  with 
sufficient  accuracy,  when  he  observes,  that  "  If  any  object  ap- 
"  pear  pleasing  and  fit  to  do  us  good,  it  raises  the  love  of 
*'  complacency."  These  two  espressions  are  not  synonymous. 
Many  things  may  be  pleasing  to  us,  from  which  we  apprehend 
mischief ;  and  in  these  we  cannot  take  complacency. 

Again  he  says,  "  Complacency  dwells  upon  its  object  with 
"  delight :  We  gaze  upon  a  figure,  we  listen  to  music,  we 
*'  dwell  long  in  a  fine  garden,  we  dwell  in  the  company  of  our 
"  friendso''  All  these  instances  contain  attributes  calculated  to 
inspire  complacency,  as  wgenuitt/  and  taste  may  be  manifested 
in  the  three  first,  and  worth  moral  or  mental,  may  be  possess- 
ed by  the  last.  Yet  it  may  be  justly  doubted,  whether  preci- 
sion of  language  will  permit  us  to  apply  the  word  Complacen- 
cy to  these  cases,  unless  there  be  some  kind  or  degree  of  ap- 
propriation. We  may  approve  ;  we  may  enjoy  great  pleasure 
and  delight  in  inanimate  objects,  when  we  view  them  as  be- 
longing to  strangers  :  but  it  has  never  been  said  of  a  connois- 
seur, that  he  took  complacency  in  the  Apollo  de  Belvedere,  or 
in  the  Venus  de  Medicis,  in  Siowe  Gardens,  or  the  Leasowcs  of 
Slienstone,  however  he  may  have  been  delighted  by  these  ob- 
jects. Some  kind  of  relation,  however  slightj  appears  neces- 
sary, to  enable  even  such  objects  to  inspire  complacency.    If 


320  KOTES  TO  THE 

we  take  complacency  in  gnrments,  or  flowers,  or  gardens,  it 
is  when  they  belong  either  ^o  ourselves  or  to  our  friend  ;  or 
when  they  manifest  our  own  taste  or  skill,  or  that  of  another 
for  whom  we  are  interested.  Nor  will  the  most  perfect  Coo- 
cert  excite  complacency  in  the  audience  at  large,  though  it 
may  in  the  composers,  performers,  directors,  or  any  of  their 
particular  acquaintances. 


Note  I. 

After  "Pride."    Page  89. 

The  above  de6nition  and  descriptions  of  Pride,  are  founded 
upon  the  various  acceptations  of  thftt  word  in  common  lan- 
guage, and  supported  by  the  authority  of  our  best  Writers. 
But  Mr.  Hume,  in  defiance  of  each,  has  given  a  very  diffe- 
rent definition  of  pride,  which  1  believe  to  be  totally  his 
own,  and  ought  of  consequence  to  possess  great  internal  merit 
to  justify  its  boldness,  in  opposing  those  ideas  which  have 
hitherto  been  received  universally.     Let  us  examine  it. 

He  defines  pride  to  be  a  "  certain  satisfaction  in  ourselves, 
"  on  account  of  some  accomplishment  or  possession  which 
"  we  enjoy."  Again.  "  The  object  of  pride  is  self,  the 
"  cause,  some  excell  ace.''''  Again.  "  Our  merit  raises  pride, 
"  and  it  is  essential  to  pride  to  turn  our  view  on  ourselves 
"  with  complacency  and  satisfaction."  (See  Dissertation  on 
the  Passions,  passim.) 

As  Mr,  Hume  has  made  no  distinction  between  real  and 
supposed  merit,  he  necessarily  directs  our  thoughts  to  abso- 
lute merit;  nor  can  there,  according  to  this  statement,  be 
any  place  for  a  vilious  pride,  or  an  i'lfonndfd  confidence  in 
our  own  superiority.  This  is  excluded,  by  his  definition, 
from  the  character  of  pride. 

Our  Philosopher  has  also  advanced,  in  another  place, 
that  '  Self  satisfaction,  in  some  degree  at  least,  is  an  ndvan- 
"  tage   which   equally   attends   the    Fool    and  the   Wise." 


PRECEDING  TREATISE.  321 

(On  Qualities  necessary  to  ourselves.  §  6.)  Now  what  is 
the  cause  of  this  self-satisfaction,  in  the /ooZ?  According  to 
the  above  position  it  must  be  Merit.  And  in  the  wise  man  ? 
Merit.  Thus  the  wise  man  and  the  fool  are  made  to  resem» 
ble  each  other  so  closely,  in  the  most  interesting  of  all 
desirable  qualities,  merit,  and  self-satisfaction,  that  there  is 
no  material  difference  between  them.  What  there  is,  will 
probably  be  to  the  advantage  of  the  fool.  As  he  will  be 
much  more  liable  to  be  pleased  with  himself,  our  Author's 
hypothesis  leads  us  to  suspect  that  he  may  possess  the  most 
merit. 

Should  it  be  alleged  that  the  above  statement  is  a  misrepre- 
sentation ;  I  would  answer,  that  such  an  allegation  can  alone 
be  supported  by  explanations  which  will  militate  against  the 
sentiments,  so  repeatedly  and  assiduously  advanced.  Re- 
course must  be  had  to  a  distinction  between  real  and  sup' 
posed  merit.  This  will  demonstrate  that  there  must  be 
two  species  of  pride  included  in  the  definition  ;  and  that  these 
are  as  opposite  to  each  other  as  light  and  darkness,  know- 
ledge and  ignorance  ;  and,  consequently,  that  it  is  not  only 
very  wiphilosophical  to  comprise  the  most  opposite  qualities 
under  the  same  genus,  but  very  ungen&rmts  to  confound  the 
good  principle  with  the  evil  one,  by  giving  indiscriminately 
the  same  appellations  to  both. 


Note  K. 

After  "the  ambitious  passions  is  a  familiar  expression."     Page  86. 

Dr.  Reid  places  Desires  among  the  animal  principles  ;  but 
he  distinguishes  them  "  from  the  Appetites  by  this,  that  there 
"  is  not  a  sensation  proper  to  each,  and  always  accompany- 
*'  ing  it ;  and  that  they  are  not  periodical  but  constant,  not 
"  being  satiated  with  their  object  for  a  time  as  the  appetites 
"are."  He  adds,  "the  desires  I  have  in  view  are  chiefly 
41 


322  NOTES  TO  THE 

"  these  three,  the  desire  of  power,  the  desire  of  esteem, 
"  and  the  desire  of  knowledge." 

This  is  not  the  place  to  enquire  whether  the  desires,  here 
specified,  deserve  to  be  ranked  among  the  aoimal  principles  ; 
but  as  the  above  description  of  a  particular  class  of  desires, 
appears  to  oppose  the  sentiments  we  have  advanced,  it 
demands   a  few  observations. 

We  may  first  remark  that  the  distinction  made  between 
appetites  and  desires  is  inaccurate,  for  the  appetites  are 
doubtless  one  class  of  desires  ;  nor  is  there  a  sensual  appetite 
totally  separate  from  the  mental  affections  and  desires  ;  if 
there  were,  the  grossest  appetites  might  be  indulged  without 
culpability. 

2dly.  The  doctrine  itself  is  very  obscurely  expressed. 
Does  the  doctor  mean  that  one  sensation  is  common  to  them 
all  ?  Then  must  the  desire  of  power  be  similar  to  that  of 
knowledge.  If  he  means  that  desires  are  not  uneasy  sen- 
sations, and  adduces  those  specified  as  proofs,  we  may  ob- 
serve that  they  are  here  considered  in  their  mildest  state, 
and  we  are  taught  to  imagine,  from  the  description  given  of 
them,  that  this  was  their  permanent  character  :  whereas  it  is 
well  known  that  the  desire  of  Power  is  frequently  as  ram,- 
pant  as  the  strongest  appetites,  degenerating  into  insatiable 
ambition  ;  that  the  desire  of  Esteem  may  become  so  excessive 
as  to  stir  up  painful  emulation,  and  still  more  painful  envy  ; 
and  that  the  desire  of  Knowledge  is  frequently  so  restless 
as  to  induce  the  possessor  to  forego  his  ease,  and  encounter 
dangers  and  difficulties  innumerable  in  order  to  gratify  it. 

But  although,  in  their  mildest  state,  they  may  not  equal 
the  appetites,  they  are  attended  with  a  degree  of  uneasiness 
which  impels  to  active  endeavours  after  the  desired  objects. 
If  no  uneasy  sensation  accompanied  either,  there  could  be 
no  motive  to  counteract  the  love  of  ease  and  indolence,  so 
natural  to  man.  The  prospect  of  success  may  indeed  inspire 
the  pleasure  of  hope,  and  the  benefits  promised  by  each 
pursuit,  may  be  so  powerfully  anticipated  by  the  imagination, 
that  the  pleasing  sensations,  from  these  adventitious  causes, 


PRECEDING  TREATISE.  323 

shall  greatly  preponderate;  but  if  no  uneasy  sensation  were 
excited,  by  the  comparison  of  our  actual  situation  with  that 
we  may  possibly  attain,  our  endeavours  after  the  attainment 
could  never  have  been  excited. 

The  Professor's  subsequent  observations  perfectly  cor- 
respond with  these  remarks.  He  says  that  "  the  pursuits 
"  of  Power,  of  Fame,  and  of  Knowledge,  require  a  self- 
"  command  no  less  than  virtue  does  :"  which  is  an  acknow- 
ledgment that  they  are  not  always  so  pacific  as  was  repre- 
sented.* And  when  he  observes  that  "  the  desire  of  Esteem 
*'  and  of  Knowledge  are  highly  useful  to  society,  as  well  as 
"  Power,  and  at  the  same  time  are  less  dangerous  in  their 
"  excesses,''^  he  tacitly  allows  that  they  are  not  totally 
exempt. 

In  support  of  another  argument  he  asserts,  that  "  innume- 
"  rable  instances  occur  in  life,  of  men  who  sacrifice  ease, 
"  pleasure,  and  every  thing  else  to  the  lust  of  power,  of 
"  fame,  or  even  of  knowledge."  A  demonstration  this,  that 
the  sensations  they  sometimes  excite,  are  not  only  uneasy 
but  ungovernable. 

If  by  the  expression,  "  there  is  not  a  sensation  proper 
"  to  each,"  we  are  to  understand  that  one  particular  sensa- 
tion is  common  to  them  all,  the  proposition  is  still  more  ex- 
travagant. Our  sensations,  in  every  species  of  desire,  are 
as  different  as  the  objects  desired.  Nor  is  there  a  greater 
difiference  between  hunger  and  thirst,  than  there  is  between 
the  desire  of  wealth,  and  the  desire  of  power.  The  desire 
of  knowledge  is  also  distinct  from,  and  superior  to  both. 

Note  L. 
After  "  feelings  of  humanity."    Page  92. 

Dr.  Reid  remarks,  that  "it  seems  to  be  false  religion 
"alone,   which  is  able  to  check  the  tear  of  compassion." 

*  This  expression  is  also  inaccurate,  since  it  is  the  province  of  virtue  to  correct 
these  as  well  as  every  other  desire,  when  they  are  in  danger  of  becoming  inordinate. 


324  NOTES  TO  THE 

"  We  are  told,"  he  adds,  "  that  in  Portugal  and  Spain,  a 
**man  condemned  to  be  burned  as  an  obstinate  heretic, 
"meets  with  no  compassion  even  from  the  multitude  ;"  ob- 
serving that  "  they  are  taught  to  look  upon  him  as  the  ene- 
**  my  of  God,  and  doomed  to  hell-fire.  But  should  not  this 
"  very  circumstance  move  compassion  ?  Surely  it  would  if 
"they  were  not  taught  that,  in  this  case,  it  is  a  crime  to 
"shew  compassion,  or  even  to  feel  it."  (See  Essay  on 
Active  Powers,   Page    156.) 

In  addition  to  the  motive  assigned,  we  may  mention  the 
influence  of  custom,  in  rendering  the  heart  insensible  to  the 
sufierings  of  these  devoted  objects.  I  was  once  passing 
through  Moorjields  with  a  young  Lady  aged  about  nine  or 
ten  years,  born  and  educated  in  Portugal,  but  in  the  Pro- 
testant Faith,  and  observing  a  large  concourse  of  people 
assembled  round  a  pile  of  faggots  on  fire,  I  expressed  a 
curiosity  to  know  the  cause.  She  very  composedly  answer- 
ed, I  suppose  that  it  is  nothing  more  than  that  they  are  going 
to  burn  a  Jew.  Fortunately  it  was  no  other  than  roasting 
an  ox,  upon  some  joyful  occasion.  What  rendered  this  sin- 
gularity the  more  striking,  were  the  natural  mildness  and 
compassion  of  the  young  person's  disposition. 

Another  instance  of  the  influence  of  perverted  principles, 
occurs  to  my  remembrance  in  the  conduct  of  a  pious  Mother, 
towards  a  most  excellent  and  dutiful  Son  ;  who  from  a  prin- 
ciple of  conscience,  in  opposition  to  his  interest,  renounced 
the  religious  system  in  which  he  had  been  educated,  for  an- 
other, which  he  deemed  more  consonant  to  truth.  She  told 
him  that  "  she  found  it  her  duty,  however  severe  the  struggle, 
"  to  alienate  her  affections  from  him,  now  he  had  rendered 
"  himself  an  enemy  to  God,  by  embracing  such  erroneous 
"  sentiments."  My  Friend  added,  that  she  was  completely 
successful  in  these  pious  endeavours  ;  and  that  the  duty 
she  enjoined  upon  herself,  was  scrupulously  performed 
during  the  remainder  of  her  days. 


PRECEDING  TREATISE.  325 

Note  M. 

After  "  past,  present,  and  future."      Page  94. 

It  is  singular,  with  what  precision  common  language  marks 
the  difference  between  to  wish  and  to  desire,  according  to 
our  power  to  obtain  the  object  of  our  wishes,  or  our  in- 
fluence over  the  means.  Thus  we  never  say  to  any  one, 
I  desire  you  to  be  well ;  but  I  wish  you  well ;  because, 
generally  speaking,  we  have  no  influence  over  another's 
health  ;  but  a  sick  man  not  only  wishes  but  desires  to  be  well, 
because  he  possesses  the  power  of  applying  the  means  ; 
and  if  he  rejects  the  means,  we  conclude  that  he  does  not 
desire  to  be  well.  If  we  are  solicitous  that  some  kind  office 
should  be  performed  by  any  one,  we  may  either  wish  or 
desire,  according  to  our  claims  upon  his  aid.  As  we  may 
sometimes  desire  where  we  cannot  command,  thus  we  may 
ivish,  where  it  would  be  presumptuous  to  desire  :  and  some- 
times we  manifest  our  desires  by  expressing  our  wishes, 
from  a  principle  of  delicacy,  leaving  it  to  the  party,  from 
whom  we  expect  the  kind  office,  to  increase  the  obligation 
by  conforming  to  our  wish,  rather  than  complying  with  our 
desires.  These  distinctions  being  founded  in  nature,  are 
common  to  every  language. 

Note  N. 

After  "  to  impede  our  progress."    Page  102. 

This  seems  to  be  the  genuine  sense  of  the  substantive  Hu- 
mility. But  its  verb,  and  participles,  are  not  equally  con- 
fined in  their  significations.  They  relate  to  states  of  debase- 
ment, in  which  the  spirits  are  peculiarly  depressed,  and  the 
mind  deeply  chagrined  and  mortified,  but  to  which  the  terra 


326  NOTES  TO  THE 

Jiiimility  has  never  yet  been  applied.  There  are  situations, 
in  which  persons  may  feel  themselves  very  much  humbled, 
and  they  may  be  exposed  to  many  humiliating  circumstances, 
without  their  being  possessed  of  the  disposition  denoted  by 
humility.  Such  expressions  never  relate  to  the  prevailing 
habit  of  the  mind,  but  to  certain  incidents  which  check  pride, 
vanity,  ambition,  emulation  ;  or  deprive  us  of  the  reputation 
we  had  enjoyed.  They  all  relate  to  some  degree  of  eleva- 
tion, to  which  the  mind  had  in  vain  aspired,  and  has  felt 
mortified  by  the  disappointment ;  or  to  some  particular  state 
from  which- the  subject  has  fallen,  and  in  consequence  of 
which  he  suffers  a  degradation.  He  may  thus  be  in  a  state 
of  humiliation,  without  being  in  a  state  of  humility.  This 
word  refers  alone  to  mental  excellence,  either  intellectual  or 
moral ;  concerning  which,  the  subject  himself  entertains 
painful  apprehensions,  that  he  is  or  shall  remain  deficient. 
The  adjective  humble  has  the  same  signification.  When  we 
say  of  a  person  that  he  has  ^x\  humble  mind,  we  mean  that 
he  is  modest,  unassuming,  diffident  of  himself.  These  dis- 
tinctions are  very  obvious,  and  though  they  may  indicate  the 
caprices  of  language,  they  are  nevertheless  highly  important; 
for  they  serve  to  discriminate  things  which  differ  very  es- 
sentially in  their  natures.  The  humble  mind  is  neither 
mean  nor  abject,  which  may  be  the  case  with  ihe  proud,  who  by 
being  detected  in  his  baseness,  or  disappointed  in  his  vain 
presumptuous  hopes,  may  be  humbled  to  the  dust.  To  the 
man  who  is  clothed  with  Humility,  may  possibly  belong  all 
those  excellencies  which  Mr.  Hume  has  ascribed  to  pride. 
He  may  in  reality  possess  more  merit  than  he  dares  to  im- 
agine. The  disposition  is  inspired  by  the  contemplation  of 
excellencies  which  he  loves,  and  which  he  almost  despairs  to 
obtain.  How  different  is  this  from  the  humiliation  any  one  may 
suffer,  from  disappointed  ambition,  from  a  perception  of  in- 
voluntary blemishes,  and  accidental  defects,  from  the  mortifi- 
cation that  self-love  may  experience,  by  being  defective  in 
beauty,  elegance,  or  wealth,  or  laden  with  corporeal  infirmi- 
ties !     All  of  which  Mr.  Hume  has  arbitrarily  chosen  to  com- 


PRECEDING  TREATISE.  327 

prehend  under  Humiliiy.  For  example.  "  If  beauty  or  de- 
"  formity  belong  to  our  own  face,  shape,  or  person,  this  pleas- 
"  ore  or  uneasiness  is  converted  into  pride  or  Immiliiy. — Pride 
"  and  humility  have  the  qualities  of  our  mind  and  body,  that  is, 
"  of  self,  for  their  natural  and  more  immediate  causes — Bodily 
"  pain  ?caA sickness ^vem  themselves  proper  causes  oi humility. 
"  Concerning  all  other  bodily  accomplishments,  we  may  ob- 
"  serve  in  general,  that  whatever  in  ourselves  is  either  use- 
"  ful,  beautiful,  or  surprising,  is  an  object  of  pride,  and  the 
•'  contrary  oi humility.'''' 

Mr.  Hume  must  have  known  that  whimsical  deviations  from 
etymology,  constitute  an  essential  part  of  the  idioms  of  a  lan- 
guage ;  which  render  it  not  only  so  difficult  to  be  acquired, 
but  occasion  ludicrous  eifects  in  the  attempt.  Would  he  not 
have  been  the  first  to  smile  at  the  mistakes  of  a  foreigner, 
who  should  suppose  that  all  persons,  labouring  every  day  at 
their  particular  occupations,  were  equally  Day-Labourers  ?  that 
to  possess  an  elegant  or  lively  fancy,  was  to  be  VQvy  fanciful  ? — 
that  a  man  was  insane,  because  he  had  ill  health  ? — and  that  ev- 
ery child  of  nature,  was  a  natural  child? — But  are  these  blun- 
ders more  inconsistent  with  the  idioms  of  our  language, 
which  custom  has  universally  established,  than  the  assertion 
that  bodily  pain  or  sickness  are  in  themselves  proper  causes 
of  Humility  ?  or  placing  "  the  Epilepsy,"  "  the  Itch,"  "  the 
'*  Kings  Evil,"  ia  the  catalogue  ?  (See  Dissertations  on  the 
passions,  passim.) 

It  is  easy  to  collect,  from  the  above'passages  and  from  the 
amiable  character  he  has  given  of  Pride,  as  remarked  in  a 
preceding  note,  that  Mr.  Hume,  "  delighted  to  exalt  the 
proud,  and  give  disgrace  to  the  humble."  Had  it  been  his 
province  to  translate  the  Bible,  how  would  he  have  rendered 
the  following  passages  ? 

Every  one  proud  in  heart,  is  an  abomination  to  the  Lord.  An 
high  look  and  a  proud  heart  is  sin.  He  that  is  of  aproud  heart 
stirreth  tip  strife.     Pride  was  not  made  for  man,  &c.  &c.  SfC. 

Before  honour  is  humility.     By  humility  and  the  fear  of  the 
Lord,  are  riches,  honour,  and  life,  God  giveth  grace  to  the  hum 
ble^  ^c.  i'C.  ^c. 


S28  NOTES  TO  THE 

It  is  not  intended  by  these  quotations,  to  confute  his  no- 
tions hy  divine  author  ty ;  but  by  that  of  common  phraseology. 
They  indicate  what  were  the  ideas  universally  annexed  to 
the  terms  Pride  and  Humility,  at  the  period  when  this  book 
was  translated  ;  and  these  continue  precisely  the  same  every 
time  such  passages  are  read,  either  in  public  or  pri- 
vate. To  the  universal  usage  of  expressions  every  au- 
thor must  conform,  who  means  to  be.,intelligible.  Nor  is  the 
misrepresentation  of  facts  more  injurious  to  the  credit  of  an 
historian,  than  the  perversion  of  language  to  that  of  a  phi- 
losopher. 

The  singularity  of  Mr.  Hume  in  his  definitions  of  both 
these  words  will  appear  still  more  assuming,  when  we  con- 
sider that  it  opposes  the  phraseology,  not  only  of  the  Eng- 
lish language,  but  of  most,^ perhaps  all,  the  European  langua- 
ges, which  always  employ  an  appropriate  word,  to  dis- 
tinguish that  amiable  consciousness,  or  apprehension  of  infe- 
riority in  mental  excellence,  from  other  painful  imperfec- 
tions ;  and  that  word  is  perfectly  synonymous  to  the  expla- 
nation we  have  given  ofhumilily. 


Note  0. 

After  "  dread  of  their  arrival."    Page  109. 

The  Author  once  attended  a  prisoner  of  some  distinction 
in  one  of  the  prisons  of  the  metropolis,  ill  of  a  typhus  fever  ; 
whose  apartments  were  gloomy  in  the  extreme,  and  sur- 
rounded with  horrors  :  yet  this  prisoner  assured  him  after- 
wards, that,  upon  his  release,  he  quitted  them  with  a  degree 
of  reluctance.  Custom  had  reconciled  him  to  the  twilight, 
admitted  through  the  thick-barred  grate,  to  the  filthy  spots 
and  patches  of  his  plastered  walls,  to  the  hardness  of  his  bed, 
and  even  to  confinement.  He  had  his  books,  was  visited  by 
his  friends,  and  was  greatly  amused  and  interested  in  the  an- 
ecdotes of  the  place. 


PRECEDING  TREATISE.  329 

An  Officer  of  the  municipality  at  Leyden  also  informed  the 
Author  of  an  instance,  which  marks  yet  more  strongly  the 
force  of  habit.  A  poor  woman  who  had  for  some  misde- 
meanour been  sentenced  to  confinement  for  a  certain  num- 
ber of  years,  upon  the  expiration  of  the  term,  immediately 
applied  to  him  for  re-admission.  She  urged  that  all  her 
worldly  comforts  were  fled  ;  and  her  only  wish  was  to  be  in- 
dulged in  those  imparted  by  habit.  She  moreover  threaten- 
ed, that,  if  this  could  not  be  granted  as  a  favour,  she  would 
commit  some  offence  which  might  give  her  a  title  to  be  rC" 
instated  in  the  accustomed  lodgings. 


Note  P. 

After  "  may  possibly  follow."     Page  109. 

As  these  distinctions  may  appear  too  refined  to  some  of  my 
Readers,  it  will  be  proper  to  shew  that  they  actually  exist  ; 
and  that  there  are  situations,  in  which  a  discrimination  is 
both  obvious  and  necessary.  Take  the  following  instances. 
When  a  young  and  inexperienced  soldier  is  first  ordered  to 
march  to  battle,  his  legs  will  tremble  under  him,  and  the  pre- 
saging colour  of  death  will  be  in  his  face,  notwithstanding  his 
strongest  resolutions,  aided  by  the  power  of  drums  and  trum- 
pets, and  the  apparent  gaiety  of  his  associates.  These  mark 
his  Fear.  Should  he,  during  the  engagement,  meet  with  a 
single  foe,  and  be  provoked  to  single  combat,  from  which  he 
cannot  possibly  or  honourably  escape,  the  emotion  of  Terror, 
will  subdue  the  listlessness  of  fear,  and  arouse  every  power 
of  action.  If  the  army  to  which  he  belongs  should  experi- 
ence a  total  defeat,  the  province,  whose  safety  might  depend 
upon  its  success,  will  be  thrown  into  the  utmost  Consterna- 
tion ;  because  this  commencement  of  evil  may  be  productive 
of  horrors,  which  the  liveliest  imagination  cannot  fulJy  re- 
present :  and  it  was  the  apprehension  of  a  possible  defeat, 
with  its  consequences,  that  had  inspired  their  minds  with 
Dread,  long  before  the  engagement  took  place. 

42 


330  NOTES  TO  THE 

These  ideas  are  in  themselves  very  distinct,  and  although 
some  of  the  terms  used  to  express  them  ?may  be  used  indis- 
criminately, where  nice  precision  is  not  so  requisite,  yet  the 
arrangement  given  them  evidently  shews  the  place  destined 
for  each.  Thus  we  may  say  that  the  young  soldier  dreads  to 
go  into  battle,  as  he  is  marching  forwards  ;  but  strictly  speak- 
ing, this  dread  may  have  been  indulged  immediately  after  he 
had  enlisted,  when  the  object  of  Fear  was  remote  ;  it  will  be 
increased  into  that  passion  as  he  approaches  the  enemy. 


Note  Q. 

After  "  though  a  degree  of  hope  is  still  indulged."     Page  110. 

The  embarrassed  and  fluctuating  state  of  the  mind,  under 
the  influence  of  doubt,  has  seduced  Mr.  Hume  into  a  singular 
hypothesis,  which  not  only  opposes  the  universal  opinion  of 
mankind,  but  confounds  the  future  with  the  present  and  the 
past.  Could  he  establish  his  hypothesis,  it  would  follow  that 
the  mind  is  first  oppressed  with  grief  concerning  a  particular 
object,  and  then  torn  with /ear  and  anxiety  concerning  its  ar- 
rival ;  for  he  makes  grief  to  be  the  parent  of  fear,  instead  of 
considering  the  accomplishment  of  fearful  apprehensions  as  a 
cause  of  grief. 

"  Sdppose,"  says  he,  "  that  the  Object  concerning  which 
"  we  are  doubtful,  produces  either  desire  or  aversion  ;  it  is 
"  evident,  that  according  as  the  mind  turns  itself  to  one  side 
"  or  the  other,  it  must  feel  a  momentary  impression  of  joy  or 
"  sorrow.  An  object,  whose  existence  we  desire,  gives  sa- 
"  tisfaction,  when  we  think  of  those  causes  which  produce  it ; 
"  and  for  the  same  reason,  excites  grief  or  uneasiness,  from 
"  the  opposite  consideration.  So  that  as  the  understanding, 
"  in  probable  questions,  is  divided  between  the  contrary  points 
"  of  view,  the  heart  must  in  the  same  manner  be  divided  be- 
"  tween  opposite  emotions. — According  as  the  probability  in- 
"  clines  to  good  or  evil,  the  passion  of  grief  or  joy  predomi- 


PRECEDING  TREATISE.  3.31 

"  nates  in  the  composition;  and  these  passions  being  inter- 
"  mingled,  by  means  of  the  contrary  views  of  the  imagination, 
"  produce  by  the  union,  the  passions  of  hope  and  fear.  Again: 

"  The  passions  of  fear  and  hope  may  arise,  when  the 
"  chances  are  equal  on  both  sides,  and  no  superiority  can  be 
"  discovered,  in  one  above  the  other.  Nay,  in  this  situation 
"  the  passions  are  rather  the  strongest ;  as  the  mind  has  then 
"  the  least  foundation  to  rest  upon,  and  is  tost  with  the  great- 
"  est  uncertainty.  Throw  in  a  superior  degree  of  prohahility 
*^to  the  side  of  grief ,  you  immediately  see  that  passion  diffuse 
"  itself  over  the  composition  and  tincture  it  into  fear.  Increase 
"  the  probability,  by  that  means  the  grief,  the  fear  prevails 
*'  still  more  and  more  ;  till  at  last  it  runs  insensibly,  as  the 
'*  joy  continually  diminishes  into  pure  grief.  After  you  have 
*'  brought  it  to  this  situation,  diminish  the  grief,  by  a  contra- 
"  ry  operation  to  that  which  increased  it,  to  wit,  by  dinainish- 
"  ing  the  probability  on  the  melancholy  side  ;  and  you  will 
"  see  the  passion  cheer  every  moment,  till  it  changes  insensi- 
"  bly  into  hope  ;  which  again  runs  by  slow  degrees  into  joy, 
♦'  as  you  increase  the  part  of  the  composition  by  the  increase 
"of  the  probability."  He  adds,  "Are  not  these  as  plain 
"  proofs  that  the  passions  of  fear  and  hope  are  mixtures  of 
"  grief  and  joy,  as  in  optics  it  is  a  proof,  that  a  coloured  ray 
"  of  the  sun,  passing  through  a  prism,  is  a  composition  of  two 
"  others,  when,  as  you  diminish  or  increase  the  quantity  of 
*'  either,  you  find  it  prevail  proportionably  more  or  less  in 
"  the  composition."  (See  Dissertation  on  the  Passions, 
Sect.  I.) 

The  mistake  which  runs  through  the  whole  of  this  laboured 
argument,  manifestly  arises  from  Mr.  Hume's  not  having  suf- 
ficiently attended  to  the  complication  which  exists  in  an  un- 
certain and  embarrassed  state  of  mind.  The  object  both  of 
hope  and  fear  must,  according  to  his  own  hypothesis,  be  fu- 
ture, or  problematical,  otherwise  no  uncertainty  concerning  it 
could  have  place.  It  cannot,  therefore,  in  itself  be  the  cause 
either  of  grief  or  joy,  but,  as  we  usually  express  the  particu- 
lar state  of  mind,  of  hope  or  fear.     In  the  observation  made  by 


33£  NOTES    TO  THE 

Mr.  Hume,  that  "  an  object  whose  existence  we  desire  gives 
"  satisfaction,  whenever  we  iliinlc  of  those  causes  which  produce 
"  ii  "  his  own  ideas  are  manifesHy  entangled  in  the  inaccuracy 
of  the  statement,  it  Cunnot  possibly  be  the  object  we  desire 
that  gives  the  satisfaction  he  mentions,  for  then  the  desire 
would  be  accomplished  ;  but  it  is  thinking  of  those  causes, 
wh-ich  produce,  or  are  calculated  to  produce  it.  Thus  has 
he  inadvertently  ascribed  an  influence  to  the  Object,  primarily 
and  solely,  which  ought  to  be  ascribed  simply  to  the  state  of 
our  minds  concerning  it.  The  object  itself,  instead  of  giving 
this  satisfaction,  will  remain  the  subject  of  our  hopes  and 
fears,  as  long  as  we  remain  in  a  state  of  uncertainty  concern- 
ing it.  When  we  advert  to  the  probabililies  of  its  existence, 
the  mind  may  derive  both  hope  and  joy,  from  the  predomi- 
nant influence  of  these  probabilities  upon  us,  and  when  im- 
probabilities  gain  an  ascendant  influence,  onr fear  will  prevail, 
and  this  will  be  accompanied  with  a  certain  degree  of  grief, 
at  the  di.  appointment  of  the  dopes  we  had  indulged.  Thus  by 
being  agitated  by  the  ^'' pro  and  co«"  of  probabilities  and  im- 
probabilities, we  feel  a  pleasing  expectation  at  one  moment, 
and  a  painful  reverse  at  another.  Here  are  of  consequence 
two  temporary  sensations,  alternately  excited  respecting  this 
desired  object  ;  but  they  are  immediately  excited  by  the  de- 
tached evidences  on  the  side  of  an  happy  or  an  unhappy  issue. 
Without  hope  we  should  sink  into  the  extreme  of  fear  ;  with- 
out fear,  our  joy  would  be  complete:  and  when  the  grand 
result  shall  be  known,  these  temporary  sensations  will  cease, 
and  the  mind  will  be  under  the  influence  of  unmixed  joy  or 
grief,  according  to  the  event.  The  joy  and  grief  accompany- 
ing hope  and  fear.,  therefore,  retain  their  own  characteristic 
natures,  without  any  transmutation  having  taken  place.  After 
we  have  indulged  hopes,  by  contemplating  the  promising  side 
of  the  question,  we  are  grieved  and  chagrined  at  the  disap- 
pointment of  these  hopes,  as  often  as  improbabilities  alarm 
our  feavs.  On  the  contrary,  when  probabilities  appear 
strongly  in  favour  of  what  we  ardently  desire,  we  rejoice  that 
our  hopes  are  encouraged. 


PRECEDING  TREATISE.  333 

Thus  the  passions  of  fear  and  hope  are  not  mixtures  of 
grief  and  joy,  in  the  same  manner  as  acoloured  ray  of  the  sun 
passing  though  a  prism,  is  a  composition  of  two  others  ;  but 
they  are  all  distinct  passions,  and  have  their  own  distinct  caus- 
es of  excitement.  Hope  and  fear  respect  the  grand  issue  ; 
grief  and  joy,  the  encouragements  or  discouragements  which 
may   alternately  present  themselves  respecting  it. 


Note  R. 

After  "  our  understandings  cannot  fully  reach  and  comprehend."  Page  149. 

From  Mr.  Grove  it  was  natural  to  expect  precision  ;  and,  al- 
though this  is  manifest  in  most  parts  of  his  Treatise  on  the 
Passions,  yet  in  his  description  of  Admiration,  he  has  not  on- 
ly deviated  from  the  best  authorities,  but  also  from  himself. 

That  admiration  is  not  excited  by  novelty  alone  is  plain,  be- 
cause there  are  many  novelties  which  no  one  can  admire  ; 
such  as  are  indifferent,  insipid,  or  displeasing.  That  it  can- 
not be  synonymous  with  surprise,  is  plain,  because  were  we 
to  tell  any  one  that  we  were  surprised  at  his  excellencies,  he 
would  probably  be  surprised  at  our  ill-manners.  Nor  is  it  the 
same  with  wonder  ;  for  when  a  lover  admires  the  charms  of  his 
mistress,  it  is  a  different  sensation  from  that  of  wondering  that 
she  possesses  them. 

But  that  the  term  Admiration,  cannot  be  confined  to  the  im- 
pressions which  simple  novelty  is  able  to  make,  is  obvious 
from  the  subsequent  remarks  of  Mr.  Grove,  and  the  more 
pertinent  phraseology  employed  in  other  parts  of  his  works. 
He  acknowledges  ih&i  greatness  or  excellency^  is  the  most  gene- 
ral and  most  proper  object  of  admiration.  But  neither  of 
these  are  necessarily  novel.  He  further  observes,  that  "arf- 
'*  miration,  according  to  the  different  character  of  its  object  is 
"  called  esteem  or  conte7npt."  But  his  definition  has  confined 
our  ideas  to  the  simple  character  of  novelty  ;  nor  can  admi- 
ration be  applied  to  opposite  characters,  without  a  destruction 


334  NOTES  TO    THE 

of  the  simplicity  he  ascribes  to  it  ;  and  I  may  add  without  ex- 
citing a  degree  of  surprise  at  the  versatility  of  its  nature.  He 
has  also  remarked,  that  even  littleness  may  excite  admira- 
tion ;  but  he  allows  that  the  works  of  nature  or  art,  which  are 
of  an  unusual  smallness,  are  admired,  not  so  much  for  their 
smallness,  as  for  the  greatness  of  the  wisdmn  and  skill  con- 
spicuous in  them.  For  "  we  can  behold  a  particle  of  mere  un- 
*'  diversified  matter,"  says  he,  "  though  incomparably  smaller, 
"  without  such  wonder."  In  another  passage,  speaking  of  the 
advantages  of  sleep,  he  says,  "  we  shall  discern  one  reason 
'^  move  to  admire  the  ivisdom  of  the  Creator,  in  appointing  so  . 
"  great  a  portion  of  our  time  for  sleep." 

Thus  it  appears  that  Mr.  Grove  feels  the  necessity  of  op- 
posing his  own  definition  ;  and  also  the  peculiar  propriety  of 
applying  the  term  to  indubitable  marks  of  excellency. 

The  extreme  confusion  and  contrarieties,  which  run  through 
the  chapter  from  whence  the  above  extracts  are  made,  pro- 
ceed from  his  considering  admiration  as  synonymous  with 
surprise  ;  and  they  fully  indicate  the  great  importance  of 
affixing  distinct  ideas  to  each  expression.  Every  author 
admits  that  the  terms  to  admire,  admiration,  admirable,  may 
always  be  applied  to  some  kind  of  excellency,  without  the 
shadow  of  an  impropriety  ;  and  the  above  observations  man- 
ifest that  they  cannot,  at  all  times,  be  used  synonymously  with 
either  surprise  or  wonder.  This  circumstance  fully  indi- 
cates their  proper  place  in  the  accurate  arrangement  of  our 
ideas. 


Note  S. 

After  "  or  which  has  a  preponderancy  of  excellence."    Page  219. 

To  enter  deeply  into  this  delicate  subject,  would  not  be  con- 
sistent with  my  plan,  but  the  following  queries  are  proposed 
to  those  who  are  more  disposed.  Since  the  Female  Sex  com- 
plain with  apparent  anguish  of  heart,  that  men  have  taken 


PRECEDING  TREATISE.  335 

the  lead  in  directing  the  wheels  of  government,  in  the  estab- 
lishment of  the  arts,  and  prosecution  of  the  sciences,  by  j<sMr- 
palion,  how  came  they  to  be  such  general,  and  exten- 
sive usurpers,  without  possessing  a  superiority  of  correspond- 
ent qualifications  ? — Can  any  other  example  be  produced  of 
predilections  being  rendered  so  universal  and  so  permanent, 
by  circumstances  merely  incidental  ? — Again,  excepting  we 
have  recourse  to  the  constitution  of  nature,  who  can  explain 
the  reason  why  each  sex  should  regard  the  qualities  in  the 
opposite  sex,  most  similar  to  its  own,  with  such  marks  of  dis- 
gust or  contempt ;  and  delight  in  qualities  directly  opposite  ? 
This  is  contrary  to  all  the  laws  of  the  social  affections  in  every 
other  instance  ;  for  similarity  of  dispositions  and  manners 
is  considered,  in  every  other  case,  as  the  foundation  of  love, 
and  the  cement  of  affection  and   friendship. 

May  we  not  safely  assert  that  there  is,  generally  "speaking, 
an  original  diversity  in  tastes  and  dispositions  liable  however 
to  some  exceptions  ?  If  this  be  admitted,  a  correspondent  di- 
versity of  pursuits  will  naturally  follow.  We  may  also  sub- 
join that  these  tastes  and  dispositions^  are  in  most  instances, 
remarkably  correspondent  with  the  corporeal  powers  of  ob- 
taining or  accomplishing  their  objects. 


Note  T. 

After  "  by  a  cautious  manner  of  communicating  the  tidings."    Page  271. 

Historians  present  us  with  many  instances  of  fatal  effects, 
from  the  excess  of  joy  ;  but  it  plainly  appears  from  their  nar- 
ratives, that  the  subjects  were,  at  the  instant  preceding,  un- 
der the  pressure  of  extreme  anguish  of  mind. 

Pliny  informs  us  that  Chilo,  the  Lacedemonian,  died  upon 
hearing  that  his  son  had  gained  a  prize  in  the  Olympic 
Games.  "  Ciim  victore  fiilio  Olympise  expirasset  gaudio."  We 
may  consider  the  excess  of  joy  in  this  case,  as  an  indication 
of  his  previous  solicitude  concerning  the   issue.     (Plin.  Maj. 


336  NOTES   TO   THE 

Lib.  vii.  Sect.  7.)  But  the  following  instances  are  more  ex- 
press. 

Valerius  Maximus  tells  us  that  Sophocles  the  tragic  writer, 
in  a  contest  of  honour,  died  in  consequence  of  a  decision  be- 
ing pronounced  in  his  favour.  "  Sophocles  ullimse  jam  senec- 
"  tutis,  cum  in  certaraine  tragaediam  dixisset,  ancipiti  senten- 
"  tiarura  eventu  diu  solicitus,  aliquando  tamen  una  sententia 
"  victor,  causam  mortis  gaudium  habuit."  (Val.  Max.  Lib. 
IX.  Cap.  12.) 

Aulius  Gellius  mentions  a  remarkable  instance  of  what  may 
be  termed,  accumulated  joy,  in  Diagoras,  whose  three  sons 
were  crowned  in  the  same  day  as  victors  ;  the  one  as  a  pugi- 
list, the  other  as  a  wrestler,  and  the  third  in  both  capacities. 
"  Diagoras,  tres  filios  habuit,  unum  pugilem,  alterum  luctorem, 
"  tertium  Pancrastiasten  ;  eosque  omnes  vidit  vincere  coro- 
"  narique  eodem  Olympiae  die  ;  et  cum  coronis  suis  in  caput 
'*  patris  positis  suaviarentur  ;  cumque  populus  gratulabundus 
"  flores  undique  in  eum  jaceret,  ibi  in  stadio,  inspectante 
"  populo,  in  osculis  atque  in  manibus  filiorum  animam  efflavit." 
(Aul.  Gell.  noct.  Altic.  Lib.  111.  Cap    15.) 

Livy  also  mentions  the  instance  of  an  aged  Matron,  who 
while  she  was  in  the  depth  of  distress,  from  the  tidings  of  her 
son's  having  been  slain  in  battle,  died  in  his  arms  in  the  excess 
of  joy  upon  his  safe  return.     (Liv.  Lib.  xxii.  Cap.  7.) 

Not  to  enumerate  more  instances  ;  we  are  told  by  the 
Italian  historian  Guicciardini,  that  Leo  the  Tenth  died  of  a 
fever,  occasioned  by  the  agitation  of  his  spirits,  on  his  receiv- 
ing the  joyful  news  of  the  capture  of  Milan,  concerning  which 
he  had  entertained  much  anxiety.  (Istoria  de  Guicciardini, 
Lib.  XIV.) 

In  all  these  instances  the  previous  state  of  mind,  with  its 
pathological  effects  upon  the  body,  made  the  impulse  of  joy 
the  stronger,  and  contributed  to  render  it  fatal. 


,  PRECEDING  TREATISE.  337 

Note  U, 

After  "  will  contribute  to  explain  the  rest,"  Page  282. 

Dr.  Haygarth,  in  his  late  Publication  on  the  Imagination  as 
a  Cause,  and  as  a  Cure  of  the  Disorders  of  the  Body,  has  pre- 
sented us  with  many  curious  and  interesting  facts  relative  to 
its  influence  ;  to  which  1  beg  leave  to  refer  the  Reader. 
Such  incontestible  proof*  of  the  power  of  the  intJHgination  ia 
medical  cases,  may  vindicate  some  of  the  strenuous  advocates 
for  Animal  Magnetism^  from  the  charge  of  intentional  fraud, 
brought  against  them  by  the  totally  incredulous  ;  while  they 
demonstrate  the  absurdity  of  all  their  theories. 

I  have,  in  the  text,  attributed  tite  power  of  the  imagination 
to  produce  certain  changes  in  the  corporeal  system,  to  the 
Passions  or  strong  Affections,  which  in  such  cases  always  ac- 
company it  ;  and  the  experiments  made  by  Doctor  Haygarth 
and  his  medical  friends,  abundantly  corroborate  the  sentiment. 
In  some  of  the  Patients,  the  salutary  influence  of  hope ^  and 
afterwards  of  joy,  was  evidently  very  great :  in  others,  the 
mind  was  obviously  in  a  state  of  surprise  and  astonishment,  at 
the  mysterious  powers  supposed  to  be  seated  in  the  instru- 
ments ; — in  others,  it  was  agitated  by  alternate  hopes  and 
fears  / — and  in  others,  it  was  under  the  strong  impressions  of 
terror.  The  directions  given  to  the  Tractors  served  to  point 
out  as  it  were,  the  influence  of  this  pre-disposition  of  mind  to 
the  parts  particularly  affected  by  a  law  not  more  inexplica- 
ble, though  more  uncommon,  than  the  operation  of  the  will 
in  producing  voluntary  motion.  Nor  is  the  process  dissimilar 
to  that  of  conveying  the  electric  fluid  to  various  parts  of  the 
body,  as  practised  in  medical  electricity.  Since  every  pas- 
sion is  frequently  excited  by  the  Imagination  alone,  without 
any  real  or  just  cause,  and  since  these  passions  are  in  their 
appearances  and  effects,  perfectly  the  same  as  those  produced 
by  realities,  the  medical  influence  of  the  Imagination  is  obvi- 
43 


3S8  NOTES   TO   THE 

ously  reduced  to  the  same  principle.  The  remaining  difficul- 
ties therefore,  attending  the  subject,  are  not  greater  than 
those  which  belong  to  the  influence  of  the  passions  in  general. 
When  it  shall  be  explained  in  what  manner  each  Passion  in- 
stantaneously produces  its  own  specific  change,  whether  it  be 
of  an  exhilarating,  irritating,  depressive,  or  languid  nature, 
we  shall  be  able  to  explain  the  medical  Power  of  the  Tmagina- 
tion,  which  is  able  to  excite  passions  and  affections,  from 
ideal  causes. 


Note  W. 

After  "  where  the  sole  object  is  to  establish  indisputable  facts."  Page  283. 

The  Section  to  which  this  Note  refers  is  an  abridged  trans- 
lation of  iome  parts  of  the  Author's  Inaugural  Dissertation,  De 
Anhni  -pathamatmn  vi,  et  modo  agendi  in  inducendis  et  curan- 
dis  Mortis;  publifihed  at  Leyden  in  the  year  1767,  In  which 
his  professed  object  was  <o  theorise  ;  and  by  adducing  numer- 
ous proofs  of  the  influence  of  the  passions,  both  in  inducing 
and  removing  disorders,  to  demonstrate  the  fallacy  of  the 
Boerhaavian  system,  which  attributes  the  proximate  causes  of 
diseases  to  certain  changes  in  the  fluids  He  attempted  in  that 
Dissertation  to  explain  the  modus  operandi  of  the  passions  and 
affections,  upon  principles  equally  adapted  to  the  influence  of 
every  other  cause  of  morbid  or  salutary  change.  It  was  his 
intention  to  have  considered  the  subject  more  amply  ;  and  to 
have  presented  it  to  the  world  in  another  form  ;  but  in  the 
earlier  part  of  life  he  was  deprived  of  the  requisite  leisure  ; 
and  in  subsequent  years  the  gradual  rejection  of  the  Boer- 
haavian doctrine,  and  the  very  learned  dissertation  of  Dr. 
Falconer  on  the  same  subject,  to  which  the  Fothergdlian 
Medal  was  adjudged,  conspired  to  render  the  execution  of  his 
design  the  less  necessary.  The  Reader  will  find  in  the  Doc- 
tor's Treatise,  numerous  instances  given,  illustrative  of  the 
doctrine  and  principles  now  advanced,  and  such  authorities 
quoted  as  will  remove  every  doubt. 


PRECEDING   TREATISE.  339 

See  also  Sir  George  Baker's  Observations,  in  the  Medical 
Transactions.    T.    iii.    xr. 


Note   X. 

After    "  the  other  compounds  partake  of  mixed  effects."     Page  291. 

These  observations  on  the  influence  of  the  passions  and 
affections  upon  thought  and  language,  united  with  those  re- 
peatedly advanced  on  the  power  of  sympathy,  point  out  to  U3 
the  reason  of  an  axiom  universally  admitted,  that  the  orator 
must  feel  his  subject  to  insure  his  power  over  the  feeling  of 
others.  As  the  warm  feelings  of  a  mind  duly  cultivated^  will 
always  suggest  a  train  of  ideas  and  expressions,  correspond- 
ent with  its  peculiar  state,  thus  in  some  degree  of  feeling 
highly  necessary  for  a  successful  imitation.  If  the  rhetori- 
cian or  orator  be  totally  destitute  of  sensibility,  there  will  be 
such  an  artifice  in  his  style  and  manner,  as  can  alone  deceive 
those  who  are  ignorant  that  artifice  exists.  It  is,  however, 
acknowledged,  that  by  constant  practice,  or  in  other  words, 
by  being  hackneyed  in  their  profession,  both  language  and 
manner  may  become  the  result  of  habit,  and  may  be  employ- 
ed with  effect,  when  the  Feelings  which  gave  them  their  orig- 
inal energy  are  obtunded.  Veteran  actors  have  been  known 
to  imitate  various  emotions,  in  a  just  and  forcible  manner, 
long  after  they  had  lost  their  sensibility.  The  retained  Coun- 
sellor has  been  known  to  imitate  that  pathos  in  a  bad 
cause,  which  a  '  good  cause  alone  could  have  at  first 
inspired  :  and  the  corrupt  Senator  may,  in  his  degenerate 
state,  counterfeit  all  that  zeal  and  energy,  which  was  gen- 
uine at  the  commencement  of  his  political  career.  But  so 
true  is  nature  to  itself,  that  it  absolutely  demands  the  passions 
and  emotions  to  be  perfectly  represented.  Defect  diffuses 
a  languor,  excess  produces  disgust.  The  eloquence  dictated 
by  an  unfeeling  heart,  mistakes  bombast  for  sublimity,  rant 
for  strong  feelings,  the  cant  and  whine  of  a  mendicant  for  the 
pathetic.  It  confounds  or  misapplies  every  trope  and  figure 
which  it  has  collected   from  systems  of  rhetoric.     It  is  lo- 


340        NOTES  TO  THE  PRECEDING  TREATISE, 

quacious  where  it  ought  to  be  concise  ;  amuses  itself  with 
drawing  of  pictures  and  gathering  of  flowers,  when  it  should 
have  been  borne  down  with  a  torrent  of  rapid  thought  and 
diction.  In  a  word,  it  presents  us  with  every  indication  that 
the  author  has  been  merely  employing  his  head,  and  playing 
with  his  imagination,  without  making  any  attempts  to  warm  his 
own  heart.  It  is,  therefore,  impossible  that  he  should  suc- 
ceed in  warming  the  hearts  of  others.  He  may  excite  the 
admiration  of  some,  the  contempt  of  many,  but  the  genuine 
feelings  of  none. 

False  eloquence,  like  the  prismatic  glass, 
Its  gaudy  colours  spreads  on  every  place  ; 
The  face  of  nature  we  no  more  survey  ; 
All  glares  alike  without  distinction  gay. 

Pope. 


THE  END. 


^¥t»' 


■A 


